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Abstract
How do organizations rapidly assess command-level effects of cyber attacks? Leaders
need a way of assuring themselves that their organization, people, and information
technology can continue their missions in a contested cyber environment. To do this, leaders
should: 1) require assessments be more than analogical, anecdotal or simplistic snapshots in
time; 2) demand the ability to rapidly model their organizations; 3) identify their
organization’s structural vulnerabilities; and 4) have the ability to forecast mission assurance
scenarios. Using text mining to build agent based dynamic network models of information
processing organizations, I examine impacts of contested cyber environments on three
common focus areas of information assurance—confidentiality, integrity, and availability. I
find that assessing impacts of cyber attacks is a nuanced affair dependent on the nature of the
attack, the nature of the organization and its missions, and the nature of the measurements.
For well-manned information processing organizations, many attacks are in the nuisance
range and that only multipronged or severe attacks cause meaningful failure. I also find that
such organizations can design for resiliency and provide guidelines in how to do so.
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Introduction
How do organizations assess command-level effects of cyber attacks? Leaders need a
way of assuring themselves that their organization, people, and information technology (IT)
can continue the organizational missions in a contested cyber environment. To do this,
leaders should: 1) require assessments be more than analogical, anecdotal or simplistic
snapshots in time; 2) demand the ability to rapidly model their organizations; 3) identify their
organization’s structural vulnerabilities; and 4) have the ability to forecast mission assurance
scenarios.
Of course, the nature of organizational dependence on IT varies, and assessments and
forecasting of resilience to contested cyber environments should be nuanced to maintain
credibility. This dissertation provides a repeatable methodology to conduct nuanced
assessments of certain types of organizations, advances research of organizational resilience,
and helps bridge gaps between related communities of interest and researchers.

Thesis Statement
Organizations can design themselves to improve their organizational resilience in
contested cyber environments. They can do this by deliberately adjusting their formal and
informal structures (human and IT) to reduce their susceptibility to events in contested cyber
environments. They can also assess the improvements in resilience to contested cyber
environments due to the chosen structural and functional mitigations and fold the assessed
shortfalls into a continuous improvement cycle. The fundamental expectation is that
organizations can indeed design their structures and their functions to be resilient to
contested cyber environments. Consequences of such efforts include organizations projecting
and achieving higher levels of mission assurance than they might otherwise.
Using a rapid data to modeling approach, this research shows that organizations can
develop complex network-based models of themselves and their characteristics that impact
the ability of the organization to continue its mission(s). These models are multimodal in that
there are multiple node types and multiplex in that there can be multiple links between nodes
of the same types as well as links between nodes of different types. Node types include
people, IT systems, resources, IT resource, tasks, knowledge, roles, and beliefs. The models
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are compatible with analysis techniques from graph theory and social network analysis
(SNA) research. The models also support over time analysis, also called dynamic network
analysis (DNA). These analytic techniques support objective analysis across multiple
dimensions as well as various levels of aggregation or disaggregation of nodes and links. The
rapidity and flexibility of these network-based models lend themselves to rapid selfassessments, especially when compared to more traditional cyber and general-purpose risk
assessment frameworks’ data gathering and analysis techniques.
This research and dissertation shows it is feasible and appropriate to convert these
multidimensional models to inputs for multiagent simulation environments. The outputs of
the simulations support assessments of organizations in nominal and degraded cyber
environments. Simulating effects of contested cyber environments (i.e., loss of
confidentiality, loss of integrity, and loss of availability), the work shows that structural
mitigations (i.e., modifications of the quantity and frequency of human-to-human links) as
well as modifications to various IT dependencies (i.e., modifications of the quantity of IT
systems and rapidity of replacements being brought into the system ) are feasible and
somewhat effective at reducing the impacts of contested cyber environments. It helps
establish that modeling and simulation (M&S) can forecast the efficacy of mitigations before
leaders commit real and potentially scares resources. With efficacious mitigations,
organizations and leaders can increase their confidence of mission assurance in contested
cyber environments.
The research and dissertation also reveal that granularity of distinctions are essential
in discussing the types of organizations put under test, as well as interpreting the results of
virtual experiments. The military organizations modeled in this work generalize to some
types of organizations, but certainly not all, and certainly not to IT dominated organizations
(e.g., exchange traded funds (ETF)), or manufacturing lines. I also choose to limit the
research to small sub-sets of the organization, with the expectation that sub-groups may
suffer different effects, again requiring nuance in group identification and effects. One result
of this research, explored further in the related work portion, is there is substantial room for
increased cooperation between research communities in organizational behavior and
resilience, organizational design, and cyberspace operations and security.
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Scope
There are multitudes of ways to scope a dissertation in this research area. The
following, combined with the definitions in Definitions (starting on page 1-1), delineate the
boundaries of the problem space for both practical and tractability reasons.
The analyses for the various organizations under test focus on the formal decision
makers of the organization—that is they are command-level analyses. However, decision
makers do not operate in a vacuum; they have surrounding and supporting structures that
both inform and constrain decisions and actions. I account for these structures by modeling
them as fellow organization members, fellow decision makers, and IT systems. I also include
IT resources and non-IT resources, organizational and groups’ tasks as well as
representations of organizational and individual knowledge. I constrain the analyses to shortterm (e.g., hours to days) measures of performance (MoP) and measures of effectiveness
(MoE) to compare and contrast conditions under test. I treat modeling and analyses of longterm impacts (e.g., weeks to months) as out of scope while acknowledging such work would
be very interesting.
The military organizations modeled in this work generalize to other organizations, but
certainly not all, and certainly not to IT dominated organizations (e.g., exchange traded funds
(ETF)), or manufacturing lines. As noted above, I limited the research to small sub-sets of the
organization, with the expectation that sub-groups may suffer disparate effects to their subgroup missions than the leadership. This may be analogous to a corporate HQ suffering no
immediate ill effects from a strike at one of its plants in another state, which has its
production rate drop to zero.
The research uses stylized adversaries capable of creating effects in and through the
IT systems and IT resources of the modeled organizations. The dissertation also scopes the
effects of contested cyber environments (see also Definitions) to three (3) of the five (5)
categories in the Committee of National Security Systems (CNSS) Information Assurance
(IA) ontology: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. These adversaries, discussed in
detail later, are neither omniscient nor omnipotent. The dissertation does not incorporate the
remaining two (2) CNSS IA categories of authentication or nonrepudiation.
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Modeled adversaries create availability effects against random or specific IT systems
within the modeled organizations with varying probabilities of effect. Modeled adversaries
can also create availability effects against various technology supported communications
mediums in the model (e.g., telephone, classified and unclassified email). The models do not
mimic the technical mechanisms an adversary could use to create these effects, nor do I
attempt to model and adversarial motive or end-state. The results for the modeled
organizations range from no measurable effects to effects high enough to generate a review
by the decision makers—statistically significant results will depend on the context . It was
not part of the research plan to generate the degenerate case of 100% loss of all
communications technology and/or IT systems within an organization.
There is also a set of stylized integrity agents that act, at the various levels of security
within the organization models, as spreaders of disinformation. These are abstracted attack
vectors without specific implementation techniques in the model. The results from the
modeled organizations indicate that various structural configurations speed and slow the
spread of disinformation. There are also distinct differences in the longevity of
disinformation in decision making circles compared to the organization as a whole.
Finally, I have modeled a passive confidentiality agent as an information sink on the
unclassified security level of the models. The intention is to begin the process of
understanding how to model confidentiality leaks—though I will not be ascribing specific
operational impacts to those leaks (e.g., the impacts of intellectual property leaking to a
competitor firm or the designs for modern military equipment).
The short duration cyber environments represent a first step in a long term research
plan. It is easy to foresee extensions to this work that would incorporate longer lasting
contested environments to trigger and assess more pronounced adaptive and maladaptive
behaviors. It is also easy to foresee extensions where attacks incorporate series effects (e.g.,
attack, pause, attack) as part of a deliberate effort of adversaries to generate adverse
environments for organizations under study.

Definitions
Short, plain English definitions are used in this portion of the dissertation with more
detailed and thorough definitions in Definitions.
4

What is a contested cyberspace (cyber for short) environment and why does it matter?
Quite simply, a contested cyber environment is a human-built complex system. It includes
interconnected telecommunications and information technology networks and networkenabled devices. Most importantly the technology intertwines with people and man-made and
natural processes that can, and do, interfere with the designed and intended purpose of the
environments. I’ll address the ‘why it matters’ portion of the opening sentence shortly.
The United States Air Force (USAF) developed a nondoctrinal definition of mission
assurance that means the USAF and its units can “fight through an attack” (Elder, 2008;
Webber, 2010) (see also the definition of Mission Assurance on page 1-2). Importantly, the
decision makers that developed this approach were not information security (INFOSEC) or
computer security (COMPUSEC) practitioners but were operations generalists. Those
generalists, by long experience and exposure, have learned the complex choreography of the
USAF’s many missions has a central core: successful execution of military operations. The
situation is akin to organizations (e.g., oil exploration) that have multiple subordinate
elements (e.g., Human Resource (HR), Finance, Logistics) that perform necessary, even
critical functions, that remain, fundamentally, not the primary raison d’être of the
organization. This USAF concept of mission assurance gives its leadership confidence that it
can perform its core and essential supporting missions in the face of adverse circumstances.
They develop this confidence predicated on the expectation of future events. This expectation
aligns with the right side of Figure 1 labeled Event Management that illustrates risk reduction
with operating through adversity.
Figure 1 depicts mission assurance as an abstract aggregation of two major
components: (1) Iterative application of one or more risk management frameworks; (2) event
management. It is important to note that in event management has at least three components:
(1) Pre-event rehearsal(s); (2) adaptation during and possibly after the event; and (3) postevent recovery. In the figure, I have also made explicit the need to record and learn from the
preceding events—deliberately choosing to not learn lessons qualifies as a maladaptive
practice that is beyond the scope of this work.
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Figure 1: Mission assurance is more than risk management

This continued functioning in the face of adversity leads us to our next, related
definition. One way of assessing mission assurance is by leveraging the concept of resilience.
According to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, resilience is “an ability to recover from or
adjust to misfortune or change” (resilience, 2012). This dissertation applies the definition in
two ways: one through a new mathematical definition as a function of congruence between
an organization’s requirements, needs, and spare capacity; the second, applied to multiple
measures of interest, is the time to return to equilibrium after disruption.
A visualization of the disruption of this new metric, and various other measures of
interest is shown in Figure 2 (see also the more complete discussion in the Network
Analytics and Resilience chapter starting on page 118). There are pre-event measures, one or
more events, post-event degradation of the chosen measures, and recovery in some fashion.
Implicit in this figure is there is a pre-event equilibrium, and there is survival—resilience for
stochastic measures cannot exist nor can it have a definition in the absence of survivability.
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Figure 2: Dynamic visualization of resilience for an arbitrary measure of interest (MoI)

1

The just discussed motivator of “contested cyber environments” scopes the
dissertation to the type of adversity, as does focusing on organizational resilience. Of the
multiple ways to model and simulate a contested cyber environment, I simulate abstract
mechanisms instead of specific re-creations of named adversaries, technical activities or
specific implementations of what the Department of Defense (DoD) defines as computer
network attack (CNA) (Joint Staff J7, 2010a) and have changed (circa 2012) to offensive
cyber operations (OCO).
Actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade,
or destroy [emphasis added] information resident in computers and computer
networks, or the computers and networks themselves.
The Committee of National Security Systems (CNSS) definition of information
assurance helps in this decision by creating an ontology with five (5) effects labeled
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and nonrepudiation (CIAAN) (2010). I
use abstracted mechanisms that create one or more of the first three effects (i.e., CIA) based
on an assessment that negative effects that start in the authentication and nonrepudiation
categories often serve as waypoints en route to deliberate effects within the first three
categories. When combined together, the use of abstract mechanisms and the CIA ontology
supports rapid modeling of effects rather than the specific technical modeling of SYN flood
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(Morgan & Lanham, 2012)
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denial of service (DOS) attacks , distributed DoS (DDoS), cryptographic or message replay
attacks, or other specific forms of CNA .

Why is this important?
Since the birth of the integrated chip, there has been an incredible growth in the ways
humanity has put IT to use. Though there are still elements of humanity that remain largely
untouched by electricity as well as information technology, it’s the electricity and IT using
organizations that interest us in this research. The growth of the penetration of IT in everyday
lives should be fairly noncontroversial, with Figure 3 (on page 12) through Figure 7 (on page
14) depicting examples of growth in civilian and military use of information technology.
With the growth in use, there is an accompanying rise in risk that disruption of IT can
negatively affect the people and organizations accustomed to its presence.
Returning to the two parts of mission assurance in Figure 1 (on page 6) leaders plan
and work to reduce their organizations’ various risks as well as plan their reactions to
misfortune and adversity. In virtually every risk management framework, a recurring task for
organizational leaders is assessing and adjusting framework compliance and adherence
measures. Such activities however are beyond the scope of this research effort.
Missing in many of risk management frameworks however are explicit
acknowledgements and deliberate planning and rehearsal for the actual occurrence of risk
events. Deliberate planning and rehearsal is an implicit acknowledgement of non-zero risk,
and a solid foundation for leaders and subordinates alike to increase confidence in mission
assurance. Incorporating lessons learned from previous assessments and events is also
salutary to increasing perceptions of mission assurance. Short of rehearsing for or living
through adverse events, there are other tools available for organizations to increase their
perception of mission assurance—specifically socio-technical simulations that support
forecasting efficacy of planned mitigations and reactions.
Another shortfall in many risk management frameworks is the oft-repeated phrase
that the assessments are snapshots in time. This shortfall becomes problematic when
reflections of the organization from weeks, months or years ago conflict with leaders’
perceptions of now. Rapidly constructed socio-technical simulation models help reduce the
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gap between perceptions of now and snapshots of the past, as well as speed contingency
planning.
With increased use of IT, leaders of organizations (Loveland & Lobel, 2012), as well
as national and military leaders (Lynn, 2010), have assessed there are increased risks to their
organizations’ ability to adequately perform missions in contested cyber environments. The
President of the United States issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)
that specified 31 policies the executive branch would pursue to protect assets from all manner
of threats—including cyber threats (2003). For all of these leaders, human adversaries are not
the only concern with respect to their reliance on cyberspace capabilities. Natural phenomena
can also inflict the effects of a contested cyber environment—a degradation, denial,
disruption, or destruction of cyber/IT assets. Hurricane Katrina (Piper & Ramos, 2006) and
Super Storm Sandy (Carew, 2012) degraded communications for consumers, emergency
services, and governmental entities quite extensively. Undersea events from earthquakes to
dragging anchors can break undersea fiber optic cables—inflicting both total and partial loss
of availability (Niccolai, 2008; Rotenburg, Schneier, McConnell, Zittrain, & Donvan, 2010).
Man-made threats to cables include advanced submarines and technology that support
eavesdropping (Sherry, Drew, & Drew, 1998; The Associated Press, 2005) to vandalism or
sabotage (Reardon, 2009; Shin & Garske, 2012) that can inflict losses of confidentiality and
availability on those who use the undersea cables.
Organizations with missions enabled by, or outright reliant on cyber resources, face
some amount of risk that the organizations could fail at those missions in a contested cyber
environment. IT-enabled supply chain dependent organizations can suffer sufficient
degradation or disruption that they are unable to continue their manufacturing, selling, or
other missions and may cease to operate (Min & Zhou, 2002; G. E. Smith, Watson, Baker, &
Pokorski Ii, 2007). Organizations that are less reliant on IT for their primary day-to-day
operations may find that they are less able to conduct other forms of business or operations as
well as their secondary functions (e.g., accounts receivable, accounts payable, shipping and
receiving, and timely resupply to subordinates, peers, or customers) during periods of
contested cyber environments. IT-reliant organizations such as electronically traded funds
(ETF) may also cease to operate, cease to exist due to monetary losses, or otherwise suffer
such degradation they cannot sustain their business model—though these types of
9

organizations are beyond the scope of this work. Targeted attacks against network-enabled
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) can affect organizations that use SCADA
such as electric power companies. Degraded SCADA systems could potentially trigger
cascading failures such as the 2003 electrical black out in portions of the U.S. and Canada
(U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004). The risks of cascading failure rise
with increased interconnections between organizations when those interconnections lack
physical and procedural safeguards.
The proceeding paragraphs of this section, in abbreviated form, make the case that the
effects of a contested cyber environment can be adverse to organizations’ ability to perform
their missions or business operations. Such outcomes are contrary to fundamental business
interests, and for militaries could hinder the ability to defend or assert national interests.
Given that risks of contested cyber environments are unlikely to be zero, there is a prima
facie case that leaders should be confident in their organizations’ ability to adapt and operate
despite such environments.

What will this dissertation do?
There are three broad sets of deliverables within this dissertation, listed in Table 1.
The first is a fine grained approach for rapidly assessing organizational resilience to
contested cyber environments. The second is a theory of command-level resilience to those
environments. The third is a reusable, empirically grounded agent based dynamic network
model and associated methodologies for assessing the command-level resilience to cyber
attacks and events.
Table 1: Three primary sets of deliverables

Develop a fine grained approach for assessing organizational resilience
Develop a command-level theory of resilience to contested cyber environments
Develop a reusable, empirically grounded agent based dynamic network model and
associated methodology for assessing command-level resiliency to cyber attacks &
events
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Literature Review
Introduction
Mission assurance, having a level of confidence in the resilience of an organization,
its ability to recover from or adjust to cyber events, along one or more measurable
dimensions is necessarily a multi-disciplinary effort. This literature review expanded from
those topics depicted in Figure 1 to include areas of interest as diverse as emergency
management, high reliability organizations (HRO), organizational behavior and learning,
supply chain management (SCM), cyber security, modeling and simulation (M&S), SNA and
network science. Each of these research areas have information and results that can shed light
onto each other’s areas of interest as well as this dissertation. The review also incorporates
research from cyber specific risk management.
This section illustrates the gaps in the literature regarding organizational resilience
especially to contested cyber environments as well as need to improve the application of
M&S to help cross the gaps. The review will reinforce the links between the research areas
that the authors within the corpus identified as well as illustrate the need for more links
between research areas that share common areas of interest without normally overlapping.
Increasing use of Information Technology IT in many civilian industries and
organizations
Since the creation of the integrated circuit, there has been an incredible growth in the
ways humanity has put IT to use. Though there are still elements of humanity that remain
largely untouched by electricity as well as the information technology, it’s the electricity and
IT using portion that interests us in this literature review. Two indirect indicators of the
growing use of IT within civilian infrastructures are the growing demand and use of the radio
frequency spectrum as well as the sales of computer and IT related equipment over the last
35 years. Figure 3 depicts the frequency allocation by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) in 2012 with Figure 4 providing the contrast in growth of frequency-use
demands. The growth in demand for the various uses of frequencies is a reflection of the
growth in the number of ways humanity has put IT to use in our industries and our daily lives.
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Figure 3: Federal Communications Commission (FCC) frequency allocation chart circa 2003 2

Figure 4: FCC frequency allocations circa 1975 3

A second indicator, and there are too many possible indicators to enumerate even a
tiny fraction, is the sales growth of computers from their inception with ENIAC in 1946
(Weik, 1961) to 2012. There is an apocryphal story that IBM’s Tom Watson, Jr., opined he
foresaw a market for about 5 mainframe computers in the world in the 1950s 4, while Gartner
forecasted over 400 million computers shipping around the world in 2012. Figure 5 reflects
sales growth for personal and desktop computers, with Figure 6 depicting the growth of
super-computers—the nearest analog to Watson’s mainframes that was IBM’s core business
through the 1980s. The figure is depicting the distribution of super-computers across the
continents of the globe, and limited to the top 500 super computer systems—the entry level
has moved up to 76.5 teraflop (Tflop)/s (floating point operations per second) from 60.8
Tflop/s in May 2012 (Meuer, Strohmaier, Simon, & Dongarra, 2012)
2

(US Department of Commerce, 2003)
(Elder, 2008)
4
IBM asserts this story is a misunderstanding of statements made by Tom Watson, Jr., in their Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQ) (IBM, 2007)
3
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Figure 5: Sales growth for personal computers from 1998 to 2011 5

Figure 6: Growth in installed super-computers by continent since
1994 6

Increasing use of IT by US Department of Defense (DoD)
The DoD’s growing division of the frequency spectrum also reflects this growth in
frequency requirements. US military forces are, in some respects, the most IT-enabled
military on the planet with their blue-force-trackers, remotely piloted aircraft (e.g. Predators,
Global Hawks), small unit access to real-time streaming video of their area of operations, as
well as line of sight (LOS) and beyond line of sight (BLOS) encrypted radios. Such is the
extent of infiltration of IT, that the White House situation room had as-it-happened

5
6

(Arthur, 2011)
(Meuer, Strohmaier, Dongarra, & Simon, 2012)
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information sent around the globe from Pakistan during the raid to kill Osama bin Laden
(Souza, 2011). Figure 7 is a DoD specific chart depicting the use of the radio frequency (RF)
spectrum that, while not all-inclusive, is a reflection of the number of uses for the RF
spectrum that simply did not exist 35 years ago (e.g., Global Positioning System (GPS),
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE)).

Figure 7: US DoD frequency allocation chart circa 2010 7

Increasing risks from contested cyber environment
With increased use of IT, leaders of organizations (Loveland & Lobel, 2012), as well
as national and military leaders, are assessing there are increased risks to their ability to
execute their missions despite contested cyber environments. Former Deputy Secretary of
Defense William J. Lynn III, among many others, has published his belief that the very
advantages IT systems give the US, potentially allow adversaries of all kinds anti-US
operational opportunities. Those opportunities can range from disrupting US logistics support
to operations around the globe as well as degrading the perception of control of globally

7

(Defense Business Board, 2010)
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deployed forces by national leaders (Lynn, 2010). The President of the United States
(POTUS), also growing concerned about the perceptions of risks to ‘critical infrastructure,’
issued HSPD 7 that enumerated 31 policy positions that the executive branch would pursue
with respect to protecting assets from all manner of threats—including cyber threats (Office
of the President of the United States, 2003).
Human adversaries are not the only concern for the national leaders around the globe.
Natural phenomena can also inflict the effects of a contested cyber environment—a
degradation, denial, disruption, or destruction of cyber/IT assets. Hurricane Katrina (Piper &
Ramos, 2006) and Super Storm Sandy (Carew, 2012) degraded consumers’ communications
quite extensively, as well as emergency services’ and governmental entities’. Undersea
events can also break segments of the global undersea fiber optic cable network—inflicting a
loss of availability (Niccolai, 2008; Rotenburg et al., 2010). Man-made threats to undersea
cables also include advanced submarines and technology that support eavesdropping on those
same cables (Sherry et al., 1998; The Associated Press, 2005)—inflicting a loss of
confidentiality. Having leaders that are aware of possible cyberspace related risks is a
necessary condition for organizations to take steps to reduce those risks as well as take steps
to ensure their ability to operate despite any contestation of their cyber environments.
Contested cyber environments as risks to organizational resilience
Emergency services, HROs, governmental leaders and their staffs are not the only
stakeholders contested cyber environments put at risk. Organizations with missions enabled
by, or completely reliant on cyber resources, face some amount of risk that the organizations
could fail at those missions in a contested cyber environment. Organizational dependency on
IT can vary anywhere along the spectrum from no dependency at all to the opposite end
where the organization will cease to meaningfully operate without IT.
Organizations that are less reliant on IT for their primary day-to-day operations may
face degradation in their abilities to conduct other forms of business, operational, or
secondary functions (e.g., accounts receivable, accounts payable, shipping and receiving,
timely resupply to subordinates, peers, customers) during periods of contested cyber
environments. Organizations dependent on supply chains could suffer sufficient degradation
or disruption that they are unable to continue their manufacturing, selling, or other missions
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and may cease to operate (Min & Zhou, 2002; G. E. Smith et al., 2007) if the disruption lasts
too long. Organizations and business that are, at heart, IT reliant may also cease to operate,
cease to exist due to losses, or otherwise suffer such degradation they cannot sustain their
business model; exchange traded funds (ETF) companies can often define exactly how much
money they lose during service interruptions and work hard to minimize those potential
losses.
Organizations that provide, operate, and maintain the many parts of national critical
infrastructure also have some vulnerability to contested cyber attacks through their use of inband and out-of-band control systems (often called Supervisory and Control Systems
(SCADA)). Those and other organizations can also have indirect at risk outside their direct
control. Cascading failures of power systems, such as the 2003 electrical black out in
portions of the US and Canada (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004)
represent a class of indirect risk. Where interconnections between providers of any cyber
related service exists, degradation or disruption of one or more providers may, like electrical
distribution systems, cause a shifting of load to other elements of cyberspace—those
elements may or may not be capable of supporting the new demands.

Related Areas of Research
What does resilience mean?
What is resilience? Revisiting Merriam-Webster, it is “an ability to recover from or
adjust to misfortune or change” (resilience, 2012). There are variations on this definition that
scope the definition to ecology and life sciences fields. The physics community has a
definition of resilience as the potential energy stored in an elastic material when the material
is deformed (resilience, 2003). When applied to technical systems, and in particular systems
of systems, some definitions add language that requires recovery be to the level of
performance or measure of interest present prior to the event (Bishop, Carvalho, Ford, &
Mayron, 2011). Other definitions require the system(s) of interest be able to predict
disruption (Pflanz & Levis, 2012), and that the system will function as the owners ‘required
and intended’ (Horning, 2009) despite being in a hostile environment.
Still others perceive resilience as a series of traits (Coutu, 2002) that companies and
assessments must then operationalize by converting the traits to measures of performance
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(MoP) and measures of effectiveness (MoE). Gunderson asserts that resilience, is effectively
“magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system redefines its structure by
changing the variables and processes that control behavior” and refers to Walker et al calling
this “ecological resilience” (Gunderson, 2003).
Resilience Engineering
The variety of definitions, especially applied to systems of humans and equipment
has even lead to the establishment of a field of engineering entitled “Resilience Engineering.”
Practitioners of resilience engineering view systemic or organizational mishaps as failures to
maintain systems, processes, and thought processes as the inverse of adaptability and
resilience (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006; Madni & Jackson, 2009c; REA Public
Affairs, 2013).
In the resilience engineering domain, the focus tends toward safety as a primary
metric. Madni and Jackson collected and synthesized fourteen heuristics in their review of
the growth of resilience engineering (2009a) that they break into near-term and longer-term
categories: reaction and adaptation respectively (2009c). In a different formulation, Westrum
asserted resilience has three meanings: the ability to prevent something bad from happening;
the ability to prevent something bad from becoming something worse; and the ability to
recover from something bad once it has occurred (2006). Westrum also distinguishes coping
by being adaptive (e.g., organizations changing themselves in response to a crisis) and being
armored (e.g., a tank) (2006). Both examples reflect different approaches to survivability
with one being very hard, and very resistant to minor perturbations. Unfortunately, once
disruption reaches the tank-armor’s breaking point, catastrophic failure is the typical, and
often unsafe, outcome. This opposite state of resilience has earned the label brittleness
(Hollnagel et al., 2006; Madni & Jackson, 2009c).
Why resilience to contested cyber environments?
This literature review will limit the scope of reviewed adversity to the effects of
contested cyber environments wherever feasible, though there is a surprising paucity of
research that restricted itself to IT based adversity or even passingly referred to IT based
adversity. In addition to this dissertation, other researchers have taken note of the dearth of
research into cyber effects (Chapman, Leblanc, & Partington, 2011; Leblanc, Partington,
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Chapman, & Bernier, 2011). Enumerating or creating ontologies of specific origins of threats
(e.g., insider/outsider, malicious/nonmalicious, natural/manmade) is certainly a time honored
way of problem decomposition for cyber security (Bishop, Engle, Peisert, Whalen, & Gates,
2009a, 2009b; Chapman et al., 2011). Clearly the nature of threat(s), their likelihood, and
their ability to incur an effect contribute to organizations decisions about resource allocations
and residual risk acceptance. Rather than adding to this well developed, and yet still evolving
body of research, this dissertation explores the need for organizations to be resilient to the
effects of events in the cyber environment. Organizations and people must be able to adapt to
or otherwise cope with the effects to return to some post event equilibrium. Which effects of
contested cyber environments in particular? We will co-opt three of the five pillars of
information assurance: confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and
nonrepudiation (CNSS, 2010) as the effects of interest.
In some research or operations circles, this focus on the effects of cyber environments
could fall under the label of ‘effects based operations’ (EBO) (P. K. Davis, 2006). I will not
be exploring this application of the EBO label. Indeed, this focus on effects defers to other
authors the comprehensive discussions of how contested environments come into being.
Readers will not see in this dissertation details and explorations of the manipulation of bits,
bytes, protocols, buffers, and other technology-oriented discussions on how to create
contested cyber environments nor the efforts to identify appropriate targets to achieve desired
objectives.
Organization adaptation and learning
Generalized discussions of resilience, the ability of both people and organizations to
improvise (a key trait identified by Coutu (2002) and Madni (2009a)) and adapt to adversity
are useful for developing perspectives and theoretical frameworks for organizational
resilience. Fundamental to the idea of adaptation to adversity is the idea that organizations
are capable of learning new behavior in the first place (Gunderson, 2003). It is clear from
observation that organizations can learn—lists of companies, and even countries that modify
their behavior over time would be long, and filled with varying levels of success from
survival through flourishing. The inverse is equally true, the history of humanity is replete
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with sovereign entities, countries and companies that have ceased to exist—arguably through
their inability to adapt to changing conditions.
What motivates or provokes those changes, the adaptation, and learning? There are
three longstanding observations of organizational learning, also shown in Table 2. The first
observation is organizations base their behavior on routines, on their collective perception of
organizational history, and on their goal orientation (Crichton, Ramsay, & Kelly, 2009; B.
Levitt & March, 1988). The second observation is behavioral changes occur through positive
and negative feedback loops, especially distinctions between perceptions of success and
failure, as well as incremental modification of routines (B. Levitt & March, 1988; Norris,
Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). The third observation is those
organizations’ self-perceptions of being adaptable, of being able to cope with the variations
of every day requirements as well as manage unusual circumstances are a key component of
making the belief a reality (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Knowing the above, the reader may
be wondering what then inhibits organizational learning and adaptation?
Table 2: Three observations on organizational learning

Organizations base their behavior on routines, on their collective perception of organizational history,
and on their goal orientation
Behavioral changes occur through positive and negative feedback loops, especially distinctions
between perceptions of success and failure, as well as incremental modification of routines
Organizations’ self-perceptions of being adaptable, of being able to cope with the variations of every
day requirements as well as manage unusual circumstances are a key component of making the belief
a reality

There are at least three structural difficulties in learning from experience identified in
research: paucity of experience, redundancy of experience, and complexity of experience (B.
Levitt & March, 1988), shown in Table 3 below. Without experience in a degraded
environment to establish routines, fail-over plans, and without a perception of “we’ve done
this before,” an organization has not learned the true effects of a degraded cyber environment
to their particular situations. The situations they could face are each a possible source of
creating routines the company switches to in contested cyber environments.
The success versus failure ratio can only change with modifications to its numerator
or denominator. Behavioral psychologists have long known that repetition is a key
component of learning for individuals, and repetition is the key to adjusting the
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organizational perception of success: failure ratios for given scenarios or general sets of
circumstances.
The third component of organizational learning, as well as the third challenge set the
stage for non-trivial exercises and rehearsals. The natural state of IT-based capabilities for
many users is that there is ‘always’ something going amiss with their tools, networks, or
other IT-based capabilities. But without shifting from the aperiodic, noncatastrophic, lowduration, nonpervasive outages of ‘normal,’ organization members will face unexpected
complexities and potentially lose their own perception of adaptability—they are akin to the
Westkin’s armored tank where the energy resistance capacity of the armor is exceeded and
catastrophic results occur.
Table 3: Structural challenges to organizational learning

Paucity of experience
Redundancy of experience
Complexity of experience

This perception of adaptability is a point of pride for the various US Armed Services
—virtually every US Army and US Air Force Posture Statement in the last fifteen years has
specifically called out adaptability, learning or transformation (Office of the Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Air Force, 2012; Office of the Chief of Staff, 2012). Each Service also embodied
adaptability in the creation of new doctrine in the 1980s (Romjue, 1984) and 1990s.
Incident and event response and rehearsal
Many United States Government (USG) documents call for better and more
preparedness for using IT and other cyber capabilities to offset declining budgets and
resource levels, increase efficiencies, and increase efficacy of available resources. These
documents often advocate for the defense and sustainment of existing and future IT based
capabilities. What the documents omit, with some recent exceptions such as (Kaminski,
Gosler, & Von Thaer, 2013), are directives to leaders to train and practice their missions
within degraded environments—what the US military often refers to as specified tasks in
contrast to implied tasks. One outcome of this lack of deliberate training in degraded
environments is leaders are training for environments with incompetent adversaries while
blithely assuming defeat of attacks or rapid restoration of lost assets (Lanham, 2012c). The
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omission also reinforces all three structural difficulties in learning from experience: paucity
of experience, redundancy of experience, and complexity of experience (B. Levitt & March,
1988). Indeed, the dominant tone of many cyber related government documents is fear of the
loss of IT and cyber capabilities with few, if any, references to the requiring reasonable
preparedness and expected adaptation to the destruction, disruption, or degradation of cyber
resource. Without loss of IT or degradation of IT training to construct lessons, the palpable
fear by reporters and luminaries in the open press could simply be another example of
propagating disaster myth (Norris et al., 2008; Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski, 2006)—the sky
will fall without our necessary IT.
This section has presumed that leaders and organizations recognize they have entered
a purposeful contested cyber environment. This presumption is not always true, and indeed,
the majority of mass media reports indicate companies learn they have been attacked well
after the attack began, especially in the case of advanced persistent threats (APT), industrial
espionage, and intellectual property theft. Two frequent ways organizations learn of an APT
in their midst is from external reporting (e.g., FBI) or a system administrator chasing down
an anomalous bit of behavior. Anecdotal stories abound of leaders reporting they had no idea
they were under attack, they had presumed [the technology problems] were related to other
causes, not deliberate actions by hostile actors.
Though I found no evidence of conscious effort to avoid purposeful and meaningful
rehearsal of contested cyber environments, there is considerable effort dedicated within risk
management and cybersecurity communities at preventing, or reducing to ‘acceptable levels
of risk,’ the occurrence of cyber events. The USG has built an information assurance model
of cyber security widely used by the three branches of government, academia, and industry.
Information Assurance pillars
There have been long running efforts by USG entities to fortify and protect their IT
systems and cyber capabilities, prominent among them were Department of Defense (DoD
Directive (DoDD) 5200.28 Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing (ADP)
Systems of the 1980s; which spawned DoD 5200.28-STD Department Of Defense Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria, aka “The Orange Book” and its accompanying
“Rainbow Series.” Efforts continued through the creation of Common Criteria of the 1990s,
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and DoDD 8500.1E Information Assurance encapsulates current DoD efforts. The USG has
been making additional strides to implementing effective Information Security through the
passage and implementation of the Federal Information Security Management Act
(FISMA)("FISMA," 2002), which tasked the heads of federal agencies and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to standardize Information Security
(INFOSEC) risk models in support of legislative oversight responsibilities. A portion of the
DoD contribution to NIST’s standard framework, applicable to national security systems, is a
glossary of terms provided by the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS)
Instruction (CNSSI) National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary (CNSS, 2010). FISMA
established three fundamental elements to the notion of information security: integrity,
confidentiality, and availability.
CNSSI No. 4009 goes on to add two additional elements to the definition of
information assurance—a rewording of FISMA’s definition of ‘information security.’ CNSSI
4009 defines each of the five pillars of information assurance as shown in Table 4 below
(2010). The Department of Defense’s definitions draw from these definitions and sometimes
add additional verbiage (Department of Defense, 2007). With these five terms, we can
characterize events as diverse as SYN floods or other forms of denial of service attacks to
undersea cable breaks as a loss of availability. Replay attacks, injecting false radar tracks into
radar systems, and changing the contents of personnel and finance computers all naturally
fall under loss of integrity effects. Key logger trojans, universal serial bus (USB) key-capture
devices, account credential thefts all fall first under the effect of compromised or lost
authentication, with likely follow-up effects in confidentiality, integrity, and nonrepudiation.
It is with the first three of these effects that I will focus the dissertation.
Table 4: CNSSI 4009 definitions of CIAAN

Term
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Authentication
Nonrepudiation

CNSS Definition
The property that information is not disclosed to system entities (users,
processes, devices) unless they have authorization to access the information.
The property whereby an entity has no unauthorized modifications.
The property of being accessible and useable upon demand by those with
authorization.
The process of verifying the identity or other attributes claimed by or assumed of
an entity (user, process, or device), or to verify the source and integrity of data.
Assurance that the sender of information receives proof of delivery and the
recipient has proof of the sender’s identity. Neither sender nor receiver can later
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deny having processed the information.

The Five D’s—Disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy, and sometimes deceive
With the DoD, discussions of contested cyber environments frequently revert to the
four elements within its definition of computer network attack (CNA referred to as offensive
cyber operations (OCO) since circa 2012)—disrupt, deny, degrade, and destroy—and
sometimes adds the element of deceive from the definition of Information Warfare (IW).
Literature associated with cyber security and contested cyber environments frequently use
these terms, and their definitions are important for further discussions. The DoD’s Joint
Publication (JP) 3-13 Information Operations (2006), defined these terms as shown in Table
5. These definitions represent different, but neither mutually exclusive nor orthogonal, ways
of characterizing contested cyber environments. A visualization of these two
characterizations, and how they could overlap in 2D space, is shown in Figure 8. The links
represent one way of mapping each of the 5 D’s into one or more of the CNSS 5 pillars of IA.
Table 5: DoD definitions of the five D's (2006)

Term
Disrupt
Deny
Degrade

Destroy
Deceive

DoD Definition
To break or interrupt the flow of information.
To prevent the adversary from accessing and using critical information, systems, and
services.
To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary C2 or communications systems,
and information collection efforts or means. IO can also degrade the morale of a unit,
reduce the target’s worth or value, or reduce the quality of adversary decisions and
actions.
To damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored
to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt
To cause a person to believe what is not true. [Military Deception (MILDEC)] seeks to
mislead adversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality (Joint
Staff J7, 2010a).

Figure 8: Five pillars of IA and the five D's
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Why resilience? Isn’t risk management enough?
This section provides a review of the fundamental techniques of risk management. It
also establishes that these techniques are insufficient for providing assurance that an
organization is resilient to contested cyber environments.
There are four principal tools of risk management, including cyber risk management
(Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997; Al-Bahar & Crandall, 1990). The four tools are avoidance,
prevention and reduction (also called mitigation), retention, and transfer. But what do
organizations perceive as risk (Cashell, Jackson, Jickling, & Webel, 2004)?
Organizations often perceive risk as a set of quantities that they can measure, cost
shift, avoid, or otherwise measurably reduce (Flinn & Stoyles, 2005; Wallner, 2008). The
downside(s) of those risks have some nominal negative impact on one or more aspects of the
organization. The emphasis in traditional cyber risk management is reduction of the problem
to one of two fairly simple models represented in equations (1)(MITRE, 2012a) or (2)
(Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002).

=
Risk Probability    
Occurrence × Impact

(1)

Equation 1: Risk as a function of the probability of occurrence and the forecasted impact

Risk = f (Threat , Vulnerability,   
Asset )
Equation 2: Risk as a function of three variables: threat nature, vulnerability nature, and asset value

Importantly, none of these tools explicitly incorporates the notion of resilience: being
able to recover from or adapt to the occurrence of a risk event. Resilience requires an explicit
acknowledgement that risk cannot equal zero, and that risk varies over time. Mission
assurance requires acceptance that nonzero risk means bad things will happen to an
organization, despite the various avoidance, mitigation, retention and transfer measures in
place. How organizations deal with that adversity is what assures their members and their
leaders that cyber adversity is not an existential threat but a threat they can adjust to and
function through. Without the explicit inclusion of both the ability to recover and the ability
to adapt to the effects of the contested environment, traditional risk management is necessary
for but not sufficient to establish mission assurance.
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(2)

Cyber threat literature
What kinds of threats and problems exist that could create contested cyber
environments? The introduction already alluded to at least two categories: man-made and
natural. By natural, I’m referring to storms and other weather events, landslides, flooding,
and virtually any other event for which humans are not the proximate cause. The other set of
threats are man-made. Efforts to categorize these man-made threats, and their alter egos,
vulnerabilities, have ranged from the taxonomies presented in the RISOS project (Abbott et
al., 1976) to the four over lapping categories of the Protection Analysis project (Bisbey &
Hollingsworth, 1978). Bishop built a taxonomy of six axes (1995) through using the
categories of the Protection Analysis project as well as modified versions of Landwehr’s
three categories (Landwehr, Bull, McDermott, & Choi, 1994). Howard’s dissertation (1997)
has an extensive review of taxonomy attempts including the use of “results Categories” that
mimic three of the five CNSS pillars of information assurance (i.e., confidentiality, integrity,
and availability) by Cohen, Russell and Gangemi. Howard himself went on to develop what
he called a process model whereby attackers use tools, to gain access to cyber systems, to
create results to achieve some objectives (Howard, 1997). Hansman, like Howard, broadened
his taxonomy to address specific vulnerabilities as well as three other dimensions of attack:
vector, target, common vulnerability and exposure (CVE) entries, and payload or effect
beyond the attack itself (Hansman & Hunt, 2005).
There are at least two degenerate cases of threat in the cyberthreat literature: (1) the
nonexistent threat, in which case Equation 2: will equal zero (0); and (2) the computationally
all-powerful adversary such as the Dolev and Yao adversary (1983) where the outputs of
Equation 1: and Equation 2: are always greater than 0, and implicitly >> 0 while still ≤≤1.
More interesting are the arguments put forth that adversarial assumptions can lead to
significant gaps in theoretical modeling (Gligor, 2008) and subsequent faulty policy
decisions. Such arguments assert that adversary models should include the capabilities and
resources available as in (F. Cohen, 1999; Leblanc et al., 2011) as well as include adversary’s
motivations (Gligor, 2008; Parker, Sachs, Shaw, & Stroz, 2004).
The efforts to classify and categorize cyber threats remain areas of continuing interest
for a variety of audiences, researchers, and the military; Sun Tzu noted that knowing your
enemy is essential to becoming a victorious general (2003). The intention in the preceding
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paragraphs was to illustrate a small portion of the efforts spent in that line of research—a
complete rendering is well beyond this dissertation and not entirely beneficial to the point of
focusing on the effects of contested cyber environments, independent of the agents and
motivations of those agents.
Rhetoric of catastrophic vulnerability
There is hardly a week that goes by in the last several years when yet another news
story discusses yet another cyber attack against some entity somewhere. Former US Defense
Secretary Panetta is part of a long list of high USG official warning of dire threats to the US
from “aggressor nation or extremist group” actors (Bumiller & Shanker, 2012). He is by no
means alone, with the head of the National Security Agency and the new Cyber Command,
General Alexander (Alexander, 2012; Roulo, 2012), the former Deputy Secretary of Defense
Lynn (Lynn, 2010), and even the President of the United States all asserting that cyber
security is a national security challenge with grave consequences if the country gets it wrong.
Some US government representatives are less circumspect in their comments and conflate
cyber attacks with an existential threat to the country (Thibodeau, 2010), feeding into a
leader and media fed meme—dependence on IT equates to a loss of modern civilization if IT
is degraded; a meme similar to the disaster myth of (Tierney et al., 2006).
These warnings may be rhetorical flourishes to overcome bureaucratic inertia, sincere
efforts at forecasting the future, or simply appeals to historical analogy. In assessing the
rhetoric, it is useful to ask, “What have been the outcomes of past events that had effects in
the cyber domain? “There are various estimates of monies lost from cyber enabled financial
crimes (Cashell et al., 2004; National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), 2011), cyber
enabled copying or destruction of intellectual property (Andrijcic & Horowitz, 2006;
Nykodym, Taylor, & Vilela, 2005; G. S. Smith, 2004). There are national security estimates
about years shaved off nation states’ research programs thanks to stolen plans from US
companies (Gorman, Cole, & Dreazen, 2009) and government agencies (Abreu, 2001; Kan,
2006). There are even reports of long-term attacks that copied unknowable amounts of data
for which effects may never be known (Lennon, 2011; Perlroth, 2012; Thornburgh, 2005).
What are the after effects of these and other reported events, aside from the prima fascia
effects of monetary loss?
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Cyber effects and strategic war fighting
There are public figures, pundits, authors, and former government officials, who
declare that cyber war is already a reality. Richard Clarke’s book CyberWar is one example
of such. But there is significant countervailing opinion—that not only is cyber war not here
yet, but that the very word is a misleading and inappropriate conflation of distinct ideas.
Security professionals such as Bruce Schneier and Marc Rotenburg concede that enormous
quantities of cybercrime and espionage happen, but emphasize that though the threats are real,
they are not war threats (Rotenburg et al., 2010). Despite the almost palpable fear in the
testimony by General Alexander, Director National Security Agency (DIRNSA) and Defense
Secretary Panetta’s public speeches, there are significant doubts that any enemy’s cyber
capabilities can inflict significant long-term effects on the US—with equal doubts about US
means to use cyber capabilities to war ending effect (Economist Editorial, 2012). It would
not be the first time that pundits proclaimed that a technology represented a revolution in
military affairs that makes warfare history irrelevant to the vision of future war—examples
range from cross bows, to guns, to machine guns, to airplanes and long-range bombers, to
nuclear bombs/missiles. The means change, decision requirements and information flows
expand and contract, response times increase or decrease, but war continues, regardless of the
perceived overwhelming technology edge of one side or another.
Impacts of past large scale cyber–affecting events
There is much gnashing of teeth in US defense circles about the speed with which
China generated its modern stealthy fighters—especially after media reports of copied data
moving from US defense contractors to China (Gorman et al., 2009; Reed, 2012; Staff Writer,
2012c). The Chinese creation of such a plane was not a matter of if, but of when. No
technological advance, once exposed to the rest of the world, stays long in the sole
possession of its creators. Creators execute the hard and expensive scientific efforts of proof
of possible; copyists execute the efforts for reproduction and imitation. The concerns over
Moonlight Maze (James Andrew Lewis, 2010), Titan Rain (James Andrew Lewis, 2005;
Thornburgh, 2005) and subsequent named intrusion sets into US government computer
systems are also widely reported, frequently talked about, and yet rarely with specificity or
even convincing generality. There are multitudes of mass media reports that USG cyber
capabilities are infiltrated across the breadth of its unclassified systems—but if reports exist
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about the specific impacts of that infiltration, they are certainly not available to convince the
general public of the harm done. Without the data points of harm done, it becomes difficult to
assess the plausibility of the extrapolations of catastrophic impacts in the future. Indeed, the
most recent report from the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) reported the
likelihood of a catastrophic attack is ‘remote’ and forecasting has now shifted to less
grandiose outcomes {Clapper, 2015 #7696}. Surely secrets have been lost, spies likely killed,
citizens of countries imprisoned, but no credible argument has been made that those events
would not have happened if all were quiet on the cyber front.
Degradation in cyber capabilities, and, sometimes, outright destruction of support
infrastructure, are almost signature marks of modern large storms making landfall on our
coats. Hurricane Katrina and Super Storm Sandy both offer possibly instructive insights as to
the cyber effects of natural environments. In Hurricane Katrina, of the many troubles faced
by emergency management services, widespread loss of electricity as well as intermittent and
total loss of communications are prominent in lessons learned reports (Guilford, 2010;
Townsend, 2006). None of these reports point out loss of cyber and IT capabilities as a
proximate cause of fatalities. None of these reports claim restoration of cyber capabilities
would have significantly reduced the near term impacts of Katrina. The long-term health and
demographic impacts New Orleans is still living with are several causal links away from
cyber capabilities in the region—so the case for long-term effects of contested cyber
environments has yet to be convincingly made to warrant the perceived levels of dread.
Super Storm Sandy’s impacts on emergency and other governmental services were
equally profound in the short term. And despite the loss of electricity to over 7.9 million
people (CBS/AP, 2012c) for days, and in some locations, even weeks (CBS/AP, 2012a),
there are no lessons learned reports yet making the claim that a faster return of cyber and IT
capabilities would have substantially reduced the widespread and long-term impacts of the
storm. The loss of electricity, and other forms of damage, also impeded the reopening of
mass transit systems (McCoy, 2012) that served millions of people a day (Goldman, Klopott,
& Vekshin, 2012). There has not been a credible declaration that their complete stoppage for
days, and only partial reopening, had destroyed New York, New Jersey and other served
areas—so exactly what would the long-term effects be of a SCADA attack on mass transit
systems? Water and sewage systems in shore communities from New Jersey (Reporter, 2012)
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to Connecticut (WFSB Staff, 2012) were negatively affected as well by the storm through
loss of electricity, flooding of facilities, uncontrolled spillage of untreated sewage into
waterways (Schwirtz, 2012). Again, no credible declarations of long-term catastrophic
damage to those communities from storm impacts to those utilities exist. This drives the
question of exactly how would a SCADA based attack on water and power systems degrade
our civilization?
Finally, there is a set of fears that large-scale cyber attacks could dramatically and
negatively impact the country’s and global financial markets. Prima fascia evidence is
usually from the Estonian attacks of 2007 (Ashmore, 2009; J. Davis, 2007), the Georgian
(Clark & Levin, 2009) and Lithuanian attacks of 2008 (Ashmore, 2009). On further review
however, the effects were greater in the public psyche and government outlook than in actual
damages to citizens or organizations within those countries. Enumerated damages included
delays of hours for monetary transactions and days for newspaper and government
information diffusion—hardly the cataclysmic outcomes of popular myth (Ashmore, 2009).
The closures of the NY-based markets from the 2003 power outages (Barron, 2003;
SEC, 2003), the 9/11 attacks (Masi, Smith, & Fischer, 2010), during and post Sandy (Kim,
2012) all had measurable impacts (e.g., USD1.7 trillion in market losses (Navarro & Spencer,
2001)) and were more pervasive than any cyber attack thus far. However, the markets opened,
organizations that existed prior to those closures existed after the closures (with some
obvious exceptions of those housed exclusively in the twin towers), companies earned money,
paid taxes, and wrote off losses. In fact, there are precious few reports of public companies
driven to bankruptcy or other ruin due to cyber events—so exactly what are the long-term
effects of contested cyber environments?
In 2008 there were a series of undersea fiber optic cable breaks that decreased
regional bandwidth by 75% and in some instances logically isolated portions of the global
cyber communications networks (Masi et al., 2010). During that time, the US had major
combat operations on going in two theaters of war, and countries in the effected region were
in the midst of conducting their routine international trading and running their national
economies. Far from being unusual, undersea cable breaks are common, so much so that
repair ships can spend 11 of 12 months a year at sea (Pole, 2009). With millions of end users,
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tens of thousands of organizations (governmental, public, and private), and dozens of
countries effected (Masi et al., 2010), no country’s government has fallen, no stock markets
suffered long-term crashes, no populations panicked into barbarity, and not a single war was
started or ended due to loss of those capabilities. These breaks serve to create denial of
availability and disruption of communications, but otherwise appear to generate little to no
global effects and little to no long-term regional or local effects. The lack of empirical
evidence of local or regional collapse, strongly suggests that extrapolations of catastrophic
impacts are, at best, unsupported by evidence and at worst are appeals to fear of the unknown.
Appeals to analogical reasoning—cyber Pearl Harbor, Maginot Line, etc.
There is an obvious analogical fallacy in attempting to rally preparedness for
contested cyber environments with a call to avoid a “Cyber Pearl Harbor.” The Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor had immediate and obvious effects such the death of over 2,400
sailors, soldiers, and marines, the sinking or damaging of 21 ships, and the destruction of
over 180 aircraft (Staff Writer, 2012a). That strategic surprise (at least to the public) and
tactical defeat, and the overlooked targets that could have had a greater long-term strategic
effect (e.g., fuel storage and ship repair yards), set the strategic stage for the United States to
enter the war, conduct full wartime mobilization and ultimately defeat the Axis powers. The
country showed itself resilient to a localized kinetic attack as large as Pearl Harbor. The
nation, with much hard work and sacrifice, ultimately achieved post-attack capabilities far
beyond what it possessed pre-attack. A lesson of the “No More Pearl Harbor” analogies can
be “Do not get caught unprepared and unaware.” What those analogies could also invoke are
the memories of the other four (4) years of warfare that ended with enemies vanquished and
America a dominant global super power. I am not asserting that a pervasive or prolonged
contested cyber environment will lead to a victorious United States. I am suggesting that
invoking “Pearl Harbor” to avoid surprise is a falling prey to the false analogy fallacy.
Additional counter arguments to the analogy could include few people anticipated raids on
Pearl Harbor, while watchers of daily news have heard stories of how easy it is for kids,
hacktivists, criminals and nation-states to exploit our vulnerable IT systems and cause us
harm. Clearly if a large scale cyber attack comes, no national or company leaders should
reasonably claim the idea of such an attack had never occurred to them.
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Another analogical appeal is comparing computer network defense to France’s
Maginot Line. The analogy frequently starts with the assertion that static computer network
defense is as useless as the Maginot Line. The pre-World War II (WWII) Germans adapted to
the presence of the Maginot Line with their decision to bypass the fortification zone—the
‘Line’ was a zone of defenses both laterally and in-depth, not simply a single line of
defenses—in their May 1940 invasion of France. One of many military art and sciences
lessons promulgated since 1940 is that static defense, with no ability to maneuver, surrenders
the initiative to the offense—the attacking enemy. The attacking enemy can decide when and
where to attack, while the defenders must defend their entire line at all times. A variant on
this lesson is the perception that France placed all her war-delaying bets on the creation of a
zone of defense impenetrable to expected attackers. With those bets, she deprived herself of
defenses elsewhere. The lack of defenses along the French-Belgium border was what the
Germans exploited—the Germans invaded France using a route through neutral Belgium.
These analogies, with their abstractions and omissions of details, are repeated within the
computer security world in the egg-defense model (aka the M&M model)—a hard shell and
soft unprotected interior. The hard shell usually refers to defensive infrastructure facing
exterior threats such as firewalls, ingress & egress filtering and monitoring, and border
intrusion protection and defense systems (IPS/IDS). The soft interior usually refers to the
perceived lack of defenses throughout the rest of an organizations’ infrastructure and the
portions perceived to have no direct contact with the outside world. These analogies are not
wrong per se, but nor are they perfect fits in their choices of what to include and what to
ignore or abstract. Indeed, examining each analogy shows points of comparison from which
it is reasonably apropos to draw lessons learned. Examination also shows points of
dissimilarity, some of which may be substantial enough to require yet another analogy, or
other viewpoints.
Fundamentally, analogical reasoning is a useful tool in the human kit bag of
reasoning skills. Ironically, if there is any cure to the problems of analogical reasoning—
besides not using it at all—the cure lies in more analogical reasoning. Analogies, as
conceptual models, deliberately abstract away details of their subject matter. The application
of multiple analogies, each with their flavors of ‘wrongness’ can provoke the recognition that
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there are few singular correct answers to extant problems—demonstrating George Box’s
truism that “All models are wrong, but some are useful” (1979).
This section of the literature review is not intended to express an opinion that there
are no effects in contested cyber environments. Nor am I opining that contested cyber
environments will leave countries, companies, and people completely unaffected—the people
of Estonia and Georgia were inconvenienced, scared, and forced to adapt. The psychological
effects were present, well reported, and possibly worse than they might have been. Cyber
enabled espionage can, and likely has, led to death and imprisonment of spies, protestors,
opposition parties, as well as the relations of those people. Companies have lost competitive
advantages through loss of intellectual property, suffered loss of trust through data breaches,
and some may have gone bankrupt—clearly effecting the shareholders, employees,
customers, and whatever supply chains of which they were members.
This portion of the review supports the notion that individuals, organizations, and
governments need to spend more effort at making better estimates of ‘badness’ in contested
cyber environments. It asserts that organizations, their leaders and workers, should not accept
assertions that all contested cyber environments are inherently worse than other forms of
risks to which they are accustomed, and to varying degrees, already resilient. Finally, the
review puts forth evidence that short of survivability challenges, contested cyber
environments are not as fundamentally different a mechanism driving adaptation as some
choose to believe. Finally, a recurring them in this section, as well as the entire dissertation is
context matters as does nuance in interpretation and reaction.

Related literature corpus and assessment
Overview
The Literature Review’s Introduction highlighted multiple areas of related work. This
section explains how I came to choose these sources from the corpus of texts, journals, and
conferences I could have chosen.
When collecting sources and literature associated with resilience to contested cyber
environments, it became evident there is a multidisciplinary aspect to the approaches taken
by researchers. I cast a fairly wide net of search terms using Google™, Google Scholar™,
and Web of Science™, using back-citation tracing, and adjusting search terms and patterns
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while reviewing sources. I then input the data into the SNA software called ORA™, from
Carnegie Mellon University’s (CMU) CASOS. ORA™ supports application of social and
network science methods and techniques to the collected data. The collected data included
the following: authors, titles, publishers, journal/source, year, hyperlinks to original articles,
and links to similar articles (as offered by Google Scholar™). Collection of citations, sources,
and books via these web sources lead to over 14,839 unique sources for which this section
provides a review and analysis. Details of the search methodology are in the Literature
Review Bibliometrics appendix starting on page 2-1.
Semantic analysis
Prior to using latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003) and latent
semantic analysis (LSA) (Laundauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998) text analysis options in ORA™,
my hypothesis was there would be links of varying strength between various aspects of
resilience research. The hypothesized links, from intuitions based of 20 years as a computer
scientist and over 10 years in the information assurance arena, are shown in Figure 9. I also
expected that there would be three dominate forms of M&S discussed in the research
literature, depicted as turquoise ovals in the figure.
I expected there would be links between the HRO, general risk management and the
business continuity communities. I presumed there would be links between the business
continuity and disaster management communities as well as the cyber risk management and
the general risk management clusters of authors and topics. I also assessed there would be
links between the business continuity community and the organizational behavior and
learning communities—after all, continuity of operations in the face of adversity is a learning
experience if ever there was one! Finally, I had a hypothesized that there would be stronger
and more numerous links between the cyber risk management community and the M&S
community, than between M&S and the other groups. Within the M&S field, I expected to
find three main families of stochastic simulations: agent based, system dynamics, and
discrete event. I also expected that the generalized cluster of M&S would contain many of
the same references that serve as the foundational pillars of modeling and simulations.
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Figure 9: Intuition based clustering and links between clusters of the Literature Corpus

The descriptive statistics for the collected citations and their respective meta-data are
in Table 6.
This review is not a review of 14,800+ articles’ concepts. The section is a
demonstration using various network analytics that there are both links between various
research communities and the absence of links that should reasonably exist through shared
and common interests. Though LSA and LDA both require a researcher to assert, a priori,
the number of clusters to which the algorithm should apply, I did not have strong evidence
that Figure 9 was accurate. I created the figure using intuitions from 20 years exposure to the
fields of computer science, computer engineering, risk management, information and
computer security, operations planning and contingency planning. As such, I ran LSA using
ORA™ for topic counts that ranged from 3 to 11, inclusive. I did the same for LDA using
5,000 iterations, a step size of 100, and β=0.01.
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of citations collected for
literature review

Total Number of articles
Number of books 8
Number of ‘citations’ 9
Authors
Concepts
Journals
Publishers
Schools
Websites
Years
Networks
Links
Total Density

LSA (see also Figure 10 through
Figure 15) was able to generate

14,838
796
1,091
19,750
4,276
5,013
755
272
743
43

meaningful fully connected graphs with
starting with 6 topics. The 6 topic LSA
graph (Figure 10) depicts a fully
connected graph though the intra topic
links as well as the inter-top links are
generally weak links. The 7 topic LSA
graph (Figure 11) is also fully connected

53
15,635,378
0.75%

though the far left topic is only weakly
connected to the remainder of the graph
through a single shared node—
“risk_assessment.” This graph however

does reveal stronger intra topic links. The remaining topics have multiple inter topic links
indicating shared concepts between topics. Of note is the topic of “simulation” does not
occur using LSA until the number of topics rises to 10—indicating that Figure 9 is overly
optimistic in establishing strong links between other key words. This lack of such a central
topic for this dissertation is one indicator that the dissertation is providing an additional link
between research topics.

8

Generally identified within Google Scholar with the [B] or [BOOK] prefix in front of titles, as well as texts
encountered by the author during readings and included in the search criteria as deliberate inclusion items
9
Generally identified within Google Scholar with the [C] or [CITATION] prefix in front of scholars, or
citations pulled from web sites such as citeseer.org. These entries also do not generally have a readily accessible
copy of the original source material available via the internet.
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Figure 10: LSA 6 topics, top 10 members/topic

Figure 13: LSA 9 topics, top 10 members/topic

Figure 11: LSA 7 topics, top 10 members/topic

Figure 14: LSA 10 topics, top 10 members/topic

Figure 12: LSA 8 topics, top 10 members/topic

Figure 15: LSA 11 topics, top 10 members/topic

Since the 10 members per topic LSA groupings are the first to incorporate this key aspect
of the dissertation (M&S), it is appropriate to conduct a comparison with the graphic shown in
Figure 16 to the topic-connections shown in Figure 9. Within Figure 16, the light blue nodes are
the topics (labeled with the concept with the highest value) and the yellow nodes are the highest
valued concepts that the LSA algorithm found when performing single value decomposition
(SVD) on the concept x document matrix. The links’ colors vary by value (red highest, blue
lowest, with even distribution of color assignment) and the link value scales the link width.
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Figure 16: ORA™ generated LSA analysis of collected citations with 10 topics.

This depiction of automated analysis compares somewhat favorably to the intuition
depicted in Figure 9 for some clusters as well as some of the inter-cluster links. Supply-chains
and the management of supply chain risk appear to align with the upper right topic of “model”
while overlapping organizational learning. Modeling and Simulation does not appear as its own
topic, but is a related node to the “response” topic in the center of the figure that also overlaps
with organizational learning, but does not otherwise link any of the other topics—the cause of
which remains unexplored. The originally expected notion of resilience appears in the “challenge”
topic at the lower right. Related words of “case study” as well as the absence of any first or
second order links to simulation are reflective of the room for improvement in the use of
simulation in studying and assessing resilience. High Reliability Organizations, as sociotechnical
systems appears to align with the LSA topic of “sys” (short for system) center-left of the figure.
The associated terms disaster, emergency, and process lend credence to that alignment as well.
The “Knowledge” topic, bottom center-right, aligns with the originally expected concept of
generalized risk management while the “change” topic, bottom left, aligns with the cyber risk
management. The originally expected organizational learning also appears to align itself with the
LSA derived “practice” concept, though like the literature itself, the learning appears to be more
market oriented than cyber event preparedness.
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Figure 16 depicts graphically that there is indeed a gap between the research about
organizational resilience (how organizations learn and adapt to adverse events) and research into
cyber risk management. Until researchers begin to bridge these and other gaps, there is
significant opportunity for duplicated work, missed findings, and other research inefficiencies.
There is also room for better integrating general risk management research with resilience
research and organization learning—the fit seems natural, and its conspicuous absence should
serve as the basis for calls for broad agency announcements or requests for proposals.
LDA (see also Figure 17 through Figure 22) was unable to generate fully connected
graphs until 13 topics. The 8 topic to 12 topic applications of the LDA algorithm generated
graphs with 2, 3, or more components. Since the 13 topic LDA iteration was the first to generate
a fully connected graph, a comparison with the intuition-based graphic shown in Figure 9 is
appropriate. Like Figure 16, within Figure 22 the light blue nodes are the topics (labeled with the
concept with the highest value) and the yellow nodes are the highest valued concepts that the
LDA algorithm found when executing. The links’ colors vary by value (red highest, blue lowest,
with even distribution of color assignment) and the link value scales the link width.
The upper left topic, labeled “cyber” is likely generated from the number of sources
discussing the future of warfare augmented with cyber warfare. I had not included a “cyber war”
node in the expected model, as it seemed a degenerate inclusion. The center-top topic of
“worldwide” aligns, with overlaps, the expected organizational behavior node. The “adaptation”
node on the right-center of the figure aligns, especially when combined with its neighbor “info,”
to the notion of organizational learning and adaptation. Of interest is the lack of direct link
between these two nodes and the node in the center-bottom labeled “resilience.” This lack again
indicates a gap between the resilience research and organizational adaptation and learning fields.
There is a weak link between the “resilience” node and the system node on the left-center of the
figure, also indicating a weak link between simulations and resilience areas of study.
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Figure 17: LDA 8 topics, top 10 members/topic

Figure 20: LDA 11 topics, top 10 members/topic

Figure 18: LDA 9 topics, top 10 members/topic

Figure 21: LDA 12 topics, top 10 members/topic

Figure 19: LDA 10 topics, top 10 members/topic

Figure 22: LDA 13 topics, top 10 members/topic
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Figure 23: ORA™ generated LDA analysis of collected citations with 13 topics

Network Analysis
ORA™ uses network analytics to help analysts identify Key Entities. Depending on
the nature of the underlying quantity and nature of the underlying data, analysts can attain a
higher confidence that their interpretations of the data attain at least face validity. With face
validity, they can then use multiple forms of analysis to triangulate results and gain further
confidence.
Key Entities
ORA™’s Key Entity functionality is unique across the various forms of social
network analysis software and tools. The Key Entity functionality uses as many of the 170+
measures in ORA™’s repertoire, as the underlying data can support. For each measure,
ORA™ stores a user-specified number of nodes (the default is 3) with the highest calculated
values. For each set of measures applicable to the various node types (e.g., measures
applicable to agents) in the data set, ORA™ then calculates the percentage frequency each of
those high-value nodes appear in each measure. The ORA™ report then displays the number
of nodes the user specified from the list of nodes’ with calculated values. The advantage to
this approach is that individual measures may correlate with each other or have high intermeasure variability (Borgatti, Carley, & Krackhardt, 2006; Kathleen M. Carley, 2002d;
Frantz & Carley, 2005). However, when nodes are consistently in the top-place ranks
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aggregated across multiple measures, analysts can reasonably have more confidence in the
relevance of those nodes to their questions of interest.
In set notation, Key Entities reports in ORA™ follow the steps below. Equations (3)
and (4) define the nodes and edges respectively. Equation (5) defines the set of possible
measures applicable to the available nodes and edge.
 = { node } = { n1 ,n 2 , ... n  }

(3)

Equation 3: Node set definition in set notation

 = { edges } edgen1  edgesn1  n1 ,* , *, n1 

(4)

Equation 4: Edge set definition in set notation

  measure ,  measure ,   

(5)

Equation 5: Measures set definition in set notation

Each node-level measure (as distinguished from a network-level measure that
generates a single value) generates a set of real values where each value’s place in the set
corresponds to the place in the node set of the node being assessed as shown in (6). In other
words, a real value b1 in (6) corresponds to a value calculated using node n1 in (3).

{

∀m ∈  , m = {ℜ} = b1 , b2 ,..., b 

}

(

bi = m ni , edgesni

)

(6)

Equation 6: A measure’s output definition in set notation

For the measure m calculated in (6), the top x calculated values are retained, realizing
that each of those values represent the node from which it was calculated. This retention of
the top x values is shown in (7) for any arbitrary measure m as is the mapping from real value
b1 to node1. The set of nodes corresponding to the top x calculated values is shown in (8).



  max1.. x m  x, max x b1 , b2 ,..., b



bi  ni

(7)

Equation 7: A set of maximum values from a measure’s output in set notation

  na , nb ,..., nx 
Equation 8: A set of node identifiers corresponding to maximum values from a single measure in set notation

Across all relevant measures, the algorithm builds a set of top rank nodes as shown in
(9). The algorithm then builds a set of values using every node in the graph. It counts the
number of times each node in  appears in the set , divides by the number of measures and
achieves the percentage of measures the node has achieved a top ranked value. This set of
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(8)

values is shown in (10). Finally the algorithm takes the top x values from , relates them
back to their contributing node identifier, and presents the identifiers to the analyst as shown
in (12).
   m , m   

(9)

Equation 9: A set of measures’ results as sets of node identifiers in set notation

1

  n   ,

 0
m

n  m 

otherwise



(10)

Equation 10: Calculating the frequency of occurrence a node is in the maximum value set of all relevant
measures

 freq  max1.. x    x, max x T1 , T2 ,...Tx  Ti  ni

(11)

Equation 11: A set of maximum frequency of occurrence values in set notation

  ke1 , ke2 ,..., kex 
Equation 12: A set of node identifiers corresponding to maximum frequency of occurrence values in set
notation

When performing this function across the data collected for the corpus of citations,
ORA™ helps identify the following key entities. The figures below offer another way to
visualize the key entities describe by the equations above. In particular and of note, there are
no dominant (i.e., an author or Journal or other entity that reaches higher than fifty percent
(50%) across all the various applicable measures. This result reinforces the perception that
there is significant room for research, Journals, and publishers to increase their crossdiscipline research as well as apply and absorb completed research from outside their
primary areas of focus.
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(12)

Figure 24: Key entity 'Author'

Figure 25: Key entity 'Journal'
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Figure 26: Key entity 'Publisher'

Figure 27: Key entity 'Article'

Co-Authorship Networks
The full visualization of the co-authorship network (i.e., the graph such that an edge
between two author nodes indicates a shared authorship and the weight of the edge indicating
the number of distinct co-authorship efforts) is a undifferentiated ball of nodes and edges
with the vast majority of nodes involved in dyads or triads with edge weights of one (1).
However, when I added a progressively higher filter on the edge weights that hide all edges
below the filter threshold, the graph rapidly degenerates into very small clusters of authors
who write with each other. At filter weight of less than 2 (see Figure 29) there are a small
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number of such clusters that form author-strings or more traditional core-periphery networks.
With the filter set to hide edges with less than a weight of 3.5 and hiding isolates, a
disconnected graph remains (see Figure 29 for the unzoomed view, and Figure 30 for the
zoomed in view) making it easier to see that very few cross-domain co-authorship efforts
exist in the realm of organizational reliance to adverse cyber environments. When I added
pendant nodes back into the graphs, the co-authorship networks remain unconnected (as
expected) except for clusters of prolific authors, as shown in Figure 31. Adding the pendants
into the graph depicts the increased opportunity for collaboration by adding related authors.

Figure 28: Zoomed in co-authorship network, edges
with weight < 2 hidden, zoomed in on prolific author
clusters

Figure 29: co-authorship network, edges with weight
< 3.5 hidden, pendants removed, not zoomed in

Figure 30: Zoomed in co-authorship network, edges with weight < 3.5 hidden, with pendants removed, zoomed in
on prolific authors
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Figure 31: Zoomed in co-authorship network, edges with weight < 3.5 hidden, with pendants remaining,, zoomed in
on prolific authors

Co-Citation Networks
The full visualization of the Co-Citation network (i.e., the graph such that an edge
between two article nodes indicates a shared citation and the weight of the edge indicating the
number of distinct shared citations) is more akin to a head of cauliflower (see Figure 32) than an
undifferentiated ball of nodes and edges. There are clearly distinct clusters of well-cited articles
surrounded by increasingly less sparse connections between shared article citations. The cocitation network for books and articles (see Figure 33 on the next page) shows a much less
connected collection of co-citations between articles and books with the vast majority of nodes
involved in dyads or triads with link weights of one (1).

Figure 32: Co-citation network of article x article, no filtering
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Figure 33: Co-citation network of article x book, no filtering

This Overview has presented bibliometric and textual analysis views of the related
literature supplemented with visual renderings and graphs of the information. While useful,
particularly to depict areas of overlap and under lap, these views need additional supporting
evidence via explication and discussion of specific trends, texts and authors. The remainder of
this section provides a review of literature from each of the clusters identified above.
Risk management
As noted in the beginning of the section Why resilience? Isn’t risk management enough?,
traditional risk management starts with the idea of risk avoidance (K. D. Miller, 1992). There are
other traditional tools of risk management besides avoidance with common ones being:
prevention and reduction, retention, and transfer (Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997; Al-Bahar &
Crandall, 1990).
An organization can avoid a risk if that is a feasible course of action; if there is a risk a
rocket will blow up during launch, the organization could choose not to launch the rocket, much
less attempt to build a rocket. If the organization’s mission is to launch rockets, clearly this is an
infeasible choice. Organizations who missions are supported by cyberspace capabilities may
decide it is equally infeasible to abandon the use of those capabilities in pursuit of their own
requirements.
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If an organization can reduce the probability of occurrence or the impact term in
Equation 1: (on page 24) to near zero, the organization could drive the overall risk to near zero.
To continue the rocket launching analogy, the organization may reduce the probability of an
explosion through rigorous testing of systems and subsystems throughout their performance
envelopes prior to an actual launch. For cyberspace-enabled organizations, they can reduce
probabilities of certain types of event occurrences (e.g., catastrophic engine malfunction, hard
disk failures and loss of data) despite being unable to reduce all events’ probabilities to zero.
Similarly, if the impact term drops to near zero, there is a greatly reduced requirement to reduce
the probability of occurrence to near zero—as the impacts are negligible. For the rocketlaunching organization, they may be able to reduce the impact of a launch vehicle explosion by
having some sort of payload evacuation mechanism such that only the launch vehicle suffers the
impacts—akin to the crew escape system on the Saturn V. For a cyberspace enabled organization,
having fail-over systems and fail-over processes in place may make the impact on primary
systems negligible.
Prevention and reduction are close cousins to avoidance. How much prevention and
reduction an organization should pursue with respect to reducing risk from contested cyber
environments is a question with as many answers are there are variations in organizational
situations. Significant effort has gone into creating and publishing cyber risk management
frameworks. Contributors to the field have been standards bodies (NIST, 2012), Federally
Funded Research and Development Corporation (FFRDC) such as MITRE (MITRE, 2012c) and
Software Engineering Institute (SEI) (Alberts & Dorofee, 2010) as well as individual researchers
(Hoo, 2000; Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010; Ralston, Graham, & Hieb, 2007). Many
of these frameworks offer extensions of the basic models of Equation 1: and Equation 2:.
Some risk management frameworks involve a cycle of identification of possible threats
and the vulnerabilities of organizations’ assets to those threats, identification and implementation
of mitigation measures, and a calculation of residual risks (Hoo, 2000; NIST, 2012; Wallner,
2008). Each of these has a component of the cycle that requires an organization to reduce one or
more terms in the respective equations through implementation of one or more controls—
measures put in place by the organization to cause a reduction in equations’ terms. These riskmitigation phases of the various frameworks’ cycles help reduce the original level(s) of risk to
level(s) that decision makers are willing to accept. Researchers and security practitioners often
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refer to this acceptance of risk after efforts of reducing it as the acceptance of residual risk. Of
course, this comfort level is subject to the usual limits of human decision heuristics: 1)
representativeness, 2) availability of instances or scenarios, and 3) adjustment from anchor
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It also is important to recall that the extensions are cycles, and are
not supposed to be a one-off execution of the process but a periodic, if not continuous exercise
(Siegel, Sagalow, & Serritella, 2002).
Retention may often be a more practical form of risk management than the other three
tools, as well as the fundamental last active step of a risk management process. An example of
risk retention is the fact that the US Government retains the risk of loss of physical assets such as
buildings, equipment, and other tangible items ("48 CFR Parts 202, 203, 211, et al.," 2011;
USHR, 2012). The USG does not purchase insurance as a protection mechanism. There are
undoubtedly many reasons for this governmental lack of transfer, but difficulties with
enumerating the number of physical assets that embody the cyber and IT infrastructure (such as
those experienced with the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) (Musich, 2001)), the states of
repair, and precautions against loss or damage surely contribute to the challenge. I found no
evidence of efforts to study whether the US government could sufficiently inform an insurance
company of the types and quantities of cyber assets the government owns and operates;
presumably the probability it could do so is small.
Risk transfer is a time-honored form of risk management by which the risk becomes a
commoditized item: there are sellers and buyers of risk, with each side of the transaction
attempting to reduce losses. The various insurance industries that exist around the globe are in
the business of selling protection from downside risk, while charging their customers enough to
cover losses and make profits. Cyber risk transfer markets are beginning to develop with
supporting research (Bandyopadhyay, Mookerjee, & Rao, 2009; Böhme, 2005; Böhme & Kataria,
2006) at the consumer level and at the corporate level (D. R. Cohen & Anderson, 2000)—though
a Chubb Group of Insurance Companies survey found 65 percent of companies forgo cyber risk
transfer (Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 2012).
Of these four tools, risk transfer and the acceptance of residual risk come closest to
explicitly acknowledging that risk is not zero, and that there is nonzero probability of negative
events occurring. Being able to rehearse for and adapt to those negative events is not explicitly
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part of the tools for cyber risk management, as such rehearsals and adaptations frequently occur
outside the areas of expertise of the cyber subject matter experts (SMEs).
Risk management frameworks
Risk management frameworks develop a common language for practitioners of risk
management. Many frameworks have names or identifiers published by standards organizations
such as Institute Organization of Standards (ISO) 31000 A Structured Approach to Enterprise
Risk Management (ERM), NIST Special Publication 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002) or SEI’s
Enterprise Risk Management Integrated Framework (Alberts & Dorofee, 2010). Some of these
are deliberately general and do not explicitly reference cyber risk management, while others are
very specific about including IT and cyber in risk management planning, such as the DoD
Directive (DODD) 8500.01E Information Assurance (Department of Defense, 2007) and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6510.01F Information Assurance and
Support to Computer Network Defense (Joint Staff J6, 2011).
Miller (1992) also developed a comprehensive risk management framework specifically
for international companies which are using information technology to enable their operations.
Despite this use of IT, the primary references to technology in Miller’s framework seem to relate
to whether competitors will produce a technical innovation in products or processes, not how the
organization adapts to degradation of its IT capabilities.
The frameworks above, and others I am aware of, implicitly treat change in the operating
environment as a nearly ever-present phenomenon. The implicitness is communicated in the
admonishments to risk-managers and organization leaders to treat risk management as a neverending cycle of activities. However, the lack of explicit planning and rehearsing for lowprobability negative events reduces the efficacy of these frameworks in establishing mission
assurance. Another drawback to frameworks, despite the as-designed cyclic nature, is the data
supporting assessment with compliance to the framework tends to be snap-shot in time data, not
a continuous data stream or constant assessment. This lack of continuous assessment means that
compliance to framework requirements are lagging indicators of risk reduction where the lag
could be days to weeks and sometimes longer. This lag between data collection and
transformation to information also reduces the confidence in mission assurance assessments.
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High Reliability Organizations (HROs)
What makes HROs fundamentally different from learn-throughexperience/experimentation organizations —those able and willing to learn from errors with less
than existential consequence (La Porte & Consolini, 1991)? Early research of HROs used
examples of high-costs-of-failure operations such as US Navy aircraft carrier flight deck
operations and Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) control tower operations as motivating
examples (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1989). Two characterizations from (Roberts,
Rousseau, & La Porte, 1993) encapsulate those difference: (1) HROs tend to focus on process
reliability because outcomes are impossible to achieve without the process—carrier flight deck
operations would be an exemplar; (2) HROs tend to have expectations of high-tempo for
sustained periods of time while maintaining their ability to do so—air traffic control being a
prime exemplar. Research into HROs over the last thirty years has flourished, extending into
fields as diverse as medical practice (Ash, Berg, & Coiera, 2004; Baker, Day, & Salas, 2006),
and disaster and emergency planning (Crichton et al., 2009; Lally, 2013) as well as post facto
explorations as to event causation (e.g., Shrivastava’s book on Bhopal (1987) as well as post
space shuttle Challenger research (Kathleen M. Carley, 1991)).
One of the more interesting, though difficult to model, aspects of HROs is the multiple
forms of self-organization they take on. Structures that correspond to routine operations differ
from those in peak-loading conditions, which in turn differ from in extremis conditions (Roberts,
1989, 1990). Unfortunately, for organizations that do not perceive themselves as operating in
these conditions, there appears to be less willingness to transform successful HRO practices than
might be fruitful. Though the specific organizations in this dissertation are not HROs, the ability
of agents in the simulation of this dissertation to not be restricted to a single form of
organizational structure can represent this simultaneous structuration seen with HROs.
Supply Chain Management and Resilience
Supply Chain Management (SCM) is a field that enjoys a rich history dating to the early
1980s (Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh, 1997). A founding idea behind SCM was the
interorganizational control of costs associated with inventory (Cooper et al., 1997; Min & Zhou,
2002). The International Center for Competitive Excellence defined SCM as “the integration of
business processes from end user through original suppliers that provides products, services and
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information that add value for customers” (Cooper et al., 1997). Implicit in this definition, and its
surrounding literature, is the need to control, mitigate, and adapt to the risks faced by companies
with supply chains. Though Cooper et al.’s literature review reveals differing opinions of scope,
she points out that there is widespread agreement about the need for information systems
integration, planning and control activities. Indeed, of the seven authors she presents
comparing/contrasting SCM and business process reengineering perspectives (Houlihan, Stevens,
Cooper and Ellram, Hammer & Champy, Andrews and Stalic, Hewitt, and Towers), all consider
IT structure supporting information flow a critical component of their research and business
practices (Cooper et al., 1997). Yet the notion of resilience, of ensuring these optimized and
efficient systems can adapt to unexpected environments is present only by implication,
suggesting a gap in awareness of the need to balance optimality and efficiency (Gunderson,
2003; D. D. Woods & Branlat, 2011).
One of the principal tools of exploration in this field is empirical study. One popular
alternative to empirical study is computerized M&S (Swaminathan, Smith, & Sadeh, 1998). Min
and Zhou’s review of M&S of SCM divides the various forms of M&S into four categories; the
traditional deterministic and stochastic models, a hybrid model of the two, and IT-driven (2002).
The use of IT-driven models (e.g., near-real time monitoring of various stages in the chain, as
well as near-real-time adjustments to process) also exposes SCM practitioners to risks, in
particular the triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (G. E. Smith et al., 2007). For
supply chains that use IT to drive or enable specialization versus generalization, any event that
creates effects within the CIA triad puts those chains at risk of imbalance (D. D. Woods &
Branlat, 2011).
Reductions in costs, improvements in customer service, faster speed to market, and more
efficient use of resources are all measurable by-products of the exploitation of robust cyber
environments (G. E. Smith et al., 2007). Given these documented benefits, how do SCM
practitioners protect themselves for the inevitable problems within cyber environments?
As early as 2003, calls emerged to shift from the traditional views of risk assessment,
business continuity planning, and crisis management to an approach where ‘risk management’ is
embedded with SCM and other operations—to enable earlier anticipation and mitigation to risks
(Jüttner, Peck, & Christopher, 2003). Jüttner also advocated for looking at the points of origin for
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risk, which fell into three categories: organization, network, and environment. The links between
organizations in the supply chain, the network source, and environmental risks (e.g., natural
events, socio-political events) drew particular attention as neglected areas of research (DHS,
2011; Jüttner et al., 2003; G. E. Smith et al., 2007). DHS and several of the national laboratories
are making progress with constructing simulations that address portions of the supply chains, in
particular the electricity and gas markets, by considering them as complex adaptive systems
(CAS) (Peerenboom & Fisher, 2007). Though these and other CAS simulations have worked at
integrating market reactions into these efforts, there remains a key challenge of integrating
nonindustry specific actors as well as human agents into the simulations.
There remains the ongoing challenge of assessing the impacts of contested cyber
environments generally (DHS, 2011), and within supply chains specifically. Published
consequences from the supply chain community of practitioners are primarily anecdotal in nature
(G. E. Smith et al., 2007), or estimations of costs that leave much of their methodology to the
imagination of the readers. In short, SCM practitioners are still working on identifying how to
assure themselves of the efficacy of their business practices and models in contested cyber
environments.
In response to these difficulties and the growing awareness of dependencies on entire
networks of related organizations and technologies, supply chain management literature has seen
a growth in the idea of disruption management (Pereira, 2009) as championed by Christensen
(Christensen, 2006).
Computer Security and Resilience
In many surface-level discussions of computer security, the participants implicitly
assume that secure cyber systems are resilient, as no attacks can affect them. A single question
will generally disabuse the conversationalists of their simplistic, and naïve notion, “Security
from what, for whom, for how long, and at what opportunity costs?” Such a question often
results in muttering and stumbling attempts to elucidate an answer. Alternatively, security
requirements could drive the discussion (Bishop, 2003) of what constitutes ‘security’. We’ll
defer whether to measure, what to measure and how to measure efforts to meet these
requirements to later in this dissertation.
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Inherent in any security plan should be some residual acknowledgement of possible
failure—of one of the dreaded D’s (i.e., destruction, denial, degradation, disruption, and
deception). Short of destruction, an organization should be confident in the ability to continue
functioning despite the event, ideally during but minimally after the event is over. This is the
“recover from” “misfortune or change” portion of the definition of resilience at the beginning of
this paper. But is the ability to restore functionality what a computer scientist, system developer
or programmer perceives when she hears ‘computer security?’ Depending on her background
and the context, she could perceive a definition akin to a “reasonable assurance that the complete
system will function (only) as required and intended, despite hostile activity” (Horning, 2009).
This definition, especially in computer science circles, supports component level design and
analysis (Bishop et al., 2011). It’s a reasonable starting place for a profession inculcated with
problem decomposition and step-wise refinement. But the definition shortchanges unplanned
interactions between technology components as well as unplanned use by humans (Rinaldi,
Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001). Nor does Horning’s definition support a holistic approach to
security as a sociotechnical problem, where humans and human organizations interact with
components of technology and webs of interconnected technology. This web of interconnected
humans and technology is extremely close to characteristics of HROs—minus the tendency of
HROs to focus on process before product.
Earlier, I used a definition from Merriam-Webster for resilience. The definition implicitly
requires that the event or events affecting the system not totally destroy it—pieces and parts
maybe, but if the overall system of interest no longer exists, is clearly not resilient, nor was it
survivable. Unlike (Bishop et al., 2011; Pimm, 1984), it is important to note that the “or adapts to”
portion of definition offers the possibility that the system or systems of interest do not return to
pre-event performance! In cases where a system is capable of adapting, it is feasible, and
possibility desirable, that the adaptation is permanent, or at least not abandoned at the first
opportunity. In addition to Merriam-Webster, a quick review of other definitions, and more
importantly ways of assessing those definitions, is appropriate.
Assessing resilience
Assessing resilience is essential for communicating to organizational leaders how its
definition applies to their organization. A quick review of ways various industries and research
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realms define the concept is fruitful at this point. In ecology circles, generally applied to ecosystems and the study of species, there appear to be two main variants to the definition of
resilience (Perrings, 1998). One is a measure of how fast a stable system returns to its
equilibrium following a perturbation, and there is no definition of resilience for unstable systems
(Pimm, 1984). This makes the concept easily susceptible to measurement, in some unit of time,
and requires some idea of whether the measured time is acceptable or not. The other variant
assesses the magnitude of perturbation that a system can absorb while still persisting, what
Holling referred to as “ecological resilience” (1973). This form of assessment may be
measurable, depending on the nature of the perturbation. M&S readily supports Pimm’s
definition while Holling’s definition is more applicable to an assessment of cybersystem
survivability more than resilience—a lack of persistence implies system destruction, and a
destroyed system is clearly not able to recover from or adapt to the perturbation.
Within the computer technology industry and academia, resilience also has multiple
interpretations. In the virtualization of computer resources industry, resilience is another flavor
of availability (Gilpin, 2008). In this incarnation, the ‘up-time’ of the capability or systems of
interest is also easily measured, both during and after cyber attacks or events. This is clearly not
a sufficient indicator of adaptability to misfortune or change, as there are plenty of events that
could disrupt organizations without making the systems they use nonavailable. Others theorists
assert, “Being resilient to an attack, [means] we are stressing the ability of the system to recover
from the impacts of this attack or at least to maintain the potential of autonomous recovery”
(Bishop et al., 2011). The first half of this definition is akin to Pimm’s return to equilibrium,
though Bishop’s has a clear expectation that the equilibrium is equal to the pre-event levels. Such
an expectation may be too restrictive, as complex adaptive systems should be able to learn new
behaviors, and once learned, they cannot reasonably be un-learned. Nor is it clear that a universal
requirement for autonomous recovery is necessary for all organizations.
Some in business management community, view resilience as a capacity for continuous
reconstruction and requires systematic preference of innovation over perpetuation of the status
quo (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). This can also be reflected in Equation 13. This definition
might be measurable and assessed assuming reasonable estimations of each term are feasible,
while organizations desire to decrease the magnitude of the denominator while increasing the
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magnitude of the numerator. In other words, reducing the time, expense, and emotional energy
associated with transformations is a clear way of increasing resilience in uncertain environments.
Resilience =

f ( strategic   
transformation × strategic transformation frequency )
f ( time, expense,    energyemotional )

(13)

Equation 13: Resilience as a function of the magnitude of transformation, the frequency of transformation, time,
expense, and emotional energy

The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) defines resilience as “the adaptive
capacity of an organization in a complex and changing environment” with two explanatory notes,
one for organizations and one for systems. Note 1 states: “resilience is the ability of an
organization to resist being affected by an event or the ability to return to an acceptable level of
performance in an acceptable period of time after being affected by an event.” Note 2 states
“resilience is the capability of a system to maintain its functions and structure in the face of
internal and external change and to degrade gracefully when it must” (American National
Standards Institute (ANSI), 2009). All three of these slightly different flavors do not immediately
lend themselves to straightforward measurement or assessment. Organizations have to have a
coherent model of their functions and structure to support this definition or find and use
measurable proxies for these concepts.
The US government is also not immune to creating definitions, as the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) defines resilience as “for cyber defense purposes, having sufficient
capacity to simultaneously collect or receive and assess security information, execute any ACOA
(Automated Courses of Action] make alterations to the ACOA as needed, and sustain agreed
upon service levels” (DHS, 2011). This definition, like the ANSI definition, presupposes a way
of measuring organizational capacities as well as predicting the impacts of various events on
those capacities. While definitions must of necessity be concise, the DHS definition simply begs
for clarification and expansion—which requires another 29 pages to explicate.
What is clear from discussion so far is that resilience to contested cyber environments
means a number of things to different audiences—there is no singular definition applicable
across all possible contexts. What is apparent however, is interested audiences should not treat
resilience as an isolated static measure independent of time. Instead, it incorporates time, effects
of perturbations, and the maintenance of function during perturbations and adaptation to those
perturbations. There are no Newtonian laws of adaption that require the adaptations be
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permanent. Nor are there universal asymptotic equations constraining adaptations to preperturbation levels of performance. These realizations lead us to a short review of non-HRO
treatments of organizations learning and behavior—how collections of people learn and behave,
especially in stressful environments.
Organizational Learning and Behavior
Industry and academia have well established that organizations learn and Huber’s
literature review does an excellent job reviewing the history of experiential learning of
organizations (Huber, 1991). There is significant evidence that the learning is nonlinear, is often
based on myths and stories, and is at times mal-adaptive (Cyert & March, 1963; B. Levitt &
March, 1988; March, 1991). There is also evidence that organizations behave differently in
ambiguous and unambiguous environments (March & Olsen, 1975; Padgett, 1980) as well as
evidence that individuals call on different relationships and information gathering mechanisms in
times of uncertainty and ambiguity (Saint-Charles & Mongeau, 2009). The entire field of
organizational learning and behavior is well beyond the scope of this review, so I constrain the
remainder of this section to research on organizational learning and behavior that includes
organizations’ information technology and cyber resources.
Researchers have shown organizational structure (both formal and informal structure)
effects learning and adaptation. Padgett found that the heads of hierarchies can best influence
their organizations by focusing more on who they pick to run their various subordinate
organizations than on trying to make decisions themselves (Padgett, 1980). Organizational
structure, the relationships and links between the members of the organization and links between
organizations, also plays a role in learning. Hierarchies, though non-optimal in many measures
of organizational performance, tend to be more resilient to certain types of turbulence (e.g.,
personnel turnover/turbulence) than other structures (Kathleen M. Carley, 1992). The reader may
also recall the seeming paradoxes associated with HRO research contrasted with traditional
organization theory. The first is HROs tend to use significant quantities of advanced technology
that requiring specialization yet HROs also exhibit high degrees of interdependence that requires
generalist understanding. The second is that HROs tend to have high task interdependency
despite operating in high variability environments (Roberts, 1989, 1990).
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Wade & Hulland, in their review of organizational learning and information technology
literature (2004), used the resource-based view (RBV) of organizations. In this view, IT systems
are tangible assets while the knowledge to run those systems, the knowledge stored in those
systems about how the organization runs and operates are capabilities of the organization. He
also discusses multiple research products that demonstrate that IT systems, and the capabilities
represented in them often play distinct roles in gaining initial competitive advantage and
sustaining long term advantage (Wade & Hulland, 2004). Unfortunately, Wade, Huber, nor
Damanpour’s (1991) literature reviews include research on IT dependent or enabled
organizations when those resources are degraded or no longer available. Neither does the metaanalysis model built by Damanpour’s (Damanpour, 1991) integrated inclusion then disruption of
cyber resources.
Research on the use of information technology, or other cyber capabilities, to enable
communications within organizations, especially to facilitate adaptation also has a robust history.
Empirical studies on adoption of information technology go back over thirty years (Orlikowski
& Gash, 1994). The data sample driving this review has over 130 articles with more than 100
citations each in the data sample dealing with technology relating to adaptation and learning.
Miller showed that even in primitive environments, any communications mechanism will
improve performance and having more robust communications will increase performance (J. H.
Miller & Moser, 2004), while Carley (1995) and Haythornthwaite (2005) have studied and
demonstrated that mass communication technologies can encourage common homogeneous
culture, but only as an eventuality—that the near term can suffer in increase in heterogeneity and
loss of consensus. Martin et al asserted via simulation that the degree of information error and
the degree of communications network intermittency interact to reduce decision accuracy in
organizations across random structural designs (Martin, Morgan, Joseph, & Carley, 2010).
Interestingly, they discern statistically significant impacts on decision accuracy by
communications media only in the extreme cases of information error (e.g., all accurate, all
inaccurate) (Martin et al., 2010), which implies that organizations are resilient along this measure
of performance. This finding of accurate learning and performance being independent of
organizational structure is in contrast to Carley’s determination that training and structure are
statistically important, as is the location of the communication’s breakdown (Kathleen M. Carley,
1991).
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Surprisingly, there appears to be very small quantities of research directed at use of IT in
degraded or destroyed environments. Among the studies of adaptation to disruption and loss of
communications networks are those focused on flow disruption (Saltysiak & Levis, 2012) and
development of decision support systems (Saltysiak & Levis, 2012; Snediker, Murray, &
Matisziw, 2008) and efforts to setup taxonomies of mission impacts from cyber events(Grimaila,
Mills, & Fortson, 2013; Musman, Temin, Tanner, Fox, & Pridemore, 2010).
A close cousin to organizational learning is organizational assessment. There is a field of
science that has grown up around assessing organizations, what they have learned and their
effectiveness at their missions. Unfortunately, organizational effectiveness, in addition to going
through a near death experience in the early 1980s, has the problem of exactly who is measuring
what and to what standards (Cameron, 1986). In addition, like resilience, there is the debate
about when to study—before events or after. In the case of organizational effectiveness,
researchers tend to examine well-established companies with less emphasis on new and
dynamically expanding organizations (Quinn & Cameron, 1983). In the case of examining
resilience to contested cyber environments, researchers focus on the direct monies loss, estimates
of future monies missed, and estimates of indirect costs such as damage to reputation or trust.
These have the disadvantage of being poor and opaque proxies for organizational impacts (DHS,
2011; Jüttner et al., 2003). Judging by scarcity of published materials, researchers are not yet
looking at the ways the companies adapted to the contested environment and demonstrated
resilience to their misfortune(s).
As noted by Huber (1991), the organizational learning literature has an enormous breadth,
and over 20 years later there are still gaps to explore. The documents in the collected sample,
plus additional and refined searching, have still lead to a paucity of research of organizational
learning and adaptation to contested cyber environments. This paucity seems to be a natural area
of research to bridge between resilience engineering, risk management, and cyber risk
management.
Social Network Analysis, Metanetworks, and Dynamic Network Analysis
The representation of collections of humans interacting with other humans, and the
systematic study of those representations is an old and widely practiced field. Since the midtwentieth century, a common description of this study has earned the name Social Network
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Analysis (Freeman, 1977, 1979). These representations most frequently take the form of single
mode networks, or graphs comprised of links and nodes. In single mode networks, each node is a
person and the people under study belong to a single class—there are not distinct types of people
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Two mode networks within traditional SNA usually refers to the
interactions of two distinct types or groups of people (Wasserman & Iacobucci, 1991), such as
doctors interacting with nurses, or intravenous drug users interacting with their sexual partners
(Williams & Johnson, 1993). A sample of SNA metrics that researchers apply to the graph
models of human interactions is below in Table 8 drawn from (Kathleen M. Carley, 2011).
Multimode analysis usually supports a richer understanding of the human groups of interest than
single mode and I provide a brief review below.
Metanetworks and Metanetwork Analysis are an extension of SNA and a modification of
the definition of multimode network. In metanetworks, multimode networks are networks with
numerous distinct node types, e.g., agents, resources, tasks, and knowledge. From the three-node
type instantiation (Krackhardt & Carley, 1998) it progressed to a four-node version (Kathleen M.
Carley, 2002a; Kathleen M. Carley & Krackhardt, 1999) similar to that shown below in Figure
34 to the nine (9) node-type version shown in Table 7 (Lanham, Morgan, & Carley, 2011a)
derived from (Kathleen M. Carley, 2002a; Diesner & Carley, 2005) which is its current state.
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Table 7: Nine (9) node metanetwork and their internode link interpretations 10

Networks
Agent

Knowledge

Resource

Node Types

Task

Event

Node Types
Agent

Knowledge

Resource

Task

Event

Organization

Location

Role

Belief

Social
“Who
knows
who”

Knowledge
“Who knows
what”

Capabilities
“Who has
what”

Assignment
“Who does
what”

Attendance
“Who attends
what”

Membership
“Who belongs to
what org”

Agent Location
“Who is where”

Role
“Who has what
roles”

Belief
“Who believes
what”

Information
“What informs
what”

Training
“What
resources are
needed for
training”
Substitution
“What can
replace what”

Knowledge
Requirements
“What
knowledge is task
critical”
Resource
Requirements
“What tasks
require what”

Education
“What event
teaches what”

Organizational
Knowledge
“What org knows
what”

Knowledge
Location
“Where is what
learned”

Knowledge
Influence
“What knowledge
informs what?”

Event
Requirements
“What events
require what”

Organizational
Capability
“What org can do
what”

Resource
Location
“Where is what”

Task Precedence
“What must
happen before
what”

Event Agenda
“What tasks
occur at what?”

Organizational
Assignment
“What org does
what”
Organizational
Responsibility
“What org is
putting on what”

Task Location
“Where is what
done”

Inter-Organization
“What org works
with what”

Organization
Location
“Where is the
organization”
Proximity
“What is near
what”

Role
Requirements
“What must be
known to
perform what”
Role
Requirements
“Who needs
what resource
to do what ”
Role
Assignment
“What roles do
what”
Role-Event
Requirements
“What roles are
often present at
what”
Organization
Role
“What org has
what roles”
Location Roles
“What roles are
common
where”

Event
Precedence
“What events
happen before
what”

Organization

Location

Inter-Role
“Who knows
what”

Roles

Beliefs

10

Event Location
“Where is what
event”

(Lanham, Morgan, et al., 2011a) and derived from (Kathleen M. Carley, 2002a; Diesner & Carley, 2005)
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Resource Beliefs
“What beliefs are
required to use
what”
Belief
Requirements
“What beliefs
require what tasks”
Belief Attendance
“What beliefs
influence
participation at
what”
Organizational
Culture
“What beliefs are
common”
Significant
Locations
“Where is
associated with
what beliefs”
Significant Roles
“What roles are
associated with
what beliefs”
Belief Influence
“What beliefs
influence what”

Table 8: Common SNA metrics and their interpretations

Measure Name
Degree
Centrality
Betweenness

Definition
Node with most
connections
Nodes in most best paths
using symmetric data

Eigenvector
centrality
(Bonacich,
1972a, 1972c)
Closeness

Nodes connected to
other well connected
nodes

Strong social
capital

Nodes closest to other
nodes
High betweenness, low
centrality

Rapid access to
all information
Connects
otherwise
disconnected
groups

ID nodes to best
acquire/transmit information
Go-between; Reduction in
activity by disconnecting
groups

Sum of hub scores from
in-link / hub score

Subject Matter
Expert

ID nodes that others
recognize as SME on one or
more subjects

Betweenness
Centrality
(Freeman, 1979;
Freeman, Roeder,
& Mullholland,
1979)
Authority
Centrality
(Kleinberg, 1999)

Meaning
In the know
Connects groups

Usage
Reducing information flow,
ID sources of intelligence
Typically has political
influence, though may be
too constrained to act
ID nodes that can mobilize
other nodes

In Figure 34, a four node type metanetwork is shown. Each oval represents one of four
node types, with decision making units (DMU) being equivalent to “decision making unit.”
Implicitly in this diagram, there exists links amongst DMU nodes, intra-task links, intra-resource
links and intra-knowledge links. Those intra-task links represent, usually, task dependencies or
task precedence networks. Intra-resource and intra-knowledge links can also represent resource
and knowledge dependencies or even compositions or aggregations of resources and knowledge.
The various labeled relationships are depicted unidirectional, but there is no definitional
requirement that a modeler must maintain such a convention. The development and refinement
of metanetwork model construction and analytical development has been a hallmark of Carley’s
research group at CMU’s CASOS (Kathleen M. Carley, 2003).

Figure 34: Four-node metanetwork
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Metanetwork notation in Carley et al.’s research, as well as this dissertation is below.
, the nonempty set of all agents in the metanetwork
, the nonempty set of all knowledge in the metanetwork
, the nonempty set of all resources in the metanetwork
, the nonempty set of all tasks in the metanetwork.

, matrix of relationships between agents

, matrix of agents with their assigned tasks

, matrix of agents with access to resources

, the matrix of knowledge possessed by
agents
, the matrix of tasks linked to their
supporting knowledge
Carley et al have also been vigorously applying the metanetwork perspective to over time
models (Kathleen M. Carley, 2003; Kathleen M. Carley & Lee, 1998; Lin & Carley, 1997;
Schreiber & Carley, 2005) at the same time that longitudinal network analysis remains a
vigorous field of research for both understanding network evolution (Graham, 2005; Skvoretz &
Fararo, 1995; Ter Wal & Boschma, 2007; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Zeggelink, Stokman, &
Van de Bunt, 1996) as well as network change detection (McCulloh, 2009; I. McCulloh & K. M.
Carley, 2008; I. McCulloh, Daimler, Eric, & K. M. Carley, 2008). When adding the time
dimension to metanetworks, the definition of dynamic network analysis becomes clear: the study
of multimode and multiplex networks over time. The expansion of quantifiable measures into the
metanetwork framework supports the calculation of generalized measures across the multimode
network such as performance as accuracy, shared situation awareness (Graham, 2005; Graham,
Schneider, Bauer, & Bessiere, 2004), knowledge and communication congruence and workload
and cognitive demand (Kathleen M. Carley & Pfeffer, 2012a, 2012c). Dynamic metanetworks,
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like their SNA antecedents, also support bi-directional links though the various SNA software
products treat this data differently and the researcher must decide if the calculation of the metric
against the available data is meaningful (Wei, Pfeffer, Reminga, & Carley, 2011).
Modeling and Simulation
As discussed in the “Supply Chain Management and Resilience” section, incorporating
uncertainty into supply chain models and attempts to understand HROs are fairly robust fields of
research (Pereira, 2009). Where SCM modeling still needs to grow is the explicit inclusion of
contested cyber environments as a cause of uncertainty. Within DHS sponsored research,
simulation of disruption of critical infrastructures with SymSuite (Brown, Riolo, Robinson,
North, & Rand, 2005), SMART++ (North, 2000), and RINSE (Leblanc et al., 2011) is well
advanced for exploring inter-dependencies of complex physical infrastructures. Incorporating
socio-political components into any of the tools does not appear to be a part of their follow-on
work.
Modeling complex adaptive systems (CAS) is also a healthy area of research applied to a
great many fields, from finance markets (Markose, 2005) (see (Hommes, 2001) for a markets as
CAS literature review) to critical infrastructure (Rinaldi et al., 2001). These efforts have ranged
from exploring organizational designs to cope with communication breakdowns (Kathleen M.
Carley, 1991; DHS, 2011) to sociotechnical models such as OrgAhead (Effken, Brewer, Patil,
Verran, & Carley, 2005; Lee & Carley, 2004; Louie, Carley, Haghshenass, Kunz, & Levitt,
2003), SimVision (Emery, 2002; ePM, 2012; R. E. Levitt & Kunz), and Construct (Kathleen M.
Carley, Joseph, Lanham, Morgan, & Kowalchuck, 2014; B. Hirshman, St. Charles, & Carley,
2011; B. R. Hirshman, Kowalchuck, & Carley, 2008)
OMNeT++ (OMNeT++ Community, 2012) and NetSim (ns-2) are examples of
technology-focused, discrete event simulation environments that enables M&S of networks at the
technical system and component level: networked devices, communications channels and
messages on those networks (2012). There are numerous other examples of technology-focused
simulations, from OPNET Modeler from Cisco, to University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s
Real-Time Immersive Network Simulation Environment (RINSE) (Leblanc et al., 2011), to the
seventeen network emulators listed in (Lochin, Pérennou, & Dairaine, 2012), that all provide
evidence of the field maturing greatly since Cohen’s lamentations about the sad state of cyber
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security M&S (F. Cohen, 1999). With these capabilities, researchers are able to construct models
of technical components of infrastructure, as well as organizations’ sets of other cyber resources
and assets (e.g., servers, terminals, other IP-enabled devices). With those models they can choose
various forms of network degradation (e.g., congestion from a denial of service attack, loss of
packets from a noisy transmission medium or other adversarial effect), analyze the effects on the
effected systems, the network as a whole, as well as identify 2nd and 3rd order effects in their
models.
Process-level modeling of business processes has also been, and remains, an active field
of research. Colored petri-nets (Levis, Carley, & Karsai, 2011) and colored petri-nets over time
(Pflanz, 2012; Pflanz & Levis, 2012) as well as time-influence nets (Levis et al., 2011) have
incorporated various levels of cyber attacks into their efforts to gauge impacts on organizational
capacities and decision time lines. Machine-level processes, independent of human-controlled
actions, have also been explored in the development of rate control services (Gligor, 2005) and
load-balancing redirection (Pai et al., 1998; Wang, Pai, & Peterson, 2002). Human-enabled
process modification (e.g., employing off-line backup capacity) is also apparent in (Pflanz, 2012;
Pflanz & Levis, 2012) as a way of assessing the sustainability of time-sensitive missions in cyber
degraded environments. What these process-based models omit though are the individual agent
level adaptations to the environment—disaggregating agents is not a feature of the above
modeled processes and flows.
Each of these tools, to greater and lesser degrees, can help construct scenarios where
researchers or analysts can model an organization’s technology assets and assess its technical
resilience to the chosen perturbations. But what of the nontechnology assets? Every organization
has people, processes, resources, data, information and tasks that, to some degree or another,
must go on even during “misfortune or change.” RINSE has been used by the USG during a
Livewire exercise (Leblanc et al., 2011), the DoD’s Bulwark Defender attempts to train staffs
and commanders in process adjustment and efforts to inject communications effects servers into
exercises continue (Wihl, Varshney, & Kong, 2010)—though the risk of participants’
misperceiving an attack as a simulation malfunction is ever present. There is an apocryphal story
in DoD simulations community Incorporating that very real risk.
Exercise participants in a virtual and constructive simulation, on perceiving a
malfunction in the simulation, headed to lunch. On their return from lunch, they
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discovered the enemy had destroyed their simulated units and equipment. On
demanding an explanation from the simulation support staff, the players learned
they had misdiagnosed the cause of several events, failed to report or explore the
possible causes of the events, and subsequently had their units die as a result of
leaving their workstations.
Multimodel modeling is another technique to assess organizational resilience in contested
cyber environments. Researchers use multiple models to address multiple portions of the
problem space: technical details, information diffusion, social influence, forecasting effects, and
forecasting the efficacy of remediation’s and adaptations. These models exchange information
about their own inputs and outputs to help enrich the overall modeling effort (Kathleen M.
Carley, Geoffrey P. Morgan, Michael J. Lanham, & Jrgen Pfeffer, 2012; Kathleen M. Carley,
Geoffrey P. Morgan, Michael J. Lanham, & Jürgen Pfeffer, 2012; Elder & Levis, 2010). These
works have shown a way to having models work in tandem, though they are not inter-operable
per se. The models share information, and most importantly can serve as means of validating the
outputs of each other—when systems with very different internal processing generate congruent
results, analysts can have higher confidence in the feasibility of the results. Examples of the tools
used in the above modeling efforts include: OMNet++, Construct (an agent based belief and
information diffusion simulation) (Frantz & Carley, 2007; B. Hirshman et al., 2011), CAESAR
III (a C2 design tool) (Levis & Perdu, 1996), and Pythia (a timed influence net simulation)
(Wagenhals & H., 2001; Wagenhals, Levis, & McCrabb, 2003; Wagenhals & Wentz, 2003).
With the combination of these tools, researchers were able to assess multiple aspects of
resilience: the ability to continue functioning during a perturbation, assess the magnitude of
various effects within the modeled organizations, and forecast the adaptations needed by the
organization to perform as best it could in its simulated environment.
Yet another example of multimodeling was the co-use of ORA™ and MONOPATH. In
this merger of tools that analyze social networks and telecommunications networks, researchers
found that including message passing paths from social-networks in a resilience analysis,
organizations can improve the message delivery by a factor of five without gross changes in endto-end latency (Bigrigg, Carley, Manousakis, & McAuley, 2009).
An example of a process centric M&S approach to assessing resilience is Pflanz’s work
with colored petri nets (Pflanz, 2012; Pflanz & Levis, 2012). With this approach, a modeler
builds information flow paths and then executes them to assess the model against various
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measures of performance and effectiveness. With timing information included in the information
path, this technique has shown that time-sensitive missions (e.g., a military unit’s ‘time-sensitive
targeting’ using GPS-enabled munitions) are not supportable when key portions of the model are
‘denied’ (e.g., GPS jamming). He also showed that organizations that are IT enabled may have
no reduction in capacity with one attack on their systems, though they have zero residual
capacity to absorb any additional misfortunes.
M&S of contested cyber environments tends to fall into three camps. The first is the
discrete event simulation that operates at bit/byte-level and/or the telecommunications-networklevel. These simulations help computer scientists and engineers identify specific failures of
components, protocols, or individual systems and IT engineers and organizations identify actual
or potential portions of the network that exhibit nondesired behavior. They can help simulate the
technical failures associated with a contested cyber environment, but do not incorporate any of
the cognitive learning and adaptation functions of the organization. The second camp is the
organization model that supports examination of the organization(s) at varying degrees of
aggregation from the individual person up to teams and groups—but those rarely incorporate
explicit and implicit dependencies on IT and information residing on that IT. Even more rarely
do those organizational simulations support the experimental analysis of how the individuals,
teams, and organizations as a whole adapt to the degradation or destruction of the IT assets they
perceive they are dependent on. The third camp is a process-centric set of modeling capabilities.
In this camp, detailed, time-dependent models are built per process-of-interest. When the models
are complete, what-if scenarios offer insights to possible effects of future scenarios.
Each of the above camps adds value to the M&S communities to which they belong.
Unfortunately the absence of an ability to model the cognitive adaptations of organizations to the
use and loss of their cyber capabilities remains a capability gap in the research of organizational
resilience!

Conclusions
In the abstract and Introduction chapter, I discuss four demands leaders should place on
their organization to increase their assurance of resilience to contested cyber environments. This
chapter has addressed the first of those four demands: leaders should require analytical and
empirical assessments that incorporate organizational and individual cognitive complexities. The
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chapter enumerates not only the reasons for the assertion, but identities gaps in existing research
into organizational resilience in contested cyber environments.
I have developed an argument to justify the importance of studying organizational
resilience in contested cyber environments. There should be few reasons for arguments against
the notion that modern, 21st century organizations, especially in the industrialized first world, are
increasingly using their information technology and cyber capabilities in ways they had not
predicted. As a corollary generalization, those organizations are challenged in fully appreciating
the multitudes of 2nd and 3rd order consequences of such use.
Despite this growing use of IT, I also developed a case that doomsday, apocalyptic, and
other predictions of existential threats are intemperate, and place the advocates for those views in
a less credible position than they could otherwise maintain. Instead, I set the stage for a reasoned
and deliberate inter-disciplinary study of organizational resilience in contested cyber
environments—both man-made and naturally occurring.
I then transitioned to an explanation of how I collected sample articles and texts
associated with what I had initially assessed would be primary candidates for inter-disciplinary
studies: supply chain management, business continuity, general risk management, cyber risk
management, organizational learning, organizational behavior, and modeling and simulation.
Through semantic network analysis and network analytics, I demonstrated that 13,000 collected
articles show weak connections between cyber risk management and risk management, weak
connections between general/global risk management and organizational learning, and an even
weaker link between organizational resilience and organizational innovation.
Next I offered a literature review of cyber risk management, organizational resilience,
organizational learning, as well as modeling and simulation applied to each of those three areas.
The literature reviews, while necessarily brief, illustrated that despite the breadth of research in
each area there are far fewer areas of commonality and shared references than intuition originally
suggested. There are gaps between the fields of research of organizational learning supported by
IT and the loss of that IT once the organization has grown accustomed to it. There are gaps in the
M&S support to both technical dependency modeling and cognitive modeling of humans using
the technology. Finally there are gaps between the risk management communities (cyber and
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general) and organizational learning—as evidenced by the continued successes bad actors enjoy
exploiting human vulnerabilities in organizations.
Reliance on a set of capabilities represents a risk to organizations that have few or no
alternatives. Mitigating risk is a natural outgrowth to being aware of it, and preparing for the
eventuality of undesired events should also be a natural part of organizational operations. With
practice, an organization gains confidence in its abilities—it builds an experiential store of
knowledge from which it can draw actual lessons as well as extrapolate to unfamiliar situations.
Practice is, of course, expensive, opening the door to the use of M&S as an expense mitigation
compared to live experimentation with organizational elements and assets otherwise occupied
with daily missions. With confidence and ability, organizations can assure themselves, their
leaders, and the organizations they interact with that they are resilient to misfortune, that they
can adapt and overcome adversity.
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Data and Models
Introduction
This chapter will introduce the methodology for collecting data for use in this dissertation.
It will also introduce the process and contributions for rapidly turning that data into multimode
(multiple node types) and multiplex (multiple types of links between nodes) organization models
for assessing mission assurance in contested cyber environments. The chapter will also present
processes and rationales for the modifications to the collected data to transform the empirical
models into inputs for the agent based simulation, Construct (Kathleen M. Carley et al., 2014). In
the literature review and research for this dissertation, I have not found evidence of using this
methodology and its generalization for organizational modeling in cyber contexts. Nor have I
uncovered evidence of its application to DoD doctrinal source material and the use of its outputs
in mission assurance contexts. This rapid modeling approach represents one of the principal
contributions the dissertation to the field of mission assurance and organizational resilience to
contested cyber environments.
Prior to providing the detailed discussion of the data collection and processing, it is
useful to see a high level view of what will happen to that data in the workflow of the
dissertation; I will use this diagram through the dissertation to relate each chapter to its relevant
piece of the workflow. Figure 35 provides such a view, with the left most rectangle representing
this chapter, and the blue ovals representing supporting or specific activities. The Data-to-Model
(D2M) process (Kathleen M. Carley, Bigrigg, et al., 2011; Lanham, Morgan, & Carley, 2014;
Lanham, Morgan, Carley, & Levis, 2011) is a defined sequence of steps for researchers to use,
with the support of automation, to rapidly ingest unstructured and semi-structured data and
convert that data into SNA and metanetwork-based models for analysis using graphic theoretic
techniques. The process is in the rectangle labeled D2M/Define Organization in Figure 35. The
Network Analytics and Resilience chapter provides the detailed discussion of metrics against the
static models generated within the D2M—the Calculate Metrics rectangle in Figure 35. The
chapter for Agent Based Models and Modeling addresses the justifications for using Agent
Based Models and the augmentation needed to take the output of the D2M block and provide
input to the Construct Simulator block. The in-depth discussion of Performance as Accuracy
(PaA) and Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) is also in the Network Analytics and Resilience
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chapter. A repeat of the block labeled Calculate metrics occurs for the outputs of the simulation
in the Simulations chapter. The block labeled Compare gets its due in the Simulations chapter as
well as the Heuristics chapter.

Figure 35: Stylized dissertation workflow

Organization—a working definition
For the purposes of this dissertation an organization is a collection of decision-making
units (DMU) (aka specific agents) and roles (aka general agents). The organization also includes
the DMUs’ supporting IT systems and capabilities as well as other resources. The organizational
definition also includes the tasks and knowledge of the organization’s members as well as their
beliefs, specified events and enumerated actions. Each of the above named categories of entities
is, in their respective models, a node type. Any arbitrary node is a specific instance of a node
type. The model, to be accessible to graph theoretic techniques, also includes the relationships
between these various nodes and their node types. There may also be multiple relationships in
that two different edges representing two distinct types of relationships may link nodes together.
Subsequent paragraphs will explain how I gathered data to construct the multimode and
multiplex models of organizations under test.
There are two types of organizations in the dissertation, both derived from the D2M
process: strategic and operational. The two are shown in Figure 35 as the two leftmost ovals,
with the rest of the workflow standardized and applied to both models. I present the data sources
for the D2M derived models next.
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Organizations’ Self-Documentation
Organizations frequently describe themselves in various ways, not all of which are
aligned with the perceptions of their members or nonorganizational observers. A common
mechanism for an organization to describe itself is in terms of its mission statement: for whom
does it work, what it does, why it does what it does, when does it do its work (or to whose
schedule), where does it do its work, and how does it accomplish its work. Mission statements, if
they exist, are excellent starting points for new arrivals to the organization as well as observers to
gain a level of understanding about the organization.
Another mechanism organizations use to describe themselves are documents they write
for their various intended audiences. A vision statement from the chief executive officer (CEO),
or other principal leader, targets not only outsiders with whom the company interacts or wants to
interact, it can serve as a common point of reference for internal audiences. A combination of
mission statements and vision statements frequently serves as the beginning of organizational
culture—a shared set of knowledge (Kathleen M. Carley, 1994). They can also serve as the
starting point for organizational modeling as well as help scope the models in this dissertation.
An additional way organizations describe themselves is via organization charts. These
often represent subsets of people and suborganizations as blocks connected via lines. The lines
and the relative position of the blocks often indicate direct and indirect reporting chains (e.g.,
chains of command), information flows, and functional specialties. These charts assist
organizations’ formal depictions of themselves and relationships between included elements or
people. What the charts rarely depict is the myriad of individual persons in each subelement—
the autonomous humans that ideally subscribe to and help implement the organizations culture
and mission.
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The Data to Model Process—an Overview

Figure 36: Dissertation workflow data to model (D2M)

Using Figure 36 as a breadcrumb, the D2M process, is the first step in the creation of
organizational models to use to answer the questions of interest in this dissertation.
From the mid-1970s onward, there has been a growing effort at developing a theory of
semantic networks. The central idea in semantic network theory is that collections of
disambiguated words (as nodes) related to each other (using links) can represent human
knowledge (W. Woods, 1975) in semantically meaningful ways. Using networks also helps
researchers subject the semantic networks to rigorous mathematical graph theoretic approaches..
To a large degree, this effort was in support of the then-expanding field of artificial intelligence
(AI) and bridging the gaps in approaches between linguists and AI researchers (Hartley &
Barnden, 1997). By the early 1990s, semantic analysis had matured to the point that meanings
were measurable on multiple dimensions (e.g. connectivity, conductivity, and consensus
(Kathleen M. Carley & Kaufer, 1993)) as well as supporting research into multiple mechanisms
to visually represent such networks (Gloor & Zhao, 2006; Hartley & Barnden, 1997).
By using text documents generated by various organizations and authors as sources for
semantic networks, it is feasible for a researcher to gain insight not only into the possible
overlaps in content but also perceptions of overlap in responsibility (Ekstrom & Lau, 2008) for
organizational tasks. Semantic networks can also help represent the authors’ mental models as
they wrote the various documents (Diesner & Carley, 2005, 2011) as well as help automate the
acquisition of relational information for members of an organization (Gloor & Zhao, 2006;
Mergel, Diesner, & Carley, 2010).
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As previously mentioned, the D2M process (Kathleen M. Carley, Bigrigg, et al., 2011;
Kathleen M. Carley, Columbus, Bigrigg, Diesner, & Kunkel, 2011; Diesner & Carley, 2004;
Lanham et al., 2014) is a rapid machine-assisted transformation of a collection of text documents
(labeled DoD Doctrine and Pubs in Figure 37) into a metanetwork model (Panzarasa, Carley, &
Krackhardt, 2001). It includes an ontological classification scheme of nine (9) categories into
which each concept will fit. Through this process, the researcher constructs an indirect model of
the collected documents. These models are reflections of the concepts and ideas the authors of
the input documents were attempting to communicate to their respective audiences.
The D2M process, as applied to this problem domain and source material domain,
required adaptation of the methods the sources cited above describe. Shown in Figure 37, the
process began with a thesaurus that CASOS staff, faculty, and students developed using both
hand encoding as well as machine learning techniques (i.e., conditional random field ontological
categorization). Through a D2M Wizard within AutoMap , this figure represents the completely
automated 11, first-round process of text cleaning, removal of stop words, and other processing
steps performed for the user. From this wizard, AutoMap generates multiple products a
researcher uses to determine if the model of the text is sufficient to their needs. The products
include semantic networks, often referred to as collocation networks of words within a sliding
window of specified size, suggested ngram lists, suggested review lists, and suggested acronym
lists. A key product is the first generation metanetworks (per text if of interest, as well as the
union of all texts’ models).
It is frequently the case that the first generation metanetwork is insufficiently developed
to explore or resolve questions of interest, and that was certainly true in this dissertation. For
these cases, the human-aided D2M process begins with thesaurus refinement as shown in Figure
38 and linked to Figure 37 via the “A” off-page connector in the flowchart. To develop a second
(2nd) through nth iteration of a metanetwork that can help resolve the research question of interest,
I used the defined process labeled “1” in the Figure 38 flowchart. This requires extracting the
concepts from the Wizard generated lists into a dissertation thesaurus. For each of the three
organization models, discussed in the next section, I developed an additional thesaurus to adjust
11

AutoMap processing time per file for some steps is approximately logarithmic in file length. Because of this
growth in processing times, Figure 37 depicts a subprocess whereby I combined the retrieval of the files as pdfs, the
extraction of text from those pdfs using pdftotext, and the splitting of the extracted text files into chunks no bigger
than 64KB.
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the overall scope of the model and its contents. While developing these thesauri, it was necessary
to develop two (2) capabilities not yet in AutoMap: the application of regular expressions as well
as case sensitive application of thesauri.

Figure 37: Data to model wizard applied to any input corpus

DoD self-documentation has numerous references to other documents that frequently
follow patterns of use. Through development and application of Perl Regular Expressions to
convert these document identifiers into ngrams, it was my expectation that I would be able to
identify which of the sources appeared to have the most impact on the overall model
development. DoD document authors also frequently use acronyms in all capital letters that
overload standard English words in lower-case (e.g., IT/it, WHO/who, POP/pop). To cope with
these two characteristics of the input corpus, I modified the standard CASOS D2M process by
adding the defined process labeled “2” in the Figure 38 flowchart. The details of these steps are
in the Pre-processing DoD corpus section of Appendix 1.
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Of particular note, at the end of this overview are some of the specific tangible
deliverables of the dissertation. The specific deliverables, as shown in Figure 38, are the preprocessing scripts for regular expressions and case sensitive application of a thesaurus, the
dissertation thesaurus, acronym/case sensitive thesaurus, and the model-specific thesaurus. All
of these deliverables are free of restrictive intellectual property rights as a work product of the
USG, though I do ask that future users of the deliverables acknowledge the products’ origin! I
have also made these thesauri and the scripts available on my personal web page at
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/nonpeer.shtml#dissertation_support.

Figure 38: D2M refinement applied to DoD input corpus

76

Two D2M generated DoD organizational models
The DoD is an organization that expends enormous effort in documenting itself. One of
the ways it does this is through the writing and distribution of doctrine documents. DoD includes
Joint doctrine in most professional military education courses that have mixed-Service audiences
and senior service members. The military departments (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force) also teach
their specific doctrine in professional military education courses, where they place emphasis on
the Service rather than Joint operations. The hierarchy of primacy for doctrine within the DoD is
Joint followed by Service (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine), in accordance with the intent of
the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Baldwin, Picavet, & Reiners, 2009).
The Goldwater-Nichols Act emphasized the need and imposed requirements for Services to train
and fight as joint entities, and not fiefdoms of expertise and noncooperation.
There are three principle levels of military organizations: strategic, operational, and
tactical (which is not in the dissertation). These three levels are identical to what the US military
education system often calls the three levels of war. Using two of these levels of war
demonstrates the generalizability of the approach from mid-sized organizations to globally
dispersed organizations. Figure 39 and Figure 40 are simplified and scoped depictions of the
strategic level of command, supported by the descriptions in following sections. Figure 41 is a
simplified and scoped depiction of the operational level of command, supported by the
descriptions in following sections. I’ve color coded the diagram with Joint organizations in
purple, USAF organizations in blue, civilian components of strategic decision making in read,
white, and blue. Mixed colors represent organizations with mixed origins. I also provide a
comparison of the descriptive statistics for the D2M Wizard generated models and the iterative
refinement generated models. For those interested in replication of the effort, the lists of
documents used to build each of these three models are Appendix 1 as well as the bash shell
scripts used to collect the documents and transform them into text on my personal web site at
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/nonpeer.shtml#dissertation_support.
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JCS

NCA

USSTRATCOM

NSC
USCENTCOM

USCYBERCOM
(USCC)

9th Air Force
(USAFCENT)
609th AOC
(COAC)

Figure 39: Simplified DoD hierarchy--strategic to operational

National Command Authority to Combatant Commands—the strategic level
The strategic-level organizations I modeled are the National Command Authority (NCA),
US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), US Cyber Command (USCC), and US Central
Command (USCENTCOM). These are shown in Figure 40. The definition of strategic warfare
drives the inclusion of the first three blocks in the figure.
The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations,
determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security
objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve
those objectives.{Joint Staff J7, 2010 #7253}
The NCA (i.e., “the President and Secretary of Defense together with their duly deputized
alternates or successors” (NCA, 2013) supported by the National Security Council (NSC), the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and their respective staffs) is at the top of this level of war. Equally
clearly, Strategic Command, to which NCA, through JCS, has assigned long-range military
assets (e.g., B2 bombers) and space assets and from which those assets take authoritative orders
is part of this level’s model. US Cyber Command, a sub unified joint command of
USSTRATCOM, has the responsibility to assure US freedom of action within cyberspace (U.S.
Cyber Command Public Affairs, 2010) . I then chose USCENTCOM from the pool of six (6)
geographical combatant commands (GCC) the US operates. This choice derives primarily from
the fact that USCENTCOM continues to be engaged in a shooting war with large numbers of US
forces, as well as small elements of allied and coalition forces. This engagement often drives
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resource allocation within USCENTCOM that might have been different had they not had forces
in contact with enemy combatants. The colors coding in the graphic remain the same: purple for
the ‘Joint’ units; a blend between Service colors (i.e., blue for US Air Force (USAF) for ‘Joint’
units predominately from a particular service; and solid colors for units from a particular Service.
There are no doctrinal colors for NCA and NSC, so I simply render them in red, white, and blue.
NCA
JCS

NSC

USSTRATCOM

USCENTCOM

USCYBERCOM
(USCC)
Figure 40: Simplified figure of USG strategic level organizations

COCOM to Numbered Air Force level—the operational level
The operational level of war is the large, and often amorphous, span of military
operations and commands between the obviously strategic and the obviously tactical (see also
the definition of tactical level of war in the Alphabetical Definitions (on page 1-7). The official
definition is below.
The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned,
conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other
operational areas (Joint Staff J7, 2010j).
In practice, this is the portion of the chain of command that spans from the regional
combatant commands (COCOM) to the first echelon of the tactical level, the division or Servicespecific equivalent (e.g., a USAF group, a US Navy battle group, or a US Marine Corps division).
For this dissertation, I modeled USCENTCOM and its Numbered Air Force (NAF) (9th US Air
Force). Instead of modeling the 9th AF’s assigned Groups or Wings, I leveraged previous work
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(Lanham, Morgan, & Carley, 2011b, 2011e) and modeled its Air Operations Center (609th Air
Operations Center), operating as a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). These
organizations are shown in Figure 41 below.

USCENTCOM
9th Air Force
(USAFCENT)
609th AOC
(COAC)

Figure 41: Simplified figure of COCOM and USAF operational level organizations

With the creation of USCYBERCOM, the relationships at this level of command have
become increasingly complicated. Complications are from at least two sources. The first is the
cyber related direct reporting from tactical elements straight to USCC. The second is the
perception, from multiple quarters, that USCC can and should issue cyber related orders directly
to tactical elements operating under USCENTCOM’s command jurisdiction without deconflicting their noncyber operational impacts.
Preceding work (Lanham, Morgan, et al., 2011b, 2011e) to this dissertation successfully
modeled one portion of a USAF operational level organization called the Air Operations Center
(AOC) and depicted above as CAOC. Figure 42 is an extract from the Air Force Instruction
(AFI) 13-1 (USAF, 2005) that depicts the doctrinal organization of the AOC. Figure 43 depicts
the hierarchy of the organization as well as the cross functional area teams as extracted from the
AFI during the D2M process.
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Figure 42: USAF doctrinal air operations center organizational structure

Figure 43: USAF AOC as a text mined model of links and nodes

Inputs of D2M Wizard and process for each of the two models
There were a total of 139 doctrinal files for the construction of the strategic and
operational models.. A tabular summary of the input corpus I used for these models is shown in
Table 9 with descriptives of the sizes of each corpus (in megabytes) depicted in Table 10 and
Table 11. It is worth noting that there are several open research questions about this selection, as
well as any particular sample of any particular corpus when constructing these types of indirect
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models. Open questions include: What distribution(s) exist for each of the nine (9) ontologies
normalized by MB or KB? Are those distributions domain dependent? Does the sample of
documents generate distributions that align with the domain of interest? What are the impacts on
processing time (normalized by processor count and available RAM) of the sizes of the input
documents? These questions, while interesting, and brief discussions of each are in the
Limitations and Future Work section of the dissertation—they may assist in demonstrating to
particular audiences additional facets of model validity as well as offer expectation management
with the use of the word ‘rapid’ in the dissertation title.
Table 9: Number of input files per model

Model
Strategic
Operational
Total

Number of Files
58
81
139

Table 10: File sizes descriptives per model/level of war – part 1

N

Strategic
Operational
Total

58
81
139

95%
Confidence
Mean Size Std. Deviation Std. Error
Interval for
(MB)
(MB)
(MB)
Mean
Lower Bound
1.7682
1.36599
.17936
1.4090
1.6211
1.27510
.14168
1.3392
2.4079
2.50609
.17677
2.0594

Table 11: File sizes (MB) descriptives per model/level of war – part 2

Strategic
Operational
Total

95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Upper Bound
2.1273
1.9031
2.7565

Minimum

Maximum

.47
.01
.01

7.94
7.94
21.27

Outputs of D2M Wizard and process for each of the generated models
This section has three subsections in it. The outputs of the first iteration of the D2M
Wizard, the outputs of the final data-cleaning iteration, and graphical representations of the two
models.
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Outputs of D2M Wizard (cycle 0)
As depicted in Figure 37 (on page 75), the D2M Wizard provides several output files
each time a researcher executes it. Two output files of interest are the “suggested ngram” list and
the “possible acronym” list. A summary of the sizes of these two output files, per model, is
depicted in Table 12 and Figure 44. The variation in the sizes of two files is not a research
question of interest, as they are both dependent on the number of input files fed into the D2M
process. The information below is illustrative of what a researcher could expect to see if they
need to build a research center or project specific thesaurus from scratch by starting with these
files. As I had access to the CASOS thesaurus as the basis of the D2M project, I focused my
thesaurus generation effort on a DoD-specific model and supplemental per-model level thesauri.
Table 12: Size of D2M wizard generated suggested ngrams list and possible acronyms list

Model Level
Strategic
Operational

Suggested ngrams

Possible Acronyms

174,821
207,687

12,273
13,192

Figure 44: Size of D2M wizard generated ngram list and possible acronym list
Table 13: Quantities of D2M wizard generated concepts as ngrams and singletons drawn from the union
of generated concept lists

Model Level
Strategic
Operational

Singletons

N-Grams (multiple words==a single concept)

30,205
29,821

29,122
33,299
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Figure 45: Quantities of D2M wizard generated concepts as ngram and singletons drawn from the union of
generated concept lists

As depicted in Figure 37, other D2M Wizard output files are the concept list, the
finalThesaurus, and the metanetwork of inter-nodal and intra-nodal links. The concept list is a
list of D2M identified concepts from the input corpus with the D2M generated suggested
ontological category and without any attempt at mapping concepts to other concepts.
Fundamentally, it’s a direct transcription of the concepts in the corpus reflecting only preprocessing modifications the researcher chooses to execute.
The third and fourth tables below summarize the link and node/entities information,
Table 14 and Table 15 respectively, in the first metanetwork created by the D2M Wizard. The
D2M Wizard creates links between nodes when those nodes co-occur within a sliding window of
words within an input text. This co-occurrence network becomes the metanetwork of the input
text with the link weight representing the number of co-occurrences between any two linked
nodes. By creating a union of all the metanetworks for each corpus, the D2M Wizard creates a
metanetwork from each corpus representing the two models.
Table 14: Metanetwork link descriptives for D2M cycle 0
Network

Links

Density

Strategic

55

8,760,073

0.00313213

Operational

55

5,983,375

0.00300365

Table 15: Metanetwork entities per ontological category for D2M cycle 0

Strategic

raw
counts

agent

belief

event

knowledge

location

organization

resource

role

task

58,861

3,365

247

83

2,447

489

1,917

2856

281

1,376

5.72%

0.42%

0.14%

4.16%

0.83%

3.26%

4.85%

0.48%

2.34%

4,696

36

23

2,434

557

2,660

3630

3

840

7.44%

0.06%

0.04%

3.86%

0.88%

4.21%

5.75%

0.00%

1.33%

% of raw count
Operational

63,120

% of raw count
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The output file finalThesaurus serves as a mapping of concepts to concepts, as well as
concepts to ontological categories. The finalThesaurus file is typically a conglomeration of
thesauri that starts with, in this dissertation, the CASOS Standard Thesaurus, mixes in research
center thesaurus, domain specific thesaurus, project thesaurus. The precedence of thesauri is
reversed, meaning the project thesaurus takes precedence over a domain, over the CASOS
standard thesaurus. The information in Table 16 illustrates what a researcher could expect to see
after a single iteration of the D2M process using a research center thesaurus. Of particular note is
the column labeled “Unknown” where many automation generated concepts have no ontological
category. For each of the models, over 70% of concepts would, ideally, need deletion or an
assigned category in the thesaurus. Depending on the corpus and research question(s), other
researchers will have different distributions of entities per category per corpus, as well as
different sized thesauri. The concepts captured in the D2M process entries in Table 16 are
reflective of applying the CASOS thesauri and dissertation thesauri, to the input sets.
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Table 16: Concept list entities per ontological category for D2M cycle 0

Strategic

Raw
Counts

#Delete

agent

attribute

belief

event

knowledge

location

organization

resource

role

task

time

Unknown

58,861

51

3,365

1,238

247

83

2,447

489

1,917

2,856

281

1,376

250

44,259

0.09%

5.72%

2.10%

0.42%

0.14%

4.16%

0.83%

3.26%

4.85%

0.48%

2.34%

0.42%

75.19%

66

4,696

744

36

23

2,434

557

2,660

3,630

3

840

427

47,004

0.10%

7.44%

1.18%

0.06%

0.04%

3.86%

0.88%

4.21%

5.75%

0.00%

1.33%

0.68%

74.47%

% of raw count
Operational

63,120

% of raw count

Table 17: finalThesaurus entities per ontological category D2M cycle 0

Strategic

Raw
Counts

#Delete

agent

attribute

belief

event

knowledge

location

organization

resource

role

task

time

Blank,
None,
Unknown

518,696

5,520

124,975

5,086

1,246

5,810

76,166

138,107

82,221

43,345

82

8,581

4,572

22,985

1.06%
5,581

24.09%
126,733

0.98%
6,658

0.24%
1,245

1.12%
5,897

14.68%
80,304

26.63%
138,440

15.85%
88,165

8.36%
46,818

0.02%
82

1.65%
8,725

0.88%
6,276

4.43%
26,650

1.03%

23.40%

1.23%

0.23%

1.09%

14.83%

25.56%

16.28%

8.64%

0.02%

1.61%

1.16%

% of raw count
Operational

541,574

% of raw count
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4.92%

Final outputs of D2M process
The D2M process usually requires multiple rounds of cleaning in ORA™, thesaurus
addition/modification, evaluation of Key Entities (see also Equation 12 on page 42) reports, and
re-execution of D2M Scripts, all of which Figure 38 illustrates. Terminating the cycle of
refinement is, at present, a researcher decision based on their question(s) of interest and the types
of validation they desire to execute. For this dissertation, and in support of ‘validation in parts,’ I
used 20 cycles for the operational model, and 12 cycles for strategic model. Termination
conditions I used are shown below.
Table 18: Three (3) terminating conditions for D2M process

1. Key Entity Reports for each node type include no obvious ‘wrong’ entities (e.g., an
‘Agent’ entity in the ‘Resource’ top-10 list) nor entities that could be meaningfully
merged.
2. Subreports for Key Entities, for the top 50 entries, included no obvious ‘wrong’
entities nor entities that could be meaningfully merged.
3. Organization models included principal organizational and agent structures typical of
military organizations (e.g., Commander, principle staff of A/G -1 through A/G-8,
and where appropriate, G8 and G9, as well as AOC-internal structures). Identifiable
through tabular data in key entity reports as well as graphical renditions of the
metanetworks.
Tabular Summary per Model
The data depicted in Table 19 on page 89 reflects the composition of the final versions of
each of the three supplemental thesauri the dissertation uses: DoD-wide, Strategic Model, and
Operational Model. These supplemental thesauri are deliverables of the dissertation and may
reduce the time between starting and conducting useful for future DoD organization modelers.
These thesauri are independent of the wizard generated thesauri shown in Table 17—the entries
in Table 17 reflect combination of the CASOS research center’s master thesaurus and the
concepts in the three sets. The substantial differences in each of these thesauri are easily
understood by recalling that the majority of the DoD-Master thesaurus is from the preceding
work modeling and simulating resilient command and control with multiple USAF Air
Operations Centers (Lanham, Morgan, et al., 2011b, 2011e). This origin, and the further descoping of the dissertation’s operational model, explains the very small model-specific thesauri
and the large number of ‘delete’ actions in the operational thesaurus. It was unexpected, though
in retrospect not surprising, that the strategic thesaurus is very different. The size of the thesaurus
was significantly larger, with each of the ontological categories exhibiting larger changes than
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either of the other thesaurus. There is insufficient data across multiple domains and variations
within domains to determine if these differences are within the band of normal or not.
Table 20 on 89 reflects the composition of the meta-models of each of the models. A
brief discussion of the differences between the starting meta-models (see also Table 15 on page
84) and the final models is in order. Each of the metanetworks in cycle-0 had a category of
‘unknown’ that the final models do not contain. The cycle of editing these models and reviewing
them for appropriate scope allowed varying levels of reductions in model size, with
consequential reductions in processing times within the static assessment as well as eventual
simulation. There could be research questions embedded in the apparent difference in the
quantity of ‘agents’ in the Strategic corpus compared to the operational corpus. This could reflect
an emphasis on the heads of various organizations responsibilities, but it remains an area of
future work to determine if there is meaning behind the change in categorical distributions.
Table 21 on page 89 provides a very brief view of the sizes and densities of each of these
metanetworks. The changes in the nature of each corpus (e.g., its intended audience, orientation
to particular levels-of-war) and the varying thesauri created an unexpected variation in the
quantities of links and densities. Both models, in cycle-0 had approximately the same density
(0.003). I had initially expected that the final densities of the models would align with the final
node counts—the highest density would belong to the strategic model with the lowest in the
operational model. This remains a question deferred to future work however.
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Table 19: Count per ontological category for each of the final thesauri (cycle 12 and higher)
DoD-Master

Raw Counts

#Delete

agent

attribute

belief

event

knowledge

location

organization

resource

role

task

time

63,586

3,841

3,841

1,719

1,682

1,056

12,333

2,833

10,584

10,056

2,950

12,482

131

6.17%

6.04%

2.70%

2.65%

1.66%

19.40%

4.46%

16.65%

15.81%

4.63%

19.63%

0.21%

3,065

1,196

166

270

492

2,667

1,326

4,219

3,830

426

5,421

5

13.28%

5.18%

0.72%

1.17%

2.13%

11.55%

5.74%

18.28%

16.59%

1.85%

23.48%

0.02%

1,525

4

-

-

-

26

2

46

5

1

2

-

94.66%

0.25%

-

-

-

1.61%

0.12%

2.86%

0.31%

0.06%

0.12%

-

% of raw count
Strategic

23,083

% of raw count
Operational

1,611

% of raw count

Table 20: Metanetwork entities per ontological category (cycle 12 and higher)
Strategic

Raw Counts

agent

belief

event

knowledge

location

organization

resource

role

Task

25,190

3,308

469

317

4,216

1,379

3,696

5,456

694

5,619

13.13

1.86

1.26%

16.74%

5.47

14.67%

21.66%

2.76%

22.31%

1,481

443

168

4,195

850

4,142

2,358

788

3,210

8.40%

2.51%

0.95%

23.79%

4.82%

23.49%

13.37%

4.47%

18.20%

% of raw count
Operational

17,635

% of raw count

Table 21: Metanetwork descriptives (cycle 12 and higher)
networks

links

density

Strategic

45

1,695,229

0.00534342

Operational

45

1,546,983

0.00994922

Table 22: Counts of N-grams, singletons, acronyms,
nonacronyms (cycle 12 and higher)
Element

89

Quantity

Percentage

N-grams

42,920

62.7%

Singletons

25,563

37.3

Acronyms

4,664

6.8%

Non-Acronyms

63,819

93.2%

Table 22 allows a comparison between the cycle-0 lists of possible ngrams and
acronyms to the contents of the final DoD-Master Thesaurus. The final thesaurus has more
ngrams than cycle-0 estimated, and fewer acronyms. The cause(s) of the variation is not clear,
though I suspect the acronym-to-ngram conversion in the thesaurus is partly responsible—I
deliberately converted many acronyms to their ngrams, as well as included their ngrams as
part of the thesaurus. Nor is it entirely clear if the cause(s) of the variation are relevant to the
research question at hand.
Table 23 depicts a component of the output model that the D2M process is not yet
capable of generating. The specific nature of this research question requires the ability to
differentiate agents and resources that a contested cyber environment can affect. There is no
direct mechanism in the text-mining process to differentiate such agents and resources.
Instead, through a completely manual process, I reviewed the lists of agents and resources for
the various models and created ‘attributes’ that would allow me to differentiate IT agents
from non-IT agents. Examples of IT agents are computer systems that generate or receive
electronic messages, with or without direct human intervention. IT agents also typically
perform some level of storage and processing on those messages as well as support habitual
interaction by humans in the performance of their human-tasks. Examples of such systems
include: Email, Blue Force Tracker, web-portals, databases, chat servers, and other such
systems. A set of encoding heuristics is shown in Table 61 for continued use or clarification.
Clearly, many IT systems susceptible to contested cyber environments do not fit into
that somewhat amorphously defined category of IT agents above. As a simplification
mechanism, I have an additional category that I have labeled IT resources. These are
information technology dependent or enabled capabilities that I do not consider message
generating or passing. Nor do I consider them as storing or manipulating messages—
exclusive of data caching and temporary storage such as a router and its routing tables. There
is some level of risk in how and where I drew boundaries for these two groups, as neither
label adequately expresses distinctions or multi-purposed systems—are radars resources and
their processing units IT agents or is the entire radar system (e.g., emitter, receiver,
processing and communications units) an IT agent? The necessity of applying arbitrary
selection criteria for binning these systems and systems-of-systems is a reflection of the gaps
in the research space I discuss in the related literature. It may be infeasible to create a
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contested cyber environment against radar emitters and receivers (ignoring the debates about
whether electronic jamming or spoofing, electronic warfare is a form of cyber operations),
though should an adversary act against processing or communications components, it is
feasible to create effects through the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
The distribution of IT agents and IT resources within the models, as well as the
master attributes list in Table 23 does provoke some thoughts: of specifically named and
mentioned agents in the sets, over 20% are named or otherwise specific IT systems. This
substantial fraction of agents is in line with the quantity of popular media stories and
concerns by USG officials that the DoD is susceptible to contested cyber environments.
Clearly, simple mentions of systems in doctrine and other documents does not necessarily
connote their place or importance within organizations’ ability to execute their missions—it
does however provide one more quantitative, not subjective, data point in mission assurance
assessments. What I found somewhat more surprising is the smaller percentage of resources
that fell into the IT resource bin. At just over 5% of the total number of resources, is there
room for making a, possibly naive, assertion that such a small percentage of assets should
never be cause for concerns about ‘Cyber Pearl Harbors’ and ‘existential threats?’ There is
certainly room for such an assertion, but like IT agents, such infrequent references in doctrine
may not indicate their actual importance within organizations. The inability of simple
counting of references to establish importance to organizations is yet another reflection of the
gaps in existing research.
Table 23: IT related agents and resources in all three generated models (cycle 12 and higher)

DoD-Master Attributes List

Agents (IT &
Non-IT)

IT agents

Resources (IT &
Non-IT)

IT resources

3,303

852

10,056

578

% of node type
Strategic Model

22.18%
3,303

% of node type
Operational Model

% of node type

242

5.75%
5451

7.33%
1,386

373
27.21%
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161
2.95%

2,342

124
5.29%

Moving from tabular summary to one of the strengths of ORA™ as a network
analytics tool, I will now review the terminating Key Entities reports for each of the three
models.
Final Key Entities Report – Operational
The Key Agents visualization for the operational model, with the agent node set
remaining the aggregation of human agents and IT systems identified in the source
documents is in Figure 46. The figure shows ‘Commander’ ranks in the top three in 90% of
agent-related measures with the more specific ‘Combined Joint Force Air Component
Commander’ (CJFACC) being the next highest ranked agent, tied with ‘adversary,’ at 56%.
Unsurprisingly, Joint and Air Force doctrinal documents place great emphasis on the
commander, and his/her place in the organization.
To further assess the validity of the top-three agent recurring report, I expanded the
visualization to those agents that consistently appear in the top 20 of their respective
measures. This expanded view is shown in Figure 47 where the nonspecific agent
‘Commander’ remains in the top most position, with the CJFACC now tied. There remains
some ambiguity in the source text about the Joint Staff—this technique is not yet capable of
differentiate whether a given reference is to the Joint Staff supporting the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in Washington, D.C., or the staff of a joint command. Of potential note is the absence of
a specific agent, other than commanders, usually associated with the cyber domain. There is
however, a number of IT systems in this expanded view, to include the generalized common
operating picture (COP), the ISR Tracking System, and the generic ‘information system.’

Figure 46: Recurring top ranked agents (top 3), operational model
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Figure 47: Recurring top ranked agents (top 20), operational model

It is necessary to disaggregate the IT agents from the agent node class to gain a better
understanding of the relative importance of the human and IT agents within the metanetwork.
This disaggregation allows for a finer grained understanding of the structural characters of
two different agent types. The disaggregated human recurring agents visualization is below
in Figure 48. In it, the corpus clearly reveals a high level of emphasis (and high variability
within measures) on commanders and various specific organizational leaders. The paucity of
the agents displayed is indicative of the variability of the human agents’ rankings within each
measure.

Figure 48: Recurring top ranked human agents (top 3), operation model

To overcome the small number of agents revealed above, I again expanded the
window of recurrence to the top 20 finishers in each measure. With this expanded view, in
Figure 49, the human agent population continues its lack of cyber oriented agents and
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remains focused on Air Force operations. It did expand to include a number of other specific
military leaders at various levels. One feasible interpretation of this emphasis on leadership is
the Air Force’s doctrine places the emphasis of mission assurance on commanders and
military leaders and not cyber specific agents or roles.

Figure 49: Recurring top ranked human agents (top 20), operational model

For the disaggregated IT agents population, when limited to the top 3 finishers per
measure, the information revealed in Figure 50, demonstrates variability among the doctrine
documents about which IT systems are important enough to be specifically mentioned. The
Global Command and Control System (GCCS), in all its Service-specific incarnations, is the
most frequently mentioned IT system, but even then is only in the top three of measures 50%
of the time.
Extending the window of analysis to the IT agents that are in the top 20 of each
measure, reveals a piece of information that I had previously thought of as anecdotal only—
units rely on internet relay chat (IRC) much more casual observers might believe. Variability
is still fairly high, though GCCS is now joined by the generic COP, the Joint Operations
Planning and Execution System (JOPES), as well as the theater battle management core
system (TBMCS) as frequently mentioned IT systems. This report provides evidence that
SME-based assessments of the importance of TBMCS, JOPES, and GCCS are supported
with quantitative analysis.
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Figure 50: Recurring top tanked IT agents (top 3), operational model

At the organization level, Joint and USAF doctrine are highly variable for the
organizations that are consistently and frequently mentioned. This is shown in Figure 52
where only the generic organization of ‘staff’ rises to the 80% mark for consistent
importance in network measures. Not surprising in their presence, though their low values
remain at odds with professional experience, are the staff divisions for Intelligence and
Operations. I had expected these organizations to be prominent in this kind of report and
graph. A possible source for the discrepancy is the common mental models of authors—if
they all simply ‘know’ that operations and intelligence divisions are important, they do not
write such apparently self-evident facts. It’s unclear that commanders at the operational level
of war would necessarily be surprised—if there was such a common reaction, the
discrepancy could help Services adjust their writing styles.

Figure 51: Recurring top ranked IT agents (top 20), operational model
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Figure 52: Recurring top ranked organizations (top 3), operational model

Expanding the threshold for visualization from the top 3 recurring organizations to
the top 20, Figure 53 below, allows us to see the results does not appreciably change, though
the number and types of units certainly does. At this threshold, the top entries do not change
in their inclusion or relative order with the exception of the operations divisions. There is
certainly ambiguity over which level of joint staff operations this entity refers to—National
J3, COCOM level J3, Joint Task Force J3, or Combined Joint Staff J3. The absence of the
logistics community in this model is likely more a reflection of the corpus selection than a
lack of institutional emphasis on logistics at the tactical levels. It is extremely unlikely that
the Air Force is cavalier to the importance of their logistics tail to their ability to conduct
operations.

Figure 53: Recurring top ranked organizations (top 20), operational model

96

The Operational Model Resources captured by the D2M process, below, and the
thesauri I applied yield only a four (4) entities that doctrine consistently cross the 25%
threshold. Like the tactical model, the aggregation of IT resource and non-IT resource in this
report is not terribly illuminating.

Figure 54: Recurring top ranked resources (top 3), operational model

Expanding the window of analysis to the resources that appear in the top 20 of these
measures, Figure 55, does not yield any more coherent presentation of resources that are
specific enough to address and important enough to have organizations dedicate resources to
improving their resilience. It is gratifying to see that networks and IT, both in generic
incarnations, are in this view of the data, though lower than professional experience would
lead me to expect.

Figure 55: Recurring top ranked resources (top 20), operational model

When disaggregating IT resources from non-IT resources, the resource picture does
not become more meaningfully clear, though a review remains in order. Below, Figure 56
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depicts that there are only three (3) highly generic resources that rise to the top 3 even 10%
of the time. The generalized resources of capabilities, systems, and personnel are
insufficiently precise to drive assessments of mission assurance. This insufficiency is,
possibly, a selection error. The result may be a function of the texts that comprise the
evaluated corpus—a corpus more precisely aligned with a specific organization may generate
more meaningful results. Before making further judgments on the usefulness of this
disaggregation and report, it’s time to review the top 20 results of each measure and the
disaggregated IT resources generated in the D2M process.
In Figure 57, the same generic resources are at the top of the list, revealing that they
are in the top 20 of all the resource-related measures. This report and analysis though is
equally nonrevelatory as the previous report. The doctrine, as the source of the data, is
insufficiently verbose in the resources listed to support primary decisions about named
resource importance. However, a metanetwork ontology’s strength is that one segment of a
model may not have direct measurable significance, but that segment still exists within the
structure of the overall evaluated model. This presence supports the face validity of the
model, and potentially increases the acceptability of results from other portions of the
structure and model. In other words, importance to the network may very well be in the
positioning within the multi-node system, not simply existence of a single node class.

Figure 56: Recurring top tanked Non-IT resources (top 3), operational model
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Figure 57: Recurring top ranked Non-IT resources (top 20), operational model

The IT resources graphs, in contrast to the non-IT resources graphs, reveal entities
that are recognizable and reasonable to Combatant Command and US Air Force cyber
familiar and aware personnel. Figure 58 reflects the importance that popular media places on
communications capabilities (of all types with no specificity) as well as networks (generally)
and computer networks. There is some ambiguity whether ‘networks’ and
‘computer_networks’ refer to the same concept or if there was some meaningful contextual
difference in the corpus. Given previous reports on the relative importance of the intelligence
divisions of this level of warfare, it is gratifying to discern the intelligence network (JWICS)
being present in the report as well. It is interesting to note that the named unclassified and
secret networks (NIPRNet and SIPRNet) are not apparent while JWICS is present. The
tactical model also reflected this absence of NIPRNet and SIPRNet.

Figure 58: Recurring top ranked IT resources (top 3), operational model
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Expanding the analysis window to the top 20 finishers in each resource related
measure generates Figure 59. In this chart the generic communications capabilities remain
high in the report, and JWICS rises even higher. The World Wide Web is a relabeling of
NIPRNet (not technically accurate but a reasonable abstraction) and has near parity with
JWICS in this view. Interestingly, a specific-to-coalition environments network (e.g.,
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange (CENTRIX)) appears in this view,
which corresponds to the national trend of operating in coalition environments. There is also
a more apparent importance of satellite based capabilities such as Global Positioning System
(GPS), communications, and the generic ‘space_capabilities’—a frequent euphemism for
classified capabilities).
This operational-level section has demonstrated that the second of the three stopping
conditions listed in Table 18 is met. Later in this chapter, we will see the evidence of meeting
the third stopping condition for the operational model.

Figure 59: Recurring top ranked IT resources (top 20), operational model

Final Key Entities Report – Strategic
This section is similar to the previous operational model just discussed, the Key
Entities Reports review of D2M output for the Operational models. It provides a snapshot of
the complete quantitative and visual representation of key entities for interesting node sets. I,
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again, provide the complete key entities reports (all 238 pages) on my home page at
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/nonpeer.shtml#dissertation_support.
The Key Agents visualization for the strategic model, with the agent node set
remaining the aggregation of human agents and IT systems identified in the source
documents, is in Figure 60. The figure shows ‘CDR-Commander,’ ‘Combatant Commander’
(Combatant Command Commander), and ‘SECDEF’ (Secretary of Defense) rank in the top 3
in 100%, 86% and 84%, respectively, in twenty-nine (29) different measures. The generic
‘info_sys’ and JOPES (Joint Operational Planning and Execution System) are the only two
IT specific agents that make it into this summary of the measures. Like the other two models,
it is not surprising that Joint doctrinal documents place great emphasis on commanders in
general while specifically calling out Combatant Command Commanders, and the Secretary
of Defense. In the US military chain of command, the SECDEF is second only to the
President for civilian leadership. Unsurprisingly, at least in the aggregated collection of
human and IT agents, named and specific IT systems are not frequently in the doctrine in the
top 3 places of the various measures. One explanation of this could be it reduces the
probability of needing to republish doctrine for each new technology change. Another
plausible—and not mutually exclusive—explanation is that doctrine is supposed to be a
guideline and framework—not a specified collection of how and when to use what tools to
accomplish tasks. There were several surprising aspects to the results: the low ranking of the
CJCS ranked, the almost complete absence of supporting staff positions, and the missing
National Security Council given its role in US military operations.

Figure 60: Recurring top ranked agents (top 3), strategic model
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Using the same process as the other two models, the expanded visualization of those
agents that consistently appear in the top 20 of their respective measures is shown in Figure
61. In this expanded view, the top three agents are identical, though their relative position has
changed with the SECDEF rising to the second place. The Geographic Combatant
Commanders have risen to the 3rd place in this chart, revealing there is ambiguity in doctrine
when authors refer to Combatant Commanders—variants include Combatant Commanders,
the Geographical Combatant Commanders, or the Functional Combatant Commanders, or
some combination. Also in this view, we begin to see the presence of IT specific systems,
though their labels remain generalized (e.g., info_sys, databases, and common operating
picture) with one specifically named system: Global Air Mobility Support System (GAMES).
Disaggregating the IT agents from the human agents yields another example of
differentiating the relative importance of the two agent types. The disaggregated recurring
human agents visualization is below in Figure 62. The disparity between the three (3) most
important agents and the remainder was not expected and is not reflective of what
professional experience would have suggested.

Figure 61: Recurring top ranked Agents (top 20), strategic model
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Figure 62: Recurring top ranked Human Agents (top 3), strategic model

For further exploration of the top ranked human agents, I again expanded the window
of recurrence to the top 20 finishers in each measure. With this expanded view, in Figure 63,
the human agent population has a much broader swath of responsibilities than the generic
‘commander’, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and the Combatant Commanders. With
this expanded view, we start seeing the inter-relatedness of the logistics community (e.g.,
USTRANSCOM), the intelligence community (IC) in the form of the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), the individual military departments and the component commands those
departments furnish. Though it may have been reasonable to prune the model to reflect only
those organizations in Figure 40, I decided that for the initial stopping point of face validity
to allow the intermingled data/entities to remain where the corpus placed them.

Figure 63: Recurring top ranked Human Agents (top 20), strategic model
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For the disaggregated IT agents population, the information revealed in Figure 64
demonstrates the near universal prominence in doctrine held by JOPES. Generic databases
are a near second with all other specific IT agents in the top three of the measures 30% of the
time or less. With such variability, the continued expansion of the analysis window to the top
twenty (20) finishers in each measure remains apropos.

Figure 64: Recurring top ranked IT agents (top 3), strategic model

Figure 65 reveals that at this level of granularity, there is much less variability
between the named IT systems. The number of supporting interests has also grown from
those whose primary consumers are ‘commanders’ to multiple supporting interests and
elements (e.g., intelligence, supply operations, and provide/operate/maintain
network/telecommunication networks).

Figure 65: Recurring top ranked IT agents (top 20), strategic model
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At the organization level, the strategic model reveals that doctrine writers have
broadened their scope of interest to include numerous organizations inside the Department of
Defense as well as other governmental agencies (OGA), as shown in Figure 66. The top
ranked organizations form the top tier of the nation’s war fighting commands—the
combatant commands, their respective service component commands, and their respective
higher headquarters. The rankings of the other displayed organizations, at less than 10% of
measures, remain too varied to do more than speculate about meaning or causation.

Figure 66:: Recurring top ranked Recurring top ranked organizations (top 3), strategic model

Expanding the threshold for visualization from the top 3 recurring organizations to
the top 20 allows us to see the robustness of the model. The variability in depicted results is
smaller than previously as well as reflecting a wider variety of organizations that strategic
doctrine writers frequently mention. This result is reflective of the actual complexity of
organizations that come together to wage our nation’s wars: its more than infantry, tanks, and
airplanes fighting in and over muddy fields. From the D2M process, the model includes not
only the principal strategic military formations, but also elements of other government
entities (e.g., CDC), Field Agencies and Agencies, and the ubiquitous Special Operations
Forces (SOF).
The Strategic Model’s resources, Figure 68 below, depict several nonspecific
resources but most interestingly, one very specific IT based resource: Joint World Wide
Intelligence Communications System (JPG joint planning group
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JWICS). The consistently and prominent presence of this IT resource is indicative of
the value of both intelligence at the Strategic level (that is data converted to information and
assessed by analysts) and the movement of intelligence across the various consumers within
the USG. Unmentioned, but essential to realize, is that the Department of Defense owns and
operates very little of its own network infrastructure—it relies on commercial public and
private operators for communications links around the globe. JPG joint planning group
JWICS, though cryptographically separated from other traffic on these links, is still
fundamentally reliant on commercial providers for the bulk of its bandwidth and availability.

Figure 67: Recurring top ranked Organizations (top 20), strategic model

Figure 68: Recurring top ranked Recurring top ranked resources (top 3), strategic model
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Expanding the window of analysis to the resources that appear in the top 20, Figure
69, of these measures does not meaningfully clarify the importance of any particular IT
resource. The top ranking forces and capabilities are generalized labels for resources
available to the DoD, but not clearly useful for a resilience assessment. The over-all ranking
of JWICS drops, while the importance of other resources enter the assessment window.

Figure 69: Recurring top ranked Recurring top ranked resources (top 20), strategic model

When disaggregating IT resources from non-IT resources, Figure 70, the resource
picture does not become more meaningfully clear. The items listed as appearing zero (0)
percent of the time across the measures, are in alphabetical order from the ranks of entities in
the same numerical category—meaning there are only six (6) entities that appear in the top
three (3) of the resource-oriented measures. Like the merged resource view depicted above,
these entities are too generalized for meaningful resilience assessment and planning.
The expanded view of the top twenty (20) finishers per measure does not yield any
more clarity. This result, somewhat consistent across all three of these models, suggests that
doctrine is potentially inadequate to perform rapid resource enumeration. It is more likely
that organizations’ documents about their standard operating procedures (SOP) within each
of their war fighting functions would be a richer enumeration source.
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Figure 70: Recurring top ranked Non-IT resources (top 3), strategic model

Figure 71: Recurring top ranked Non-IT resources (top 20), strategic model

The IT resources graphs, Figure 72 and Figure 73, reveal entities that are
recognizable and reasonable to a Joint cyber familiar and aware member of DoD. The
generic AIS is reflective of the pervasiveness of IT within the department. JWICS remains,
as indicated in the aggregated view, consistently mentioned in the top twenty (20) finishers
of each resource-centric measure. The top 20 graph indicates that there are a significant
number of systems deemed by various authors as important, but there is wide variability in
the authors’ writings. The variability is potentially a good news review of available
communications abilities. There is no single set of capabilities that form a critical IT hub that
could disrupt the entire IT infrastructure of the DoD—at least not in doctrinal references.
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Figure 72: Recurring top ranked IT resources (top 3), strategic model

Figure 73 Recurring top ranked IT resources (top 20), strategic model

This section has demonstrated that the second of the three stopping conditions listed
in Table 18 is met for the Strategic model. The section later in this chapter entitled Final
Graphical Renderings - Strategic provides the evidence of meeting the third stopping
condition for the strategic model.
Final Graphical Renderings - Overview
Graph visualization is one of many ways to analyze the models in this dissertation,
and is the third way (see also Table 18) to establish terminating conditions for the iterative
D2M process. With 45+ networks per model, 18K+ nodes, and 1.4M+ nodes, visual
representation of the entire metanetwork generally looks like a multi-colored ball of yarn—
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sometimes visually striking but rarely fit to elucidate answers to questions. Instead, and as a
demonstration of organizational face validity, I present in the following figures
representations of the Organization x Organization networks for each of the two models.
A short discussion of what visual representations of networks and how ORA™ lets
researchers make visualization choices follows. Each network represents the co-occurrence
of each listed organization with other listed organizations. The numeric value for each link
represents the number of times the co-occurrence happened within the relevant corpus. For
example a link between a node labeled G_3 and G_2 indicates those two organizations cooccurred within a window of concepts in the relevant input corpus. A link weight of 20 for
such a link, as an arbitrary example, would indicate there were 20 such co-occurrences in the
relevant input corpus.
Table 24: Visualization options for organization x organization Models

Filter by link weights/values (per figure caption)
Recursively hide isolated nodes and pendant nodes (nodes with only one connection to another node).
Distance between nodes is a function of the link weight, with higher link weights representing
stronger ties between nodes and hence visually closer together.
Nodes colored by a researcher imposed attribute defining approximate level of command within an
Army tactical hierarchy, the Air Force operational hierarchy, and the strategic hierarchy. The colors
are for high contrast and not for any doctrinal or semantic reflection of meaning, and are the first
figure in each series of figures
Removal of nodes from graph whose level-of-warfare is ambiguous (left blank)

Final Graphical Renderings - Operational
The visualizations below are for the Operational model (Combatant Command to
Numbered Air Force). I include four visualizations of the same model, at three levels of linkweight filtering and one filtered by the exogenously determined ‘level’ of command. Node
colors per ‘level’ of command are shown in the legend in Figure 74. Figure 75 is the version
with no filtering by link weight, and nodes with ambiguous levels of command colored in
translucent green. This is a fairly typical ball of yarn for such a large network and is
reflective of the challenges of rendering large numbers of meaningfully discrete objects.
Figure 76 however begins to reveal itself as closer to attaining face validity through its two
principal colors, purple for the combatant command, blue for the Air Force Service
Component (USAFCENT) and red and orange for various AOC elements. In this view, each
of the five (5) principle divisions of the AOC are visible, as well as the cross functional
teams and groups. In Figure 77, the model reveals the even stronger links with the filtering
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set to 15 or higher, though it is still clearly dominated by the purple joint and semi-joint
elements of the Combatant Command, the Joint Air Force Component, and other elements
associated with cyber operations. Figure 78 depicts yet another level of filtering with links
with edges 35 or higher depicted. Taken in isolation, a researcher might chose to interpret the
filtered view of this weighted network as indicating that, from the 83 documents in the
Operational corpus, the emphasis tends to be on the joint and mostly joint elements of this set
of organizations.

Figure 74: Node color legend for operational
organization x organization visualizations

Figure 76: Operational org x org, filtering by level
of warfare ≠ blank (the level is unambiguously
within scope, exogenously determined by
researcher)

Figure 77: Operational org x org, filtering by link
weight ≥ 15

Figure 75: Operational org x org, no filtering by
link weight
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Figure 78: Operational org x org, filtering by link
weight ≥ 35

Final Graphical Renderings - Strategic
The visualizations below are for the strategic model (NCA to USSTRATCOM,
USCENTCOM, and USCYBERCOM). I include three versions of the same network, at three
levels of link-weight filtering. Figure 75, with no filtering at all, is reflective of the
challenges of rendering large numbers of meaningfully discrete objects. Filtering the
displayed links and nodes by link weight, it’s apparent that a value of 15 (Figure 76) is
insufficiently de-cluttered to make any reasonable SME assessment from visual inspection.
By increasing the filter value to 35 (see Figure 77) it is becoming more apparent that each of
the intended primary organizations are present, though it’s indeterminate whether we have an
excessive number of unnecessary organizations remaining in the model. The numerous
exemplars for viewing the model reflect choices any researcher can make as part of their
model-refinement process, and when to stop such refinements. Via visual inspection, a SME
can confirm relevant organizations and suborganizations are present, prune nodes not in
scope to the research question, and in the opposite sense, decide to not prune nodes based on
unanticipated but present links between nodes. I also included DoD elements associated with
how the Department, in accordance with the National Strategy for Cyber, has decided it will
conduct cyber operations at the strategic level.

Figure 79: Node color legend for strategic organization x
organization visualizations

Figure 80: Strategic org x org, no filtering by link weight
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Figure 81: Strategic org x org, filtering by link weight ≥
15
Figure 83: Strategic org x org, filtering by link weight ≥
35

Figure 82: Strategic org x org, filtering by level of
warfare ≠ blank (the level is unambiguously within
scope, exogenously determined by researcher)
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Input Inconsistencies and Biases
Doctrine at the Joint and Services levels is frequently written by multiple authors over
multiples months and years, with numerous editors, all of varying training and experience in the
fields of technical and doctrine writing and editorial control. With that background and those
limitations, it should surprise no one that there are inconsistencies between doctrine documents
(e.g., assertions of primacy and need for adherence) as well as within doctrine documents (e.g.,
computer security as ‘commander’s business’ with implicit and sometimes explicit tones of ‘this
is too complicated for commanders’).
I was aware of the possibility of biasing the input by over-selecting cyber security,
information assurance, and other documents that would be focused on IT. To avoid this
possibility, I deliberately avoided over selecting for such technology focused documents and
focused on more general conduct of operations doctrine. I do not have evidence however that I
hit the right mix, or that I over corrected and under selected for technology focused doctrine
documents.
In the future work section I describe possible ways of quantifying the bias across
documents, within documents, and identifying if those biases are effecting the resultant models.
It may be infeasible to eliminate all forms of bias since the authors of the documents are
unknown as are their own personal and professional tendencies.
Limitations of Text-Mining and D2M process
Text-mining as a method of constructing general organizations seems an imminently
reasonable starting point for model construction. However there are difficulties and challenges
associated with the use of free-form documents to derive a organizational meta-model.
The first and most obvious drawback is the use of pictures, charts, diagrams, and other
visual explainatory material in the documents. The old saying that a picture is worth a thousand
words requires pictures’ content be transcribed back into a text readable by the D2M process. A
second significant drawback is where doctrine or other documents use tables and lists to convey
semantic meaning via positioning or other stylistic mechanisms. The D2M process, as it exists
now, does not capture the doer of an list of actions presented in a list form. The D2M process can
read text in tables, but does not currently attempt to differentiate columns and their headings,
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from rows and their headings. Semantic content then gets lost unless transcribed into a separate
file.
The D2M process is also hampered in its ability to convey emphasis or valence. There
can be proscriptive lists that the D2M process will completely miss the negative valence and
intent. There can also be lists of items or actions that a particular agent or group of agents are
responsible for, and the positive valence of the list gets lost, as well as the potential linking of the
object noun(s) to every single sentence.
These shortcomings are, at present, overcome through model review and suggestions of
SME input. The identification of valence, positive or negative sentiment in text is itself a field of
research within the text-mining community, and I will defer to that community for advances in
technology to reduce the workload of SMEs.
Summary of D2M process
This portion of the dissertation has discussed the origin of the data from which I have
built two distinct models of portions of the US Department of Defense. Each model represents
one simplified portion of the larger organization to assist demonstrating generalizability of the
model building process. I have also presented a multi-step process as well as modifications of the
CASOS D2M process to support the model construction in this acronym and jargon filled
domain. Finally, I have presented the numerical descriptives of each of the models derived from
this text-to-model process. Recall that though one deliverable of the dissertation is a process that
can be followed by future researchers, and DoD modelers. Though it is a deliverable, the process
is a means to an end. It is also a previously unavailable means that is significantly more rapid
than any risk management framework compliance assessments in my professional experiences.
This rapidity sets this process apart from other forms of organizational model construction. The
process is also very accessible to un-augmented staff and supports the capturing and reflecting
connections between and among nine (9) different node-types,

Changes to empirical models in support of Agent Based Modeling
I defer the discussion of the modifications to the empirical models to enable a near direct
transition to the Construct simulation capability to the Agent Based Models and Modeling
Chapter (on page 175).
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Conclusions
In the abstract and Introduction chapter, I listed four demands leaders should place on
their organization to increase mission assurance in contested cyber environments. This chapter
has addressed the second of those four demands: the ability to rapidly model their organization(s).
With this methodology, leaders and their subordinates can build graph models of their
organizations with a small number of well defined steps. They can update their previous work to
increase model validity or conduct excursions and forecasting. Organizations are no longer
bound to the more traditional risk management framework snapshot in time assessment. There is
no requirement to hire survey takers, expropriate time from the respondents, and adjust key-word
coding per respondent. Instead, with the use of CASOS software tools, augmented by the DoD
thesaurus and the work flow I’ve demonstrated and described, leaders can rapidly model their
organization as their own documents describe it. Leaders can avoid the perception the model (or
RMF assessment) is ‘too old’ to be accurate or relevant, helping them gain a more up to date
level of confidence about their people, processes, and equipment. In this chapter, I introduced
modified data to model processes, modified and built new computing capabilities and tools to
support the automation-aided construction of multimode and multiplex organizational models
from documents about the modeled organizations. This rapid modeling approach represents one
of the principle contributions of the dissertation to the field of mission assurance and
organizational resilience to contested cyber environments.
I have also postulated a meaningful research area into the statistical distributions of the
metanetwork ontology—though I defer execution of that research to future work for myself or
other researchers. On a last note, this chapter is the origin of the dissertation. With my
professional history and outlook shaped by the US Army, I had originally approached this
dissertation with the idea of helping the Army defeat the nation’s enemies. It rapidly became
apparent that applying this process to real world adversaries would require real world adversaries’
documents, doctrine, and literature as well as appropriate translations. Securing access to such a
dataset would be problematic at best. This difficulty had the natural outgrowth of demonstrating
the process against friendly organizations. Presuming a competent enemy who seeks to
understand us, they could do to us what I have demonstrated in this chapter—a automated
method of supplementing the USAF CARVER method for targeting.
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Network Analytics and Resilience
Numerous standard social network analysis (SNA) measures for single node types,
single-mode measures, can offer indicators of general resilience—though they suffer from being
unable to capture context outside the modeled types. Likewise, if organizations do not conduct
assessments over time with sufficient frequency, their indicators and assessments may fail to
capture enough information for meaningful conclusions—or worse, woefully misinformed
conclusions. It is entirely feasible that depending on the timing of pre- and post event data
gathering (see also Figure 85), assessments would completely miss any indicators of
performance-degrading events. Such ignorance in the presence of data is one of numerous
justifications for dynamic network analysis (DNA)—that is the longitudinal application of SNA
measures to a data set or organization. Longitudinal study of organizations and the events that
affect those organizations can be resource intensive above and beyond the investment in time.
Organizations must be able to identify their sense of ‘normal,’ identify when contested cyber
environments begin and end, and identify the affect people, systems, processes, and other
structural elements. Organizations must also be able to quantify those effects with a trustworthy
methodology and meaningful effects.
To the requirements above, this chapter offers an exposition of theory applied to the
domain of resilience to contested cyber environments. Exposition is through application of
quantitative SNA techniques to the models created in the Data-to-Model (D2M) process of the
preceding chapter. The application of quantitative analytic techniques to the models addresses
the first of the four demands I specified in the abstract: leaders should require assessments be
more than analogical, anecdotal or simplistic snapshots in time. I extened the fields of SNA and
organizational behavior by providing a static measure of resilience as a function of near-isolation
of agents, tasks, resources, and knowledge.
Harkening back to the dissertation work flow of Figure 35 and zooming in between the
creation of the models and the augmentation leading to simulation, Figure 84 is another
breadcrumb to assist the reader in knowing where this chapter fits in the workflow of the
dissertation.
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Figure 84: Dissertation workflow static analysis prior to augmentation for agent based modeling

Resilience in what context?
Like (Pflanz, 2012; Pflanz & Levis, 2012) and revisiting Figure 2, now shown as Figure
85, a graph depicting the dynamic nature of resilience is useful to convey a more complete
understanding.

Figure 85: Dynamic visualization of resilience for an arbitrary measure of interest (MoI) 12

In this Figure, there is a span of time from t0 to twarmup that reflects the possible values of a
Measure of Interest (MoI) prior to reaching a pre-contested-environment equilibrium. As noted
12

(Morgan & Lanham, 2012)
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by Pimm (1984), without equilibrium, resilience is indefinable. During the time of normal
operations (MoInormal), the organization achieves some level of equilibrium with variance within
some acceptable tolerances. The figure also depicts the beginning of an attack (tattack-start), or
some other cause for a negative Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) effect(s). While the
attack is ongoing, the attack should be having some effect on the MoI, though it may not be
consistent, statistically or operationally significant—absent an effect, there is no rational reason
to expend resources to deal with the attack. As shown, there is an approximate stair step halfway
through the attack…as just one of an infinite variety of possible impacts on the MoI (e.g.
instantaneous drop, linear or step-wise linear drop, logarithmic drop, quadratic drop). At some
point-in-time, the attack ends (tattack-end), though there is no guarantee that the organization or its
agents are aware of the specific end time—nor for that matter are they assured of being aware of
a specific start time (tattack-start). The chart above depicts a quiescent period after the attack and
before ‘recovery’ begins (trecovery), or before the MoI rises above the minimum performance
reached as a consequence of the attack.
There is no requirement for recovery to start immediately, as the attack may have effects
on the MoI that outlast the attack itself. It’s also important to note that there is a space between
the minimum performance (MoImin-acceptable) for this MoI and a minimally acceptable threshold
set, a priori, by one or more leaders of an organization of interest. This threshold may have been
set, or may simply be a generalized statement by leadership akin to ‘no performance drop is
acceptable!’ This picture does not depict a return to pre-attack levels for this MoI (at tpre-attack
reached),

indeed there is no universal requirement in definitions of resilience that such a return to

pre-event levels occur, notwithstanding Bishop (2011). To be sure, in the happy situation shown
above, the forecast is that the attack/attacker makes the organization better in this MoI than they
might otherwise have become, with adaptation as a likely explanation.
In an attack, however, where the MoImin drops below MoImin-acceptable, the MoI for the
modeled organization would have low resilience, and potentially low-survivability. Such a
situation would make recovery all the more daunting as first recovery efforts would be geared to
re-gaining the MoImin-acceptable level of performance.
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Static resilience indicators
Deciding which SNA-measures an organization can or should use to indicate resilience to
cyber events is a fundamental task for any meaningful program of assessment and improvement.
The decision may be existing-data driven—a measure with no supporting data is a theoretical
achievement un-anchored to any organizational reality. Of course, lack of data during the
decision process can itself drive efforts to establish a recurring data collection mechanism that,
ideally, imposes little differential loading on the organization itself. A brief example of SNAmeasures and their applicability to the domain of cyber resilience follows.
When a resilience question relates to information or belief diffusion, a researcher could
use changes in measured pre- and post event “communication speed” (Kathleen M. Carley,
Pfeffer, Reminga, Storrick, & Columbus, 2012)—where the longest path length of the Agent-byAgent (  ) network is an indicator of the speed that any arbitrary message can pass across the
modeled network. This communication speed model is inappropriate to modeling specific
technical-channel flows—for that goal a tool such as OMNet++ may be more applicable.
However, realizing that humans frequently have more than one method of communicating with
other humans, this measure abstracts away the details of channel selection, capacity, utilization,
and congestion. In this abstracted manner, this model provides an indicator of possible changes
to message passing speeds pre- and post event, and allows a quantitative assessment of the
impact(s) to such message passing.
Negative changes in an organization’s Resource-by-Resource (  ) network (e.g., loss

of links or nodes in the  matrix), indicating possible loss of system-to-system

communications links or unfulfilled inter-dependencies are another application of SNA to the
myriad facets of resilience assessment and engineering. Not all changes are necessarily negative
in their impacts. It is entirely feasible that the loss of access to one or more systems by one or
more agents and their organizations may lead the organization to successful adaptive behavior.
Where the behavior is deleterious to the desired organizational outcomes, leadership and
assessors have succeeded in identifying mal-adaptive behavior as well. Before discussing further
applications of SNA measures to cyber resilience assessments, it is appropriate to look at the
results of measures calculations on the three models in the dissertation: tactical level; operational
level; and strategic level.
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This application of network analytics to organizational resilience is akin to the CARVER
method of targeting used by the US military and some of its military allies. US Joint and Service
doctrine discuss CARVER(Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and
Recognizability) as a methodology to help quantify the inputs to the targeting decision
processes—what resources, organizations, or people should the military apply force against, to
what effect, and for how long should the effect last. With CARVER as a near analog, it’s an easy
leap to using standard centrality measures (e.g., inDegree, outDegree, geodesic centrality
(Freeman, 1977)) for agents and message-passing resources. These measures have other analogs
in the idea of span-of-control (the number of direct-report subordinates a leader can effectively
manage).

Metanetwork resilience indicators
Several metanetwork-based measures are also suggestive of potentially useful measures
of interest. A partial list, primarily those contributing to the new measure ‘resilience’ is in Table
25, with a more complete list in Table 26.
Network measures, in particular the general network/organization measures shown below,
would be infeasible without multimode networks. Calculations using matrix algebra support the
creation of measures such congruence between knowledge and resources available and that
needed for task completion. The same is true for the multimode assessment of cognitive demand
(expanding past the effort humans expend to keep their social networks to the effort humans
expend to maintain their social networks, manage their resources, and execute their tasks).
Finally, Graham’s work on shared situation awareness (SSA) would be infeasible without the
added information in a metanetwork representation of an organization.
ORA™, with over 170 measures, helps assess static resilience in the two models using
immediate impact assessments or the following metrics applied to the metanetwork using
entropic and targeted node removal. A sampling of those measures are below in Table 25.
Table 25: A sample of metanetwork measures for indicators of resilience

Measure
Performance as Accuracy
Communication Congruence

Meaning from Carley (2002d) and ORA™ Help
How accurately agents can perform their assigned tasks
based on their access to knowledge and resources.
Measures to what extent the agents communicate when
and only when it is needful to complete tasks. Perfect
congruence requires a symmetric Agent x Agent
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Knowledge Congruence

Key Node Identification
Shared Situation Awareness
(SSA)

Resilience (new)

network.
Across all agents, the knowledge that agents lack to do
their assigned tasks expressed as a percentage of the
total knowledge needed by all agents.
Using Key Entity reports
A function of Eigen vector centrality, social
demographic similarity, and physical proximity. High
values correspond to having a better understanding of
what others are doing.
A function of near isolated status of knowledge,
resources, and tasks, as well as organizational needs and
wants with respect to knowledge and resources. High
Values indicate high resilience to contested cyber
environments.

New and adjusted metanetwork resilience indicators
There are two sets of new measures of resilience under consideration. The first is a single
measure that combines several existing measures. The second is a set of measures that provide
over time assessment, and therefore requires over time data—in this dissertation generated
through simulation and discussed in the next two chapters.
The first point-in-time measure is a multivariable function shown in (14). This is a
multivariable function of normalized network access indices for knowledge, resources and tasks,
organizational needs and the organizational waste. Access indices are reflections of near
isolation, organizational needs reflects shortfalls in knowledge and resources needed to do tasks,
and organizational waste represents knowledge supplied to tasks (via agents) that tasks do not
need for their execution. The final three-part result is in (14), with the incremental steps to build
to the equation shown in (15) through (35) along with additional definitions and explication for
each component. Exogenous weighting factors,

are shown as well, though for this

dissertation I set them to one (1) in the absent of evidence supporting other values. I have drawn
and derived this measure from (Kathleen M. Carley & Pfeffer, 2012c; Kathleen M. Carley,
Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012) with minor axial shifts.
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Equation 14: Structural resilience as a new metanetwork calculation

The three-part access index component, multiplied by

is a measure of near isolation

for three node types: knowledge, tasks, and resources. Near isolation is another way of referring
to a single point of failure. (SPOF) —albeit possibly irrelevant to specific questions of interest.
For the agent node set, (15) shows how to compute the knowledge access index. In English, for
each agent, a possibly empty set of knowledge entities (  ) exists of knowledge to which only
the one agent has access. Additionally, the agent (ego) with access connects to only one other
agent (alter)—the ego is a pendant with respect to all alters.
(15)
Equation 15: Access index as reflection of criticality through near isolation (Kathleen M. Carley, Juergen Pfeffer, et
al., 2012)

The intuition is that the effect of this type of SPOF corresponds to an inverse sigmoid
function (aka S-curve), such that low numbers of SPOFs correspond to high levels of structural
resilience. I normalize the access index by the magnitude of its source node set. I then segment
the result into 12 bins—12 bins allows the output curve to align with the Army’s (though not Air
Force or Joint) color coding scheme for unit combat effectiveness 13. With normalized results of
(15) ranging from [0, 1], the sigmoid function must shift to the right to reflect zero near isolates
equate to the maximal output of the function (x=0  f(x)=1). The exponent of the sigmoid
function is shown in (16) with the final sigmoid function shown in (17).
 'a 




a

6 

12

12   a


6

(16)

Equation 16: Normalized summation of a model’s knowledge access index, agents aggregated

13

The four (4)-color ‘Gumball’ method of representing unit effectiveness at a glance is green, amber, red, black.
These colors corresponds to combat capable/100%-85% strength, combat capable/70-84% strength, Combat
Ineffective/50-69% strength, and requires reconstitution/<50% strength (Headquarters Department of the Army,
2010). In this color-coding scheme, a decrease in a measure of 30-50% corresponds with an organization in need of
reconstitution/regeneration before receiving additional missions. Decreases of 15% or less correspond with no
change in visual representation of the measure—the color code remains ‘green.’
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1

(17)
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Equation 17: Knowledge access component sigmoid, right shifted six values, in 12 bins

Equation (17) depicts all types of agents aggregated into a single group. In this
dissertation I disaggregated Agents (nominally humans or roles humans fill) and IT Agents
(nominally computer-based systems or capabilities that process, store, manipulate transmit and
receive data). To accommodate this disaggregation I modified (16) by summing the two ORA™calculated Knowledge Access Indices before normalizing. This modification is shown in (18)
with the consequent update to (17) reflected in (19).

 'aita 

12 (  a    ita )


6

(18)

Equation 18: Normalized summation of a model’s knowledge access index, agents disaggregated

KnowlegeAccessComponent 

1

(19)

1  e  aita
'

Equation 19: Knowledge access component sigmoid, right shifted six values, in 12 bins, agents disaggregated

Identical calculations then occur for tasks as shown in (20). Calculations for Resource
Access Index had to accommodate the combinatoric effects of disaggregating IT resources from
Resources as well as disaggregating Agents and IT Agents and is shown in (21).

a' ita 

12 ( a   ita )
2 

6

(20)

Equation 20: Normalized summation of a model’s task access index, agents disaggregated 14

 'raritaitraitrita 

12 (  a    ita    a    ita )
2   

6

(21)

Equation 21: Normalized summation of a model’s resource and IT resource access index, agents disaggregated

The use of (19), (20), and (21) to build the combined access index component causes that
component to look like (22) below.
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Access Index Component   
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(22)

Equation 22: Access Index Component, adjusted for disaggregation of Agent and Resource node sets

14

ORA™ does not yet support direct calculation of task access index. To accomplish this, I recoded the ‘Task’ node
set as a ‘Knowledge’ node set and re-executed the knowledge access index calculation report in ORA™.
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A 2D projection of the sum of two of the above indices is below, with the addition of the
third index left as an exercise for the reader. It is easy to discern that when there are no SPOFs,
the highest score shown for two (2) indices is two (2). The Access Index Component is therefore
a function with a range of [0, 3] with three (3) being the best possible score, representing no
SPOFs for tasks, knowledge, or resources.

Figure 86: 2D projection of 3D rendering of two access indices

The next portion of building (14) is the calculation, at an organization level, of the
knowledge and resource shortfalls. Within ORA™, the measures names are
congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeNeeds and congruenceOrgTaskResourceNeeds.
congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeNeeds reveals “Across all tasks, the knowledge that tasks lack
expressed as a percentage of the total knowledge needed by all tasks” (Kathleen M. Carley,
Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012). A value of zero (0) is an excellent result for both measures. Using
the same number of bins as the access index calculations, I again right shift the curve six (6)
values. I also translate the percentage to one of 12 bins as shown in (25) and then used as input
into a standard sigmoid function show in Figure 87. Figure 87 is a reduced form of the Access
Index Component with only two (2) functions summed, causing a reduction in the range from
[0,3] to [0, 2]. Zero (0) is indicative there are no tasks lacking knowledge of any variety.
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Figure 87: Sigmoid function of knowledge + resource needs component, low input values best

 k  '  

(23)

Equation 23: Tasks with needed knowledge via assigned agents (Kathleen M. Carley, Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012)

(24)
Equation 24: Percentage of knowledge not provided by agents assigned to tasks (Knowledge Needs) (Kathleen M.
Carley, Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012)
'
nknowledge
 nknowledge 12  6

(25)

Equation 25: Knowledge needs, right shifted 6 values, in 12 bins

NeedsKnowledge Re source 

1
1 e

'
nknowledge



1

(26)

'

1  e nresource

Equation 26: Needs Component as sum of two sigmoid needs functions, right shifted 6 values, in 12 bins

Again, there are modifications to (26) necessary due to the disaggregation of agents and
IT agents. To merge and normalize the nknowledge value for agents and IT agents, it is necessary to
unwind the percentage values of each, and recalculate a normalized value. This process is in (27).
'
 12
nknowledge
agent itagent
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knowledgeagent

 

   nknowledgeitagent  
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 6

(27)

Equation 27: congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeNeeds with disaggregated agents and IT agents (Kathleen M. Carley,
Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012)

 r  '  

(28)

Equation 28: Tasks with needed resources via assigned agents (Kathleen M. Carley, Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012)
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(29)
Equation 29: Percentage of resources not provided by agents assigned to tasks (Kathleen M. Carley, Juergen Pfeffer,
et al., 2012)
'
nresource
 nresource 12  6

(30)

Equation 30: Resource needs, right shifted 6 values, in 12 bins

The modifications to (30) due to the disaggregation of resources and IT resources follows
the same pattern as the modification for nknowledge . With two disaggregations, IT Agents and IT
resource, there are four percentage values to unwind and renormalize This process is shown in
(31).
'
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   nresourceitagent    nitresourceagent    nitresourceitagent  
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  6 (31)

Equation 31: congruenceOrgTaskResourceNeeds with disaggregated agents and IT agents (Kathleen M. Carley,
Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012)

The measure congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeWaste reveals “Across all tasks, the
knowledge that agents have that are not required to do their assigned” (Kathleen M. Carley,
Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012). Intuitively, having extra knowledge within an organization is
inefficient but potentially useful in some crisis or exigency. As such, this aspect of the resilience
score uses an inverted sigmoid function, indicating that zero (0) waste is bad, and that
superfluous knowledge or resources are good. Using the same number of bins as the access index
calculations, I again right shift the curve six (6) values as well as translate the percentage to one
of 12 bins as shown in (36) and used as input into Figure 88.

128

Figure 88: Sigmoid function of Knowledge + Resource Waste Component, high input values best

(32)

Equation 32: Percentage of knowledge not used for tasks assigned to agents (Kathleen M. Carley, Juergen Pfeffer, et
al., 2012)
'
wknowledge
  wknowledge 12  6

(33)

Equation 33 Knowledge waste, right shifted 6 values, in 12 bins

Again, there are necessary modifications to (33) due to the disaggregation of agents and
IT agents. To merge and normalize the wknowledge value for agents and IT agents, it is necessary to
unwind the percentage values of each, and recalculate a normalized value. This process is shown
in (34).
'
wknowledge
 12
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knowledgeagent
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2 

6

(34)

Equation 34: congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeWaste with disaggregated agents and IT agents (Kathleen M. Carley,
Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012)

(35)

Equation 35: Percentage of resources not used for tasks assigned to agents (Kathleen M. Carley, Juergen Pfeffer, et
al., 2012)
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'
wresource
  wresource 12  6

(36)

Equation 36: Resource ‘Waste,’ right shifted 6 values, in 12 bins

The modifications to (36) due to the disaggregation of resources and IT resources follow
the same pattern as the modification for wknowledge . With two disaggregations, IT Agents and IT
resource, there are four (4) percentage values to unwind and renormalize This process is shown
in (37).
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(37)

Equation 37: congruenceOrgTaskResourceNeeds with disaggregated agents and IT agents (Kathleen M. Carley,
Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012)
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(38)

Equation 38: Waste Component as sum of two sigmoid waste functions, right shifted 6 values, in 12 bins

A 2D projection of (14) is shown in Figure 89 as well as a surface mapping of the
interaction between a single growth curve (i.e. a single waste value) and a single decay curve
(e.g., a single access index value or a single needs value) in Figure 90. A more comprehensive
(for output values) surface depiction is in Figure 91. All three of these figures depict that the
ideal resilient organization should have no near isolates, maximal excess knowledge and
resources (e.g., twice what is minimally necessary), and no needs. They also show that the least
resilient organization is hyper-efficient in knowledge and resource distribution with no waste
whatsoever. The least resilient organization also has the degenerate case that all tasks, resources,
and knowledge are near isolates and accessible only through agents that are pendants. Finally the
least resilient organization has every task short of necessary knowledge and resources.
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Figure 89: 2D rendering of resilience score, as function of access indices, wastes, and needs

Figure 90: Surface mapping of interaction between a single waste and a single needs/access value

Returning to (14), Figure 91 offers a more nuanced rendering of the interactions between
the grouped outputs. Unlike previous graphs, I am rendering a sampling of the possible output
values for each of the three components of (14). At the far right, high component scores each
contribute to a high score for resilience. It is also read as there exists no, zero, unique
knowledge/tasks/resources possessed by pendant agents. There are no knowledge or resource
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shortages for any tasks, and there are twice as much knowledge in the organization as assigned
tasks need. The opposite end of the graph, at the left, depicts a scenario where there is nothing
but unique knowledge and resources possessed by pendants. There are shortages of knowledge
and resources for every task, and there is no excess knowledge or resources of any kind in the
organization. Such an organization scores a zero (0) in this resilience measure.

Figure 91: 3D surface rendering of theoretical resilience scores, as function of access indices, wastes, and needs

Resilience indicators for strategic and operational models
We can assess network models of organizations in terms of their structural changes when
a node or sets of links leave an organization. Picking the nodes to delete is of course one of
challenges and which to pick depends on the task at hand—disruption of information flow or
ensuring continued information flow? Breaking a network into segments with a single deletion or
multiple deletions and under what constraints? To explore these questions, node-level measures
help generate Key Entity reports, thereby reducing the possible deletion pool from the entire
model to a more restricted set of nodes. Network-level measures then provide the pool of
measures of interests (MoIs) that reflect the effects of IT agents and IT Resource node deletions.
Potentially, we are also interested in the changes to node-level metrics for the nodes left behind
as well—identifying shifts in node-level metrics for follow-on analysis or action. In light of the
above, I present here a list of network measures, their base line values, and discussion points that
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can serve as markers of resilience to contested cyber environments. It is likely, in future research,
that additional network measures within ORA™ can add to the robustness of analysis and
expand the scope of possible disrupting or negative events as well as to-be-developed measures.
Table 26: Dissertation measures of interest (MoI)

Network Measure

Discussion and How/Why it is relevant to assessing resilience in a
contested cyber environment 15
The proposed newest measure seeks to quantify the vulnerability based on
Resilience Score
scarcity of access to resources, knowledge and tasks. The perception that a
entity with few connections to the rest of the model could have significant
effects through its absence runs counter to many more traditional modes of
social network analysis. It does however mesh with the specialization of
functions and roles within modern organizations with broad ranges of
responsibilities.
The remainder of the network-level measures are in alphabetical order
For each node set, the average path length across all linked nodes in that set.
Characteristic Path
Most relevant to linked human and IT agents that manipulate and process
Length
information while performing tasks. The shorter the path, the faster
information may flow. Path lengths not perturbed by node deletions indicate
resilience to path disruptions. Excessively high path lengths can, though out
of scope for this work, indicate room for pruning communications links
within an organization.
Across all agents, the amount of knowledge needed for completion of
Congruence,
assigned tasks, expressed as a percentage of total knowledge needed. Clearly
Organization Agent
low needs values are more appropriate for organizations than high values.
Knowledge Needs
Across all agents, the amount of knowledge possessed by agents not required
Congruence,
by assigned tasks. Wastes, when not substitutable for other knowledge,
Organization Agent
represent expenditure of cognitive resources by agents that they might
Knowledge Wastes
otherwise use for the benefit of the organization. Lower values will generally
be preferable over high values.
Like knowledge needs, but with respect to resources. Clearly low needs
Congruence,
values are more appropriate for organizations than high values.
Organization Agent
Resource Needs
Like knowledge wastes, but with respect to resources. Wastes, when not
Congruence,
substitutable for other knowledge, represent expenditure of cognitive
Organization Agent
resources by agents that they might otherwise use for the benefit of the
Resource Wastes
organization. Lower values will generally be preferable over high values.
Across all tasks, the amount of knowledge lacking to tasks expressed as a
Congruence,
percentage of total knowledge needed. Clearly low needs values are more
Organization Task
appropriate for organizations than high values.
Knowledge Needs
Across all tasks, the amount of excess knowledge to tasks expressed as a
Congruence,
percentage of total knowledge needed. Wastes, when not substitutable for
Organization Task
other knowledge, represent expenditure of cognitive resources by agents that
Knowledge Wastes
they might otherwise use for the benefit of the organization. Lower values
will generally be preferable over high values.
15

Unless otherwise noted, definitions and explanations for these measures are verbatim from (Kathleen M. Carley,
Juergen Pfeffer, et al., 2012). Discussion of applicability to the dissertation is original work by the author.
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Table 26: Dissertation measures of interest (MoI)

Network Measure
Congruence,
Organization Task
Resource Needs
Congruence,
Organization Task
Resource Wastes
Congruence, Social
Technical

Density, Clustering
Coefficient
Diffusion

Fragmentation

Isolate Count

Overall Complexity

Performance as
Accuracy
Social Density
Speed
Shared Situation
Awareness
(Aggregated)

Discussion and How/Why it is relevant to assessing resilience in a
contested cyber environment 15
Like task knowledge needs, but with respect to resources. Clearly low needs
values are more appropriate for organizations than high values.
Like task knowledge wastes, but with respect to resources. Wastes, when not
substitutable for other knowledge, represent expenditure of cognitive
resources by agents that they might otherwise use for the benefit of the
organization. Lower values will generally be preferable over high values.
The match between the coordination requirements established by the
dependencies among tasks and the actual coordination activities carried out by
the engineers. In other words, the concept of congruence has two components.
First, the coordination needs determined by the technical dimension of the
socio-technical system and, secondly, the coordination activities carried out
by the organization representing the social dimension (Cataldo, Herbsleb, &
Carley, 2008).
The average of nodes’ clustering coefficient. The higher the value the more
like a small world network—the more the network supports local information
diffusion as well as a decentralized infrastructure.
Computes the degree to which something could be easily diffused (spread)
throughout the network. This is based on the distance between nodes—
inferred when latitude/longitude data is not available for the Location node
set. A large diffusion value means that nodes are close to each other, and a
smaller diffusion value means that nodes are farther apart.
The proportion of nodes disconnected from the network, though not
completely isolated. The more fragments in a model, the less likely the
network is to diffusion information well, synchronize task execution, or
otherwise perform as a purposeful whole.
The number of isolates in a model. The more isolates in a model, the less
likely the network is to diffusion information well, synchronize task
execution, or otherwise perform as a purposeful whole.
The density of the metanetwork as a whole. Denser network have more links
between nodes than less dense networks, usually indicating higher resilience
to node removal.
Measures how accurately agents can perform their tasks based on the agent’s
access to knowledge required of the tasks.
Density of the Agent x Agent network.
The inverse of the average shortest path length between two arbitrary nodes.
This is usually a node-level and dyad-level measure. However, when
aggregated across all agents in a model, it can provide a view of the mean and
distribution of the value.
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Baseline resilience measures of interest (MoI)
MoI 1: Baseline resilience score
The descriptive statistics below in Table 27 reflect the baseline for each of the D2M
models. In this research, the strategic model earned a higher resilience score than the operational.
There is insufficient data to speculate on the causation of why the resilience score ordering
mimics the ordering of the levels of war. The data below indicates that strategic organizations
have substantial knowledge and resources at their general disposal for reacting to negative
events—though the measure does not attempt to assess how difficult any adaptations may be.
Table 27: Descriptive statistics for D2M resilience scores
N

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Model
Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Strategic

1

5.581919 5.581919 5.5819196

Operational

1

5.087243 5.087243 5.0872437

MoI 2: Baseline characteristic path length resilience score (agent, IT Agent, IT Resource)
ORA™ also labels characteristic path length as averageDistance. The strategic and
operational models, as shown in Table 28 have an above average score based on (Kathleen M.
Carley & Kim, 2008). This indicates that as modeled, these organizations have a smaller average
value for links between arbitrary agents (and IT resources). This score is reflective of the
organization’s ability to pass information quickly between agents.
Table 28: Descriptive statistics for D2M characteristic path length
Model

strategic

N

Measure

Statistic

Minimum Maximum
Statistic

Statistic

Mean
Statistic

averageDistance_agent

1

4.352554 4.352554 4.35255400

averageDistance_IT Agent

1

5.461147 5.461147 5.46114700

averageDistance_IT Resource

1

3.489093 3.489093 3.48909300

averageDistance_agent

1

5.198773 5.198773 5.19877300

1

9.842969 9.842969 9.84296900

1

4.212481 4.212481 4.21248100

operational averageDistance_IT Agent

averageDistance_IT Resource

MoI 3: Baseline Congruence, Organization Agent (and IT Agent) Knowledge Needs score
The strategic model is ahead of the operational model for the IT Agents, but behind the
operational model for Agents. For both models, agents are less well off than their electronic
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peers. The scores for both models indicate that the organizations have significant room for
improvement—alternatively it indicates authors of documents about the organizations should be
more robust in describing the links between people, technology, and tasks.
Table 29: Descriptive statistics for D2M congruence, organization, agent knowledge needs
Model
strategic

operational

N

Measure

Statistic

Minimum Maximum
Statistic

Statistic

Mean
Statistic

congruenceOrgAgentKnowledgeNeeds_task

1

.2422910 .2422910 .242291000

congruenceOrgIT AgentKnowledgeNeeds_task

1

.5885547 .5885547 .588554700

congruenceOrgAgentKnowledgeNeeds_task

1

.2787664 .2787664 .278766400

congruenceOrgIT AgentKnowledgeNeeds_task

1

.4187375 .4187375 .418737500

MoI 4: Baseline Congruence, Organization Agent (and IT Agent) Knowledge Wastes score
These scores indicate that agents, IT agents, and roles in the doctrine-defined models
have very little knowledge considered ‘waste.’ Waste in this context is knowledge with one or
more links to agents, but there is no task that needs the knowledge to which the agents have links.
In the context of (14), this corresponds with an output in the waste component of nearly zero (0),
also indicating very little resilience to the loss of access to knowledge in the organization.
Table 30: Descriptive statistics for D2M congruence, organization, agent knowledge waste
Model
strategic

operational

N

Measure

Statistic

Minimum Maximum
Statistic

Statistic

Mean
Statistic

congruenceOrgIT AgentKnowledgeWaste_task

1

.0443308 .0443308 .044330780

congruenceOrgAgentKnowledgeWaste_task

1

.0140131 .0140131 .014013100

congruenceOrgIT AgentKnowledgeWaste_task

1

.0409634 .0409634 .040963360

congruenceOrgAgentKnowledgeWaste_task

1

.0275715 .0275715 .027571470

MoI 5: Baseline Congruence, Organization Agent (and IT Agent) Resource (and IT Resource)
Needs score
This MoI contributes to one-third (1/3) of (14) in the needs component of that function. It
reflects, across the agents in a network-based model of an organization, the percentage of tasks
that lack required resources. The lack of resources does not assure failure of a task, but it does
decrease the probability of successful and satisfactory completion. Unlike in MoI 3: Baseline
Congruence, Organization Agent (and IT Agent) Knowledge Needs score , the strategic model is
in second place, behind the operational model in each disaggregated measure. Figure 92 depicts
the same information in scatter plot form.
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Table 31: Descriptive statistics for D2M congruence, organization, [agent | IT agent] [resource | IT resource] needs,
baseline
Model

strategic

operational

Measure

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

congruenceOrgAgentResourceNeeds_task

1

.1925941

.1925941

.192594100

congruenceOrgITAgentResourceNeeds_task

1

.4864685

.4864685

.486468500

congruenceOrgAgentITResourceNeeds_task

1

.2038859

.2038859

.203885900

congruenceOrgITAgentITResourceNeeds_task

1

.4391244

.4391244

.439124400

congruenceOrgAgentResourceNeeds_task

1

.5028715

.5028715

.502871500

congruenceOrgITAgentResourceNeeds_task

1

.6678281

.6678281

.667828100

congruenceOrgAgentITResourceNeeds_task

1

.9963437

.9963437

.996343700

congruenceOrgITAgentITResourceNeeds_task

1

.5575537

.5575537

.557553700

Figure 93: congruenceOrg[agent | IT agent][resource
| IT resource] waste, baseline

Figure 92: congruenceOrg[agent | IT agent] [resource
| IT resource] needs score
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MoI 6: Baseline Congruence, Organization Agent Resource Wastes score
This MoI contributes to one-third (1/3) of (14) in the waste component of that function.
Figure 93 above, and Table 32 below, reflect the information for this MoI. This MoI, across the
agents in a network-based model of an organization, is the percentage of tasks that have access to
resources not explicitly required by tasks. The excess resources do not assure an organization of
resource substitution or transfer, but they could conceivably increase the probability of
successful and satisfactory completion in the event of loss of original resources. Another phrase
for excess resources is spare capacity. Spare capacity generally implies substitutability at some
reasonable ratio, but the D2M model would rely on the contributing thesauri to help identify
words or word phrases to signal that particular level of meaning.
With context however, high scores for ‘waste’ for IT resources and IT agents bode well
for any organization in terms of resilience. Without spare capacity, or waste in the more
traditional verbiage of DNA, the organization is exhibiting very little ability to absorb or deflect
adverse effects caused by a reduction in IT agents’ presence.
The operational model has the highest scores for this MoI with the strategic model barely
half as good. The Supply Chain management domain of research would likely assert these low
scores reflect a desirable allocation of resources—but with little to no excess resources to support
reallocation, leaders have less decision and execution space to operate in.
Table 32: Descriptive Statistics for D2M congruence, organization, [agent | IT agent] [resource | IT resource] waste,
baseline
Model

strategic

operational

Measure

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

congruenceOrgAgentResourceWaste_task

1

.0227923

.0227923

.022792310

congruenceOrgITAgentResourceWaste_task

1

.0991865

.0991865

.099186480

congruenceOrgAgentITResourceWaste_task

1

.0137338

.0137338

.013733750

congruenceOrgITAgentITResourceWaste_task

1

.0416444

.0416444

.041644420

congruenceOrgAgentResourceWaste_task

1

.0516288

.0516288

.051628760

congruenceOrgITAgentResourceWaste_task

1

.0709751

.0709751

.070975060

congruenceOrgAgentITResourceWaste_task

1

.9989119

.9989119

.998911900

congruenceOrgITAgentITResourceWaste_task

1

.2638718

.2638718

.263871800
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MoI 7: Baseline Congruence, Organization Task Knowledge Needs score
From the task perspective, this measure reveals a mixed message for each of the D2M
models. The operational model has the least variance between the two varieties of this measure,
while the strategic model has the least needs across all the tasks. This measure suggests the
strategic organizations modeled are better positioned for completing their tasks as they have
fewer knowledge gaps. Fewer knowledge gaps generally correlate to higher rates of task
completion as well as higher accuracy for those tasks.

139

Table 33: Descriptive Statistics for D2M congruence, organization, task knowledge needs, baseline
Model

N
Minimum Maximum
Statistic Statistic Statistic

Measure

congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeNeeds_agent
congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeNeeds_itagent
congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeNeeds_agent
operational
congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeNeeds_itagent
strategic

1
1
1
1

.1067627 .1067627
.3208613 .3208613
.2940585 .2940585
.2127802 .2127802

Mean
Statistic

.106762700
.320861300
.294058500
.212780200

Figure 95: congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeWaste,
Baseline

Figure 94: congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeNeeds,
Baseline

MoI 8: Baseline Congruence, Organization Task Knowledge Wastes score
From the task perspective, there is an over abundance of knowledge in the models. The
D2M models’ scores are congruent with what I expected of values in the range of 20-30%. The
table below, and Figure 95 above indicate that the strategic model has very low variability
between the two varieties but as an organization has a higher waste score than the operational
model.
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Table 34: Descriptive Statistics for D2M congruence, organization, task knowledge waste
Model

N Minimum Maximum
Statistic Statistic Statistic

Measure

congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeWaste_agent
congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeWaste_itagent
congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeWaste_agent
operational
congruenceOrgTaskKnowledgeWaste_itagent
strategic

1
1
1
1

.3109356 .3109356
.3117439 .3117439
.1960738 .1960738
.2271573 .2271573

Mean
Statistic

.310935600
.311743900
.196073800
.227157300

MoI 9: Baseline Congruence, Organization Task Resource (and IT Resource) Needs score
Like MOI 8, from the task perspective, this measure reveals a mixed message for the two
models. The strategic model has the least variance for the four combinations of this measure. For
the strategic model, the IT agents were worse off than regular agents in their needs. This
alignment of tasks and resources for the strategic model, and the low starting value for this score,
supports a higher resilience score than organizations with large shortages of resources. Figure 96
on the next page and Table 35 below reflect the data.
Table 35: Descriptive statistics for D2M congruence, organization, [agent | IT agent] [resource | IT resource]
waste, baseline
Model

strategic

operational

Measure

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

congruenceOrgTaskResourceNeeds_agent

1

.1042690

.1042690

.104269000

congruenceOrgTaskResourceNeeds_itagent

1

.2544663

.2544663

.254466300

congruenceOrgTaskITResourceNeeds_agent

1

.1094033

.1094033

.109403300

congruenceOrgTaskITResourceNeeds_itagent

1

.2706257

.2706257

.270625700

congruenceOrgTaskResourceNeeds_agent

1

.4005018

.4005018

.400501800

congruenceOrgTaskResourceNeeds_itagent

1

.3523277

.3523277

.352327700

congruenceOrgTaskITResourceNeeds_agent

1

.9986320

.9986320

.998632000

congruenceOrgTaskITResourceNeeds_itagent

1

.0415371

.0415371

.041537120

MoI 10: Baseline Congruence, Organization Task Resource Wastes score
Unlike MoI 8 and 9, from the task perspective, this measure has a very coherent message
for the strategic model compared to the mixed messages for the operational model. Table 36 and
Figure 97, below, illustrate the strategic model, like MoI 9, has the least variance for the four
combinations of this measure. For the strategic model, it has the least amount of waste, or excess
resources for all the tasks in the model. The operational model had all four varieties of this
measure above 30% .
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Figure 96: congruenceOrgTaskResource needs,
baseline

Figure 97: congruenceOrgTaskResource waste,
baseline

Table 36: Descriptive statistics for D2M congruence, organization, task [resource | IT resource] waste, baseline
Model

strategic

operational

N

Measure

Statistic

Minimum Maximum
Statistic

Statistic

Mean
Statistic

congruenceOrgTaskResourceWaste_agent

1

.2333035 .2333035

.233303500

congruenceOrgTaskResourceWaste_itagent

1

.2731924 .2731924

.273192400

congruenceOrgTaskITResourceWaste_agent

1

.2663376 .2663376

.266337600

congruenceOrgTaskITResourceWaste_itagent

1

.2696142 .2696142

.269614200

congruenceOrgTaskResourceWaste_agent

1

.3698346 .3698346

.369834600

congruenceOrgTaskResourceWaste_itagent

1

.3228272 .3228272

.322827200

congruenceOrgTaskITResourceWaste_agent

1

.9999931 .9999931

.999993100

congruenceOrgTaskITResourceWaste_itagent

1

.8789737 .8789737

.878973700

MoI 11: Baseline Congruence, Social Technical score
On a scale of [0,1], inclusive, this score indicates poor alignment between the assignment
of tasks and the social connections needed to gain knowledge to execute those tasks for both
models. I had not expected such low scores with these models. An initial hypothesis for why this
score would be so low is that doctrinal documents rarely enumerate which particular people use
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which particular capabilities and systems to accomplish which particular tasks. The low scores
suggest that additional work is necessary to establish how to get the score more congruent with
professional opinion in the organizations themselves. It is unlikely that the leaders of the
strategic and operational organizations would agree that there is such low alignment between
their people and the technology their people need to accomplish their tasks.
Table 37: Descriptive statistics for D2M congruence, social technical
Model

N
Minimum Maximum
Statistic Statistic
Statistic

Measure

socialTechnicalCongruence_agent_task
socialTechnicalCongruence_task_itagent
socialTechnicalCongruence_agent_task
operational
socialTechnicalCongruence_task_itagent
strategic

1
1
1
1

Mean
Statistic

.01065395 .01065395 .0106539500
.006576661 .006576661 .00657666100
.00364293 .00364293 .0036429330
.006184001 .006184001 .00618400100

MoI 12: Baseline Density, Clustering Coefficient score
This is a [0,1] scaled-measure, reflected in Table 39 and Figure 99 that assists a leader in
learning how similar an organization is to a small-world network. Social network science circles
have studied small-world networks and know the networks have very well defined
characteristicPlans. One such prominent characteristic is the speed with which such networks of
people can pass messages to each other. Given how the military often perceives of itself as a
hierarchical organization, I expected these scores to be fairly low. It was somewhat surprising
that IT agents and resources were as high as they were. Also surprising was that the strategic
model was four times closer to being a small world model than the operational model. I do not
have a working hypothesis for the disparity in scores between the two models and defer to future
work hypothesizing about the differences.
Table 38: Descriptive statistics for D2M density, clustering coefficient
Model

N
Minimum Maximum
Statistic Statistic
Statistic

Measure

clusteringCoefficient_agent
strategic clusteringCoefficient_itagent

clusteringCoefficient_itresource
clusteringCoefficient_agent
operational clusteringCoefficient_itagent
clusteringCoefficient_itresource

1
1
1
1
1
1
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Mean
Statistic

.21368170 .21368170 .2136817000
.227304300 .227304300 .22730430000
.408167600 .408167600 .40816760000
.05838165 .05838165 .0583816500
.245274800 .245274800 .24527480000
.255845000 .255845000 .25584500000

Figure 98: clusteringCoefficient needs, baseline

Figure 99: diffusion [it]agent | itresource], baseline

MoI 13: Baseline Diffusion score
Computes the degree to which a network of agents can easily diffuse (spread) something
throughout the network. Figure 99 and Table 39 visually depict the diffusion values for both
modes. A diffusion value of 1 means that nodes are close to each other. Diffusion, in and of itself,
has limited use to leaders attempting to assess their resiliency to adverse events such as contested
cyber environments. However, it is a fast measure to calculate, and changes in the measure can
support over-time assessment as well as forecasting. For both models, the IT resources seem
better positioned for fast message propagation, which would be congruent with expectations of
automated message passing.
Table 39: Descriptive statistics for D2M diffusion, baseline
Model

Measure

diffusion_agent
strategic diffusion_itagent

diffusion_itresource
diffusion_agent
operational diffusion_itagent
diffusion_itresource

N
Minimum Maximum
Statistic Statistic Statistic

1
1
1
1
1
1
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Mean
Statistic

.2393415 .2393415 .239341500
.10742080 .10742080 .1074208000
.6412405 .6412405 .641240500
.0312542 .0312542 .031254200
.15454540 .15454540 .1545454000
.3475332 .3475332 .347533200

MoI 14: Baseline Fragmentation score
The proportion of nodes disconnected from the network, though not completely isolated.
The more fragments in a model, the less likely the network is to diffusion information well,
synchronize task execution, or otherwise perform as a purposeful whole. With this in mind,
Figure 100 shows that IT resource fragmentation is the lowest of all three varieties of this
measure. Both models’ agent varieties earn scores of .70 or higher, indicating a high level of
agents not connected to the larger population. The same is true of their IT agents though less so
for IT resources.
Table 40: Descriptive statistics for D2M fragmentation, baseline
Model

Measure

fragmentation_agent
strategic fragmentation_itagent

fragmentation_itresource
fragmentation_agent
operational fragmentation_itagent
fragmentation_itresource

N
Minimum Maximum
Statistic Statistic
Statistic

1
1
1
1
1
1

Figure 100: Fragmentation, baseline

Mean
Statistic

1
1
.76
.8920292 .8920292 .892029200
.358133900 .358133900 .35813390000
1
1
.97
.8448566 .8448566 .844856600
.651077800 .651077800 .65107780000

Figure 101: isolateCount [[IT]sgent|resource],
baseline
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MoI 15: Baseline Isolate Count (Agents, IT agents, and IT resources) score
This measure is a simple count of isolate nodes in a model. The more isolates in a model,
the less likely the network is to diffusion information well, synchronize task execution, or
otherwise perform as a purposeful whole. These agents did not get deleted during the cleaning
processes, as I had chosen to only delete isolates in relation to the entire metanetwork. This
means that so long as the agent was connected to any node of any node type, the cleaning
process would not delete it. Overall, this is a mixed message across both models.
Table 41: Descriptive statistics for D2M isolate count, baseline
Model

N Minimum Maximum Mean
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic
201
201.00
1 201

Measure

isolateCount_agent
strategic isolateCount_itagent

isolateCount_itresource
isolateCount_agent
operational isolateCount_itagent
isolateCount_itresource

1
1
1
1
1

205

205

205.00

299
271

299
271

299.00
271.00

187

187

187.00

176

176

176.00

MoI 16: Baseline Overall Complexity score
This value is the calculated density of the metanetwork as a whole. Denser networks have
more links between nodes than less dense networks, usually indicating higher resilience to node
removal among other characteristics. Density, in much the same way as diffusion, is very useful,
easy to compute, and changes are easily observed during simulations. Significant changes in
complexity are indicators of a change somewhere in the network, the nature of which a leader or
researcher would need to exactly determine. In the resilience context, this measure proved less
illuminating than expected.
Table 42: Descriptive statistics for D2M complexity, baseline
Model

Measure

strategic Complexity
operational Complexity

N
Minimum Maximum
Statistic Statistic
Statistic

1
1

Mean
Statistic

.002388317 .002388317 .00238831700
.002537118 .002537118 .00253711800

MoI 17: Baseline Performance as Accuracy score
Measures how accurately agents can perform their tasks based on the agent’s access to
knowledge required of the tasks. This is a summary statistic that reflects the general probability
that an organization will perform its tasks correctly. Low scores are not good, and while
signaling to leaders a misalignment between people, tasks, resources, and knowledge, it does not
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identify which particular tasks are more likely to be incorrect than others. Figure 102 and Table
43 depict the scores for the disaggregated collections of human and IT agents, as well as non-IT
and IT resources. The operational model shows a higher variability among the groups than the
strategic model, but both organizations have lower scores than I expected. These low scores
detract from the face validity of the model with respect to this measure. The leaders of the
organizations captured in the D2M process would surely disagree that their organizations are
getting their tasks and missions done with less than 20% accuracy.
Table 43: Descriptive statistics for D2M performance as accuracy, baseline
Model

strategic

operational

Measure

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

performanceAsAccuracy_agent_resource

1

.198872000 .198872000 .19887200000

performanceAsAccuracy_agent_itresource

1

.184975500 .184975500 .18497550000

performanceAsAccuracy_itagent_resource

1

.027839

.027839

.02783935

performanceAsAccuracy_itagent_itresource

1

.028977

.028977

.02897680

performanceAsAccuracy_agent_resource

1

.041837840 .041837840 .04183784000

performanceAsAccuracy_agent_itresource

1

.060753970 .060753970 .06075397000

performanceAsAccuracy_itagent_resource

1

.028103

.028103

.02810312

performanceAsAccuracy_itagent_itresource

1

.037095

.037095

.03709463

Figure 102: performanceAsAccuracy, baseline
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MoI 18: Baseline Social Density score
At the core of every organization are its human resources. This measure captures the
density of the known social network(s) as reflected in the links between agent nodes. This
dissertation, as a result of disaggregating IT agents from agents, has two flavors of this measure
per model. The data in Table 44 indicate a fairly low density for the organizations modeled. A
working hypothesis is the doctrine documents need supplementing with more detailed internal
SOPs to more closely reflect organizations’ self-perceptions.
Table 44: Descriptive statistics for D2M Social Density, Baseline
Model

Measure

N
Minimum
Statistic Statistic

density_agent
density_agent_x_itagent
density_agent
operational
density_agent_x_itagent
strategic

1
1
1
1

Maximum
Statistic

Mean
Statistic

.00646176 .00646176 .0064617550
.001520241 .001520241 .00152024100
.00179914 .00179914 .0017991390
.001570701 .001570701 .00157070100

Figure 103 Social Density, Baseline

MoI 19: Baseline Speed score
The inverse of the average shortest path length between two arbitrary nodes. The data in
Table 45 and Figure 104 both reveal that neither organization is near its theoretical maximum of
1.0. Not unexpectedly, the IT Resources have the highest scores with the human agents coming
in noticeably slower.
Table 45: Descriptive statistics for D2M averageSpeed, Baseline
Model

Measure

averageSpeed_agent
strategic averageSpeed_itagent
averageSpeed_itresource
averageSpeed_agent
operational averageSpeed_itagent
averageSpeed_itresource

N
Minimum Maximum
Statistic Statistic Statistic

1
1
1
1
1
1
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Mean
Statistic

.2297502 .2297502 .229750200
.18311170 .18311170 .1831117000
.2866074 .2866074 .286607400
.1923531 .1923531 .192353100
.10159540 .10159540 .1015954000
.2373898 .2373898 .237389800

Figure 105: Shared situation awareness (agent and IT
agent), baseline

Figure 104: averageSpeed, baseline

MoI 20: Baseline Shared Situation Awareness score
This is usually a node-level and dyad-level measure. However, when aggregated across
all agents in a model, it can provide a view of the mean and distribution of the value. The
rendition of this measure is shown below in Table 46 and above in Figure 105. These results
were not congruent with expectations and certainly would not be in congruence’s with the
perceptions of the leaders of the modeled organizations. A working hypothesis is that this
measure may be ill suited to this form of model construction, as there are few indicators of actual
location—and Graham et al. demonstrated that physical proximity was a large contributor to
shared situation awareness{Graham, 2004 #7627}.
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Table 46: Descriptive statistics for D2M Shared Situation Awareness, Baseline
Model

N
Minimum Maximum
Statistic Statistic
Statistic

Measure

sharedSituationAwareness_agent
sharedSituationAwareness_itagent
sharedSituationAwareness_agent
operational
sharedSituationAwareness_itagent
strategic

1
1
1
1

Mean
Statistic

.002326
.002326
.00232558
.001851852 .001851852 .00185185200
.002532
.002532
.00253165
.001524390 .001524390 .00152439000

The tables above support the original assertions that the ideal information processing
resilient organization should have no near isolates, maximal excess knowledge and resources
(e.g., twice what is minimally necessary), and no needs. They also show that the least resilient
organization is hyper-efficient in knowledge and resource distribution with no waste whatsoever.
The least resilient organization also has the degenerate case that all tasks, resources, and
knowledge are near isolates and accessible only through agents that are pendants. Finally the
least resilient organization has every task short of necessary knowledge and resources. These
assessments fulfill the third challenge of organizational leaders: identify their organization’s
structural vulnerabilities.
The next section begins addressing the fourth challenge for leaders, being able to forecast
mission assurance scenarios.

Entropic and Targeted Attacks
ORA™ is capable of performing two types of immediate impact assessments for models
to gauge the variability of the resilience indicators in the previous section. The first type is
through a replication analysis in which the researcher specifies how many random nodes from
which data sets to remove and how many times to run the analysis. This is the entropic attack the
heading of this section refers to. ORA™ randomly selects the nodes from among the nodeset
(from a uniform distribution), removes the links to/from those deleted nodes, and then
recalculates network measures. ORA™ generates the average deltas for the iterations performed.
Previous work (Kathleen M. Carley & Lanham, 2012) indicated that there were minimal
impacts (all but one was less than 1% with the one measure changing only 3% from baseline)
with random single entity removals. To confirm or refute those findings, I repeated the effort and
set the number of entities to randomly remove at one (1), four (4), and ten (10). I had not
expected any changes in output measures averaged across multiple repetitions of arbitrary node
150

removal. The results met my expectations—none of the measures above had any change when
recorded across as few as 10 and as many as 1,000 repetitions. This result is most likely due to
the sparseness of the various matrices as well as the long right-tailed distribution of link counts
between nodes.
The finding above must be emphasized! Small scale random deletions of IT agents in
models of information processing organizations rarely have substantial effects. And even in the
face of this truism, it is dreadfully wrong for targeted attacks!
For exploratory purposes, and aligned with the Army’s Green/Amber/Red/Black color
coding of combat capability, I conducted further experiments with random node removal of 15%,
30%, 50% and 75% losses. I also performed a round of deletions at a 90% level. Army doctrine
color-codes a unit with up to 15% loss of combat capability as green, up to 30% loss as yellow,
up to 50% as red, and anything beyond 50% as black. Of these values, I expected to see high
variability in the measures of interest at the 15% level, with significant impacts at the 30% and
higher levels. I again started with 10 iterations and spot-checked only a few combinations with
100 replications. None of the measures outputs varied by more than 10% from the baseline until
I crossed the 50% threshold, which the Army would consider a ‘red’ status. The summarized
results of the random deletions experiments are below and then operationalized for both the
strategic and operational models.
ORA™ executes the second immediate impact analysis using specifically named entity
removal in what ORA™ calls impact analysis. In this method, the researcher specifies which
nodes to remove from the model, and ORA™ again calculates and depicts the deltas between
pre-removal and post removal network measures. This is what I refer to as targeted attacks in this
section. Previous work (Kathleen M. Carley & Lanham, 2012) demonstrated nonlinear effects
that cross a five percent (5%) threshold change in measures of interest with the top four entities
in the Key Entity reports of the IT agents and IT resources. This dissertation revisited this effect
by enumerating 1, 4, and 10 nodes for removal. These are clearly significantly fewer than 15% of
nodes that I started with in the random targeting—reflective of the difference between random
outages and adversaries’ efforts to deliberately create significant effects on friendly forces.
To decide which nodes to using in the targeted removal, it is necessary to make a short
diversion into what the military calls defended asset lists and prioritized defended asset lists

151

(PDAL). The next section enumerates an example of a PDAL for each model. I then draw from
the PDAL for the targeted node deletions.
Defended Asset Lists and Prioritized Defended Asset Lists
Defended Asset Lists (DALs) and PDALs are, in their simplest incarnations, formal
recognition of too few resources for too many demands. Each defensive asset (e.g., anti-aircraft
artillery battery, network-based firewall) has finite reach and decreasing effectiveness against
varying enemies at varying ranges. With this limitation—often called a limiting factor
(LIMFAC) — in the military, leaders make allocation decisions. Their task is to incorporate a
mix of point defenses and area defenses—defending a few things well while balancing the desire
to defend ‘everything’ from ‘everything.’ The Air Defense Artillery (ADA) community, theater
missile defense, and strategic missile defense communities are examples of military planners and
operations officers who expressly prioritize the importance of the assets they defend. These
communities frequently use the CARVER (Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability,
Vulnerability, Effect and Recognizability) method to provide a quantitative first round estimation
that SMEs then refine and commanders approve. This dissertation’s modeling process can
contribute to such efforts by providing another quantitative basis to the decisions of what assets
to prioritize based on their position in structural models.
Using this process, without consideration to political, public affairs, or coalitionmaintenance considerations, extracts of the PDALs for the three models’ IT resources and IT
systems might look like those below. Importantly, though the network analysis identifies key
systems, SMEs for each system, the organization itself, and the providers, defenders, and
maintainers of the communications methods can, and should, contact and expand the list to
include necessary, but unmentioned, supporting technology(ies).
Operational PDALs (IT System and IT resources)
The operational model’s Key Entity reports lead to the contents of Table 47 below.
ORA™ provides the seeds for the PDAL and organization SMEs refine the list to ensure the
organization maintains the capability. The first such example is internet relay chat (IRC)
capabilities—which ranked consistently higher than email. Presuming the IRC servers are not
organic to the organization, paths to the servers and terminals to access the IRC servers become
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part of the capability on the PDAL in the second column, with comments or other pertinent
information in the last column to maintain provenance for the entry.
Table 47: Interpreting key entity reports as a operational PDAL

Primary IT
System or IT
Resource

IRC Client (NIPR
& SIPR)

Secondary or related IT System or
IT Resource
x terminals (primary and backup) to
access IRC server(s)
VLANs and network equipment
between IRC terminals and servers
Primary and backup authentication
Firewall rules
Traffic shaping device and rules

JOPES (Joint
Operations
Planning and
Execution System)

x JOPES terminals (primary and
backup)
VLANs and network equipment
between JOPES terminals and
up/downlink(s)
Primary and backup authentication
Firewall rules
Traffic shaping device and rules

COP (Common
Operating Picture)

x COP terminals (primary and
backup)
VLANs and network equipment
between JOPES terminals and
up/downlink(s)
Primary and backup authentication
Firewall rules
Traffic shaping device and rules

TBMCS (Theater
Battle Management
C2 System)

x TBMCS terminals (primary and
backup)
VLANs and network equipment
between TBMCS terminals and
up/downlink(s)
Primary and backup authentication
Firewall rules
Traffic shaping device and rules
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Source / Rationale

Key Entity Report
W/o network, terminals are useless
W/o login, IRC server unable to allow
access
Avoid self-inflicted DOS by firewall
to local and remote IRC server(s)
Preserve priority of traffic to local and
remote data stores if necessary
Key Entity Report
W/o network, terminals are useless

W/o login, terminals are useless
Avoid self-inflicted DOS by firewall
to local and remote data stores
Preserve priority of traffic to local and
remote data stores if necessary
Key Entity Report
W/o network, terminals are useless

W/o login, terminals are useless
Avoid self-inflicted DOS by firewall
to local and remote data stores
Preserve priority of traffic to local and
remote data stores if necessary
Key Entity Report
W/o network, terminals are useless

W/o login, terminals are useless
Avoid self-inflicted DOS by firewall
to local and remote data stores
Preserve priority of traffic to local and
remote data stores if necessary

GCCS (Global
Command and
Control System)

x GCCS terminals (primary and
backup)
VLANs and network equipment
between JOPES terminals and
up/downlink(s)
Primary and backup authentication
Firewall rules
Traffic shaping device and rules

Telephone

x Landline telephone, encryption
capable
Failure over to non landline
VoIP satisfactory iff traffic shaping
device and rules prevent loss of
service
x terminals (primary and backup)
Strategic / permanent link
(terrestrial)
Backup Uplink/Downlink capability

Key Entity Report
W/o network, terminals are useless

W/o login, terminals are useless
Avoid self-inflicted DOS by firewall
to local and remote data stores
Preserve priority of traffic to local and
remote data stores if necessary
Leader Directive
Continuity of Ops Planning
Continuity of Ops Planning

Key Entity
Terrestrial links usually have highest
bandwidth
JWICS
Backup (e.g., TROJAN SPIRIT like
capabilities). Continuity of Ops
Planning
Other entries as criticality, rehearsed backups/mitigations plans, resources, and other leader-specific
criteria dictate
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Strategic PDALs (IT System and IT resources)
The strategic model supports the same analysis though with a different set of capabilities
present at the top of the PDAL. For this community the servers, data stores, authentication
abilities, intervening firewalls between some defined number of terminals and the supporting
servers become part of the package of ‘JOPES’ and ‘GCCS.’ Table 48 expands on the list of
ORA™ listed capabilities, with the second column indicating necessary supporting abilities. The
third column can provide rationale and continuity of knowledge between shifts and in the face of
personnel turbulence.
Table 48: Interpreting key entity reports as strategic PDAL

Primary IT
System or IT
Resource

JOPES (Joint
Operations
Planning and
Execution System)

Secondary or related IT System or
IT Resource
x JOPES terminals (primary and
backup)
VLANs and network equipment
between JOPES terminals and
up/downlink(s)
Primary and backup authentication
Firewall rules
Traffic shaping device and rules

GCCS (Global
Command and
Control System)

x GCCS terminals (primary and
backup)
VLANs and network equipment
between JOPES terminals and
up/downlink(s)
Primary and backup authentication
Firewall rules
Traffic shaping device and rules

COP (Common
Operating Picture)

x COP terminals (primary and
backup)
VLANs and network equipment
between JOPES terminals and
up/downlink(s)
Primary and backup authentication
Firewall rules
Traffic shaping device and rules

GAMSS (Global
Air Mobility
Support System)

x GAMMS terminals (primary and
backup)
VLANs and network equipment
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Source / Rationale

Key Entity Report
W/o network, terminals are useless

W/o login, terminals are useless
Avoid self-inflicted DOS by firewall
to local and remote data stores
Preserve priority of traffic to local and
remote data stores if necessary
Key Entity Report
W/o network, terminals are useless

W/o login, terminals are useless
Avoid self-inflicted DOS by firewall
to local and remote data stores
Preserve priority of traffic to local and
remote data stores if necessary
Key Entity Report
W/o network, terminals are useless

W/o login, terminals are useless
Avoid self-inflicted DOS by firewall
to local and remote data stores
Preserve priority of traffic to local and
remote data stores if necessary
Key Entity Report
W/o network, terminals are useless

between GAMSS terminals and
up/downlink(s)
Primary and backup authentication
Firewall rules
Traffic shaping device and rules
x Landline telephone, encryption
capable
Failure over to non landline
VoIP satisfactory iff traffic shaping
device and rules prevent loss of
service
x terminals (primary and backup)
Strategic / permanent link
(terrestrial)
Backup Uplink/Downlink capability

Telephone

W/o login, terminals are useless
Avoid self-inflicted DOS by firewall
to local and remote data stores
Preserve priority of traffic to local and
remote data stores if necessary
Leader Directive
Continuity of Ops Planning
Continuity of Ops Planning

Key Entity
Terrestrial links usually have highest
bandwidth
JWICS
Backup (e.g., TROJAN SPIRIT like
capabilities). Continuity of Ops
Planning
Other entries as criticality, rehearsed backups/mitigations plans, resources, and other leader-specific
criteria dictate

Targeted Assets
The next three tables (Table 49 to Table 50) list the nodes to remove during the targeted
removal conditions of testing. The key entity reports provide these agents as a fast and justifiable
listing of nodes that will be likely to inflict disruption on the owning organization(s). The
deliberate targeting of capabilities on the PDAL and in the Key Entity report supports measuring
the impacts of such removals—large impacts to the chosen measures of interest support the
original forecasting.
Table 49: Operational model nodes to Remove

Total Nodes
to Remove
1
4

10

Node Title
Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
IRC
Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)
Joint Warfighter Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS)
IRC
JOPES
Common Operating Picture (COP)
Tactical Battle Management Command and Control System
(TBMCS)
Global Command and Control System (GCCS)
Joint Warfighter Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
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Node Set
IT agents
IT agents
IT agents
IT Resource
IT Resource
IT agents
IT agents
IT agents
IT agents
IT agents
IT Resource

Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS)
World Wide Web (www)
Global Positioning System (GPS)
Combined Enterprise Information Exchange System (CENTREX)

IT Resource
IT Resource
IT Resource
IT Resource

Table 50: Strategic Model Nodes to Remove

Total Nodes
to Remove
1
4

10

Node Title
Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)
JOPES
Common Operating Picture (COP)
Joint Warfighter Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS)
JOPES
Common Operating Picture (COP)
Global Command and Control System (GCCS)
Army Data Distribution System (ADDS)
Global Air Mobility Support System (GAMSS)
Joint Warfighter Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS)
Army Air Ground System (AAGS)
Army Tactical Communications Systems
Common Ground Station (CGS)
Directory services

Node Set
IT agents
IT agents
IT agents
IT Resource
IT Resource
IT agents
IT agents
IT agents
IT agents
IT agents
IT Resource
IT Resource
IT Resource
IT Resource
IT Resource
IT Resource

Results of entropic and targeted IT agents and IT Resource deletions
Overall, the entropic results confirm the previous work—random attacks against IT assets
(systems or resources) have to rise to 30% or more of named assets to have effects on measures
of interests that consistently cross a 10% change from baseline threshold. In the context of
military battle damage assessment (BDA), for the twenty MoIs in use above, IT causalities have
to rise to nearly a ‘red’ level for the effects of their total loss to move from ‘green’ to ‘amber.’
This broad result stands in stark contrast to the expansive statements of impending peril in the
mass media.
However, broad results frequently have variability and nuance not well captured in sound
bites or single sentence summaries. I will review the nuances of each of the measures of interest
in the figures below. Each figure depicts in bar chart format the entropic deletion of nodes,
replicated 20 times for each model. The heights of the bars are the percentage change from the
baseline values discussed in the previous section. The color-coding matches previous color
coding with blue representing the operational model and purple the strategic model. The height
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of the like-colored lines represents the percentage change in the targeted node removals for each
model. The X-axis has dual labels, with the integers representing the number of nodes removed
and the percentage value representing the percentage of the IT agents and IT resource node set
population removed.
The first MoI to check is the new measure of resilience.

Figure 106: Resilience score for entropic and targeted deletions

The first two MoIs are the Characteristic Path Length and the Communication Speed of
IT agents, Figure 107 and Figure 108 respectively. These MoIs are the inverse of each other so a
discussion of both at the same time is appropriate. As none of the node removals involved the
other node sets, there were no observed changes in this measure for any of the other networks in
the model. As I expected, the targeted removal of small numbers of nodes in 600-1,000 node
networks, did not in these models, nor is it likely in other models, have significant effects when
aggregating at a network level. It is extremely interesting to note however that the removal of as
few as ten (10) well-chosen nodes can have an effect as large as removing 50% of the IT agents
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and IT resources. As noted in numerous other studies, this effect is clearly the result of the
degree distributions of the underlying networks—power-law distributions are resilient to random
removals but highly susceptible to removal of hub nodes. With random outages (both selfinflicted and others) being far more common than targeted outages, there is very little wonder so
many organizations perceive they can handle deliberate outages when they extrapolate from
random outages. A key take away from these two models, and the previous work of (Lanham,
Morgan, et al., 2011e), is that a few well chosen IT targets can generate the same effects as the
loss of 30% of IT resources for IT related MoIs.

Figure 107: Changes in characteristic path length of IT agents for entropic and targeted deletions

Figure 108: Changes in communication speed of IT agents for entropic and targeted deletions
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The next three MoIs paint very similar pictures in the effects at the IT system level. They
all show the same pattern: targeted node removals yield results of similar magnitudes with an
order of magnitude fewer removals than random attacks. The Density Clustering Coefficient in
Figure 109, indicates that both models’ IT agents populations move further and further away
from a small-world topology. The implication of this finding is that these IT systems will find it
harder and harder to move messages between each other. This finding is not reflective of
underlying technology protocols that support rerouting of information across operational links
(e.g., EGRP or BGP in IP-based routers).

Figure 109: Changes in clustering coefficient of IT agents for entropic and targeted deletions

A related MoI is Diffusion. Diffusion typically requires a location node set inclusive of
latitude and longitude (lat./long) information per location. When lat./long data is not present,
ORA™ inference distances between agents by calculating and using geodesic distances
instead—that is how far apart nodes are by hop count and link weight. In Figure 110, both
models display a slightly nonlinear slow down in diffusion as the number of random and targeted
nodes deletions goes up. Whether such diffusion slow down is significant for the organization is,
of course, context dependent. The general finding should give pause to any leader tasked with
working through and recovering from contested cyber environments.

160

Figure 110: Changes in diffusion of IT agents for entropic and targeted deletions

The third of these related MoIs is Fragmentation and is shown in Figure 111. Here the
pattern remains the same—increasing fragmentation as nodes get deleted. What stands out as
prominent however is that the operational level organizations are more susceptible to IT system
fragmentation than the strategic organizations. I had expected the reverse based on the
professional observation that strategic IT systems are highly dependent on free-flowing
information and they would be more vulnerable to system deletion and information disruption.
One possible explanation could be that the strategic model had a high fragmentation score in the
first place. It is reasonable to presume it’s hard to fragment an already fragmented network.

Figure 111: Changes in fragmentation of IT agents for entropic and targeted deletions
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The next MoI, Isolate Count, behaved counter to expectations as seen in Figure 112,
though a reasonable explanation is not difficult to find once faced with the modeled results.
Intuition would suggest that the loss of IT agents and IT resources would lead to increased
isolation of other, dependent systems. Results of random deletions however, as shown in Figure
112, lead to fewer isolates within the IT agents x IT agents network, not more. As noted earlier
in this chapter, the IT agents node set, when examined in isolation, has 70 to 200 isolates for the
tactical through strategic models. When examined within the entire metanetwork context
however, the nodes are not isolates but connected to other node types. Given the high
fragmentation rating for each model, it is no longer surprising that high quantities of random
deletions would serve to reduce the over number of IT agent isolates. It is noteworthy that the
targeted deletion of nodes had precisely the expected result, the increasing numbers of isolates!

Figure 112: Change in isolate count of IT agents for entropic and targeted deletions

None of the changes in Overall Complexity, Figure 113, rose above 4.5% change from
baseline. These are large metanetworks with very low starting densities for each model. I had
expected all deletions to lower the density, as with node deletion I expected link deletion. I had
failed to incorporate the link distribution into my initial assessment and the results are visible in
Figure 113. Random deletion is clearly deleting far more fragmented and low link count nodes,
actually improving the over-all density, though the reader may recall the density improvement is
insufficient to reduce the characteristic path length until 75% of the IT agent and IT resource
nodes are deleted. The changes to the density with the targeted removal are in line with
expectations both in the general trend and the magnitude of the decrease.
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Figure 113: Overall changes in complexity

A more granular examination of density leads us a discussion of Social Density of IT
agents—the network density of the IT agents x IT agents network in isolation from the
metanetwork as a whole. In this MoI, Figure 114, we see that when focusing on the node set
which is applicable to this MoI, there are, again, nonlinear results that differ dramatically by
model. Random deletion is clearly not having much effect, with the high fragmentation values
for each model. This type of variability and nuance is precisely what is lost in much of the
opening paragraphs of related cybersecurity literature. IT specific effects may be significantly
different than results aggregated across multiple viewpoints.

Figure 114: Change in social density of IT agents
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The last MoI of this chapter is by far the most interesting and one with interesting
variability. Performance as Accuracy is a measure I applied to three node sets in each model:
agents, IT agents, and roles. In that order, I’ll discuss the findings of the static targeted and
entropic node removal impact analysis. When considering just the human agents as problem
solvers, there were essentially no effects in the targeted and entropic deletion efforts—no model
nor deletion condition led to changes larger than 6% from baseline! As seen in Figure 115, the
strategic model had improvements as we deleted random IT agents and IT resources, as did the
tactical model and the operational model with one exception. This result may not generalize to
all organizations with perceptions of IT dependence—it certainly is counter to numerous public
assertions that the American military could be paralyzed by a cyber attack. Even the targeted
deletions have very little effect, and not consistently negative either. This too was counter to
expectations, but reinforcing earlier work! Though worthy of exploration in live exercises and
events, it is possible that far more task knowledge and situation knowledge exists with people in
these organizations than the cyberthreat-focused analysts give credit for.

Figure 115: Changes in performance as accuracy of agents
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Figure 116: Changes to performance as accuracy of roles

When using the rapid model construction process of this dissertation, and the D2M model
in general, one of the output node sets is ‘Roles.’ This node set consists of generalized positions
filled by more than one person, so broadly discussed it does not easily map to a single person.
These kinds of entities are frequently in doctrine documents or other organizationally generated
documents. As such, it is appropriate to examine the impact of removing access to IT agents and
IT resources on these types of organizational members. As shown in Figure 116, the impacts are
mixed and do not present a clear picture. The impacts are consistently low (all below 1% change
from baseline) and as such it is unwise to overly generalize the results both within the two
modeled organization types as well into organizational resilience to contested cyber
environments.
When disaggregating IT agents from other agents, Figure 117, the impacts of entropic
deletions correspond almost exactly with the color coding scheme of the Army: 15% loss of
systems equates to approximately 15% loss of accuracy and the consequent color-coding change
from Green to amber/yellow. Likewise a 50% loss of random systems equates to a 50% drop in
accuracy, moving from yellow to red, and bordering on black. Across these three models, and
one other model from previous work, there is now an established trend that random loss of
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availability of IT systems and IT resources may not have overt large-scale effects unless the loss
crosses a leadership-defined threshold.
Importantly though, the same trend exists for targeted losses, to which organizational
leaders must pay very close attention. Loss of Key-Entity-identified-systems, when combined
with each other, rapidly causes nonlinear results in very small quantities! In these models, the
loss of four capabilities (two (2) IT agents and two (2) IT resources, without expressly
considering the mechanisms for their loss) causes the same drop in this MoI as the loss of 15% of
the original node populations (see also node populations in Table 19). In these models, deletion
of as few as ten (10) nodes, when carefully selected, can create effects as large as a random loss
of 50% of the nodes.

Figure 117: Changes to performance as accuracy of IT agents

Conclusions
In the abstract and Introduction chapter, I listed four demands leaders should place on
their organization to increase mission assurance in contested cyber environments. This chapter
has addressed the first and third of those four demands: 1) require assessments be more than
analogical, anecdotal or simplistic snapshots in time and 3) identify their organization’s
structural vulnerabilities.
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Fundamentally assessments are essential for leaders to have confidence in their ability to
maintain their essential missions in contested cyber environments. To conduct assessments,
leaders and analysts must start with one or more baselines—this chapter is the baseline for
comparison of future time points. With this baseline, and with appropriate questions and
measures of interest, leaders and researchers can use M&S to forecast mission assurance
scenarios (the fourth demand I listed in the abstract and introduction).
This chapter has demonstrated the application of existing social network analysis and
metanetwork analysis measures against two doctrine generated models. The chapter has
introduced and demonstrated the calculation of a new metric that takes into account the
specialization of organizational functions and components. This measure is a weighted function
of the near isolation of tasks, resources, and knowledge, over-supply of knowledge and resources
to organizational tasks as well as shortfalls of the same. The new measure assists decision
makers through adding an additional dimension of resilience through redundancy of capabilities
as well as redundancy of access to capabilities—it does not provide a single ‘magic number’ that
can signal “All is well” or “Brace for impact.”
The most important take away from this chapter is that the rapid modeling process of the
previous chapter can generate a model subject to analytic efforts that demonstrates a
recognizable, though nonunique, outcome: targeted removal of IT systems and IT resources in
complex sociotechnical organizations can lead to effects disproportionate to the number of
directly affected systems and resources. This trend leads to a lesson for organizational leaders
that the risk management community has incorporated for a very long time: identify the most
important systems and resources and ensure their continuity of operations at some a priori
acceptable level.
Organization leaders can use the processes in this chapter to establish contingency plans
for their people, organizations, and systems. Offensive targeting can use this process to identify
combinations of systems that generate higher payoff than attackers might otherwise achieve. The
key is the realization that a few well-chosen losses will predictably have outsized impacts! This
phenomenon has earned the moniker ‘black swan event’ in some circles though it is by no means
the only descriptor.
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In the next chapter, I move from this chapter’s point-in-time assessments to a forecasting
methodology using D2M derived models and cognitive agent based simulations. Forecasting
how organizations adapt to a contested cyber environments can be a useful tool for leaders to use
in what-if scenarios and general-purpose cyber resilience discussions.
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“All models are wrong, but some are useful,” (Box, 1979)

Agent Based Models and Modeling
This chapter of the dissertation will review related agent based model (ABM) work in
sociotechnical systems and cyber security research. I will also provide a brief discussion of how
the CASOS ABM capability called Construct (Frantz & Carley, 2007; B. Hirshman et al., 2011)
operates. These set the stage for a detailed discussion of model preparation and experimental
design that I use to demonstrate the resiliency score over time as well as the other indicators of
resilience performance.
In brief, the experimental scenario applied to two (2) empirically based models derived
from the models discussed in the previous two chapters. In addition to baseline conditions (no
attacks of any variety), the experiments involved creating and assessing the effects of cyber
attacks in the form of integrity and availability attacks aimed at specific systems, a generalized
confidentiality attack, and availability attacks aimed at communications infrastructure between
agents. I expected, and simulation experimentation confirmed, varying effects on selected
network measures discussed in the last chapter. Importantly, the scenario then added four
possible mitigations to the simulation to assess their efficacy—and demonstrating in simulation
that networked organizations can adapt to misfortune and assure leadership of their resilience.
The operational scenario for each model was based on the first few steps of the military
decision making process (MDMP): receive a plan and conduct a cycle of mission
analysis/planning and briefing of leadership. These steps are, under different names, nearly
identical in all organizations tasked with receiving direction from others, planning how to
implement those directions, communicating the plan to subordinates, and executing the plan. I
represented the operations order (OPORD) by adding, exogenously, a set of ‘plan’ bits to the set
of knowledge bits the D2M process had discerned. I assigned these ‘plan’ bits to the key IT
Agents identified using key entity reports. The agents linked to the agent group named “joint
planning group” had the task to plan amongst each other (e.g., interact with each and exchange
information) then brief organization leadership 3 times during the first one-third of the
simulation time. I also added a set of ‘bad plan’ bits for use by the attacking integrity agent.
Using a Box-Behnken Response Surface Modeling design, I varied the probability of effects of
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each of the six attacks vectors, as well as four mitigation efforts, for a total of ten quantitative
variables.
The cyber losses, when enabled, occur during the midst of the plan-brief-plan-brief cycle.
I expected, and the simulations experimentation confirmed effects dependent on the probability
of effect, the mitigation in place (if any), and the speed with which the mitigation is put in place.

Agent based models and sociotechnical systems
ABMs are ideally suited for developing theories of and exploring via simulations,
situations where the modeled entities, as individuals, must perceive and react to their modeled
environment(s). When those situations are not conducive to human-subjects studies, simulations
using agents help bridge gaps between theory in isolation, theory based on extrapolation from
human-subjects studies, and being unable to pursue resolutions to research questions of interest.
ABMs are not the only method of modeling for these situations, as previously discussed
in the related literature portion of the dissertation. When the question at hand is continuous flow
or process related across well-defined paths, dynamic systems may be a more appropriate vehicle
for developing theories of flow (Borshchev & Filippov, 2004). When questions at hand have no
interest in forecasting the effects of multiple individuals’ actions in an artificial landscape,
abstracting the individuals away into sets of equations, sources, sinks, and interference patterns
may be a better approach for a researcher. When a researcher wants to study aggregations of
entities (e.g., organizations) free from cognitive limitations, there is unmistakably no need to
complicate their abstraction with per-entity limitations, or even low-level entities at all! Of
course, ABM offers exactly the opportunity for low-level decisions, behaviors, and observables
to, without a priori rule writing, discover explanatory mechanisms for what appear as deliberate
or purposeful crowd-level phenomena. Indeed, a key aspect of a properly designed and built
ABM experiment is to ensure that whatever constraints and impulses do exist in the model, they
are not artificially driving the result to an aggregate-level outcome through over-controlling the
agents (J. H. Miller & Page, 2007).
Examples of ABM use applied to questions of aggregated-level phenomena include
theorizing about which organizational designs cope better with communication breakdowns at
agent levels (Kathleen M. Carley, 1991; DHS, 2011). OrgAhead is another example of ABM
used to improve patient care at the unit-level (Effken et al., 2005), evaluate team performance in
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the face of turnover when interactions include face-to-face as well as technology-enabled
mechanisms (Levine, Moreland, Argote, & Carley, 2005). Indeed Levine’s work, using a codebase predecessor of Construct, validated the results of the ability to generate realistic patterns of
behavior among artificial agents as well as generated aggregated results congruent with humansubject experiments. Canessa’s work using ABM was another effort at demonstrating replication
of emergent behavior from collections of agents interacting with and without the aid of
technology (Canessa & Riolo, 2003). That work also demonstrated structure/network-based
effects mediated by technology as well as the effects of out-of-group forced interactions on intragroup performance. The breadth of examples of researchers using ABM to help build and test
theories is well beyond the scope of this dissertation to cover. What is notable however are the
research areas between these examples of ABM applied to sociotechnical systems and current
incarnations of cybersecurity research and the desire to protect continued use and access to the
technical components of those systems. Those research areas remain ripe for study, as
demonstrated in the paucity of cross-domain collaboration of authors in their respective areas of
expertise and discussed in the Literature Review chapter and specifically in the Related Areas of
Research section.

Agent based models and cyber security research
Cyber-security research, especially when constrained to technology-focused models and
questions of interest have ventured into the ABM realm less frequently than many other fields of
research. This is certainly understandable when viewing computer network traffic as continuous
flows of data packets, where individual packets, and even individual components of the network
have little to no ability to perceive their environment and react to it. It is this broad view that is a
common theme in the network emulators in (Lochin et al., 2012) review. Even in the pursuit of
‘intelligent’ networks and machine adaptation to network or component level challenges (e.g.,
component outage, rate control services (Gligor, 2005), load-balancing redirection (Pai et al.,
1998; Wang et al., 2002)), the agents are not human agents, nor are the researchers usually
making the leap to incorporate the sociological component of sociotechnical systems in the
section title. In one NSA-sponsored cybersecurity forum, the organizers went so far as to
constrain discussions by omitting ‘humans’ because ‘they are hard to understand’ and it is much
less contentious to work on the technology side of research questions.

171

There have absolutely been efforts at evaluating the human-impacts of disruptions to or
loss of the technical infrastructure. The research gap remains however between those efforts and
the continuity of operations COI, the HRO COI and other efforts to understand the world we live
in, especially when the world changes quickly or dramatically. Some efforts have incorporated
human-enabled process modification (e.g., employing off-line backup capacity) (Pflanz, 2012;
Pflanz & Levis, 2012) as a way of assessing the sustainability of time-sensitive missions in
cyber-degraded environments. Others, such as RINSE (Leblanc et al., 2011) support Live and
Constructive integration of human role players and simulations of technology as does the
Department of Defense’s Bulwark Defender exercise (Wihl et al., 2010). Multimodel modeling
is also an approach to incorporating ABM M&S with technology focused M&S (Bigrigg et al.,
2009; Kathleen M. Carley, Geoffrey P. Morgan, et al., 2012; Kathleen M. Carley et al., 2012;
Elder & Levis, 2010). The cited examples have demonstrated modeling working in tandem
though not interoperating. The methods would seem to offer fertile opportunities for researchers
to use models with varying processing and generative internals. When outputs are congruent,
researchers can reasonably argue higher confidence in the feasibility of the results.
This section has been a short refresher of the material discussed in Literature Review
chapter. The intent has been to remind the reader that there are many related fields of research
that a casual observer could reasonably infer share interests and information. The potential for
such sharing of theories, methods, results, and understanding certainly exists, and this
dissertation is but one example of a way to link related-yet-disparate research: technology
enabled and dependent organizations’ resilience to contested cyber environments.

Overview of Construct
Construct is an ABM developed over time at Carnegie Mellon University under the
guidance and supervision of Dr. Carley. It has its roots in constructuralism (Kathleen M. Carley,
1986), the view that the inhabitants of socio-cultural environments continually construct and
reconstruct their environment through individual cycles of action, adaptation, and motivation. It
is network-centric not only in its roots but in its implementation, internal data structures are
frequently matrix representations of those networks—a sight familiar to practitioners of social
network and graph-theoretic sciences. Construct has had numerous technical reports written
since its inception, and I refer the reader to its User’s Guide (Kathleen M. Carley et al., 2014),
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predecessor Technical Reports and CASOS for up-to-date information and changes from its
documentation. This section will provide a brief over-view of Construct’s origins and internal
functioning.
Initial instances of Construct had basic interaction mechanisms that embodied three (3)
empirically identified human interaction generalizations. The first is that knowledge acquisition
occurs through interaction (Leon Festinger, 1950) as cited by (Schreiber, Singh, & Carley, 2004).
The second is that humans tend to interact with those who are similar to them, often called
homophily and described in (J. M. McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987) and revisited by those
authors in (M. McPherson, Lovin, & Cook, 2001) among many others. The third interaction
pattern is social relativity, first discussed by Festinger (1954) and (Merton, 1957, 1968) (as cited
by (Schreiber et al., 2004)) . These three (3) patterns had up to five (5) moderators available to a
researcher to use in experiments: forgetting, proximity, transactive memory, referrals, and access
(Schreiber et al., 2004).
The roots of Construct as an information diffusion simulation are evident in the first
interaction pattern and the principal motivation of agents in the simulation—the drive to interact
with other agents to exchange information. The moderators of that drive are the agents’
perceptions of similarity to other agents (transactive memory (Argote, 2003; Ren & Argote,
2001) and homophily) as well as proximity and synchronous availability. Knowledge retained
and propagated has, as moderators, the forgetting rate(s), as well as stochastic probabilities of
mishearing a message from other agent(s) as well as misstating knowledge when sending it.
Subsequent and modern versions of Construct added binary task completion and energy
tasks (Moon, 2008) to the simulation. Binary tasks are used in traditional methods of studying
organizational accuracy. Participants in the task attempt to discern the number of ones (1) or
zeros (0) in a binary string, and pass their estimations or answers to others. Knowledge bits,
pools of binary values representing knowledge available to agents, have links to these tasks (in
the form of a Task x Knowledge network). These networks support the intuitive property that
possessing higher quantities of linked knowledge leads to higher probabilities of agents and
groups of agents accurately performing these tasks. In the absence of knowledge, agents must
still make assessments and do so using reported assessments of agents to whom they are
connected. Energy tasks are abstracted nonspecific tasks that reflect the reality of human agents
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not spending their entire existence only talking with other agents. When enabled, agents will
spend some portion of their simulation
Belief diffusion, an extension of knowledge diffusion and tied to the social relativity
work of Festinger and others is in current-day versions of Construct. Real numbers ranging [-1,
1] represent each stylized belief per agent. In this range of values, -1 represents a maximal
negative valence and 1 represents a maximal positive valence to the belief. Researchers may
create modeled beliefs rooted in possession of knowledge that contributes to positive or negative
valence as wells modeling beliefs not directly related to knowledge. Self-perception as well as
omnipotent knowledge of other agents’ beliefs contribute to homophily assessments and increase
the probability of interactions—at the expense of increased computational time.
The final aspect of Construct to briefly discuss is its recent incorporation of social groups
and generalized other (Mead, 1925) as cited in (Joseph, Morgan, Martin, & Carley, 2013).
Joseph et al. adjusted Construct away from agents retaining perceptions of every alter-ego to
which the agent has connection. In its newest incarnation, Construct agents, when faced with
having no personalized perception of an alter, and consequently no basis to judge homophily,
create an error prone interpretation of the alter based on knowledge of the social groups the alter
belongs to (Joseph et al., 2013). This social stereotyping is akin to not personally knowing a
political candidate, but inferring the candidate has certain beliefs and knowledge based on the
avowed political party of the candidate. If there is no information about the group(s) the person
belongs to, then inferences occur based on a people-in-general concept, often referred to as the
generalized-other (Mead, 1925).
Through creation of appropriate input files, what the Construct’s User Guide (Kathleen
M. Carley et al., 2014) calls input decks, researchers provide Construct definitions of
experimental variables, lists of input nodes, and network definitions. Construct can stochastically
generate the networks using parameters in the input deck, read data from ORA™ DynetML files,
or draw from other empirical sources. Node identifiers can also be from empirical sources, or
simple integers from [0..n] with n=number of nodes. I refer the reader to the Construct User’s
Guide for a more complete discussion of the input deck contents and to Appendix 6 (starting on
page 6-1) for the deck I used for the operational and strategic modeling.
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Augmentation of D2M generated models
There are two models of organizations (organization being an aggregation of multiple
heterogeneous cognitively limited agents) I use in the dissertation: strategic and operational. To
use the D2M models created in previous chapters, each requires a level of augmentation.
Revisiting the dissertation workflow from , we can see where we are in the process by looking at
the colored ovals and box in .

Figure 118: Dissertation workflow augmentation of models for use in ABM

The source documents I used do not discuss many of the particular inputs Construct
needs to function, though this shortfall is likely more manageable with use of proprietary or
sensitive documents instead of public documents. Additionally, the initial modeling effort
deliberately used the entire ontology for metanetwork node types. Not all the node types in the
metanetwork ontology are useful to Construct which leads to both descoping the metanetwork
model as well as augmenting it for processing by Construct.
The table below is roster of changes and modifications to the metanetwork ontology.
There are a total of thirty modifications needed on the D2M model for Construct to be able to
make complete use of the model.
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Table 51: Exogenous modifications to D2M models

Item #

Action

1.

Added
nodes

Of What

Why and Discussion
Where I had no data to discern a classification level, I created a new instance of the agent
or IT agent. I assigned this new instance the ‘level 2’ attribute and assigned ‘level 1’ to the
D2M-identified agent or IT agent.

agent nodeset
In this manner, a geospatial_database IT agent would get a twin called
geospational_database_level2.
I manually create a confidentiality sink agent and assigned it a ‘level1’ attribute for each
model.

2.

Added
nodes

agent node set

This agent is responsible, when active during confidentiality attacks, for receiving
communications from other IT agents. Assessment of the organization is the tendency of
level2 knowledge to flow to and within level1 agents—representing a classification leak
though without specific operational impacts.
Assignment of links to level1 key IT agents used the same random binary graph generator
and equation (39)
I manually create an integrity agent for each level of each model.

3.

Added
nodes

agent node set

4.

Added
nodes

agent node set

This agent is responsible, when active during integrity attacks, for disseminating bad
information into the organization.
Roles do not exist in Construct. I recoded all roles as agents, though I retained an attribute
on the imported roles listing them as ‘role’
I recoded all IT agents that the D2M process generated as construct agents. I did however
retain an attribute that labels the recoded agents as ‘it_systems.’

5.

Added
nodes

agent node set

Construct supports different behaviors for different agent types, and the IT agents have a
reduced probability of forgetting, higher quantities of communication reception counts
than human agents. IT Agents have the same communications initiation counts as human
agents, and with the disparity between initiate and receive, they are more akin to ‘pull’ IT
systems than ‘push’ IT systems.
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Item #

Action

Of What

6.

Added
nodes

knowledge node set

7.

Added
nodes

knowledge node set

8.

Added
nodes

knowledge node set

9.

Added
nodes

knowledgegroup node set

Why and Discussion
Where I had no data to discern a classification level, I created a new instance of the
knowledge node. I assigned this new instance the ‘level 2’ attribute and assigned ‘level 1’
to the D2M-identified knowledge node.
This heuristic possibly over generalizes the amount of information in an organization but
it decreases processing time for model generation. It also acknowledges that a knowledge
concept may well reside with two (2) slightly different instantiations: unclassified and
classified.
I manually created a set of knowledge equal to 10% of the knowledge set to represent a
‘plan.’
10% of plan knowledge received a ‘level 1’ attribute
90% of plan knowledge received a’level 2’ attribute
I manually created ‘bad plan’ knowledge at ratio of 10:1 (good:bad) for level 1 and level
2.
I manually assigned these two sets of knowledge to their respective knowledgegroup.
I manually assigned integrity agent level 1 to bad plan knowledge level 1.
I manually assigned integrity agent level 2 to bad plan knowledge level 2.
I manually segregated the D2M generated knowledge pool into five (5) major groups, and
eleven total sub-groups. The dissertation is asking questions about the resilience of
planning organizations in the face of contested cyber environments. But having only
‘information of interest’ in the simulation is a degenerate design case and uninteresting
from a research perspective.
1. All_knowledge
2. General_knowledge
2.1. General_knowledge_level1 (all level 1 non-plan knowledge)
2.2. General_knowledge_level2 (all level 2 non-plan knowledge)
3. Plan_k
3.1. Plan_knowledge_level1 (see next row for details)
3.2. Plan_knowledge_level2 (see next row for details)
4. Bad_Plan_K
4.1. Bad_plan_knowledge_level1
4.2. Bad_plan_knowledge_level2
5. No Bad K (General_K + Plan_K)
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Item #

Action

Of What

Why and Discussion

Figure 119: Knowledge x knowledgegroup network

I added nodes for the headquarters of all the commands of interest. For those commands
where I did not have an exact location I used Google Maps and a general search to provide
a latitude and longitude (e.g., Al Udeid Air Force Base, Doha, Qatar)
10.

Added
nodes

Location node set

I also added an ‘other’ node for those organizations for which I had no evidence of an
actual location. This was particularly true for IT systems. For the geographical location of
this other, I chose Fort Knox, Kentucky as it was somewhat near the geographical center
between Washington DC and Barksdale AFB for the Strategic Model. For simplicity I left
it the same for the Operational model as well.

178

Item #

11.

12.

13.

14.

Action

Added
nodes

Of What

organization node set (aka
agentgroup)

The dissertation is asking questions about the resilience of planning organizations in the
face of contested cyber environments. Focusing on the planning nature of these
organizations, allows me to have a set of agents (the JPG) that receives a ‘plan’ from some
exogenous source.
A method of assessing organizational resilience is to trace the flow of plan information
from this JPG to the remainder of the agent population. More specifically, the dissertation
attempts to identify differences in uncontested environments and contested environments
in the speed and accuracy of information flow to the various sets of decision makers (the
attendees of the JPG Briefings) in the models.
Incorporation of beliefs was beyond the scope of this effort. I deleted the entire belief
node set.

Deleted
nodes

Belief node set

Deleted
nodes

Event node set

Deleted
nodes

Why and Discussion
I added a JPG group and ‘JPG Briefing’ groups to each model’s organization nodeset.

Future work could easily generate questions of interest and incorporate beliefs intofuture
models.
The only specific event modeled in the scenarios under test was the plan-brief-plan cycle.

IT Resources (aka
Communications Mediums)

Construct could not draw this cycle from the list of events the D2M process generated, so
Construct does not use these nodes or networks.
I deleted all the IT resource nodes in the D2M generated models and kept seven (7) nodes
per model. These nodes are what Construct calls ‘Communications Mediums.’
For any two agents to interact, not only must they have a connection in the agent x agent
network, they must both have access to a common communication medium.
Operational
Strategic
1. Unclassified Telephone/Voice
1. Unclassified Telephone/Voice
2. Classified Telephone/Voice
2. Classified Telephone/Voice
3. Unclassified IP networks
3. Unclassified IP networks
4. Classified IP networks
4. Classified IP networks
5. Face-to-Face(f2f)
5. Face-to-Face (f2f)
6. Unclassified Email
6. Unclassified Email
7. Classified Email
7. Classified Email
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Item #

Action

Of What

Why and Discussion
I down selected organizations, manually, in the D2M models to a set of suborganizations
of interest as noted below for each of the two models.
I manually deleted organizations with less than 3 x D2M-discerned edges in them—with
the exception of the manually added groups (e.g.,, confidentiality agent group, and
integrity agent group) and groups necessary to maintain organizational face validity.
I added groups for assessing collections of agents that the D2M process did not otherwise
capture. See also the entry for adding nodes to the organization node set.
Operational
Strategic

15.

Deleted
nodes

organization node set (aka
agentgroup)

16.

Deleted
nodes

Location node set

17.

Deleted
nodes

Resource node set

Added
node
attributes

agent nodeset

18.

COCOM Staff (J1…J9)
AFSCC/NAF Staff (A1..A9)
JCOAC Divisions (x5)
Wing and Below
USAF/Service
Cyber
JPG

NCA related
NSC & NSC Staff
CJS & JS (J1..J9)
USSTRATCOM
USSTRATCOM JPG
USCYBERCOM
Intelligence Community (IC)
Military Departments (MILDEP)
Other Gov’t Agencies (OGA)
Geographic Combatant Commands
(GCC)
Functional Combatant Command (FCC)
I deleted all nodes that did not have a geographically identifiable location (e.g., Barksdale
Air Force Base).
Resources do not exist in Construct with its origins in belief and information diffusion.
I deleted the entire resource node set the D2M process generated.
The corpus rarely discussions clearance requirements for roles and individuals. For each
human and IT agent, I assigned them a node attribute of ‘human’ or ‘it_system.’
The corpus rarely identified IT systems as ‘IT systems’ and usually simply referred to
generic IT systems or named and specific systems. I therefore manually reviewed each of
the retained agents to identify if they were ‘human’ or ‘IT.’
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Item #
19.

20.

Action
Added
node
attributes

Added
node
attributes

21.

Added
edges

22.

Added
edges

Of What
agent nodeset

knowledge nodeset

agent x agent network
agent x organization network
organization x organization
network

agent x agent

Why and Discussion
I added an attribute to each node entitled ‘key’ and treated it as a Boolean. I marked those
agents from the Key Entities chapter as ‘key’ and used that as an exogenous marker for
differentiating key IT agents
Differentiation of sensitive and nonsensitive knowledge The D2M corpus rarely directly
differentiates which knowledge concepts belong to which levels of classification domains.
To remediate this shortfall, and assist in the rapid modeling process I used the following
heuristics and methods to segregate the single knowledge node set into two nodesets.
• Knowledge nodes connected only to IT systems (Level 1) stayed in level 1 knowledge
• Knowledge nodes connected only to IT systems (Level 2) stayed in level 2 knowledge
• Logistics, Medical, and Personnel ‘intel, ’ and ‘plan’ nodes stayed with level 1, while
military operations centric intel nodes stayed with level 2
• All publications stayed with level 1 knowledge
•
Most organizational models, to at least establish face validity, need to reflect lines of
authority. The D2M process did not always capture the chains of command a reader would
expect of military organizations. The D2M corpus frequently did not adequately reflect
the details of the command hierarchies for both levels of warfare.
As such, a manual process of edge creation in the agent x agent, organization x
organization, and agent x organization networks based on SME input and my own
professional expertise was necessary to augment the automation-based models with
additional relationship edges between organization nodes.
When I duplicated agent nodes to create ‘level2’ agents, I needed to duplicate the edges
each ‘level 1’ twin had, but inside the ‘level2’ agent set.
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Item #

Action

23.

Added
edges

Of What

agent x agent

Why and Discussion
When I created integrity agents, I needed to have them connect to other agents to enable
dissemination of their information. I chose to target the Key IT systems as the targeted
systems, based on the static assessments of large effects created by targeting small but
important quantities of IT systems.
I used a random binary graph generator within Construct with a mean value set with the
equation shown below. In other words, if the probability of an integrity attack was 0.8, the
integrity agent would have a probability of 0.8 for receiving an artificially created link
between it and any particular key IT agent.

1, random <Probabilityintegrity attack
Pinteraction = 
else 0


(39)

Equation 39 agent x agent probability of interaction

24.

Added
edges

Agent x communications
medium network

I manually created links between agents and communications media using the following
heuristics:
- Human (level 1 and level 2) to human (level 1 and level 2): f2f, level1 phone
- Level 2 Human to Level 2 Human: level 2 phone, level 2 email
- Level1 Human to Level 1 IT Agent: level 1 IP network
- Level 2 Human to Level1 IT Agent: level 1 IP network
- Level 2 Human to Level 2 IT Agent: level 2 IP network
- Level 1 IT Agent to Level 1 IT Agent: level 1 IP network
- Level 2 IT Agent to Level 2 IT Agent: level 2 IP network
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Item #

Action

Of What

Why and Discussion

Figure 120: Agent x Communications Medium (Operational)

25.

Added
edges

agent x organization network
organization x organization
network

Organizations (aggregations of humans for common purposes/tasks) do not exist as
explicitly modeled entities in Construct. Instead, modelers can exogenously assign agents
to groupings of Agents that help fulfill the stereotyping of perceived similarity capability.
Such grouping also supports output analysis at various levels of aggregation.
The Agent x Organization links derived from the D2M process are far too sparse to
support the Construct group membership stereotyping.
I added ed edges between agents and organizations that I knew existed based on my
military experiences. I also added edges based on samplings of the corpus.
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Item #

Action

26.

Added
edges

27.

Added
edges
Deleted
edges

28.

29.

Edge
modificati
on

30.

31.

Of What

agent x organization
organization x organization

Organization x location
Agent x knowledge network

agent x agent network

Warm Up Period

Added
network

Physical proximity network

Why and Discussion
After I manually created the JPG and JPG Briefing Group for each model I created links
between elements habitually included in JPGs (e.g., intel, ops, ops planners, logistics
planners, staff judge advocate, targeters).
The D2M models may have words that semantically mean JPG briefing, but there is no
other sense of a time-driven event in the D2M models. Instead the plan-brief-plan cycle is
implemented using the following heuristics within the simulation
- 1/3 of the time period after the simulation warm-up is set aside for ‘planning.’
This corresponds to a military heuristic of 1/3:2/3 time division between the
planning organization and the implementing organization.
- A starting value of 20% of the ‘planning’ time is set aside for ‘briefings’
- The JPG is incentivized to interact with each other by more heavily weighting
expertise seeking behavior during the plan-brief-plan cycle.
- There is a large group of
I manually created links between the organizations of interest and the locations of interest.
I manually removed links between level 1 Human and IT agents and level 2 knowledge. I
allowed level 2 agents and systems to remain connected to level 1 knowledge.
I binarized the agent x agent interaction network the D2M process generated. Edge
weights were co-occurrence counts in the source documents, and otherwise not of benefit
to the simulation process.
Co-occurrence counts for the IT systems, especially after sampling and reading source
documents indicate a a common interpretation: there is some logical inter-dependency of
the systems. An example of this would be a web server linked to a database is representing
a logical dependency with the actual physical or network-level interconnection abstracted
away from the model.
As noted in Figure 2and Figure 85, I use a warm up period to establish an equilibrium
point in the organization prior to executing attacks.
I used a mathematical model that incorporates agent forgetting lead and the volume of
data communicated at each interaction to estimated equilibrium points for both strategic
and operational models.
Construct supports inferring a distance measure thorough the use of geodesic distances
and edge weights, but I decided to use geographical distances, scaled and inverted as
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Item #

Action

32.

No
Change

Of What

Task node set

Why and Discussion
Construct expects—a distance of 1.0 indicates two agents are maximally close, while a
distance of 0.0 indicates the agents are maximally distant.
I did not differentiate sensitive and non-sensitive tasks.
The implication is that such tasks can require level 1 and level 2 personnel and
knowledge.
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Adversary definition and setup for contested cyber environments
Instead of developing an adversary with a defined set of capabilities and motivations, this
dissertation moves directly to predicted and simulated effects of an adversary’s actions. In this
effort, adversaries have, implicitly, finite capabilities and implicit motivations. The scenarios put
under test here demonstrate an approach well beyond negligible threat, but equally well short of
omniscient threat. I do make overt assumptions about adversarial capabilities, but in a direction
orthogonal to the warnings of adversarial assumptions and resulting bad policy (Gligor, 2008).
Each of the three effects under test in the next chapter, loss of confidentiality, loss of
integrity, and loss of availability are mid-term effects of a cyber attack. The loss, from near zero
to total, of any of these three pillars of information assurance and security, are in themselves,
rarely the sought-after effect in contested cyber environments. Rather, they are a component in
efforts to deny friendly forces synchronized command and control of resources, with the
subsequent effect of creating opportunities (e.g., military advantage, commercial advantage,
possession of intellectual property, embarrassment, criminal opportunities) for an adversary to
exploit. By inserting attack agents into each model at each classification level to act as a source
for ‘bad’ knowledge to diffuse within the organization, I am implicitly granting my nameless
adversaries the capability to conduct actions akin to advanced persistent threats (APT). The
adversary has at his/her disposal, in each of the integrity attack conditions, the ability to inject
bad data into the friendly organizations. Previous work (Lanham, Morgan, & Carley, 2012) has
already demonstrated that with no screening criteria for clearly ‘bad’ knowledge, an adversary
can have bad information diffuse throughout an organization. The same work also demonstrated
that the bad knowledge, even if given an extremely short time-to-live, is incredibly long-lived: in
general up to an order of magnitude longer than the original injection time!
In the loss of availability scenarios, I again choose to not posit a particular scenario that
lead to the loss of key IT system availability—I simply assert there are instantaneous losses of
availability at specified times. I grant the adversary (e.g., a malicious person, persons, nationstate, natural weather event) the ability to temporarily render one or more agents inaccessible
while making the motivations of the contested cyber environment opaque. In this way, I’m
attempting to avoid the numerous arguments and point/counter-point debates about plausibility
and instead move to the more important aspect, for this dissertation, of assessing post event
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resilience. I do not dispute the arguments by Cohen (F. Cohen, 1999) and Leblanc (F. Cohen,
1999; Leblanc et al., 2011) that adversary models should include capabilities and resource. Nor
do I dispute that when research questions involve adversary motivations that scenarios and
experiments should address such as advocated by (Gligor, 2008; Parker et al., 2004). The
absence of these pieces of adversarial information is indicative that the information is not
essential to the study of resilience to posited adversary-caused effects.
Finally, for the loss of confidentiality effect, I have chosen to model an adversary who is
not pursuing an aggressive penetration and exploitation style of cyber attack. The technique I
have chosen is to mimic a passive device targeted at ‘key IT systems’ and whose purpose is to
collect data. It is an imperfect data capturing device, and is active at only specified time periods.
This is a very general form of a confidentiality threat, much less than a key logger, and yet more
than a data sniffer on a random piece of hardware. I do not attempt to assert a particular
motivation for the confidentiality agent, nor do I have a particular end state for what some
remote adversary would do with the captured data.
IT capabilities for D2M organizational models
Underlying telecommunications and networking infrastructure systems (e.g., TELCO
POPs, signal regeneration points) are abstractions contained but not otherwise addressed in the
Construct simulation’s implementation of communications mediums. As noted in Table 51, both
D2M generated models have communications mediums of face-to-face, email, phone, and IPbased networks (the only way for IT agents to interact with other agents of any variety). Each of
these mediums exist at each of the security levels. This gives a total of seven (7) communications
mediums per model.
Classification levels for D2M organizational models
Organizations, civilian and military, frequently handle information and communications
at several levels of sensitivity. In the military, these are typically the classification levels of
unclassified (with and without handling caveats such as For Official Use Only), secret (with and
without compartmentalization indicators), and top secret (with and without compartmentalization
indicators). Civilian organizations may or may not use these same levels, but this proposal makes
the simplifying assumption that both organizations operate with two levels of sensitivity: level 1
and level 2.
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As described in Table 51, the corpus of documents for each organization rarely makes
explicit reference to the classification levels of the personnel or the IT systems those personnel
have access to. With SME input and personal experience as well as on-line research, I
differentiated the corpus-named IT systems by putting the correct classification domains on those
systems. The agents (IT and Human) with the level 2 attribute set, have direct access to both
levels of knowledge. Level 2 humans have access to both levels of IT systems, while level 2
systems will only be able to connect to other level 2 systems. Inter-connecting level 1 and level 2
systems does not happen in this dissertation, though future work could include such
interconnections. The DoD calls such interconnections across classification domains cross
domain solutions (CDS).
IT systems’ capabilities and limitations for D2M organizational models
In each type of model, IT systems are agents with different sets of limitations and
capabilities than human agents. IT systems are, themselves, agents within the simulation, but
they are able to communicate with more agents per turn in both send and receive mode. IT
systems communicate more complex messages per turn than do human agents. IT Systems do
not lie, and they rarely forget facts compared to human agents. IT systems do not have beliefs,
and they can suffer from availability attacks where, even if present in the simulation, they are
unable to communicate with other agents in the simulation until the attack is over.
Shared planning, or operations order (OPORD), knowledge for D2M models
There is also, as part of the scenarios in use by the dissertation, a shared common set of
‘planning’ knowledge. These knowledge bits, shown below in Figure 121 as blue dots, have
multiple links with red agents. The six (6) red agents in this particular figure are ‘Key IT’
systems in the classified and unclassified domains. These systems connect to the knowledge as
well as provide interorganizational links to their peer systems in other organizations. The blue
dots in the upper right corner of Figure 121 represent the starting configuration of a test run
where only the singular Level 2 IT system per organization had access to all the plan data.
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Figure 121: Shared planning knowledge

Inferring physical proximity for agents
Physical proximity, as well as the perceived difficulty of overcoming such distance
(Conrath, 1973), is a well known mediator to communications. Construct uses physical
proximity in its calculations of interaction probabilities on an agent x agent basis every turn. To
support this use, Construct needed data. To generate data, especially in the near complete
absence of geographical locations and distances in doctrine, it is necessary to apply additional
data generating techniques. There were twelve steps to the process of calculating a physical
proximity network.
Location by Location network with links as distance in kilometers
After down selecting nodes in the location node set, I created nodes for the approximate
locations of each of the organizations and commands of interest. Google maps™ offered a
fabulous opportunity to generate geospatial data independent of classified data sources. By
adding latitude and longitude to each location, I was then able to export the data to Excel and
calculate the pair-wise distance between all locations. I used the law of cosines to calculate the
distances in kilometers using the equation below, and ϕ1 = latitudelocation A , ϕ2 = latitudelocation B ,

=
and ∆λ longitudelocation B − longitudelocation A all in radians.
=
d cos −1 (sin ϕ1 × sin ϕ 2 + cos ϕ1 × cos ϕ 2 × cos ( ∆λ )
Equation 40: Law of Cosines to calculate distances between two points on a sphere
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(40)

Creating a Agent x Location network, count of common organizations
The next step was to create a network of Agents by organizations where the link values
are the counts of shared organizations. This will give me a denominator for calculating the
average distance across all same-agents at multiple organizations—in other words an agent
George may be common to multiple organizations and this will generate the count of those
shared organizations Using previously discussed node set and matrix notations, the equation to
generate this network is shown below.


=
× 

(41)

Equation 41: Generating an agent x location network (count of shared organization)

Creating a Agent x Location network, sum of distances between egos
The next step was to create a network of Agents by locations where the link values are
the sums of distances across all the instances of each particular agent at each location.

=
 dichotomized × 

(42)

Equation 42: Generating an agent x location network (sum of distances between ego instances)

Creating a Agent x Agent network, count of common locations
The next step was to create a network of Agents by agents where the link values are the
counts of shared locations.

=
× T


(43)

Equation 43: Generating an agent x agent network (count of shared locations)

Creating a Agent x Agent network, sum of distances between egos and alters
The next step was to create a network of Agents by agents where the link values are the
sum of distances between each ego (row agents) and their alters (column agents). I use (42) to
assist in calculating this value and show the equation below.

T
=

43 ×

Equation 44: Generating an agent x agent (sum of distances between egos and alters)
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(44)

Cell-wise division to generate average distance between egos and alters
The next step is to generate the average distance, by dividing each cell of (44) by the sum
of the respective cell in (43) and the row sum of the ego in the agent x location network. This is
more easily depicted in the equation below.

 physical proximity =

 i  j sum of ego-to-alter distances

 i  j shared loc count +  i  row count

(45)

Equation 45: Generating average distance between ego and alter agents

Cell-wise inversion and return to ORA™ the agent x agent physical proximity network
The last step in generating the physical proximity network, where the links represent the
average distance between egos and alters, is to cell-wise invert the values to achieve the scale
Construct expects of [1.0,0], for maximally close and maximally distant.

1, if i = j


i  j 
= 1
, otherwise
 
i
j


(46)

Equation 46: Generating an agent x agent physical proximity network for use by Construct, scale [1.0,0.0]

With the copying of the results of (46) back into ORA as a network called ‘physical
proximity’ the modeler has provided Construct with the data to computer the physical proximity
component of interaction probabilities between agents.

Experimental Design Setup
As previously discussed, there are two text mined models. For each model, I put under
test various combinations of cyber effects (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, availability) targeting
specific IT systems or more general communications mediums. A graphical representation of the
DMU’s in these models and their connections to the systems under attack is shown in Figure 122
The intent of the experiments was to judge if the graphical representations of resilience of
measures of interest (MoI) (see Figure 2 and Figure 85) were theories with empirical foundations
and to what degree. Additionally, the expectations of the experiment were to fulfill another
deliverable of the dissertation, a rapid multi-dimensional assessment of resilience of
organizational models that were themselves rapid constructions from self-documentation. Finally,
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two broad categories of mitigations were put under test: functional changes and organization
structure changes, operationalize as new arrival training, spare/replicas of Key IT systems and
procedures for bringing them on-line, and changing the ratio of meetings to planning sessions.

Figure 122 Graphical representation of organization under test

New arrival training informs new members of the organization who-knows-what and
who-does-what. These correspond exactly with Construct’s ability to implement knowledge
transactive memory and task assignment transactive memory. New arrival training has a history
of improving organizational performance (Bartel, 1994) with Tracey et al building the General
Training Climate Scale to provide feedback to management (Tracey & Tews, 2005). Within the
military, this is akin to a new arrival receiving an overview briefing of the organization with
fairly explicit details about what each staff section and sub-section does, as well as learning the
names of members in those sections. Learning what the sections do (task assignments) supports
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individual agents in creating generalized perceptions of all agents in the subsections. By varying
the false positive rates and false negative rates for each of the types of perceptions, I expect the
modeled organizations to have better performance with low false rates for all four variables.
The second change, use of replica Key IT systems (and their starting knowledge) and
varying how fast the equipment is brought online, increases knowledge redundancy within the
organization. Redundancy as a means of improving resilience to disruptions is a known
technique in multiple fields: public-key cryptosystems (Frankel, Gemmell, Mackenzie, & Yung,
1997), design of control systems in critical infrastructures(Rieger, Gertman, & McQueen, 2009),
provision of public services(Low, Ostrom, Simon, & Wilson, 2003), and is frequently seen in
functional redundancies in ecosystems (Low et al., 2003). The US Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board (Crichton et al., 2009) specifically calls out widespread distribution of
knowledge, especially of past organizational failures. The variable aspect of this component is
how fast mitigation techniques are fully in effect—analogous to rehearsals that improve the
ability of organizations to react to situations.
The last mitigation I experiment with is the varying of the meeting to planning ratio for
the JPG and JPG briefing attendees. In time compressed environments, the military already
practices something like this mitigation—it is sometimes called an abbreviated military decision
making process. Abbreviated MDMPs usually require more participation by leaders (more
‘meetings’ or larger audiences) and less time by specialized planners (JPG planning) isolated in
their planning cell. Changing meeting time ratios and attendees are both techniques common in
the emergency management services (Comfort, 2006). I expected modeled organizations with
this mitigation to have better performance than the baseline up to a point, and then I expect a
worsening return on investment of leaders’ time.
The verbiage of the variables placed under test can get daunting. In addition to the
explanations above, I offer two additional aids: a graphical rendering of the factorial tree of
categorical variables with Box-Behnken leaves, and a set of tables.
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Figure 123: Graphical rendering of experimental setup with factor tree and Box-Behnken leaves
Table 52: Experimental summary for D2M generated models

Condition
Organizational Model
Confidentiality Attack
IT
Integrity Attack IT
Availability Attack IT
Availability Attack
(email)
Availability Attack
(phone)
Availability Attack
(web)

Possible Values

Quant.
Combos

Strategic, Operational
Peffect= 0.0,0.2,0.8

3

Peffect= 0.0,0.2,0.8
Peffect= 0.0,0.2,0.8
Peffect= 0.0,0.2,0.8

3
3
3

Peffect= 0.0,0.2,0.8

3

Peffect= 0.0,0.2,0.8

3
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Cat.
Combos
2

Knowledge tm false
positive rate
Knowledge tm false
negative rate
Task tm false positive
rate
Task tm false positive
rate
Speed of Mitigation in
Plan-Brief Cycles
Meeting-Plan Ratio

Mitigations:
Peffect= 0.05,0.1,0.2

3

Peffect= 0.0 5,0.1,0. 2

3

Peffect= 0.0 5,0.1,0.2

3

Peffect= 0.0 5,0.1,0.2

3

0,1,3

3

0.20, 0.40, 0.60

3

A naïve implementation of the experimental table above would yield a factorial result
shown below. Clearly this is an infeasible number of iterations especially given runs times of 1 5 minutes per turn, even across a high throughput computing cluster.

2 models ×

311 combinations 20 iterations
×
=
7, 085,880 iterations
model
combination

(47)

Equation 47: Naive experimental design and summary

Instead of planning on a naive implementation as shown in (47), I turned to the BoxBehnken designs for response surface modeling (RSM) (Box & Behnken, 1960). The 10 factor
design, called ‘Design 7’ in the above looks like the table below, where ±1 indicates to the
modeler to take the top and bottom values of the three specified values for that variable.
Table 53: 10 factor Box-Behnken design

Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0

±1

0

0

0

±1

±1

0

0

±1

±1

±1

0

0

±1

0

0

0

0

±1

0

±1

±1

0

0

0

±1

±1

0

0

0

±1

0

±1

0

±1

0

0

±1

0

±1

0

0

0

0

0

0

±1

±1

±1

0

0

±1

±1

±1

0

0

0

0

±1

±1

0

0

±1

0

0

±1

±1

0

0

0

0

±1

0

±1

0

±1

0

±1

0

±1

0

±1

0

0

±1

0

0

±1

0

0

0

0

±1

±1

±1

0

±1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
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Expanding Table 53 and including ten (10) iterations of the last combination (the baseline
condition), this RSM technique allows me to reduce the number of iteration substantially. The
final number of combinations per model is 179, yielding the equation below for the number of
iterations within the experimental design.
2 models ×

179 combinations 20 iterations
×
=
71, 600 iterations
model
combination

(48)

Equation 48: Box-Behnken experimental design and summary
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4.00
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4.00

3.00

3.50

2.50

3.00
2.50

2.00
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1.50
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1.00

1.00

0.50

0.50
0.00

0

50

100

150

Conidtion ID/Number
attackSum

mitgation sum

200

0.00

Sum of mitigation vales (e.g., false positive rates, time to
bring spare IT online)--low values are best

Sum of Attack Probabilities of Effect - low values are best

The expanded and colored version of this spreadsheet is also Table 53 on page 195. The
colorized versoin (red=low, yellow=mid-value, green=high value) helps depict the design. A 2D
projection of the sum of the attack and mitigation value, Figure 124. I added 13 conditions into
the plan to reduce the probability of missing critical zones and interaction. The large black line
after the sixth column divides the table between probabilities of attack effect and the mitigations.
Though there are six columns for mitigations, the knowledge transactive memory false positive
rate and task transactive memory false positive rate columns vary at the same time. The false
negative rate columns are equally tied to to each other. This, in effect, changes the six column
representation to four mitigations in practice.

Figure 124: Visual representation of distibution of sums of attack probabilities and mitigations’ values
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Conclusion
In the abstract and Introduction chapter, I discuss four demands leaders should place on
their organization to increase their assurance of resilience to contested cyber environments. This
chapter has contributed to the second, third, and fourth of those demands. With the processes and
methods in this chapter, organizational leaders can more rapidly model their organizations, their
organizational vulnerabilities, and prepare the model for forecasting mission assurance scenarios.
This chapter delivers yet another component of the deliverables I had proposed: an empirically
based process for rapidly modifying organizational models to incorporate cyber attack effects
using SNA derived vulnerability assessments.
The thirty-32 (32) modifications I have described in this dissertation are detail oriented,
but are subject to needing reinvention—I would assess that any open-minded operations,
logistics, or other similar planner could perform these modifications following the steps of this
dissertation. I would recommend pair coding/modeling for future modelers, as it was
exceptionally easy to mis-configure the model within ORA as well as the simulation input file
(see next chapter for details). I would also recommend future researchers and developers to
extend the number and types of scenarios to place under test/forecasting, as well as varying the
underlying use case—not all organizations are primarily interested in receiving and processing
an operations order, some build widgets, others deliver widgets, others pay the bills for the
widget makers.
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Simulations
The simulations for this dissertation use Construct, the agent based model simulation
discussed at length in the Overview of Construct section (on page 172). Revisiting the
dissertation workflow from Figure 36, we can see where we are in the dissertation workflow by
looking at the colored ovals and box in Figure 118.

Figure 125 Dissertation workflow executing simulations of models

Before describing the uses to which I put Construct, it is appropriate to discuss some of
the changes I put in place, the testing for verification and validation of the changes, and the
support I built in for continued maintenance and updates.

Changes to Construct
Construct began in the late 1990s, and has been modified extensively since then by
researchers in CASOS and CASOS alumni now at other research institutions. Even with those
changes, there continue to be modifications in the code base for purposes of resolving usability
issues, aligning user documentation with as implemented functional, adjusting as-designed
documentation to reflect as-implemented as well as the reverse. To use Construct for my
purposes, to conduct Rapid Mission Assurance Assessment via Sociotechnical Modeling and
Simulation, I needed some additional functionality that I have briefly alluded to in previous
chapters.
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Code base descriptives
When assessing code base complexity, a long-standing, but somewhat simplistic measure
of complexity is the lines of code (LOC) in the project. Table 54 below depicts the descriptives
created by cloc, a perl application (Danial, 2015) of the source code before I and other CASOS
developers began modifying it in 2012.
Table 54: Lines of code summary for Construct, pre-dissertation

Language
C++
C/C++ Header
CMake
Sum:
Total LOC

files blank lines
71
9,355
80
4,164
2
472
154 14,022
74,460

comment lines
14,166
3,615
310
18,097

code lines
27,519
12,960
1,605
42,187

A second table, Table 55, depicts the combined efforts of source code modification
between three authors. My classmate Kenny Joseph is responsible for implementing the Boolean
Transactive Memory related modifications to the application. A simple line count for those
efforts are included, and then deducted from the total changes observed in the code base.
Table 55: Lines of code summary for Construct, post-dissertation, by Joseph,
Kowalchuck and Lanham

Language
XML (testing input files)
C++
C/C++ Header
CMake
DOS Batch
SUM:
Total LOC
Total LOC Change
TMBool LOC
LOC Change w/o TMBool

files

blank
comment
code
lines
lines
lines
8
622
891
45,769
161
9,549
18,469
31,634
172
5,128
5,817
18,854
3
35
82
115
2
36
9
116
346
15,370
25,268
96,488
50,719 exclusive of testing input files
8,532 exclusive of testing input files
2,536
5,996

I was unable to differentiate Mike Kowalchuck’s work as it was throughout the code base.
Mike is one the principal staff developers in CASOS, and he had the yeoman’s task of
incorporating all the many changes Kenny and I created. The changes, grossly summarized in
terms of lines added, or removed, are shown below in Table 56. Of note in this table is the im
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Table 56: Lines of code added and removed during refactoring and additions

Language
make
same
modified
added
removed
Bash Shell
Same
modified
Added
removed
DOS Batch
same
modified
added
removed
XML
same
modified
added
removed
C++
same
modified
added
removed
C/C++ Header
same
modified
added
removed
HTML
same
modified
added
removed
CMake
same
modified
added

files

blank

comment

code

0
0
0
1

0
0
0
439

0
0
0
244

0
0
0
1,276

0
0
1
1

0
0
33
31

0
0
9
6

0
0
113
103

0
0
1
0

0
0
3
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
3
0

0
0
8
0

0
0
622
0

0
0
891
0

0
0
45,769
0

0
0
161
71

0
0
9,549
9,355

0
0
18,469
14,166

0
0
31,634
27,519

0
0
172
80

0
0
5,128
4,164

0
0
5,817
3,615

0
0
18,854
12,960

0
0
4
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
821
0

0
0
3

0
0
35

0
0
82

0
0
115

200

removed

1

33

66

329

SUM:
same
modified
added
removed

0
0
350
154

0
0
15,370
14,022

0
0
25,268
18,097

0
0
97,309
42,187

Binary Tasks as a motivation for interaction
Part of the deliverable I proposed for this dissertation was a set of modifications that
added binary tasks as a motivation for interaction between agents. I achieved this modification
through extending Construct code originally written by Kenneth Joseph, placing extensions
under a testing framework, and authoring new code.
I added the ability for agents to calculate the binary task similarity and binary task
expertise values that are contribute to agents stochastic decisions about who to attempt to interact
with. Binary task similarity, much like knowledge similarity, is a score the simulation tracks to
support homophily based interaction (that is egos interacting with those alters that are similar).
Binary task expertise is the other calculated value drawing directly from the knowledge expertise
code base—it is a score on a per-alter basis that the higher it is, the more an alter has binary tasks
the ego does not.
The agent x binary task network most commonly conveys which binary tasks each agent
is assigned. The agent (ego) x agent (alter) x binary task network is the transactive memory of
which alters the agent believes are assigned to which tasks.
Agents can now add binary task assignment bits to their messages they transmit to their
interaction partners. In the case of transmitting a bit from the agent x binary task network (the
task assignment network listed in Table 7), this would be the equivalent of the ego agent
assigning a task to the alter agent. That is not an intuitive behavior, and I have placed warnings
in the technical report for ORA, the source code, as well as the Doxygen comments to warn
future experimenters.
Agents can also add binary task transactive memory bits to their messages they transmit
to their interaction partners. This is the equivalent of an ego, telling its interaction partner that
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one of the ego’s alters is assigned to a particular task or set of tasks. This behavior is as intended
and as designed for the simulation, and fits well within the literature on why humans tend to
interact with each other.
Improve Maintainability
I added copious quantities of embedded and inline comments, explanations, and math
functions using syntax geared for ingestion by doxygen (van Heesch, 2014). Doxygen is a
program that creates source code documentation and graphical class inheritance diagrams in
multiple output formats.
To author and render math functions I used MathJax (MathJax Consortium, 2014) , a
JavaScript display engine for mathematics. I embedded Construct’s driving equations into the
comment structure for classes where significant calculation was a fundamental task. The
equations embedded in the code therefore represent an as-built view of Construct’s behavior that
future readers will be able to compare/contrast to technical reports or user manuals.
Construct Unit testing using Boost:UnitTestFramework
The majority of the files I added to the source base fell into one of two categories: unit
test files and refactoring classes into their own files (in lieu of multiple classes in a single
header/source file pair). The end state of the dissertation is that I have placed 23 classed under
varying levels of test coverage, ranging from 100% to as little as 10% of the public APIs. The
principle advantage to this contribution is that future developers can use both the Boost Unit Test
Framework (Dawes, Abrahams, Josuttis, & Et. al.) test cases and the XML input files from
previous versions to verify their implementations perform as they should and as the older
versions of Construct used to.
Table 57: Class count changes in code base

Code base stage

Class Count

Pre-Dissertation

297

Post-Dissertation

324

Class growth

27

Unit Test Classes

23
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Analysis
To establish the experimental baseline, and after conducting the augmentation of the
model as I discussed in the previous chapter, I used the CASOS Condor High Throughput
Computing Cluster ("Computing with HTCondor," 2015). This cluster supported executing
multiple iterations per run condition to identify inherent variability in the execution of the model.
The variability helps establish face validity in the minds of reviewers as it demonstrates the
ability to incorporate stochastic processes into the simulation.

Omitting New Resilience Metric
The analysis of the simulations does not include the newly developed resilience measure.
This is principally because in test and initial simulations, there were no observed effects on the
measure. Part of the no change result was predicted; the static assessment uses ‘resources’ while
the construct model does not. I had expected some change however since the attack scenarios
involve the logical deletion of highly connected IT agent nodes. I expected this would cause the
creation of pendants of pendants in the agent chains remaining in the model. I had also expected
knowledge bits connected to the deleted agents would contribute to a change in the resilience
score. I was wrong. What changes did occur happened in the four and fifth decimal places, and I
had to revisit my expectations.
My working hypothesis for this outcome is that the process of augmenting the model for
Construct caused the agent node pendants of pendants to no longer exist. Addition of links and
joining agents to groups caused them to not be isolated anymore. As to knowledge, if there were
any knowledge bits that could no longer diffuse when the availability attack occurred, its loss
was not noticed by the organization level measures. Finally, when augmenting and cleaning the
data file, especially in my efforts to reduce run times to a manageable duration, I use an
automated remove isolates capability in ORA. Because I defined isolates using the entire metanetwork ontology, there were still several thousand knowledge bits in the ORA model, not
connected to a single agent, though many did form knowledge clusters. Without connections to
agents, the knowledge bits were simply causing the simulation to run slower but still could never
diffuse. This was also true of tasks. When I deleted isolates from those two individual networks
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(agent x knowledge and task x knowledge), I made it even more challenging for the resilience
score to change. Given the lack of changes, my conclusion for the resilience score is I have
demonstrated its applicability to static models generated from the D2M process. I have also
demonstrated that model cleaning and augmentation techniques as well as attack scenario
implementations can negatively impact the resilience score calculations.
Instead, I choose to analyze other aspects of performance that help answer the ‘so what’
of the indicated drop in performance we saw in the static analysis. In the static analysis chapter,
we saw drops in measures that varied from nearly zero percent (0%) change to 60% and higher.
To operationalize the impacts of those measures, the analysis deliberately constrains itself to the
impacts to a small sub-set of the simulation population per model. Specifically, I focus on the
diffusion of ‘plan’ knowledge in a normal execution environment to the agents that ‘attend’ the
planning and plan briefing events in the simulation. An additional operating premise of the
dissertation is that sufficient diffusion of ‘plan’ knowledge within key leader population is
necessary for adequate execution of the plan. This premise nests with the generalized statement
that at the operational and strategic levels, commands tend to be more information-task oriented
than other types of DoD organizations. The structure of my experiments and the scenarios that I
have chosen are simply one of the many ways future researchers could instantiate a mission
assurance simulation scenario.
Diffusion of plan knowledge, operational and strategic
In each of the two models, as shown in Figure 126 and Error! Reference source not
found., the diffusion curves of the plan knowledge have the warm up period on the left of the
chart; there is an increase in the rate of diffusion during and after each of the 3 simulated
planning meetings. This is most clearly seen in the change in slope at time period 21, the
beginning of the ‘planning cycle’ and just before meeting one (1). As noted in the augmentation
chapter and even in the visual rendering of resilience from Figure 2, the warm up assists in
establishing an equilibrium with respect to agents’ transactive memory being initialized and
stabilized, stereotypes generated, and entropy associated with forgetting.
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Figure 126: ‘Plan’ diffusion for operational model

max
PlanKnowledge
=
17 jpg &jpg briefing agents ×
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300 plan _ bits
= 5,100 bits (49)
1 agent

Figure 127: Operational model information diffusion effects for single-vector and multi-vector attack conditions

I had expected the mitigation of reducing the transactive memory error rates to provide a
more substantial effect on plan knowledge diffusion that it demonstrated With a decreased
opportunity to have incorrect perceptions, the simulation suggests that newcomer training is
helpful in increasing diffusion, even in contested cyber environments. This suggests to
commanders that should emphasize initial who-does-what and who-knows-what, at least in the
larger organizational sub-groups.
The rise in plan diffusion after attacks in the scenarios where the spares were brought
online was, like the strategic model not very pronounced and was barely correlated with the use
spares in the first place. This was a surprising result, as I had expected a distinctly visual
difference as well as a more pronounced statistical evidence of efficacy. My working hypothesis
there are more IT systems with the plan knowledge in these scenarios, thereby helping spread the
information at a faster rate and to a larger population.
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I had expected and saw a very small increase in plan diffusion by changing the ratio of
meeting time to planning time during the planning cycle. The resulting change in diffusion was
statistically significant (p < 0.005), but miniscule from an everyday perspective and barely
correlated ( correlation was 0.03, with p < 0.005 as well). Though the increase is not dramatic,
this particular adaptation has challenges in operational units as it does in strategic units. As noted
in the potential leadership interpretation above, too many meetings in favor of planning will
reduce the flow of information within the leadership circles.
The 10 dimensional response surface generated by the Box-Behnken design shown in is
necessarily inaccessible for visual rendering except in slices and pieces. I have not depicted or
discussed outcomes for combinations of factors that do not demonstrate outcomes of potential
interest to organizational leaders. This is a useful aspect of M&S based experimentation however
as there are little to no differential costs in running additional scenarios—though the same is not
true of the analysis efforts associated with each scenario. What this approach supports however
is forecasting for conditions that will, or should, cross the risk-acceptance thresholds of
organizational leaders. Those leaders can use the scenarios with intriguing or obvious results to
guide their decisions to establish training objectives and expectations in their formal training
calendars and events. The outcomes of the M&S experiments thus serve as screen criteria for
selecting high-payoff scenarios when the unit shifts from simulation to live or constructive
training modalities.
Strategic Model
As previous work (Lanham, Morgan, et al., 2011b) indicated, I had expected that the
strategic model would experience non-linear changes when confronted with multiple attack
vectors. In the figure below the reader can see there are effects, and they follow the same
reduction in diffusion pattern as the operational model, but they are not as dramatic as predicted.
There are obvious changes in slope during planning periods and meetings, and different
maximums achieved for various attack combinations. The vertical bars in the diagram represent
the 3 planning meeting periods. The top most series of markers is the average of the best
condition (no attacks and very low false positive and false negative rates for transactive memory).
There were at total of 46 people in the JPG planning group and JPG Briefing group, with 510
total plan bits, leading to a theoretical maximum diffusion of 23,460 bits I would expect to see in
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Figure 128: Strategic model best and worst cases only

Performance as Accuracy
Performance as Accuracy is a calculated measure that generalize the alignment of
knowledge tied to tasks with knowledge possessed by people assigned to those tasks. This
measure, applied to each model in turn, has as its operating premise that alignment of agentpossessed knowledge, agent-assigned tasks, and tasks’ required knowledge. The caveat of course
is the measure does not offer task-specific visibility to leaders about which tasks, per-se, the
organization will do poorly in, it simply offers an indicator of increased probability of higher or
lower performance. With that in mind, the two graphs below convey two very distinct outcomes
for which I do not have an initial hypothesis. The operational model, across 32 tasks assigned to
the various members of the JPG and JPG Briefing groups, had a distinctive pattern to the amount
of knowledge the groups possessed for tasks they were assigned. The air_refueling task depicted,
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derived from D2M generated extraction processes, has 12 bits of knowledge linked to it. One or
more members in the JPG and JPG briefing group are assigned the mission to plan air_refueling
in support of other operations.
I had expected a gradually increasing curve depicting a slow growth in the possession of
this knowledge. I was wrong. Instead, the pattern depicted in the graph held sway: agents gained
all of the bits necessary for a high probability of completing the task very early, and generally
held on to them. I assert the turn-by-turn drop and rise is reflective of agents being able to forget
knowledge, then re-acquire it.
More interesting was that this pattern was true for each of the tasks assigned to these two
sub-populations. The tasks were insensitive to attack conditions, suggesting that the D2M
process captured the essence of tacit knowledge within the group: the knowledge is resident in
the agents’ memories, and they are not reliant on their IT systems as the sole source of that
knowledge. The task knowledge was also insensitive to the mitigations. This suggests that the
agents assigned these groups rarely have their task-peers fall out of activated transactive memory,
else their knowledge would decay through non-use.

Figure 129: Baseline performance as accuracy for operational model

The strategic model behaved in a very different manner than the operational model, and I
do not yet have a hypothesis for why or a generative mechanism for the behavior. The model
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behaved as I had initially expected: the number of agents with the task-related knowledge would
rise and reach equilibrium, strongly suggesting that for those tasks, the organization has a high
probability of correctly implementing the tasks. I had not expected the rise to be delayed as it
was, and indeed the initial stages of the simulation saw a slight in access to this knowledge,
supporting the need of simulation warm up period. Across all the conditions tested under the Box
Behnken methodology, the strategic model demonstrated no sensitivity for these tasks across
attack or mitigation conditions.
The insensitivity of both models to the attacks could very well be an artifact of the M&S world,
some inadvertent over-circumscribing behaviors and interactions, or otherwise not materially
relevant. What it could also be, and is very suggestive of, is that people can and do retain
information even when they lose or suffer degraded access to their IT. With practice to reinforce
a mindset of resilience, these organizations, and potentially many others, can have confidence
that they can accomplish far more in a contested cyber environment than mass media

pontificators suggest.
Figure 130: Baseline reflection of performance as accuracy for strategic model

From this baseline analysis of non-contested environments, I move on to analyzing and
summarizing the six attacks in their various combinations as well as the mitigations. Before
doing so, I will provide a slightly more in-depth review of the mitigations in place.
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Confidentiality assessment
Recall the I modeled a passive confidentially agent that I connected to ‘level1’ IT
systems. My motivation for selecting ‘level1’ IT systems is that the mass media typical reports
on compromises of military and company’s systems that are not cryptographically separated
from the global internet. Since I’ve not read reports of breaches of classified systems, it seemed
plausible to have had an adversary that will have compromised multiple systems, and ideally
systems they would consider important. I am not modeling an advanced persistent threat
however, as the agent is passive, does not initiate interactions, and the reader can think of the
agent as a confidentiality sink.
The assessment of the sink if not operationally focused. Without a specific time,
organization, or circumstance, assessing operational impacts to any particular breach is a
generalized challenge—possible suitable for its own research area. However, in this case I
reviewed the confidentiality agent’s ability to absorb and maintain ‘level 2’ plan knowledge.
I expected the sink to accumulate a small percentage of ‘level 2,’ and expected it to
slowly grow over time and possible reach some low equilibrium. I was wrong. The next to
figures show the average is highly variable across attack conditions, with two peaks, but not
sufficiently so to call the average a bimodal distribution.

Figure 131: Average plan distribution across attack and mitigation conditions
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In retrospect, I should have expected a peak during nothing but a confidentiality attack (at
0.8 on the x axis) as that attack condition has no other competitors or interference occurring in
the model. I had not expected the peak at the far right of the figure for the strategic sink agent. In
this condition, the sink has attained almost 25% of the ‘level 2’ plan knowledge. This is a
surprising amount. I’ll discuss a working hypothesis after reviewing the sink’s ability to collect
the other forms of knowledge in the simulation.

Figure 132: Confidentiality sink's collection of various knowledge groups

In Figure 132, we can see that the confidentiality agent, though constrained by being
unable to initiate interactions, nonetheless gathers a significant amount and variety of
information. The x-axis is time, with the y axis the number of bits the agent has gather, with
each line representing a different group of knowledge—knowledge groups are exogenous to the
agents and for the modelers use in configuring the simulation. In this chart, this not very
aggressive passive agent, in the worst case strategic model, is able to get a large variety of
knowledge!

Mitigations
New arrival training informs new members of the organization who-knows-what and
who-does-what. These correspond exactly with Construct’s ability to implement knowledge
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transactive memory and task assignment transactive memory. New arrival training has a history
of improving organizational performance (Bartel, 1994) with Tracey et al building the General
Training Climate Scale to provide feedback to management (Tracey & Tews, 2005). Within the
military, this is akin to a new arrival receiving an overview briefing of the organization with
fairly explicit details about what each staff section and sub-section does, as well as learning the
names of members in those sections. Learning what the sections do (task assignments) supports
individual agents in creating generalized perceptions of all agents in the subsections. By varying
the false positive rates and false negative rates for each of the types of perceptions, I expect the
modeled organizations to have better performance with low false rates for all four variables.
The second change, use of replica Key IT systems (and their starting knowledge) and
varying how fast the equipment is brought online, increases knowledge redundancy within the
organization. Redundancy as a means of improving resilience to disruptions is a known
technique in multiple fields: public-key cryptosystems (Frankel et al., 1997), design of control
systems in critical infrastructures(Rieger et al., 2009), provision of public services(Low et al.,
2003), and is frequently seen in functional redundancies in ecosystems (Low et al., 2003). The
US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (Crichton et al., 2009) widespread
distribution of knowledge, especially of past organizational failures, is specifically called out by.
The variable aspect of this component is how fast mitigation techniques are fully in effect—
analogous to rehearsals that improve the ability of organizations to react to situations.
The last mitigation I experiment with is the varying of the meeting to planning ratio for
the JPG and JPG briefing attendees. In time compressed environments, the military already
practices something like this mitigation—it is sometimes called an abbreviated military decision
making process. Abbreviated MDMPs usually require more participation by leaders (more
‘meetings’) and less time by specialized planners (JPG planning) isolated in their planning cell.
increasing shared situation awareness. This technique is also common in the emergency
management services (Comfort, 2006). I expected modeled organizations with this mitigation to
have better performance than the baseline up to a point, and then I expect a worsening return on
investment of leaders’ time.
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Both model experienced degradations when confronted with multiple attack vectors,
though I was not able to generate the non-linear effects seen in previous work not in the static
assessments.
I was also unable to generate, despite literature suggesting otherwise, significant
improvements with the mitigations I experimented with. In both models, the improvements were
statistically significant (p <0.005), but in my assessment not meaningful or significant to the
average commander. Of course, a 3-5% improvement to one leader in one organization may be a
ho-hum response, while another organization would find that level of change an emotional event.
None of the observed changes are as obvious as I had predicted in either graphical or
mathematical model form.

Figure 133: Operational model information diffusion effects for single-vector and multi-vector attack conditions
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Revisiting the diffusion graph, the legend to the right of the figure remains the sum of the
probabilities in effect (since rendering a graph along 10 dimensions is impractical). The label
“0.00 / 0.31” indicates there are no attacks in effect, and the lowest false positive and false
negative rates are in effect for transactive knowledge memory and transactive task assignment
memory. The figure depicts that none of the mitigations are profoundly good at reducing the
impacts to the attacks. This was not as expected, though it certainly gives credence to the thought
that M&S will need to explore the universe of good ideas before leaders commit precious
resources with artificially high expectations of preparations and mitigations.
There is sufficient information in the graph though to allow organizational readers to
interpret the figure in this way:
The organization as modeled can, on average, disseminate over 70% of the plan
to the members of the JPG Briefing group. When put into a contested cyber
environment of DDoS, the organization can expect to drop in performance, on
average, 16%. Combined, this means the organization can reliably say 60% of the
plan will reach the senior leadership of the organization.
There is a band of performance the organization will need to refine and explore to
decide how best to improve overall dissemination as well mitigation efficacy. No
mitigation under test restores the organization to its pre-attack effectiveness. The
organization itself does not return to pre-attack effectiveness with respect to this
planning cycle and this planning task for this attack..
A hasty dive into the underlying data shows that exceeding 0.40 as the ratio
between meetings and planning, induces a reduced dissemination effect, which is
congruent to the 1/3 2/3 rule the DoD uses for staffs and planning- time
allocation.
I had expected the mitigation of reducing the transactive memory error rates would
provide a more substantial effect on plan knowledge diffusion that it demonstrated below in
Error! Reference source not found.. Indeed, the surprising aspect of the false negative rate was
that it was negatively correlated to diffusion success, albeit very slightly. The false positive rates
however were positively correlated ( p < 0.005) with better diffusion rates. This suggested that
newcomer training geared to providing specific information about who-does-what and whoknows-what is helpful in increasing diffusion, even in contested cyber environments.
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What I had not expected was the rather dramatic rise in plan diffusion after attacks in the
scenarios where the spares were brought online. As seen in Error! Reference source not found.,
the plan diffusion curve is a definite improvement to the no attack condition as well as the preattack condition. My working hypothesis, and in retrospect predictable outcome, is that there is
simply more IT systems with the plan knowledge in these scenarios, thereby helping spread the
information at a faster rate and to a larger population.
I had expected and saw an increase in plan diffusion by changing the ratio of meeting
time to planning time during the planning cycle. Though the increase is not dramatic, this
particular adaptation has operational challenges in units. What it effectively does is requires a
large percentage of key leaders in the organization to decrease their attention and effort spent on
their other duties. This worked fine in this scenario, but would likely cause many a commander
to have second thoughts on doing so as a long term solution.
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Heuristics
This chapter is an opening effort at distilling tens of pages of detailed analysis to
heuristics for consumption by organizational leaders. Like all heuristics, their value will come
from their general accuracy, their brevity, their references to other experiential frames of
references, and their adoption. Some of the heuristics below are not directly supported by the
evidence of this dissertation, but are extrapolations of experience and intuition. The very need for
extrapolation is evidence of the continuing gaps in research and experiential learning.
First and foremost, to paraphrase a co-worker, military cyber space operations are
traditional military operations on non-traditional terrain (Lanham, 2012a). Removing the military
context, cyber space operations are traditional business operations in non-traditional regulatory
and market environments. Moderately stripping away the aura of uniqueness and specialness of
the IT-realm can enable leaders to recall their other professional planning and coping skills while
avoid the pitfalls of disaster mythologies (Tierney et al., 2006). This rule of thumb is especially
important and seen in practice during community reactions to natural disasters (Coping with
Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet People's Needs in Natural
and Mammade Disasters, 1993; Quarantelli, 1988; Reason, 1991): leaders that retain a
semblance of calm under stress help the community maintain its sense of capacity to overcome
adversity. In the military context, there are few scenarios where professional militaries will
surrender or otherwise stop military operations simply because of setbacks and adversity nor
would they tolerate leaders who refuse to plan and rehearse for obvious eventualities.
Legal authorities matter, as they do in traditional military and business operations.
Espionage and warfare are lawfully different activities; as a nation, we do not habitually use the
military to conduct espionage, nor do we use espionage agents to conduct combined arms
military operations. Conducting everyday business and industrial espionage, sabotage, or
counter-sabotage are also all different activities, controlled by differing legal frameworks,
regardless of individuals personal opinions or beliefs. Combining these two heuristics leads to
the following logical assessment. Military cyberspace operations are not inherently extensions of
cyberspace espionage any more than coalition and multi-service maneuver and clash of armed
forces are inherently extensions of covert operations.

217

Small well chosen targeted system losses can affect organizations as greatly as large
random losses. Effects vary greatly by system(s) and duration of event(s)/outage(s). Of the
twenty MoIs presented in the The tables above support the original assertions that the ideal
information processing resilient organization should have no near isolates, maximal excess
knowledge and resources (e.g., twice what is minimally necessary), and no needs. They also
show that the least resilient organization is hyper-efficient in knowledge and resource
distribution with no waste whatsoever. The least resilient organization also has the degenerate
case that all tasks, resources, and knowledge are near isolates and accessible only through agents
that are pendants. Finally the least resilient organization has every task short of necessary
knowledge and resources. These assessments fulfill the third challenge of organizational leaders:
identify their organization’s structural vulnerabilities.
The next section begins addressing the fourth challenge for leaders, being able to forecast
mission assurance scenarios.
Entropic and Targeted Attacks The tables above support the original assertions that the
ideal information processing resilient organization should have no near isolates, maximal excess
knowledge and resources (e.g., twice what is minimally necessary), and no needs. They also
show that the least resilient organization is hyper-efficient in knowledge and resource
distribution with no waste whatsoever. The least resilient organization also has the degenerate
case that all tasks, resources, and knowledge are near isolates and accessible only through agents
that are pendants. Finally the least resilient organization has every task short of necessary
knowledge and resources. These assessments fulfill the third challenge of organizational leaders:
identify their organization’s structural vulnerabilities.
The next section begins addressing the fourth challenge for leaders, being able to forecast
mission assurance scenarios.
Entropic and Targeted Attacks starting on page 150, percentage change impacts were as
low as 0-1% at 10% loss levels (random) to as high as 80% at 75% loss levels. Those percentage
change can be a gross form of impact assessment, short of specific organizational impacts with
SME-input (or experience), it remains a useful data point for leadership. With those caveats, the
table below summarizes the impacts of random losses. The table is akin to the green, amber, red,
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black color coding schemes traditional military commanders use for assessing overall operational
capability of an organization (see also Figure 117).
Table 58: Effects of random losses table

Random Loss Level
Up to 15% random loss of IT agents and IT
resources
Up to 30% random loss of IT agents and IT
resources
Up to 50% random loss of IT agents and IT
resource
Up to 75% random loss of IT agents and IT
resource

Operational Impact for Organizational Leaders
Little to no operational impact on the 20 assessed
SNA measures.
10% change threshold crossed on some of the 20
assessed SNA measures
Changes are highly variable and range from little to
no impact to changes up 60% on the 20 assessed
SNA measures
Changes are highly variable and range from
moderate (>10%) to severe impacts on the 20
assessed SNA measures.

A more nuanced heuristic for the above table is that ‘it depends’ on the MoI, the effected
system(s) and the operational impacts. For a hospital, the degradation of a centralized patient
database, with no spares or failover capability, could dramatically effect sustained care while the
health care providers revert to paper-based systems. The decision to revert would clearly be
driven by an estimated time for return to service as well as assessments for any data integrity loss
(e.g., corruption of patient data). For time sensitive targeting, organizations may lose small
windows of opportunity (Pflanz & Levis, 2012), causing a reversion to other processes or other
expectations. For strategic and operational logistics, degradations to business-to-business
communications with commercial shipping, rail, and trucking companies may prove
inconsequential for short duration events, and could impact controlled supply rates and restricted
supply rates for specific classes of supply.
The table above is table, and the more nuanced answer are both aligned with the first
paragraph of this chapter. A traditional military commander at the operational level would have
an experiential and intuitive basis for knowing that a random loss of 15% of her aircraft may be
very consequential of the 15% overlaps completely with a high value airframe. Or the logistician
that understands the random loss of the sole material handling equipment at an airfield has ripple
effects larger than a single piece of equipment loss would usually generate. Traditional business
and military operations require risk mitigation, as does cyber space operations. Traditional
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military studies also strongly alternate, contingency, and emergency plans as well as rehearsals
of the switch over and execution of those plans.
There is danger is assuming that resilience to everyday outages and challenges equates to
resilience to deliberately contested cyber environments. The specific targeting of systems by a
malicious adversary will be attempting to create effects within the targeted organization’s
operations, leadership decision cycles, information flow, or some other goal. The research shows
that combinations of key node losses can rapidly shift to non-linear effects disproportionate to
the number of systems directly affected. In these models, deletion of as few as ten (10) nodes,
when carefully selected, can create effects as large as a random loss of 50% of the nodes. For
strategic and national level commands, who perceive themselves as reliant on up-to-the-minute
information flow to make decisions, this argues that they should prepare for and rehearse
degraded communications!
The paragraph above reinforces the first takeaway of the dissertation yet again.
Traditional military operations seek to identify and target adversaries’ centers of gravity and
decisive points. Such targeting helps set the stage of cascading successes by the friendly
elements while depriving the adversaries of decision space and time. The loss of key leaders in
an organization can have a disproportionate effect on the workers and processes. Likewise, the
creation of an effect in a key leader’s world view, can dramatically affect the organization—a
deliberate injection of erroneous data to a key leader or key IT system can rapidly and
persistently corrupt the decision making and processes within an organization.
The clearest example of this degraded information flow is in Figure 110. An adversary
can, in these models, double the amount of time it takes for information to flow through the
organizational models. In this figure of these two models, the loss of a single IT system can
degrade communications flow up to 10%. Deliberate targeting by an adversary of just 10 IT
centers of gravity can degrade IT-only diffusion by 50%, hence the doubling of time to move
information. That time lag may be without effect, or it may place national decision maker(s) well
outside their comfort zone for decisions without up-to-the-minute current data or information.
Expectation management for impacts pre- and post-event is essential to ensure leadership
demonstrates resilience in the face of an information addictions not receiving their periodic
updates.
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The table below reduces the content further with the commiserate risk of over simplifying
and under stating the variability of outcomes.
Table 59: Rules of thumb for impacts

Cyber Condition
Random and everyday losses != targeted or
deliberate losses

Contested cyber environments will happen

Up to 15% random loss of IT systems

Up to 30% random loss of IT systems

Operational Impact for Organizational Leaders
Extrapolating from everyday random losses and typical
troubles of ‘build, operate, and maintain’ mission to a
malicious adversary imperils assurances as there is no
confidence in coping plans
Org leaders and members having estimates of impacts
avoids disaster myths, knowing how to adapt and
approximate path for return to normalcy is essential to
mission assurance
Little to no operational impact—usually
Akin to: if luck favors the adversary, loss of a main
supply route
Slight operational impact—dependent on which 30% of
the population is affected

or
Loss of a single ‘key’ IT system
Up to 50% random loss of IT systems
or
Loss of up to four (4) ‘key’ IT systems
Up to 75% random loss of IT systems

Akin to: Loss of high level ‘key leader’ contingency
requires succession of command plan and expectation of
resilience
Moderate to severe impacts without Primary, Alternate,
Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) plans in place and
rehearsed. Impacts are highly variable!
Akin to: Loss of an entire command group or other
cluster of key personnel or resources.
Moderate to severe impacts PACE plans in place and
rehearsed.

or
Loss of up to ten (10) ‘key’ IT systems

Akin to: Doubling time it takes to move reports across
the organization(s). Loss of an forward airbase or port in
a theater of operations

The most important take away from this chapter is that the rapid modeling process of the
previous chapter can generate an model subject to analytic efforts that demonstrates a
recognizable, though nonunique, outcome: targeted removal of IT systems and IT resources in
complex sociotechnical organizations can lead to effects disproportionate to the number of
directly affected systems and resources. This trend leads to a lesson for organizational leaders
that the risk management community has incorporated for a very long time: identify the most
important systems and resources and ensure their continuity of operations at some a priori
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acceptable level. The decision process that identifies those important functions and capabilities
can use the techniques in this dissertation as a mechanism, as well as supporting or supplemental
means—the key is the realization that a few well-chosen losses will predictably have outsized
impacts! This phenomenon has earned the moniker ‘black swan event’ in some circles though it
is by no means the only descriptor.
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Limitations and Future Work
Text-mining as basis of organizational modeling
There is clearly a prima fascia case for using documentation nominally describing an
organization and its workings as the basis for constructing a model of the organization.
Unfortunately, the relevant literature on organizational modeling does not address this technique
on any consistent basis. This lack of discussion points to gap in applied research toward rapid
model construction and a form of rapid model validation—a funding challenge compared to
pursuing original theoretical research. The research questions currently open would be
approximately, “Does mapping of concepts within sets to ontological categories create consistent
meaningful distributions that support researchers’ efforts at validating the ‘accuracy’ of those
mappings?” If the answer is yes, a follow-on question could be, “How small a corpus can an
organization use to establish a defined confidence interval (e.g. 95th percentile) of capturing
meaningful nodes?”
As alluded to in the Literature Review portion of this dissertation, starting on page 11, as
well as the comparisons of edit-cycle 0 and terminal models generated in the D2M process (see
also Figure 37 and Figure 38), there is a current lack of empirical data for multi-domain
ontological distributions. An approach to resolving this lack of empirical data is not hard to
envision, and I look forward to pursuing such data in the future. I currently envision a detailed
analysis of each input file across the chosen sets, with pre- and post cleaning collection of data,
processing times, outputs, and pre- and post processing decisions. I foresee the output of interest
being the distributions of the metanetwork ontology per megabyte of input. With those
distributions, a future research could, with better mathematical certainty, assert their inputs are
representative of the population, as well as their post cleaning results fall within a known
standard-deviation from norms. Clearly the choice of ontology would impact the mapping and
distributions of concepts to ontological categories. Unless and until sufficient empirical data is
available across multiple domains, its infeasible to assert that the distributions evidenced in this
dissertation reflect ‘truth.’

Limitations of doctrine and written products as the basis of models
Doctrine and other written products have several obvious shortcomings as the basis of
models of specific organizations. Joint doctrine is authoritative within the DoD but is not
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prescriptive. Organizations and leaders have the explicit leeway to deviate from doctrine—
frequently causing doctrine to be a common point of departure. There is apocryphal story that an
American adversary complained that studying American doctrine was useless, as the Americans
do not read their own manuals or feel any obligation to follow their doctrine. Though it is a
stretch to assert that doctrine is honored more in its being ignored than followed, it is also a
stretch to assert that the DoD religiously adheres to its doctrine.
Organizations’ written documents can help reduce the disconnect between the way the
organization writes about itself and any doctrine/documents that others write about it. Those
written documents, depending on their nature, can also help reduce the disconnect between the
present day (assuming the documents are of recent generation) and the time when the document
was written.
Doctrine is also slow to change or evolve in response to current or perceived futures.
Generally, it attempts to overcome this known trait through leveraging the ‘authoritative but not
prescriptive’ caveat within the DoD. This slowness to change can contribute to perceptions that
any model derived from doctrine will not be applicable to current-day environments and
situations. The slowness to change can also lead to some elements of DoD publishing doctrine
that contradicts but cannot outright supercede existing doctrine. There are examples throughout
American military history of competing camps of authors and personalities publishing materials
that are not congruent with each other. For multi-author documents, it is also possible that
documents are not internally consistent with each other, This research effort did not attempt to
identify any such contradictory or non-congruent sentiment between the 100+ harvested
documents. Adjusting the D2M process to reflect sentiment would be a necessary step to
supporting some alignment or non-alignment assessment of the corpus.
Doctrine or other organizational documents also implicitly start shaping bias in the
resulting models. Bias could be from internally inconsistent documents as I discussed above.
Bias could also derive from the selection of documents to input into the D2M process. I
deliberately chose a broad spectrum of documents about joint, strategic and operational military
topics. I left out documents dedicated to the use and employment of indirect fires, strategic and
operational levels of global logistics, planning and implementing medical support to military
operations, defense support to civil authorities and many other hundreds of documents. I
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especially left out the hundreds of USG and DoD level documents explicating the various cyber
security visions, postures, guides, plans, and other such specialized knowledge.
Leaving these documents out helped me avoid the biasing of the corpus to much toward
specialization. Future work is called for though to identify at what cost did I bias the sample? Do
input corpi require the same number of sources for each sub-group of interest? Would bias be
reduced by using the same quantity of megabytes of input, words, or pictures to reduce
quantitative bias through excessingly specialized inputs? This discussion of bias also links with
the recurring discussion of context to cyber assessments. No researcher should build a corpus of
documents about strategic and operational medical operations for wounded troops and use it to
build and test hypothesis about non-medical operational planning.

Cyber effects vs. methods-of-attack
This dissertation has not directly modeled the various technical or natural methods that
can create a contested environment. Instead I have used the information assurance ontology of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This means my models do not include a motivation by
agents that cause problems nor do the organizations have a perception of cause on the part of
their agents. Including a perception of cause, or motivation, is an area of organizational
adaptation that is ripe for exploration and analysis—intuition suggests potentially different
adaptations to nature-caused effects versus adversary-caused effects. There is also potentially
different adaptations or mitigations for adversary-caused effects and the vagaries of modern
technology—between a suspected human insider spy and a technology-fault leading to data
corruption within a database.

Modeling and Simulations
Emotive responses by agents during events
In none of my scenarios, or even in Construct itself, do any of my agents experience any
steady or rising level of ‘frustration’ when they are unable to interact with their first choice or
discover their interaction has been obviated by the failure of a communication mechanism. It
seems safe to assume that emotional reactions to natural-event driven disruptions will vary from
those reactions to suspected or known hostile actions.
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There is significant evidence that in communities that suffer natural disasters, the
expectation of return to some level of normalcy is key to resilience—in the information deprived
environments the seeds of maladaptive outcomes are sown.
The other form of knowledge the agents do not posses, nor are currently designed to
incorporate is knowledge that they and/or their organization is actually under attack. The absence
of such knowledge is consistent with many real life reporting—knowledge of a breach or attack
gets known well after the initial effort began. However, throughout the dissertation, especially in
the related literature section, I have talked about perceptions being very important to
organizational performance. An organizational reaction to an attack (e.g., deliberately invoking a
high cost mitigation plan) may be very different than coping with a natural event such as a storm
or even an anchor breaking a cable off the coast.
Future scenarios could not only change Construct agent’s awareness of a threat (possibly
coded as a belief), but use that belief as a driver of actions seen in companies that have been
attacked. I am confident there will be different interaction patterns, which presumably will affect
the MoIs used in this dissertation.
Inclusion of more D2M-ontology categories into Construct
‘Beliefs’ from D2M ontology better carried into Construct
Related literature already exists to support the assessment that agents’ beliefs contribute
to a sense of likeness, or homophily (M. McPherson et al., 2001; Ridgeway, 2006). The
extension of Construct to include beliefs would open the possibility of studying belief-influenced
behaviors. Of particular interest to me would be application of beliefs to compliance studies in
cyber security. I have a strong intuition that rules without supporting beliefs in the rules’ efficacy
or applicability are counter-productive to the end-states the rules had intended to achieve.
Compliance studies exist in a number of fields from sector specific EU studies (Börzel & Knoll,
2014), providing health care (Rydenfält, Ek, & Larsson, 2013), public administration and red
tape (Bozeman & Feeney, 2011), but there appears to be a dearth of compliance studies related to
cyber security and incorporating modeling and simulation. I am most interested in research
questions that acknowledge humans are the biggest attack surface of any IT system, and whether
and how influencing their behavior interacts with technology-focused security efforts.

226

‘Events’ from D2M ontology carried into Construct
Extending and expanding the forecasting abilities of Construct to a larger set of events
would also be a very useful avenue of research. Forecasting future events, the possible impacts
of those events on measures of interest, and organizational responses to those events is essential
mission assurance as I depicted the concept in Figure 1.
It is not entirely clear to me whether the semantic concepts of events that the D2M
process can harvest are translatable into forecastable events. But even if the D2M generated
‘event’ nodes are not good candidates for specific event modeling, there is a large set of possible
events that could reasonable form a body of M&S researcher scenarios.
An alternative way of incorporating D2M harvested events is to use them and agents
linked to them as drivers of shared-experience interactions. Such an extension to Construct might
fall under the umbrella of trust building and interactions with trusted persons for human agents
as well as supporting the ‘trustworthy’ belief between egos and alters.
‘Roles’ from D2M ontology carried into Construct
Modelers and researchers can already use Construct to model implicit roles such as
boundary spanners, leadership at the top of hierarchies, and other structural definitions of roles.
In this conceptualization, I am leaning more toward the differentiation humans give to our
various professional and personal roles.
Professional roles within the DoD could be as broad as personnel categories (e.g., general
officer, field grade officer, company grade officer) or as specific as work roles (e.g., chief of
operations, executive assistant). These roles place implicit, and sometimes explicit, constraints
and limitations on decisions by agents. In Construct as implemented, agents have no ability to
perceive their roles nor the roles of other organizational members. The D2M process already
captures some of the agent x agent links represented in these work specific roles. Having a M&S
based implementation of one or more role-based behavior pattern generators would open the
door for additional research about whether particular roles are more or less resilient to contested
cyber space operations. It could also incorporate lessons from resilience studies of communities
and community leadership to negative events (Norris et al., 2008).
A second way of potentially incorporating social roles into future work is incorporating
the duality of at-work behavior and away-from-work behavior. This is a direct extension of the
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role discussion in the previous paragraph, as organizational members at work have different
motivations for interacting with organizational members, than when they are away from work.
Family and non-work social interactions, even if they share common motivations (e.g.,
homophily), the factors used to assess the homophily change—even if the resulting patterns do
not.
‘Resources’ from D2M ontology carried into Construct
Task execution in Construct is accomplished in one of two ways: knowledge based
decision making (e.g., binary classifications) or energy tasks (not used in this dissertation).
Though it is not immediately apparent whether a bolt-on module could be added to Construct to
incorporate resource-based tasks, it would certainly broaden the perception of face validity for
organizations that conduct activities other than information sharing and processing. Such a bolton module would, ideally, be able to directly use the resources identified during the D2M
process, as well as the linked nodes to those resources. Resource acquisition could then become
its own motivator for interaction, as well as resource acquisition in pursuit of accomplishing
resource based tasks.
Circadian rhythms carried into Construct for human agent interaction patterns
Circadian rhythm incorporation within Construct could conceivably assist modelers in
developing more complex representations of organizations, should such rhythms be value added.
It would require the concept of turns in Construct to become less broad in the general sense, and
need to be a selectable option in any case. As currently implemented, each turn can represent as
much or as little of real time the modeler assesses is appropriate. Modelers can also divorce real
time and its passing from any overt representation in Construct models—an especially useful
ability when there is too little empirical evidence to support initial configurations of rates of
changes.
Lively and Stale ‘Knowledge’
I created several groupings of knowledge within both models to support simulations and
context-based analysis. I also presumed that the plan knowledge was more short-lived than the
general knowledge that I code the D2M-identified knowledge and designed the simulation such
that plan knowledge could go stale, or be forgotten, faster than general knowledge bits. Plans
however vary, and there are different time horizons for various plans even within the same
organization.
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One such example could be a time-sensitive targeting situation where the weapons
release authority is at the strategic or operational level, rather than a tactical level. In such a
scenario and use case, the MoI is the ability to execute the targeting process within the time
constraints that the organization cannot control (e.g., the adversary is moving from point A to
point B, and only accessible in a small time window). This modeling approach, at present is not
suited for such a process and time sensitive effort. The success of such a process is more
dependent on the technical capabilities of the targeting and flight control systems of the
munitions as well as the nearly point-to-point information transfer of target details to lawyers and
commanders to decide whether to engage the fleeting target. However, Pflanz performed work at
GMU that used colored petri nets to model the process architecture that has no need for
cognitively limited agents (Pflanz, 2012). Though we have not conducted multi-model modeling
for this scenario, CMU and GMU have conducted virtual experiments in other contexts where
the outputs of Construct and Pythia (the Pflanz tool) where congruent with each other.
Additional forms of attacks and effects
I have previous asserted there are many types of mitigations that this method can support
assessing. It can also support additional forms of attacks and effects that I did not perform, but
are easy to envision.
These additional attacks could be variations on a theme, targeting the IT systems of the
organization. They could also be multi-staged attacks where the cyber attack is simply a means
to an end. One such scenario could be a comprise of confidentiality of the HR systems that
contain agents’ contact information, personally identifiable information (PII), or maybe even
health care providers database(s). The MoIs I presented in this work are not immediately
applicable to such a scenario, but it would seem improbable there would be no operational effect
within the psychological operations domain. Such a breach may also support a very fine grained
attack along phone lines blocking communications, SMS text messaging of cell phones of
employees or their loved ones, or other ways of actively attempting to degrade mission focus.
Mission focus could very well be one of the emotive responsive I mentioned earlier in this
section as well.
Another form of a DoD computing asset would be the DoD’s increasing effort to employ
cloud computing and local caching of data to support cloud segmentation. One instantation of
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this is the Army’s use of DISA’s Enterprise Email, housed in several major processing nodes
around the US and in select places of the globe. Cloud computing has as its most fundamental
principle uninterrupted network access between the users and the various data centers that house
and replicate the IP-based services. These centers’ designs incorporate their own contingency
plans for various risks but the using customer is still constrained to their small set of
communications links and terminals to take advantage of the remote centers. The availability
attacks employed here against the ‘email’ medium and the more generalized ‘web’ link can serve
to degrade communications with distant end services. Integrity attacks can also be deployed even
in the
M&S is forecasting, not prediction
M&S of human populations can be and frequently is reflective of population level
measures and trends. It is tempting to extrapolate that since the modeled populations reflect
empirical populations, that modeled agents will reflect real-life agents. This extrapolation,
though tempting, is unwise in the extreme. Construct is an excellent tool for group level
interactions, trends, and supplying data to network analytic methods. Construct is not the right
tool to model individual agents’ actions and reactions to their specific environments.
Fundamentally, this M&S as depicted in this dissertation is sufficient for forecasting
results of meaningful use to organizational leaders. Construct-based M&S is not however
appropriate to predict the actions and reactions of specific individuals.
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Integration with staff section recommendations
While this effort, if used in an organization, can repeatability forecast operational impacts
along multiple MoIs, it does not yet attempt to convert those impacts into units of measure used
by the resource management teams(e.g., US dollars). The new measure uses the term ‘wastes’
that could very well be ‘spare capacity.’ Spare capacity itself has a carrying cost, a phenomena
that economists and SCM researchers have been aware of for years. What neither the ABM
simulation, nor simple spreadsheets can do is decide for the organizational leaders. These
systems can provide data points, indications of probability, sensitivity analysis, and other forms
of input to leaders—but fundamentally it is up to organizational leaders to decide how best to
attain mission assurance within their given resource limits. It is also up to those leaders to
perform expectation management for their higher headquarters or leaders as well—they are no
less immune to profound disruption when their expectations of ‘return to normal’ are violated.

Contributions
There are six contributions from this dissertation to the field of computational modeling
of organizations and to organizational resilience as a component of organizational science. The
first three are applicable directly to the study of resilience and the last three are technologycentric contributions that support resilience assessments.
The first contribution is a brand-new static measure of assessment within the theoretical
structure of Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA) (e.g., multimode and multi-link graphic analysis).
This was the function of resilience relating needs, redundancy, and near isolation to a final value
as Equation 14 depicts. This measure builds on the traditions of organizational theory and
resilience engineering, as well as supply chain management work by quantifying the interplay
between spare capacity in knowledge and resources, as well as existing shortfalls and near single
points of failure.
The second contribution is a rapid process to generate mission assurance models for
specific organizations. This process is responsive to leaders’ perceptions of ‘now’ and not weeks
or months ago. It is also responsive to forecasting scenarios to help plan future resource
commitment. This rapid process is through the application of SNA and DNA to mission
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assurance and resilience in contested cyber environments—unlike other state of the art cyber risk
management techniques.
The third contribution is the incorporation of adaptive agents into mission assurance and
resilience M&S. The majority of cyber risk management techniques do not incorporate the
human element into organizational resilience M&S efforts. Supporting this contribution are the
generalized assessments of resilience across multiple categorical and quantitative inputs of
structure. Additionally, there are generalized assessments of resilience across multiple forms of
contested cyber environments for baseline conditions and under mitigation efforts.
The three technology-centric contributions revolve around further refinements to the
D2M process under development at CASOS as well numerous technical updates, major and
minor modifications to the Construct ABM simulation. Some of the modifications derived from
extensive refactoring of code written by a multitude of developers over the years. Some were
integration of automated code documentation tools with the code base and the incorporation of
inline commenting and source-code level documentation. One of the larger major modifications
was the initial development and use of test cases integrating a unit test framework. The unit test
addition to the code base increases confidence that the fundamental function of the system
remains consistent across the versions and years. Regression testing is a key benefit of the unit
test add-ons.
Another substantial technological addition to Construct was implementing task
transactive memory—an error prone and cognitively modeled perception by egos of tasks
assigned to their alters within a simulation environment. Task-based homophily is now a
capability that modelers can use, or not, based on the nature of their research and questions of
interest. By adding this capability, modelers who desire to incorporate similarity of assigned
tasks into agent behavior can do so.
The last technology-oriented contribution is a DoD-specific thesaurus suitable for
continued use, reuse, and expansion within the DoD for the D2M process. Thesauri can represent
an enormous psychological barrier to use as well as a resource barrier; not all organizations can
afford to create a thesaurus for use just by themselves. By using the thesaurus developed for this
dissertation, future DoD organizations can increase their confidence in D2M generated models as
well as speed of development of those models.
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Insights and Surprises
An expected result of this dissertation is that there is substantial room for increased
cooperation between research communities in organizational behavior and resilience,
organizational design, and cyberspace operations and security!
Starting places
I started on the road to this dissertation with the complete and unquestioning conviction
that military cyberspace operations could dramatically change the shape of future warfare. I had
intended to use this work to demonstrate that manipulation of the right IT targets at the right time
could render an organization incapable of functioning and much less militarily capable. To prove
my intuition right, I thought I needed multiple and accessible models of adversaries’
organization—unfortunately they are less prone to publishing in English the details of how they
organize, train, and equipment in than we Americans. As a proof of concept, I decided to use the
American DoD as my target, and its doctrine as the basis of the models I needed to attack and
render helpless with a few judicious cyberspace operations.
What I have learned instead is that technology focused views of the world may not be
adequate to forecast the future of cyberspace warfare. I’m a technologist by education and
training, an Infantry officer by profession, military education, and training. I came to this
realization because, excepting degenerate cases, creating scenarios and situations where dramatic
effects were obvious has proven an elusive goal for the stragetic and operational organizations I
modeled
Nuance is necessary
There is no bumper sticker summation of this work that captures both the primary results
and the caveats to those results. A non-discerning reader might miss that the military
organizations I modeled generalize to some types of organizations, but certainly not all, and
certainly not to IT dominated organizations (e.g., exchange traded funds (ETF)), or
manufacturing lines. By choosing to limit the research to small sub-sets of the organization, in
particular the organizational leadership and operational planners, a reader may wrongly
extrapolate that an entire organization is unaffected by the simulated effects in my virtual
experiments. Recall from Figure 115 that human agent performance went up when IT agents
were removed from the organization, while IT-agent performance went down as well as multiple
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other IT-agent MoIs. Are these result inherently contradictory? It is an open question, but my
intuition is they are consistent with reality for some organizations and not others.
Nuance and granularity are also appropriate in which sub-organizations to study. As
discussed in the Limitations and Future Work section, it is foreseeable that there are attack
scenarios that greatly impact one sub-group of an organization (e.g., coordinating air craft
landing and takeoffs) while not impacting another (e.g., logistics resupply of fuel to the airport).
Averaging across both groups can give an artificially sanguine picture to leadership, and
extrapolating from a single good or horrid case can provoke Pollyanna or apocalyptic predictions.
It is also foreseeable that some attacks effects may have effects not present in any of the
measures I have discussed. A prime example of such an attack could be a complete loss of
confidentiality to the HR sections databases about all of the organization’s personnel. The
psychological effects of such an event on sub-group and population MoI are not within the reach
of the Construct M&S environment.
My top three surprises
Of all the surprises I encountered while conducting this research, I leave the reader with
the top three. Each of these surprises have implications not only for future researchers in the field
of cyber resilience, but also for organizational leaders. The three surprises are shown below:
•

•

The modeled organizations were more resilient to cyber attacks than I predicted. I have spent
a number of my professional Soldier years in joint strategic and operational headquarters as a
staff officer. I had expected there would be ample and obvious evidence of the criticality of
IT. I now recognize that I entered the research effort with an experiential bias toward the
value of IT to everyone. I was aware that some portions of the organizations I worked at were
more dependent than others, but I assumed significance throughout the organization. This
research provides evidence that context of attacks, their timing, targeting, and second and
third order effects contribute to variations in effects as well as perceived importance. It also
provides evidence that human-dominated organizations, those with large reservoirs of tacit
knowledge un-reachable by cyber attacks, are less likely to suffer ill effects of contested
cyber environments.
The modeled mitigations were not as obviously effective as I expected. Though all four were
positively correlated with statistical significance to improvement during attacks, I had
expected them to have, individually and combined, more obvious positive benefits. This
surprise is tied to the first however—if the leadership is not as dependent on IT as I thought,
the mitigations will not be as relevant to the leadership. It also contributes to my original
justification for using M&S—real mitigations cost resources to put in place, and M&S may
help identify those with a higher likelihood of efficacy.

234

•

I had every intent of making the workflow first depicted in Figure 35 accessible to any DoD
organization that cared to use M&S in its pursuit of cyber resilience. It is now my assessment
that though this research is imminently repeatable, it requires more specialized knowledge
and time than most DoD organizations will be willing to dedicate to its use. Further
automation and process simplification is necessary before this approach could become
widespread. Additionally, it would be very easy for casual users to misinterpret results,
attribute causality over correlation, or otherwise use the M&S outputs in pursuit of agendas
over simple mission assurance estimates.

Operational Implications
Below is a set of implications to operations based on the models I put under test and the
results of the virtual experiments. The implications are both organization based, as well as leader
based.
•
•
•

•
•

•

•

•

When leaders hear the phrase “mission assurance” or “cyber resilience,” they should
immediate ask: resilient to what, for whom, to what extent and to for what duration. This
information will allow leaders to shape their expectations and prepare for adversity.
Organizations with very little slack or spare capacity (for tasks, information flow, or other
organizational missions) are brittle, the exact opposite of resilient. Spare capacity, resources
permitting, can be human, IT, or combinations of both.
Targeting matters, extrapolating resilience to targeted effects from the ability to cope with
everyday IT problems is unsupported by evidence and probably not a good idea. Leaders
should presume professional adversaries are trying to find the point(s) to target and cause the
advantage(s) to their own their purposes.
Integrity attacks and their effects are more pernicious than the others. The injection of
moderately or completely wrong data into friendly decision cycles may be difficult to
identify, and even more difficult to eradicate (urban legends several for years and decades).
Expectation management matters. Resilient organizations communicate to their members
both current information as well as realistic expectations for the future. Pollyanna predictions,
when violated, cause greater negative effects than news of ‘it will take a long time’ to return
to pre-event status.
When leaders receive doom and gloom predictions of contested cyber environments, they
should challenge themselves and their sub-groups to define quitting criteria. If they cannot
picture or define how or why they would choose to quit their missions in a contested
environment, they can start defining how they will adapt, and begin practicing the adaptation
to make degradation smoother and not ad hoc.
This methodology is a tool, suitable to some but not all organizations and scenario
forecasting. This method is repeatable, supports exploration of good ideas’ efficacy without
enormous resource commitment, and can inform leaders decisions for the kinds of models it
supports. It does not currently support processes such as time-sensitive targeting or
manufacturing. Don’t misapply tools to incorrect tasks.
Subject Matter Experts for model review and construction is essential. SMEs for the models
in this dissertation were able to see, very quickly and with little effort, holes in the groups
and sub-groups of the modeled organizations. They were also able to rapidly point to
additional documents that contained appropriate text, or point to the appropriate and small
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•

selection of pictures and diagrams to transcribe into text for ingestion by the D2M process.
Additionally, SMEs assist in establishing the first claims of face validity through their
corrections and adjustments. They also assist in justifying omissions or inclusions of
elements in the model that a research unfamiliar with the domain might otherwise miss.
Information flow, task performance as accuracy, and other MoIs successfully used in these
strategic and operational models may not be apropos for a tactical model. Tactical
organizations, though also using information to control their operations, are the level of war
tasked with planning and conducting battles, usually of limited duration and often in very
time constrained environments. They have a tendency to emphasis action even in the face of
insufficient information. Action-counter action cycles between friendly forces and
adversaries is not a use case Construct currently supports.
Organizations are at their most fundamental level, collections of people, following sets of

rules, procedures, and policies, supported and enabled by their equipment and tools. This area of
research is rife with missed opportunities to bring researchers who specialize in people together
with researchers who specialize in technology, and numerous other fields I discussed in the
literature review. Resilience to contested cyber environments may be new, but resilience to
adversity is something we humans have been doing for tens of thousands of years!
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Appendix 1 Definitions
Central Definitions
Below is a small collection of definitions essential to the dissertation. The next section is
an alphabetical section that contains other definitions taken from various sources. When using
sources, I choose to use, in order of precedence, National standards bodies’ definitions (e.g.,
CNSS), Joint doctrine, Service Doctrine, and finally dictionary definitions.
Cyberspace
“A global domain within the information environment consisting of the
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers. “(Joint Staff J7, 2010a)
There are a multitude of definitions of cyberspace, some of which go on to enumerate the
types and quantities of people and organizations (e.g., owners, customers, criminals, script
kiddies, organized crime syndicates, nation-states) as well as the various types and natures of
equipment (e.g., telecommunications companies’ (TELCO) routers, undersea fiber-optic cables,
points of presence, sites’ perimeter routers and firewalls, organizational terminals and other IT).
Additionally, many computer and information security practitioners and researchers believe
threat enumeration (e.g., hacktivists, espionage, military forces, and ‘advanced persistent
threats’) is necessary; the nature of threat(s) are inputs into the decision process of resource
allocation. Adhering to the base definition in established doctrine however retains a broader
perspective on the problem than using additional descriptors.
This dissertation models various types of organizations that own, use, operate, maintain
and defend internet-protocol (IP)-based communication networks as well as other forms of
telecommunications IT to facilitate information exchange. It also uses stylized representations of
computing systems (e.g., databases, servers, client terminals) without delving into the technical
implementation of those systems, their protocols, or their inner-workings.
Contested Cyberspace
A human-built environment constantly, but irregularly, effected by people and natural
processes that can, and do, negatively interfere with the designed and intended purpose of that
environment.
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Merriam-Webster defines ‘contested’ as the following:
to make the subject of dispute, contention, or litigation (contested, 2013).
As discussed earlier, this dissertation, as well as the generalized discussion of mission
assurance and resilience, requires a slight broadening of the definition above. This change is
necessary as natural causes can create the same effects of denial, degradation, and disruption on
availability as human-driven disputation or contention—though I’ve not found a reasonable path
that nature can use to inflect effects on integrity or confidentiality.
Mission Assurance
The plain English definition this dissertation will use is shown below:
Mission assurance means having a level of confidence in the resilience of an
organization, its ability to recover from or adjust to cyber events, along one or
more measurable dimensions.
The USAF developed a nondoctrinal definition of mission assurance that conveys its core
intent that the USAF and its units can “fight through an attack” (Elder, 2008). Importantly, the
decision makers that developed this approach were not information security (INFOSEC) or
computer security (COMPUSEC) practitioners. These decision makers were operations
generalists who, by long experience and exposure, have learned that the complex choreography
of USAF’s many missions have a central core: successful execution of military operations. The
situation is akin to the organizations (e.g., oil exploration) that have multiple subelements (e.g.,
HR, Finance, Logistics) that perform necessary, even critical functions, that are, fundamentally,
not the primary raison d’être of the organization.
Within the USAF multi-dimensional approach, shown in Figure 134, INFOSEC and
COMPUSEC practitioners will note the overall effort subsumes traditional definitions of
information assurance (IA) and computer network defense (CND).
Figure 134 clearly links the technical components of cyber capabilities and
infrastructures (lower left) with the traditional notions of physical security (lower right). It also
links the systems (center orange triangle) with the people and organizations (upper right) that use
those systems. This depiction helped USAF leadership accomplish two (2) simultaneous tasks.
The first was to enlighten traditional leadership in multiple facets of mission assurance without
overly technical vocabulary. The second, and as importantly, was to ensure traditional ‘cyber’
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personnel remembered that cyber capabilities are a means to an end—that peoples’ and
organizations’ missions must be resilient to contested cyber environments and leaders are
assured of that resilience. This continued meaningful functioning in the face of adversity leads us
to our next, related definition.

Figure 134: USAF Visual Depiction of Mission Assurance (Elder, 2008)

Resilience
Merriam-Webster defines ‘resilience’ as the following:
“an ability to recover from or adjust to misfortune or change” (resilience, 2012)
The nature of the misfortune or change is of course necessary to any discussion of
resilience. The nature of who or what is being resilient, to what degree they are resilient to the
misfortune, and how long they can demonstrate resilience are also essential to any analysis,
assessment, and discussion of resilience. This dissertation contains both static structural
assessments of resilience as well as dynamic assessments of resilience as a function of other
measures.
“Contested cyber environments” helps scope the discussion to the type of misfortune or
change, as does focusing solely on organizational resilience. A first impulse for many
organizations concerning themselves with a ‘contested cyber environment’ is to leap to
discussions of ‘bad people’ doing ‘bad things’ to the organizations’ computers and other IT
resources. This initial impulse can also lead to follow-on questions, such as:
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To what degree do organizational subelements depend on their computers for their local
needs? To what degree do local needs affect the organization-wide needs?
Are the ‘bad people’ insiders to the organizations or outsiders?
Are the ‘bad things’ malicious acts? Obviously nonmalicious acts? Somewhere in
between? ‘Back-hoe’ attacks by road repair crews are generally not malicious while
purposeful hacking generally is malicious. Self-infection with malware is generally
insider carelessness leading to external exploitation, can be malicious, but intent is hard
to trace or otherwise prove.
Are off-site ‘bad things’ (e.g., power outages, telecommunications outages, solar-storms)
considered part of a contested cyber environment? Are they considered at all when
developing mission assurance plans and assessments for resilience to contested cyber
environments?
From these examples, it’s possible to get a sense of a broad spectrum of events that can

comprise a contested cyber environment. Indeed the spectrum of mechanisms of affect are so
broad, it’s unlikely that any single model or simulation capability could adequately represent
them. There is clearly value in exploring, via technically oriented modeling and simulation
(M&S), specific effects by specific mechanisms in both general and specific situations. But
exploring a broad spectrum of mechanisms and effects via such sampling is not the only method
for researchers and organizational planners. Indeed, this dissertation has one goal of allowing
such broad exploration without the per-attack mechanism details being present in the model—
supporting generalization of impact assessments!
Since the dissertation is not exploring per-attack buffer overflows, cryptographic attacks,
denial of service (DoS) or distributed DoS (DDoS) mechanisms, the reader is probably interested
in knowing what the dissertation will explore. The briefest answer is that the dissertation
explores the effects of these various mechanisms, without the mechanisms themselves having
explicit representation. Using the CNSS’ now common acronym of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (CIA) (2010), it is feasible to consider the effects of nearly every form of computer
network attack (CNA) disruption, degradation, denial, destruction (Joint Staff J7, 2010a) or
deception (USAF, 2012)) within a contested cyber environment. A mechanism may create
effects in one or more of these ontological categories, relieving the modeler and simulationist
from the need to simulation specific technical mechanisms and specific technical effects, and
instead recreate these primary effects within the IA ontology of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability.
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Like (Pflanz, 2012; Pflanz & Levis, 2012) a visual chart depicting the dynamic nature of
resilience is useful to convey a more complete understanding.

Figure 135: Dynamic visualization of resilience for an arbitrary measure of interest (MoI)(Morgan & Lanham, 2012)

In this picture, there is the span of time from t0 to twarmup that reflects the possible values
of an MoI prior to reaching a pre-contested-environment equilibrium. As noted by Pimm (1984),
without equilibrium, resilience is indefinable. During the time of normal operations (MoInormal),
there could be variance from the normal, though such variance over time would still need to
establish equilibrium within some tolerances. The figure also depicts the beginning of an attack
(tattack-start), or some other form of cause for one of the CIA effects. While the attack is on going,
the attack should be having some effect on the MoI, though it may not be consistent, statistically
or operationally significant. As shown, there is an approximate stair step halfway through the
attack…as just one of an infinite variety of possible impacts on the MoI (e.g. instantaneous drop,
linear drop, logarithmic drop, quadratic drop). At some point-in-time, the attack ends (tattack-end),
though there is no guarantee that the organization or its agents are aware of the specific end
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time—nor for that matter are they assured of being aware of a specific start time(tattack-start). The
chart above depicts a quiescent period after the attack and before ‘recovery’ begins (trecovery), or
before the MoI rises above the minimum performance reached as a consequence of the attack.
There is no requirement for recovery to start immediately, as the attack may have effects on the
MoI that outlast the attack itself. It’s also important to note that there is a space between the
minimum performance (MoImin-acceptable) for this MoI and a minimally acceptable threshold set, a
priori, by one or more leaders of organizations. This threshold may have been set, or may simply
be a generalized statement by leadership akin to ‘no performance drop is acceptable!’ This
picture does not depict a return to pre-attack levels for this MoI (at tpre-attack reached), indeed there is
no universal requirement in all definitions of resilience that this be so, not withstanding Bishop
(2011). Indeed, in the happy situation shown above, the forecast is that through adaptation, the
attack/attacker makes the organization better in this MoI than they might otherwise have become.
In an attack, however, where the MoImin drops below MoImin-acceptable, the MoI for the
modeled organization would have low resilience, and potentially low-survivability. Such a
situation would make recovery all the more daunting as first recovery efforts would be geared to
re-gaining the MoImin-acceptable level of performance.
It’s also feasible that there are indirect measures of resilience for the organization. An
example of such could be the cognitive load turbulence due to a contested-cyber environment.
During a contested cyber environment, facing degradation, destruction, denial, or disruption of a
cyber resource, people will attempt to adapt. Part of their adaptation can be changes to their
normal patterns of interaction with other systems and other agents. This change in interaction is
an indirect measure of resilience—with very few changes, the effects of the contested cyber
environment may be mitigated by the agents. Or the attack could provoke very large changes in
interaction patters. Once the attack has passed, it is unlikely that new interaction patterns recently
experienced will en masse return to their pre-attack patterns. In this case, we would expect
resilience to appear something like the figure below.
The measure of organization (MoO) shown on the vertical axis could, as discussed, be the
stability of the cognitive core of activated alters for the decision makers (e.g., the members of the
C-Suite). During the attack there is a decrease in stability of those activated cores, and
importantly, even after the attack the stability continues to drop. However, after MoOmin is
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reached, recovery commences and begins an upward trending but periodic improvement. In the
case depicted, the new equilibrium is below the original equilibrium, indicating a permanent
effect (MoOperm neg effect) for this attack. If this effect is forecast to be large, a decision maker
could use the forecast to potentially make changes in their continuity of operations planning,
their rehearsals, or other ways to improve their ability to return to normal operations (MoOnormal).
We expect to see the periodic nature of improvement prior to equilibrium as a reflection of the
echoes of the original change—much as sound waves do not instantly dissipated, the
perturbations of organizational adaptation will also not instantly remove themselves from the
organization.

Figure 136: Dynamic visualization of resilience for an arbitrary measure of organization (MoO)(Morgan & Lanham,
2012)

Alphabetical Definitions
Computer Network Attack (CNA)
“Actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or
destroy [emphasis added] information resident in computers and computer
networks, or the computers and networks themselves.” (Joint Staff J7, 2010a)
Computer Network Defense (CND)
“Actions taken to defend against unauthorized activity within computer networks.
CND includes monitoring, detection, analysis (such as trend and pattern analysis),
and response and restoration activities” (CNSS, 2010)
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Computer Security (COMPUSEC)
“The protection resulting from all measures to deny unauthorized access and
exploitation of friendly computer systems.” (Joint Staff J7, 2010a)
Information Security (INFOSEC)
“The protection of information and information systems against unauthorized
access or modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or transit,
and against denial of service to authorized users.” (Joint Staff J7, 2010a)
Information Assurance (IA)
“Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and
nonrepudiation. These measures include providing for restoration of information
systems by Incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.” (CNSS,
2010; Joint Staff J7, 2010a)
From an operations generalist perspective, IA is a repeatable set of processes that enable
informed risk management in the face of uncertainty and competing demands on limited
resources.
Tactical level of warfare
“The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to
achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.” (CNSS,
2010; Joint Staff J7, 2010a)
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Introduction
This appendix is to document the steps and methodology I used to collect information in
support of the Literature Review portion of the dissertation that started on page 11. It is my
intention to provide sufficient information and specificity that the reader may duplicate the
process I used, and ideally arrive at similar if not identical results. I have made the outputs of the
searches into data files and made them available on my personal web page at the following URL:
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/relatedLit:

Process
The following is a high-level summary of the steps I used to gather and analyze the
bibliometric data included earlier in the dissertation.
1. Use Google Scholar to conduct key word, key phrase, collocation, and Boolean-based
searches.
2. Use a custom ECMA/JavaScript I wrote, Google Scholar Citation Exporter 16, to mark
citations as related to the dissertation. This was a subjective decision based on a number of
factors. Those factors included: citation count, title concepts, summary concepts, author(s),
and publication.
3. Iterate steps 1 and 2 across each of the query sets I developed.
4. Pre-process collected citations and citation links to reduce duplicates and ensure well formed
columns of data. Copy citations’ identifiers and citations’ titles to a separate file for textbased analysis (i.e., Latent Dirichlet Analysis and Latent Semantic Analysis).
5. Import collected citations as Nodes into ORA™
6. Import collected citation links as Node links into ORA™
7. Conduct ORA™-based Analysis

Searches and Search Results
Each of the searches fell into a mental category based on my personal intuition as well as
suggestions from fellow students and CASOS faculty. The categories are shown below, with the
search strings for each category depicted for future replication. The hyperlinks to the results
16

This script is an extension, by permission, of Mayank Lahiri's "Google Scholar™ Citation Exporter." In brief, the
original script allows a user to select multiple Google Scholar™ returns and then display the co-citations of those
selected results in a new window. The extension resolved fatal errors that accumulated over time as a result of
Google changing the HTML used to render the results. The extension then gives the user the option of displaying the
results in a comma-limited window with citations at the top, and citation links at the bottom. A user may then cut
and paste this displayed information into other files for follow-on processing and analysis.
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point to my personal web page on Carnegie Mellon Web Servers. Should, at some future point,
CMU remove my personal web page from their servers, I will have moved a copy of that web
site to a new locale—Google™ or other search engines should be able to find the site with little
difficulty.
Organizational Resilience
1. organizational resilience -child –ecology Output: pdf
2. (measure OR assess) AND (organization OR organizational) AROUND(10) resilience "occupational stress" –seismic –children –youth Output: pdf
3. organizational adaptation to (crisis OR attack OR degraded) –animal Output: pdf
Cyber Command and Control
4.

(resilient OR adaptive) (centralized OR decentralized) command and control cyber
environments -"natural resource" Output: pdf
5. military cyber (“command AND control” OR C2) degraded AROUND(3) environments
Output: pdf
Cyber Security
6. cyber vulnerability military (“command AND control” OR C2) (measure OR assess) Output:
pdf
7. cyber sociotechnical organization vulnerability -scada –power Output: pdf
8. military effects of cyber attacks US OR Korea OR Estonia OR Georgia OR Lithuania
Output: pdf
9. cyber military “mission assurance” Output: pdf
10. (perceived OR perception) and (reliance OR reliant) and ("information technology" OR
cyber) –teaching –patient –medicine –entertainment Output: pdf
Modeling and Simulation
11. agent based modeling simulation organizational resilience "information technology" -water –
agriculture –genetic Output: pdf
12. "discrete event" (modeling OR simulation) organizational resilience "information
technology" -water –agriculture –genetic Output: pdf
13. "system dynamics" (modeling or simulation) organizational resilience "information
technology" -water –agriculture Output: pdf
14. "business process" (modeling or simulation) organizational resilience "information
technology" -water –agriculture Output: pdf
15. model organization reaction to loss of IT Output: pdf
SNA and Resilience to Cyber Vulnerability
16. organization AROUND(5) modeling and simulation "text mining" topic –gene Output: pdf
17. sociotechnical system vulnerability modeling (cyber or "information technology") Output:
pdf
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18. sociotechnical AROUND(5) (modeling OR model) AROUND(15) simulation (cyber OR
“information technology” Output: pdf
19. sociotechnical disaster model "information technology" preparedness Output: pdf
20. metanetwork organizational model “information technology” Output: pdf
21. author:elder cyber Output: pdf and pdf
HRO and Resilience to Cyber Vulnerability
22. (“High Reliability Organization” OR HRO) resilience Output: pdf
23. “Resilience Engineering”

Pre-processing Collected Data
This step principally involved the merging of the multiple takes from the queries depicted
in the Searches and Search Results section, removing duplicates, and ensuring well-formed data
in each column of the merged data files. For cells with entries clearly placed one or two cells left
or right of where they should be, I simply moved them to their correct position. For cells with no
data, or partial data, I left them as was and conducted additional merging and cleaning within
ORA™.
The data files end up in two (2) distinct comma separated variable (CSV) files: one with
the citations’ information (relatedLit_Citations.csv, URL:
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/relatedLit/relatedLit_Citations.csv) and one with the
links between citations (relatedLit_Links.csv), URL
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/relatedLit/relatedLit_Links.csv.

Importing Collected Data into ORA™
Metanetwork Creation and Preparation
1. Created a new, empty, metanetwork, which I called Dissertation Related
Literature
Created the following node sets, with 1 node per node set as a place holder
1.1. Author (as ORA™ type Agent)
1.2. Article (as ORA™ type Resource)
1.3. Journal (as ORA™ type Organization)
1.4. Publisher (as ORA™ type Organization)
1.5. Year (as ORA™ type Event)
Created the following networks to link the node sets, though they are all empty
1.6. Article x Article
1.7. Author x Article
1.8. Journal x Article
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1.9. Publisher x Journal
1.10. Year x Article

Import Node Sets and Networks
Article Node Set (IDs only) and Article x Article Network
To import the citation node identifiers, as well as import the links between the identifiers,
I imported the relatedLit_Citations.csv first and had ORA™ create nodes in the
Article node set for each unique ID it processed.
1. Within ORA™, selected the Article x Article
2. Selected from the menu, FileData Import Wizard…
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.

Selected the option labeled Import Excel or text delimited files
Selected the option labeled Table of network links
Selected the button labeled Next
Selected the option labeled Add to the existing metanetwork: and ensured
I selected Dissertation Related Literature
2.5. Selected the button labeled Next
2.6. To the right of the Step 1 dialog box, I selected Browse and navigated to where I had
stored the relatedLit_Links.csv file
2.7. In the Step 2 portion of the UI
2.7.1. Selected CITEDBY and CITED
2.7.2. Set the type in each column to Resource
2.8. In the Step 3 portion of the UI
2.8.1. Selected the button labeled New to define a new network of links
2.8.2. Selected citedBy in the Source Node Name column
2.8.3. Selected cited in the Target Node Name column
2.8.4. Selected link in the Link Value column
2.8.5. Typed Article x Article in the Network Name column
2.8.6. Placed a check mark in the Create new nodes for unrecognized
node names
2.9. Selected the button labeled Finish
2.10. Selected from the menu, FileSave
For readers interested in performing the steps from 2.6 to 2.8 using a saved configuration
file, save the source code listed under the subheading Article x Article within the section entitled
Error! Reference source not found. to an XML file. Select that file using the Load
configuration file button to automatically perform (or repeatedly perform) steps from
2.6 to 2.8.
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Article Nodes’ Attributes
Next I finished the importation of all the citations’ attributes and information stored in the
relatedLit_Citations.csv file.
1. Selected the Article node set
3. Selected from the menu, FileData Import Wizard…
3.1. Selected the option labeled Import Excel or text delimited files
3.2. Selected the option labeled Table of node attributes
3.3. Selected the button labeled Next
3.4. Selected the metanetwork to modify by placing a check mark in the box next to the
Dissertation Related Literature metanetwork name.
3.5. Selected Next
3.6. To the right of the Step 1 dialog box, I selected Browse and navigated to where I had
stored the relatedLit_Citations.csv file
3.7. In the Step 2 portion of the UI, I Selected citationId in the drop down box for
Use this column for node names
3.8. In the Step 3 portion of the UI
3.8.1. For the citationUrl column, changed the type to URI
3.8.2. For the citedByUrl column, changed the type to URI
3.8.3. For the relatedArticlesUrl column, changed the type to URI
3.8.4. For the clusteredArticles column, changed the type to URI
3.8.5. For the clusteredArticles column, changed the type to URI
3.8.6. For the title column, changed the type text
3.8.7. For the citedByCount column, changed the type Number
3.8.8. De-selected journal column
3.8.9. De-selected publisher column
3.8.10. De-selected year column
3.8.11. De-selected author0 to author5 columns
3.8.12. De-selected link column
3.8.13. Selected Create new nodes for unrecognized node names. This
selection will support the creation of nodes that were not in the links file, that are
otherwise isolates in the citation metanetwork.
3.9. In the Step 4 portion of the UI
3.9.1. Selected the button labeled Clear All
3.9.2. Selected the Article nodeset
3.10. Selected the button labeled Finish
3.11. Selected the button labeled OK in the window that popped up reporting the import
status.
3.12. Selected from the menu, FileSave
There is no saved configuration file for this step like where was for importing a network.
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Author x Article Network
4. Selected the Author x Article
5. Selected from the menu, FileData Import Wizard…
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.

Selected the option labeled Import Excel or text delimited files
Selected the option labeled Table of network links
Selected the button labeled Next
Selected the option labeled Add to the existing metanetwork: and ensured
I selected Dissertation Related Literature
5.5. Selected the button labeled Next
5.6. To the right of the Step 1 dialog box, I selected Browse and navigated to where I had
stored the relatedLit_Citations.csv file
5.7. In the Step 2 portion of the UI
5.7.1. Selected CITATIONID , set the Class to Resource, and the Name to
Article
5.7.2. For AUTHOR0 to AUTHOR4, select the column
5.7.2.1. Set the Class to Agent
5.7.2.2. Set Name to Author
5.8. In the Step 3 portion of the UI
5.8.1. Selected the button labeled New to define a new network of links
5.8.2. Selected author0 in the Source Node Name column
5.8.3. Selected citationID in the Target Node Name column
5.8.4. Selected link in the Link Value column
5.8.5. Typed Author x Article in the Network Name column
5.8.6. Repeat steps 5.8.1 to 5.8.5 for Author1 to Author4
5.8.7. Placed a check mark in the Create new nodes for unrecognized
node names
5.9. Selected the button labeled Finish
5.10. Selected from the menu, FileSave
For readers interested in performing the steps from 2.6 to 2.8 using a saved configuration
file, save the source code listed under the subheading Author x Article within the section entitled
Error! Reference source not found. to an XML file. Select that file using the Load
configuration file button to automatically perform (or repeatedly perform) steps from
2.6 to 2.8.
Journal x Article Network
6. Selected the Author x Article
7. Selected from the menu, FileData Import Wizard…
7.1. Selected the option labeled Import Excel or text delimited files
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7.2. Selected the option labeled Table of network links
7.3. Selected the button labeled Next
7.4. Selected the option labeled Add to the existing metanetwork: and ensured
I selected Dissertation Related Literature
7.5. Selected the button labeled Next
7.6. To the right of the Step 1 dialog box, I selected Browse and navigated to where I had
stored the relatedLit_Citations.csv file
7.7. In the Step 2 portion of the UI
7.7.1. Selected CITATIONID , set the Class to Resource, and the Name to
Article
7.7.2. Selected Journal, set the Class to Organization, and the Name to Journal
7.8. In the Step 3 portion of the UI
7.8.1. Selected the button labeled New to define a new network of links
7.8.2. Selected journal in the Source Node Name column
7.8.3. Selected citationID in the Target Node Name column
7.8.4. Selected link in the Link Value column
7.8.5. Typed Journal x Article in the Network Name column
7.8.6. Placed a check mark in the Create new nodes for unrecognized
node names
7.9. Selected the button labeled Finish
7.10. Selected from the menu, FileSave
For readers interested in performing the steps from 2.6 to 2.8 using a saved configuration
file, save the source code listed under the subheading Journal x Article within the section entitled
Error! Reference source not found. to an XML file. Select that file using the Load
configuration file button to automatically perform (or repeatedly perform) steps from
2.6 to 2.8.
Publisher x Journal Network
I repeated the steps used to create the Journal x Article network making the
appropriate substitutions for network and file names.
Year x Article Network
I repeated the steps used to create the Journal x Article network making the
appropriate substitutions for network and file names.
Concept Nodeset, Text Nodeset and Semantic Network
1. Copied the Citation’s Node Name and Node Title columns to a tab-delimited text file.
The Node Name column contains the Google Scholar™ identifier for the citation, and the
Node Title column contains the citation’s title text as presented by Google Scholar ™.
2. Used a small Java application, CitationSplitter.java, (URL:
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/code/CitationSplitter.java) to convert this text
file into a directory containing a file per row in the text file. Each file uses the Node Name
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as the file name, with an underscore (‘_’) prepended to avoid troubles with ID’s using
characters unacceptable to operating systems as a filename (e.g., a minus sign (‘-‘) as the
starting character.
3. Used AutoMap’s Data-To-Model (D2M) (Kathleen M. Carley, Bigrigg, et al., 2011; Lanham
et al., 2014; Lanham, Morgan, Carley, et al., 2011) process to ingest this directory of citation
titles to create a concept list. The D2M wizard user interface (UI) is shown in Figure 137.
The concept list is a list of distinct words in the corpus of citation titles.
3.1. I used a standard thesaurus available to CASOS researchers as well as a thesaurus I
personally constructed over the course of multiple iterations of data reduction and
cleaning. The personal AutoMap thesaurus is available the following URL
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/relatedLit/relatedLit_Thesaurus.csv. I have
no objections to future readers Incorporating this thesaurus into their work so long as
they cite this dissertation within the relevant work.

Figure 137: Data-to-Model (D2M) User Interface of AutoMap
After creation of the concept list, I ‘cleaned’ the concept list in support of creating semantic co-location networks of
concepts in the corpus. The D2M process, in addition to the concepts, provides the term-frequency inverse document
frequency (TFIDF) as calculated using Equation 49 through Equation 51 (Kathleen M. Carley, Columbus, et al.,
2011). The initial cleaning used the distribution of the TFIDF values depicted in Figure 138 to establish a cut-off of
4.19 x 10-4. This equates to including, in the first pass of cleaning, 90.442% of the concepts when sorted from largest
to smallest TFIDF values, depicted in Figure 139. The descriptive statistics for this pass are shown in Table 60.

termx frequency (tf ) 

Count of termx
Number of terms in document y

Equation 49: Term Frequency for Concept x
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inverse document frequency (idf ) =

log number of documents in corpus
number of documents with termx

(51)

Equation 50: Inverse Document Frequency for Term x in Corpus

TF-IDF = tf  idf

(52)

Equation 51: Term Frequency x Inverse Document Frequency (TFIDF)
Table 60: Descriptive statistics for D2M of Citation Titles

Description
Number of Concepts,
Pre-Cleaning
TFIDF Mean
TFIDF Median
TFIDF Mode
TFIDF Trend
Equation 17
TFIDF Quartiles 18
(75%, 50%, 25%)

Value
6,591
0.00088
0.00032
0.00012

y = 2.3563 x −1.122

Description
Number of Concepts,
PostCleaning
TFIDF Standard
Deviation
TFIDF Skew
TFIDF Kertosis
R2 for Trend
Equation

Value
4,276
0.00187
6.59235
63.0528
0.9174

0.00617
0.00237
0.000849

Figure 138: Concept 19 x TFIDF 20

17

Using Excel for Mac 2010, ‘Trend line’ functionality built into Excel’s Charting Functions
TFIDF values sorted in descending order, cumulatively summed until 25%, 50%, and 75% of the area under the
curve is reached. 50th percent deviates from median as some TFIDF values repeat—many concepts have the same
TFIDF values
19
Concepts not depicted in graph for visual clarity of the graph
20
TFIDF values sorted in descending order
18
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Figure 139: TFIDF 21 x Cumulative Percentage of Σ TFIDF

3.2. The second pass of cleaning involved deleting concepts with a frequency of one (1) and
then using ORA™ to remove isolates created from the previous steps.

Cleaned Article node set
1. Deleted articles with nonEnglish titles
2. Transformed networks to delete isolates based on entire metanetwork and saved as new file

Cleaned Author node set
1. Removed Asian script names
2. Used ORA™’s clean menu button to remove duplicates
3. Used ORA™’s Clean menu button to look for names 1 character edit-distance from others:
An example would be M Lanham and MJ Lanham. Disambiguated with aid of
scholar.google.com and google.com, ORA™ visualization, and ORA™ metrics. Merger if
confident of names referring to the same individuals.
4. Used ORA™ Key Entity Report to look for any entries in top 50 that were visually similar.
Used similarity to focus addition search for duplicates. Merged as necessary.
5. Transformed networks to delete isolates based on entire metanetwork and saved as new file

Cleaned Concept node set
1. Deleted concepts with UTF-8 symbols that were not rendered as meaningful text
2. Merged a number of nodes that were generalizations of each other
3. Ran Hot Topics Report on Semantic Network and had ORA™ depict the top 50 entries. The
report depicted no entries that were generalizations of each other

Manipulate Networks
Co-Authors
1. Transposed Author x Article
2. Multiplied Author x Article with transpose to get co-authors
Articles per Year
1. Transposed Year x Article
21

TFIDF values sorted in descending order
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2. Multiplied Author x Article with transpose above to get articles per year
Move .edu organizations from Publisher to new nodeset School of type
Organization
3. Selected *.edu and moved them to a new nodeset
4. Merged schools of same 2nd level domain unless I was aware of a 3rd level domain being a
specific research lab/center
Move [BOOK] and [B] articles to new nodeset called Book of type Resource
5. Selected [BOOK|B] articles and moved them to a new nodeset
Move [C] articles to new nodeset called Citation of type Resource
6. Selected [C] articles and moved them to a new nodeset
Data-to-Model AutoMap ScriptRunner file
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><Script>
<Utilities>
<Procedures>
<DataToModel attributes="" numThreads="3"
projectDirectory="V:\dissertation\ora\relatedLit\automap_outputs"
standardThesaurus="**a unique to CASOS thesaurus**"
textDirectory="V:\dissertation\ora\relatedLit\inputs\IDs_and_Titles_Spl
it"
userThesaurus="V:\dissertation\ora\relatedLit\inputs\relatedLit_Thesaur
us.csv"/>
</Procedures>
<CEMap/>
<Extractors/>
<PreProcessing/>
<Generate/>
<PostProcessing/>
</Utilities>
<Settings>
<AutoMap deleteTemp="n" intermediate="y"
tempWorkspace="C:\temp\am3temp" textDirection="LT"
textDirectory="V:\dissertation\ora\relatedLit\inputs\IDs_and_Titles_Spl
it" textEncoding="UTF-8"/>
</Settings>
</Script>

Article x Article
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<queryScript>
<metaMatrix id="Meta Network">
<create>
<nodeset type="Resource" id="Article" />
<nodeset type="Resource" id="Article" />
<graph sourceNodesetId="Article" targetNodesetId="Article" id="Article x
Article" />
</create>
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<query>
<input> V:\dissertation \ora\relatedLit\relatedLit_Links.csv</input>
<output>
<graph id="Article x Article">
<fromColumn index="0" makeUnique="false" />
<toColumn index="1" makeUnique="false" />
<weightColumn index="2" makeUnique="false" />
</graph>
</output>
</query>
</metaMatrix>
</queryScript>

Author x Article
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<queryScript>
<metaMatrix id="Meta Network">
<create>
<nodeset type="Resource" id="Article" />
<nodeset type="Agent" id="Author" />
<nodeset type="Agent" id="Author" />
<nodeset type="Agent" id="Author" />
<nodeset type="Agent" id="Author" />
<nodeset type="Agent" id="Author" />
<graph sourceNodesetId="Author" targetNodesetId="Article" id="Author x
Article" />
<graph sourceNodesetId="Author" targetNodesetId="Article" id="Author x
Article" />
<graph sourceNodesetId="Author" targetNodesetId="Article" id="Author x
Article" />
<graph sourceNodesetId="Author" targetNodesetId="Article" id="Author x
Article" />
<graph sourceNodesetId="Author" targetNodesetId="Article" id="Author x
Article" />
</create>
<query>
<input>V:\dissertation\ora\relatedLit\relatedLit_Citations.csv</input>
<output>
<graph id="Author x Article">
<fromColumn index="10" makeUnique="false" />
<toColumn index="0" makeUnique="false" />
<weightColumn index="15" makeUnique="false" />
</graph>
<graph id="Author x Article">
<fromColumn index="11" makeUnique="false" />
<toColumn index="0" makeUnique="false" />
<weightColumn index="15" makeUnique="false" />
</graph>
<graph id="Author x Article">
<fromColumn index="12" makeUnique="false" />
<toColumn index="0" makeUnique="false" />
<weightColumn index="15" makeUnique="false" />
</graph>
<graph id="Author x Article">
<fromColumn index="13" makeUnique="false" />
<toColumn index="0" makeUnique="false" />
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<weightColumn index="15" makeUnique="false" />
</graph>
<graph id="Author x Article">
<fromColumn index="14" makeUnique="false" />
<toColumn index="0" makeUnique="false" />
<weightColumn index="15" makeUnique="false" />
</graph>
</output>
</query>
</metaMatrix>
</queryScript>

Journal x Article
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<queryScript>
<metaMatrix id="Meta Network">
<create>
<nodeset type="Resource" id="Article" />
<nodeset type="Organization" id="Journal" />
<graph sourceNodesetId="Journal" targetNodesetId="Article" id="Journal x
Article" />
</create>
<query>
<input>V:\dissertation\ora\relatedLit\relatedLit_Citations.csv</input>
<output>
<graph id="Journal x Article">
<fromColumn index="7" makeUnique="false" />
<toColumn index="0" makeUnique="false" />
<weightColumn index="15" makeUnique="false" />
</graph>
</output>
</query>
</metaMatrix>
</queryScript>

Publisher x Journal
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<queryScript>
<metaMatrix id="Meta Network">
<create>
<nodeset type="Organization" id="Journal" />
<nodeset type="Organization" id="Publisher" />
<graph sourceNodesetId="Publisher" targetNodesetId="Journal" id="Publisher
x Journal" />
</create>
<query>
<input>V:\dissertation\ora\relatedLit\relatedLit_Citations.csv</input>
<output>
<graph id="Publisher x Journal">
<fromColumn index="8" makeUnique="false" />
<toColumn index="7" makeUnique="false" />
<weightColumn index="15" makeUnique="false" />
</graph>
</output>
</query>
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</metaMatrix>
</queryScript>

Year x Article
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<queryScript>
<metaMatrix id="Meta Network">
<create>
<nodeset type="Resource" id="Article" />
<nodeset type="Event" id="Year" />
<graph sourceNodesetId="Year" targetNodesetId="Article" id="Year x
Article" />
</create>
<query>
<input>V:\dissertation\ora\relatedLit\relatedLit_Citations.csv</input>
<output>
<graph id="Year x Article">
<fromColumn index="9" makeUnique="false" />
<toColumn index="0" makeUnique="false" />
<weightColumn index="15" makeUnique="false" />
</graph>
</output>
</query>
</metaMatrix>
</queryScript>
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Introduction
This appendix is to document the steps and methodology I used to collect and process
information in support of rapidly developing the sociotechnical models of Strategic, Operational
and Tactical set of US Department of Defense (DoD) commands. This material expands upon
and extends the work briefly discussed in the Data and Models chapter of the dissertation that
started on page 70. It is my intention to provide sufficient information and specificity that the
reader may duplicate the process I used for each of the three (3) D2M generated models, and
ideally arrive at similar if not identical results. I have made the Adobe Acrobat ™ files (.pdf)
available on my personal web pages at in three (3) zip files: strategic.zip, operational.zip, and
tactical.zip at the following URL: http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/data2model. I have
also made the DoD-specific thesaurus, in what CASOS refers to as Master Thesaurus format,
available as well as the model-specific thesauri. It is my intention that, for organizations who
decide to use the D2M process, these thesauri be available and useful. Additionally, as an
employee of the USG, the work I have done while pursuing this research should be available to
the public.

Retrieving input corpus
The bash shell script shown below retrieves the set of PDF documents for each model of
interest in the dissertation. There were some documents that, though within the list of documents
in later sections, I had to manually download as the organizations that host the documents have
placed them behind authentication schemes that wget does not support.
Bash script for retrieval, text extraction, and text file splitting
The bash script is hosted on my personal web page at
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/data2model/get_sets_as_text.sh and the algorithm for
the script is below.
For each model in model list
Create pdf directory, if needed
Use wget to retrieve all entries in corpus_list.txt
For each pdf file, use pdftotext to extract file_name.txt
Create split_texts dir, if needed
Move extracted text files to split_texts dir
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For each extracted text file, split it into 64KB chunks using
split
List of documents for strategic level corpus and the URLs to retrieve them
1. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/esci_hbk.pdf
2. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/jopes.pdf
3. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/nds2008.pdf
4. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/nms_2004.pdf
5. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/nss2010.pdf
6. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/cjcsi5120_02b.pdf
7. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_0.pdf
8. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf
9. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf
10. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf
11. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_01.pdf
12. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_03.pdf
13. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf
14. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_01.pdf
15. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf
16. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_06.pdf
17. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf
18. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf
19. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_09.pdf
20. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_10.pdf
21. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_11.pdf
22. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf
23. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf
24. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf
25. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_17.pdf
26. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf
27. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_27.pdf
28. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf
29. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf
30. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_31.pdf
31. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_32ch1.pdf
32. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_33.pdf
33. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_34.pdf
34. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_35.pdf
35. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_41.pdf
36. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_52.pdf
37. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf
38. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf
39. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_01.pdf
40. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_07.pdf
41. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_08.pdf
42. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf
43. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp6_0.pdf
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44. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/cjcsn3500_01.pdf
45. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/cjcsn3500_01.pdf
46. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/joh_aug2010.pdf
47. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ujtl_tasks.pdf
48. http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov3.pdf
49. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_05_1.pdf
50. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_09_3.pdf
51. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_13_1.pdf
52. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_13_3.pdf
53. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_13_4.pdf
54. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_15_1.pdf
55. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_60.pdf
56. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp4_012.pdf
List of documents for operational level corpus and the URLs to retrieve them
1. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-1AOCV3.pdf
2. Air Force Tactics Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3.2 AOCNov07.pdf
3. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd1/afdd1.pdf
4. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd2-0/afdd2-0.pdf
5. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-0/afdd3-0.pdf
6. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-01/afdd3-01.pdf
7. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-04/afdd3-04.pdf
8. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-05/afdd3-05.pdf
9. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-10/afdd3-10.pdf
10. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-12/afdd3-12.pdf
11. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-13/afdd3-13.pdf
12. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-14/afdd3-14.pdf
13. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-17/afdd3-17.pdf
14. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-27/afdd3-27.pdf
15. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-40/afdd3-40.pdf
16. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-52/afdd3-52.pdf
17. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-60/afdd3-60.pdf
18. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd3-70/afdd3-70.pdf
19. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd6-0/afdd6-0.pdf
20. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfcom/cc_handbook_sc_1sep2008.pdf
21. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/esci_hbk.pdf
22. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/jopes.pdf
23. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/nds2008.pdf
24. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/nms_2004.pdf
25. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/nss2010.pdf
26. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/cjcsi5120_02b.pdf
27. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_0.pdf
28. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf
29. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf
30. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf
31. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_01.pdf
32. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_03.pdf
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33. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf
34. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_01.pdf
35. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf
36. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_06.pdf
37. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf
38. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf
39. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_09.pdf
40. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_10.pdf
41. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_11.pdf
42. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf
43. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf
44. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf
45. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_17.pdf
46. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf
47. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_27.pdf
48. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf
49. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf
50. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_31.pdf
51. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_32ch1.pdf
52. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_33.pdf
53. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_34.pdf
54. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_35.pdf
55. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_41.pdf
56. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_52.pdf
57. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf
58. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf
59. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_01.pdf
60. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_07.pdf
61. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_08.pdf
62. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf
63. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp6_0.pdf
64. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/cjcsn3500_01.pdf
65. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/cjcsn3500_01.pdf
66. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/joh_aug2010.pdf
67. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ujtl_tasks.pdf
68. http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov3.pdf
69. http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/afdd3-03.pdf
70. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_05_1.pdf
71. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_09_3.pdf
72. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_13_1.pdf
73. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_13_1.pdf
74. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_13_3.pdf
75. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_13_3.pdf
76. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_13_4.pdf
77. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_13_4.pdf
78. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_15_1.pdf
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79. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_60.pdf
80. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp4_012.pdf

Corpus augmentation
Augmenting corpus—figures to text
Figures within texts remain indecipherable to the pdftotext application as well as the
AutoMap program. As such, the author and a collaborator, Jon Licht, translated select figures
from AFTTP 13-3.2 to text for ingest by AutoMap and for use in previous work. Those figures
were;
1.1

3.4

4.3

6.2

1.2

3.5

3.5

6.5

1.3

3.6

4.8

6.9

3.1

3.7

5.1

6.14

3.2

4.1

5.2

3.3

4.2

5.5

Though undoubtedly the generated models could benefit from translating other
figures to text, there is at present insufficient evidence to assess the improvement. Many of
the cross functional groups’ relationships and membership depicted in AOC structural
diagrams were not in the sets as text—thus substantiating the possible usefulness of figureto-text translation. However, as discussed in the Data and Models chapter starting on page 70,
it remains an open question if such effort will always work, will, with statistical significance,
appropriately update models, or if, in the absence of statistical significance, provide
qualitative improvements to the models.
Additionally, translating pictures into their respective “one thousand words” is a label
intensive process that is clearly not aligned with the key word ‘Rapid’ in the title of the
dissertation. Though figures and pictures remain relevant and useful to a large set of the
human readers of doctrine, it is doubtful that they will provide meaningful assistance
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Retrieving input corpus
Augmenting corpus—coercing links via AutoMap
ORA™ does not yet have the ability to capture a change list, a set of changes created
by the user, for edges between nodes within the ORA™ UI. One way I captured additions of
links between existing nodes was through the use of a manually created and updated Isolate
Correction text file. This file, in pseudo-English, supports the automated creation of links
between multiple node types using either the reduced form name of a node (e.g., i_t) or other
forms that the thesaurus is ready to process correctly (e.g., information technology). Through
the deliberate creation of sentences with words that should be linked to create an accurate
model, AutoMap can be manipulated into creating links a researcher would otherwise have to
create by hand. In this way, a modeler can reduce deficiencies in the model AutoMap
generates from the corpus of text.
This technique, like the figures-to-text translation discussed above, has its drawbacks.
It is easy, and sometimes entirely appropriate to hand-link dozens to hundreds of nodes to
other nodes—even if not readily repeatable by other researchers attempting to replicate and
extend work. It is also easy, sometimes appropriate to type the relationships in sentences
knowing the names of the nodes and the word(s) that capture the relationship link between
the nodes. This process has the advantage of being repeatable for future researchers, as well
as slowly building up a repository of relationships explicitly drawn in figures, but frequently
not addressed as text. The final draw back for this technique is the labor drain to author the
links-as-sentences file. Such labor drain runs contrary to the rapid initial model creation
implied in the dissertation model. It may however be suitable for model sustainment and
refinement over time.

Pre-processing DoD corpus
Over the course of the dissertation, there were several opportunities to refine the
process and reduce the amount of thesaurus refinement and ORA™-based model refinement.
This section addresses each of those opportunities and the techniques I used to conduct preprocessing of the corpus before using AutoMap.
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Regular expression deletion of noise patterns
Many of the documents in the corpus have headers or footers that contain verbiage
that, if retained in the final models, would unduly weight the repeated concepts. There are
also other word patterns that AutoMap, as of 2013, is incapable of removing or adequately
addressing. To resolve this situation, I used bash shell code below to invoke perl and preprocess the corpus to replace the identified patterns with empty white space. Having a script
available and functioning reduces the development time for future researchers and / or
organizations desirous of using this dissertation’s process. The overhead in terms of
processing time was minimal, on the order of a few minutes per corpus.
#!/usr/bin/sh
#
#3rd pattern catches Doc Origination +
# number [.number[alpha][.-][number]]
#4th pattern catches Title + number, USC, Section +
# Number Doc Original + number, doc-title
#5th pattern cleans up multiple underscores to
# single underscore
#6th pattern drops trailing underscores from words
#7th pattern drops leading underscores from words
#8th pattern drops patterns of junk chars created(?)
# during pdf-to-txt conversion
perl -0744pi -e \
's/Department of Defense Instruction \(DODI\) /DODI/g;\
s/Joint Publication|Joint Publication\w*\JP\)/JP/g;\
s/(EO|HSPD|PDD|CJCSI|NSPD|DODD|DODI|JP|AR|AFDD|FM|TC|DIAM
|CJCSN|CJCSM|AFTTPI|DCID|AFDDs|j_p|DODDs|APP|STANAG|TM)[
-.]?([0-9]+)(?:[.-]([0-9]*))?([A-Z]*)(?:[.-]([09]+))?(?:[.-]([AZ]+))?(,([^\r\n.]*(\r[^.\r\n,]*){0,2})[.,])?/lc($1)."_$2_
$3_$4_$5"/gie;\
s/(Title) ([0-9]+)(\,? USC\,? (?:Section ([09]+))?[^\r\n.]*(\r[^.\r\n]*)?\.)?/lc($1)."_$2_$4"/gie;\
s/_+/_/g;\
s/\b_//g;\
s/_\b//g;\
s/^Table.*[0-9]+$//g;\
s/^Figure.*[0-9]+$//g;\
s/[ÔøÔΩ‚Ä¢≈√æ¬©\?]+/ /g;' $1
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Case sensitive application of DoD and model-specific thesaurus
Since the DoD makes extensive use of acronyms, I needed to have a case sensitive
way of disambiguating all-capital-letter acronyms from words that might otherwise be in the
thesaurus. To conduct the disambiguation, I applied the DoD thesaurus in a case sensitive
manner, using a short Python script whose pseudo-code is below—the actual python script is
on my personal web page at
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/code/applyAcronymThesaurus.py.
The Python script performs word-level, case sensitive, regular expression matching as
well as attempting to match words surrounded by parenthesis. The DoD uses a writing style
where authors spell out an acronym then specify the acronym in parenthesis (e.g., Listening
Post (LP)). The script also performs a function that AutoMap developers have sense
incorporated—turning hyphenated words into ngrams as a first-pass heuristic for ngram
identification.
read thesaurus into Python key-value dictionary
for each text file
for each line of text
for each word in line
if word in thesaurus
if meta-ontology column == #delete
delete word in line
else replace word in line with
thesaurus word
else if word minus 1 char in thesaurus
if meta-ontology column == #delete
delete word in line
else replace word in line with
thesaurus word
if word contains hyphen
convert word to ngram
flush read/writer buffers periodically

Metanetwork encoding heuristics for thesaurus refinement
The thesaurus refinement process is rife with opportunities for inconsistencies.
Though follow-on researchers may choose to disagree with the encoding choices I have made,
the table below depicts the heuristics I used when assigning concepts of interest to one of the
ontological categories in the metanetwork framework.
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Table 61: Metanetwork ontological labeling heuristics

Key word/words in original text segment

Most words with –ly,-est suffixes

Metanetwork ontology category

Attribute (based on generalization that the
words with those endings are adverbs)
Knowledge (based on generalization that
the past-tense of a verb implies knowledge
of the execution of that verb)
Attribute
Task
Agent

Most words with –ed suffix

Ranks (SES, GS, E1-E9, O1-O10)
Request, Responsibilities, Duties
Chief, commander, director, system,
processor, tool, database
Specific named people relevant to project,
Specific named position within orgs filled
by exactly one person (e.g. Commander,
Director, Secretary)
Authority (Ability to grant/deny
permission)
Critical
Conference
Agreement, architecture, consequence,
contract, course, Estimate, guide,
handbook, instruction*, law, memo*,
message, mission, Module, *plan, policy,
report, treaty,

Resource
Belief
Event
Knowledge

*authority

Resource

Shared information, if when given to
another, the originator still has the
information (e.g., lists, opords, plans,
oplans, procedures)
Area, Facility, installation, base,
operations area, post, camp, station
Program

Knowledge

Location
Task (e.g. WMD Counter-proliferation),
sometimes organization when I can tie the
lone word into a N-Gram for
disambiguation
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Agency, branch, brigade, center,
committee, company, council, detachment,
division, fleet, MEU, MEB, Mission,
office for *, office of *, organization,
platoon, program office, *service*, named
units/organization/ship, squadron, team,
united, wing, ship(s), S1-S9, G1-G9, same
for A/N/M/J-staff codes

Organization (specific ships, when
discussed as a resource [e.g. USS JFK was
decommissioned/overhauled) get coded as
“resource” instead of org)

Specific/named (e.g. fighter wing,
division, brigade, agency) collection of
people or organizations (by composition or
aggregation), * force(s), alliance
Generic/unnamed (e.g. fighter wing,
Resource
division, brigade, agency) collection of
people or organizations (by composition or
aggregation), * force(s), alliance
Causeway, equipment, radios, antenna,
fuel, medal, missile, package, * Program
(e.g. Contingency Program, DITSCAP,
DIACAP), tanks, trucks, airplanes,
programme

Resource

An instance of a physical asset, if when
given to another, the originator no longer
has it AND the asset is not frequently
synonymous with an ‘organization’
A computer system component (e.g. DVD
ROM drive, keyboard)
Computer protocol(s), radio
frequency(ies), subsystem(s),
*Support*

a generalized service provided (often) by
one party to another party

Budget
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Named computer systems, named
information technology, named satcom
systems, named ,

Agent (with Agent Type
attribute==it_system) – if it passes
knowledge/information between other
agents/organizations. Using computers
imposes a cognitive load on people as well.
Finally, intention is to model within
construct the following: p(forgetting)>0 &
<< 1; p(! interact) >0 & << 1; p(tx err)>0 &
<< 1.

Computer network (jwics, NIPRNet,
SIPRNet, *net)
Unnamed/generic computer systems,
generic references to technology,
information technology, classes of IT
systems (e.g., gps, dscs)

Resource (with Resource Type
attribute==it_resource)

Relay device(s) or nonmessage content
manipulating device/capability (e.g.,
routers, switches, network)
Switch, generic telephone, call manager(s),
IT-enabled radars, weapons, radios,
Nonspecific position within orgs (e.g.
Role
officer, assistant secretary [without a
qualifier])
Foe, Ally, adversary
Management, process, reception,
Task
responsibilities, support, task, synchronize,
plan, manage, establish, conduct,
Acronyms ≤ 3 chars
Insert underscore between letters, look- up
the definition and apply category based on
definition
Prefer to add deconstrS3ion of acronym if
feasible (e.g.,
gps_global_positioning_system)

Using frequency as culling decision input variable
At least for some measures, the heuristic of deleting nodes with low ‘frequency’
attributes will sabotage the use of the measure. Likewise the deleting of pendants, recursively
or not, may inflict unexpected changes to the network.
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The D2M process, when generating the metanetwork, will generate several attributes
per node in each of the node classes. One of those attributes is ‘Frequency,’ which is a simple
count of how many times the concept (or its mapped-from predecessor) has appeared in the
sets. This attribute does not, in isolation, provide a modeler with high confidence that the
node(s) is worthy of deleting. I certainly ran across a number of instances when building
these three models where the ‘frequency’ of a node was an order of magnitude lower than top
nodes, yet other network measures revealed the node was relevant to the model for its
position in the network structure as well as serving as a conduit from one node class to
another.
In the specific case of the proposed static resilience measure, the measure requires the
counting of near-isolated nodes in three node sets: agents; resources; and tasks. With the
intuition that too many nearly isolated nodes leads to too many points of degraded access to
people, resources, and tasks, it should be apparent to the reader that removing pendants
necessarily decreases the number of nearly-isolated nodes. This is especially true for
recursive deletion of pendant chains—where a chain of nodes is connected to nothing other
than the next element of the chain.
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This appendix repeats information from a research project that preceded the dissertation
discussed elsewhere in this work. However, the methodology and practical how-to guide should
benefit future researchers as well as those desiring to critique my work. This appendix describes
exactly how the supporting infrastructure and the actual virtual experiments were carried out at a
re-execution level of detail.

SVN or other Shared-work Repository
I’ve been using SVN as the code repository for all my work. I will write this recipe as if
the reader will likewise be using SVN. I leave modifications and changes of the recipe to the
reader if they using Git, CVS, SourceSafe, or some other technology/capability.
Create a named repository
I usually ask the SVN repository administrator to create a repository using some
shortened version of the project name--if feasible. For example, if the project name is “Learned
Multi-Level Resilience,” I ask for a repository project called multi-level.
Checkout the named repository
Of course, a SVN client can checkout a project to a directory using the project’s name or
some arbitrary name. The choice is user specific and should be irrelevant to the remainder of this
recipe.

Create a Directory Structure
Within the (presumably brand new and empty) project directory, create a directory
structure. This structure is inherently specific to the researcher or the team of researchers. If a
team, defining and settling on it early, though allowing modifications later, will make
collaboration easier.
I have created several directory trees and depict them below starting at the project
directory entitled multi-level. For the dissertation work, I replaced “multi-level” with
“dissertation.”
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The two folders of immediate interest to the virtual experiment researcher are the
scriptsAndApps folder and the construct folder. As depicted in Figure 140, there are several subfolders in the scriptsAndApps folder.

Figure 140: Directory structure for virtual experiments

Within the construct folder there are two folders, both required for the proper functioning
of the automated scripts created for the learned multi-level resiliency project. The folders have
the names inputDecks and runs. This tree is below in Figure 141.

Figure 141: Directory structure for construct within virtual experiment directory structure

CondorPreparation - This folder is for the scripts and applications. Those scripts and
applications pre-process inputs and write temporary outputs to disk. The folder also holds some
helper scripts and .jar files used by the individual condor clients to help the researcher identify
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problematic machines in the condor cluster. The .jar file is from the directory tree rooted in the
javaUtils folder which is the root of an Eclipse IDE project.
NetworkGenerator - This folder is for the Java-based application to take the temporary
outputs from the preparation scripts, generate construct networks, and write them to disk. It is the
root of an Eclipse IDE project. The resultant exported executable jar is copied to a location I will
discuss shortly.
CondorPostProcess - This folder holds several shell scripts (bash and perl) that help the
researcher identify problems with the output from a condor run.
runDataAggregator - This folder is for the Java-based application to take the outputs of a
construct run, conduct data reduction and processing enroute to information. It is the root of an
Eclipse IDE project.

Input Files
The construct input deck can refer to one or more external files for loaded a simulation.
The deck for the Multi-Level Project refers to a params.csv file that lists a number of key-value
pairs. The reader will note params.csv does not exist, in the inputDecks folder. The preprocessing scripts automatically generate the params.csv from the params_template.xls file.
The params_template.xls file serves several functions
•
•
•
•
•

It supports a single point of entry for variables (thereby reducing the probability of mistyping parameters and/or their values elsewhere)
It supports rapid and automatic generation of XML needed to define <var> elements in the
input deck. The Researcher may still need to copy the XML to the input deck manually.
It supports rapid and nearly automatic generation of XML relevant to defining <networks> or
<operations> elements in the input deck. The Researcher may still need to copy the XML to
the input deck manually.
It supports the rapid and automatic generation of params.csv files unique to each
configuration of the virtual experiment as well as the directory structure needed to isolate
each of those configurations from the others.
It supports the rapid and automatic data reduction, aggregation, and output of meaningful
results by using the single point of entry for key-value pairs
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Params_template.xls
This file, as of April 2013, needs to remain in the pre-Excel 2007 format of .xls.
Warning: Do not use the .xlsx format, as the perl script processing the file uses a CPAN
module that does not support the .xlsx format.
The contents of params_template.xls are worth reviewing, column by column.

Figure 142: Snapshot of params_template.xls, Columns

A-H

Variables and their definitions
Column A should remain a zero-indexed list of integers, incremented by one (1) for
each row. This information is needed in the XML in Column H to tell construct what row the
variable definition resides on.
Column B is the variable’s name. Construct does not allow spaces in variable names,
nor to start with a numeric value. The example demonstrates an all lowercase style with words
separated by underscores. As a matter of convention, I have maintained ascending alphabetical
order for the variables in two groups: non-file name variables, and file name variables.
Column C is the value that the variable will assume in the params.csv file. The
application that creates the directory structure for a virtual experiment as well as the data
aggregator also uses the key-value pairs in Columns B & C.
Column D supports the generation of XML to define <var> elements in the input deck.
Construct expects values to be “float”, “int”, “string”, and “bool.”
Column H is the XML definition of the <var> element that the researcher needs to
manually copy this entire column into the input deck, overwriting the existing vars derived
from params_template.xls.
WARNING: MS Excel copy and paste does not usually copy the MSExcel escaped quotation marks in Column H into a text-only editor. A
fast way to overcome this phenomena is to paste the material first into
MS Word, then copy from MS Word the text to paste into the text-only
editor.
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Failure to copy and paste and ensure correct processing of escaped quotation marks
may result in non-obvious deck failures!
Variables that impact <network> definitions
Columns E, F, and G store data needed to create a <network> element definition. A
<network> is a collection of links between source and target nodes.
Column E is the type of node from which the link originates. It must be a value that
construct expects and defined in the input deck’s <nodes> tree. In the example, the src node
type is shown as agent.

Figure 143: Snapshot params_templat.xls, Columns

E-J

Column F is the type of node to which the link connects. It must be a value that
construct expects and defined in the input deck’s <nodes> tree. In the example, the tgt node
type is an agent.
Column G is the link type. Construct expects this value to be one of the following:
float, int, or bool. In the example, the linktype is a float in row 64 and bool in row 65.
Column H is, as discussed above for variables that do not impact network definitions,
the XML definition of the <var> element. The researcher needs to manually copy this
entire column into the input deck.
Column I is a visual separator and is not otherwise relevant.
Column J is a concatenation of Column K “Network Comment(s)” and Column L
“additional network generators.” This concatenation reduces the number of columns the
researcher needs to manually copy, into the input deck while supporting the possibility of
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multiple network generators per network definition. The researcher needs to manually copy this
entire column into the input deck, overwriting the existing <network> elements derived from
params_template.xls.
WARNING: MS Excel copy and paste does not usually copy the MSExcel escaped quotation marks in Column H into a text-only editor. A
fast way to overcome this phenomena is to paste the material first into
MS Word, then copy from MS Word the text to paste into the text-only
editor.
experiment_config_file.xls
This file, as of April 2013, needs to remain in the pre-Excel 2007 format of .xls.
Warning: Do not use the .xlsx format, as the perl script processing the file uses a CPAN
module that does not support the .xlsx format.
This file is used by the makeCondorDirs script to setup the Box-Behnken experimental
design. Each column represents a variable under test. The name of the variable must match
exactly the variable name specified either in the deck or in the params_template.xls file. The
second row is a comma-separated list of values that the variable can assume. Rows 3 and
upwards (15 in the example above) are the values in the Box-Behnken design where -1
represents the lowest possible value from row 2, 0 represents the middle value from row 2, and 1
represents the highest value from row 2.
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Figure 144: Snapshot of experiment_config_file.xls

The makeCondorDirs script automatically reads and parses this file and applies its
contents to the process of writing params.csv files for each of the experimental configurations
under test.
The researcher must copy Columns H and J into the input deck if they
have added or deleted any rows to the params_template.xls file. Failure
to do update the input deck ensures the results will not reflect any
changes to the template file!

Updating Executables sent to the Condor cluster
The submission of jobs to the Condor cluster includes passing multiple executable files to
each Condor node. Each of these executables must be up-to-date before the researcher creates the
directories for the virtual experiment and submitting the jobs to Condor for execution.
In the scriptsAndApps folder, the following files must be current:
•
•

construct.exe - the agent-based simulation executable
networkGenerator.jar - the executable jar that will, on the condor client, read the params.csv
file, and generate the various input networks that construct needs to run. For the multi-level
resilience project, this is a highly specific application though the division of labor between
numerous applications may remain appropriate for other projects, such as this dissertation.
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•

dataAggregator.jar - the executable jar that will, on the submitting machine, recursively
traverse, reduce, and process the outputs of the condor jobs. Each condor client will return
the results of the run (as specified in the construct input deck) and anything else in the
condor working directory of the client.
In the CondorPreparation folder, the following files must be current:

•

condorShell.cmd - this MS DOS script (using the cmd.exe found on various flavors of MS
Windows operating systems since Windows XP) is the application that the condor client
executes directly. It performs a multi-step process on each client. A copy of the script I used
is available on my personal web page at
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/dissertation/CondorPreparation/condorShell.
•
•

•

Confirms Perl and Java are installed on the condor client
Confirms that Perl is installed (Cygwin Perl)
• if Perl is not installed, the script sets a flag to cause the network generator application
to failure over to Java alternatives to the Perl Scripts
• Confirms that 64-bit java is installed
• Makes a critical assumption that the 64-bit java.exe is in c:\program files\java since
Microsoft uses the C:\Program Files (x86) directory as the default location for 32-bit
applications on 32-bit machines.
• If 64-bit java is not installed, the script fails with an errorcode set to 1.
• Just before exiting, the script creates a file called
64_Bit_JAVA_IS_MISSING_ON_%HOST% and replaces %HOST% with the name
of the machine. This file gets returned to the submitting machine and a postprocessing script can support a researcher’s effort to identify and remediate machines
without 64-bit java.
• Note: 64-bit java has been necessary for several reasons
• possibly sloppy coding that leads to heap and stack memory errors
• insufficient heap and stack memory to process large quantities of large output
files
• Runs the networkGenerator.jar file
• Run construct using construct.xml as the input
• Deletes the input files and undesired output files.
• Compresses the desired output files, then deletes the .csv versions
• When the condorShell.cmd exits, the condor client transmits all the files in its working
directory back to the submitting machine.
whichJVMIsInstalled.jar - this Java application returns the highest version of installed JRE
and JDK, if present, or an empty string if not present.

Perl on submitting machine
You must have Perl installed on the submitting machine to use the makeCondorDirs.pl
PERL script. I’ve tested the scripts on cygwin perl 5.14.2. You must also have the following Perl
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Packages installed (CPAN comes in handy for this).All are installed on zurg.CASOS.cs.cmu.edu,
the machine The URL for the makeCondorDirs is
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/dissertation/CondorPreparation/makeCondorDirs.
•
•
•
•
•
•

File::Path
File::Copy::Recursive
Getopt::Long
Getopt::Std
Switch
Spreadsheet::ParseExcel

(v2.09 is the version I installed)
(v0.38 is the version I have installed)
(v2.39 is the version I installed)
(v1.06 is the version I installed)
(v2.16 is the version I have installed)
(v0.59 is the version I installed)

Directories for Condor Virtual Experiment
WARNING: The following steps need to be on a machine that can submit
jobs to condor. If not, then the machine that can submit jobs to condor
will need shared access to these folders and files to run.
The researcher should open a command prompt (cygwin is the shell prompt most used by
the dissertation author) and change directory to the runs folder.

Figure 145: Directory structure for construct runs

Execute makeCondorDirs.pl script (which of course presumes the reader has Perl
installed on their system). The specific invocation syntax is below:
../../scriptsAndApps/CondorPreparation/makeCondorDirs.pl -verbose -best –p ../../construct/inputDecks/params_template.xls
-c ../../construct/inputDecks/experiment_config_file.xls -i
../../construct/inputDecks/multiLevel_inputDeck.xml
makeCondorDirs.pl --help will show the options available for use as of April 2013.

Submitting to Condor for the Virtual Experiment
To submit to condor, assuming the condor client is installed and appropriately configured
to submit to the condor cluster controller, enter the following command
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condor_submit condor_submission_file0000.txt
Alternatively, you can setup a for loop such as the one
for i in `ls condor_submission_file00*`; do condor_submit $i;
done
The purpose of a five (5) minute delay between submissions is to allow some spacing of
the file transmissions of the executables between the submitting client and the condor controller.
It also spaces out the number of jobs on the controller at any given point. Finally, it spaces out
the file transmissions from the executing condor client returning outputs to the submitting client.

Post-Processing Outputs of Condor from a Virtual Experiment
Data Aggregation
There are three ways to invoke the data aggregation. One is via an executable JAR file,
the other is through Eclipse (assuming access to source code). The third is to have the aggregator
run on the Condor Cluster. This recipe will review the running of the aggregator through Eclipse
and then via the JAR file, and then the execution on the Condor Cluster.
Data Aggregation via Eclipse IDE
Assumption: The user has created a Java project within their Eclipse™ framework, and
has the project correctly set to use Java 1.7 (there are reasons for using Java 1.7), java-getopt1.0.14.jar as a Library in the Java Build Path.
Setup a Run Configuration using either the Run menu item or the drop down menu next
to the run button as shown in the figure below.
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Figure 146: Eclipse's Run configurations menu item

After selecting Run Configurations, the model should create or edit the run configuration
for the data aggregator. If creating, you’ll want to click on the “Create Configuration” icon in the
upper left corner, and if editing, you should see a window much like the one below. Ensure the
Project name matches and the main class dialog box are correctly filled in.
You will also want to fill in the “Arguments” tab with the command line arguments as
well as the working directory text box. The command line arguments are discussed below, and
can be accessed using the command line execution environment with the -h option.
java -jar NetworkDataAggregator –h
Options, as of April 2013 are:
-f DirectoryName
Directories from Condor’s virtual experiment
runs, naming convention has each starting
with
Condition_[int(s)]
-v
verbose output
-d [ints >=1]
debug output of greater volume the higher the
int
-o DirectoryName
Directory where the Aggregator will write
output
files
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Figure 147: Eclipse run configuration for NetworkDataAggregator – main tab

Figure 148: Eclipse run configuration for NetworkDataAggregator – arguments tab
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The experimenter should also set the working directory to the same directory as the input
directory. Once configured, the researcher can press “Apply” and “Close” and then invoke this
run configuration at some future point in time.
Data Aggregator from the Command Line
Assuming the developer has exported a current and up-to-date copy of the executable
JAR, the researcher can invoke it from the command line. For convenience, having the present
working directory (pwd) as the input directory works well. The invocation is below:
java -jar NetworkDataAggregator -f inputDir [-v] [-d int] [-o
outputDir]
If the output directory is not specified, the aggregator will write outputs to the present
working directory.
Data Aggregation via Aggregator on Condor
Assuming the researcher has the outputs from the virtual experiment run available,
aggregation on the Condor HPC is feasible.
The invocation for the Condor-based aggregator preparation program is shown below:
java -jar CondorBasedAggregator -f inputDir [-v] [-d int] [-o
outputDir]

The outputs of this jar file will be a submission file per experimental condition as well as
a series of .7z (7Zip) files that are the compressed outputs of the virtual experiment. The research
may submit each condor submission file with an invocation like that shown below:
condor_submit condorBasedAggregation_0001.txt
Alternatively, you can setup a for loop such as the one shown below:
for i in `ls condorBasedAggregation_*`; do condor_submit $i;
done
These condor jobs will transfer the compressed outputs of the virtual experiment
directories. On the execute node, unzips the outputs, and processes the outputs. During
processing it creates two (2) directories that Condor returns to the submitting node:
AggregatorOutputs, and condition_00xx_AVG_Attributes.
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To merge the results of these aggregator outputs into a single output file, use the bash
script in the CondorPostProcess directory called MergeAggregatorOutputs. An example of
invoking that shell script, from within the directory holding the results of the virtual experiment
looks like this:
../../scriptsAndApps/CondorPostProcess/mergeAggregatorOutputs.sh

Using R for Graph Generation
Open R-Studio
Load “plotAllMetrics.r”
Change Line 4 “setwd” to match current run directory where aggregator data is stored
Change Line 8 if necessary
Change source lines 25 through 29 if necessary, which should be relative to the working
directory
a. Set working dir in script if using IDE
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Parameters files

16
17

The table below is a listing of the parameter file used

18

by the processing scripts and Construct. Electronic copies of

19

the parameter file, the source code, and the executable jar file

20

are available on my personal web page at

21
22

http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mlanham/dissertation/

23
24

Table 62: Parameters used to in operational and strategic simulations
Line
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Parameter
a_attack_email_prob
a_attack_key_it_prob
a_attack_phone_prob
a_attack_web_prob
agent_flip_to_negative_rate
agent_flip_to_positive_rate
attack_end_time
attack_start_time
c_attack_prob
email_preference_mean
email_preference_variance
facetoface_preference_mean
facetoface_preference_variance
group_flip_to_positive_rate
group_flip_to_negative_rate
human_agent_forgetting_mean

25
26

value
0
0
0
0
0.1
0.1
162
50
0
0.2
0.02
0.6
0.06
0.1
0.1
0.9

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
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human_agent_forgetting_rate
human_agent_forgetting_variance
human_agent_initiation_count
human_agent_learn_by_doing
human_agent_message_complexity
human_agent_reception_count
human_agent_selective_attention
i_attack_prob
it_agent_initiation_count
it_agent_forgetting_mean
it_agent_forgetting_rate
it_agent_forgetting_variance
it_agent_message_complexity
it_agent_reception_count
knowledge_count
knowledge_general_count
knowledge_plan_bad_count
knowledge_plan_count
knowledge_plan_priority
knowledge_priority
ktm_false_neg_rate
ktm_false_pos_rate
meeting_interaction_multiplier
meeting_plan_ratio
num_briefings
ora_input_fname
phone_preference_mean

0.01
0
2
0.999
5
1
0.9999
0
2
0.54
0.006
0
5
1
3232
2782
150
300
2
1
0.06
0.03
9
0.2
3
construct_ORA_file.xml
0.1
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43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

phone_preference_variance
plan_briefing_1_end
plan_briefing_1_start
plan_briefing_2_end
plan_briefing_2_start
plan_briefing_3_end
plan_briefing_3_start
plan_briefing_duration
plan_briefing_interlude
plan_execution_ratio
plan_time_count
social_proximity_weight
time_count
time_failover_complete

0.01
57
54
75
72
93
90
4
14
0.3333
53
0.5
200
4

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

ttm_false_neg_rate
ttm_false_pos_rate
warm_up_period
warm_up_period_enabled
web_preference_mean
web_preference_variance
facetoface
phone_lvl1
phone_lvl2
email_lvl1
email_lvl2
web_lvl1
web_lvl2

0.08
0.04
40
1
0.1
0.01
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

Experimental Configuration File (Box-Behnken implementation)
The table below is the colorized experimental design file read by the Perl script to create directories, modify the parameters file
shown above to reflect the experimentally varied values, and communicates the
Table 63: Box-Behnken design of six attack vectors and four mitigations
c_attack
_prob
0.2,0.0,0
.8

i_attack
_prob
0.2,0.0,0
.8

a_attack_ke
y_it_prob

a_attack_e
mail_prob

a_attack_ph
one_prob

a_attack_w
eb_prob

ktm_false_
pos_rate
0.015,0.03,
0.0075

ktm_false_
neg_rate
0.02,0.04,0.
01

ttm_false_
pos_rate
0.03,0.015,
0.06

ttm_false_
neg_rate
0.04,0.02,0.
08

time_failover
_complete

0.2,0.0,0.8

0.2,0.0,0.8

0.2,0.0,0.8

0.2,0.0,0.8

0

-1

0

0

0

-1

-1

0

-1

0

0

-1

0

-1

0

0

0

-1

-1

0

-1

0

0

1

0

-1

0

0

0

-1

1

0

1

0

0

-1

0

-1

0

0

0

-1

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

-1

0

0

0

1

-1

0

-1

0

0

-1
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1.0,0.0,3.0

meeting_pl
an_ratio
0.40,0.20,0.
6
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c_attack
_prob

i_attack
_prob

a_attack_ke
y_it_prob

0

-1

0

0

-1

0

a_attack_e
mail_prob

a_attack_ph
one_prob

a_attack_w
eb_prob

ktm_false_
pos_rate

ktm_false_
neg_rate

ttm_false_
pos_rate

ttm_false_
neg_rate

time_failover
_complete

meeting_pl
an_ratio

0

0

1

-1

0

-1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

-1

-1

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

-1

-1

0

-1

0

0

-1

0

1

0

0

0

-1

-1

0

-1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

-1

1

0

1

0

0

-1

0

1

0

0

0

-1

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

-1

0

-1

0

0

-1

0

1

0

0

0

1

-1

0

-1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

-1

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

-1

-1

0

0

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

-1

-1

0

0

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

-1

-1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

-1

-1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

-1

1

0

0

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

-1

1

0

0

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

-1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

-1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

-1

0

0

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

1

-1

0

0

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

-1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

1

-1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

1

1

0

0

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1
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c_attack
_prob

i_attack
_prob

a_attack_ke
y_it_prob

0

-1

-1

0

-1

0

a_attack_e
mail_prob

a_attack_ph
one_prob

a_attack_w
eb_prob

ktm_false_
pos_rate

ktm_false_
neg_rate

ttm_false_
pos_rate

ttm_false_
neg_rate

time_failover
_complete

meeting_pl
an_ratio

0

0

0

-1

-1

-1

-1

0

0

-1

0

0

0

-1

1

-1

1

0

0

-1

-1

0

0

0

1

-1

1

-1

0

0

0

-1

-1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

-1

1

0

0

0

-1

-1

-1

-1

0

0

0

-1

1

0

0

0

-1

1

-1

1

0

0

0

-1

1

0

0

0

1

-1

1

-1

0

0

0

-1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

-1

0

0

0

-1

-1

-1

-1

0

0

0

1

-1

0

0

0

-1

1

-1

1

0

0

0

1

-1

0

0

0

1

-1

1

-1

0

0

0

1

-1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

-1

-1

-1

-1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

-1

1

-1

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

-1

1

-1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

-1

0

-1

0

-1

0

0

0

0

-1

0

0

-1

0

-1

0

-1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

-1

0

-1

0

1

0

0

0

0

-1

0

0

-1

0

-1

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

-1

0

1

0

-1

0

0

0

0

-1

0

0

-1

0

1

0

-1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

-1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

-1

0

0

-1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

-1

0

-1

0

0

0

0

-1

0

0

1

0

-1

0
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0

0
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0

0
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0
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0

1

0

0

0

0

-1

0
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c_attack
_prob

i_attack
_prob

a_attack_ke
y_it_prob

0

1

0

0

1

0

a_attack_e
mail_prob

a_attack_ph
one_prob

a_attack_w
eb_prob

ktm_false_
pos_rate

ktm_false_
neg_rate

ttm_false_
pos_rate

ttm_false_
neg_rate

time_failover
_complete

meeting_pl
an_ratio

-1

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

-1

0

0

0

0

-1

0

1

0

1

0

-1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

-1

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

0

-1

-1

-1

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

0

-1

-1

1

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

-1

0

-1
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0

0
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0

0
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0
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0
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0

0
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1
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0
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0
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c_attack
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i_attack
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a_attack_ke
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a_attack_e
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Appendix 6 Construct input deck for operational and strategic simulation
<construct>
<construct>
<!-- ******************************************************************** ->
<!-- *********************** GLOBAL VARIABLES
*************************** -->
<!-- ******************************************************************** ->
<construct_vars>
<!-- value is in col 1 (zero indexed) -->
<var name="param_val_col" value="1" />
<!-- ############################################################### -->
<!-- ############################################################### -->
<!-- ### Start vars from parameters file
### -->
<!-- ### copy 60+ var xml nodes from params_template.xls Column H ## -->
<!-- ### You may need to copy & paste into MS Word, then copy and ## -->
<!-- ### paste into this XML document. It depends on how your ### -->
<!-- ### XML editor handles the Excel-oddities of embedded
### -->
<!-- ### quotations in a cell
### -->
<!-- ############################################################### -->
<!-- ############################################################### -->
<var name="a_attack_email_prob"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,0,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="a_attack_key_it_prob"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,1,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="a_attack_phone_prob"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,2,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="a_attack_web_prob"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,3,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="agent_flip_to_negative_rate"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,4,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="agent_flip_to_positive_rate"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,5,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="attack_end_time"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,6,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="attack_start_time"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,7,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="c_attack_prob"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,8,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="email_preference_mean"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,9,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="email_preference_variance"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,10,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />

<var name="facetoface_preference_mean"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,11,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="facetoface_preference_variance"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,12,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="group_flip_to_positive_rate"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,13,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="group_flip_to_negative_rate"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,14,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="human_agent_forgetting_mean"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,15,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" /><!-- for
use in binary forgetting -->
<var name="human_agent_forgetting_rate"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,16,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" /><!-- for
use in non-binary_forgetting -->
<var name="human_agent_forgetting_variance"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,17,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" /><!-- for
use in binary forgetting -->
<var name="human_agent_initiation_count"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,18,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="human_agent_learn_by_doing"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,19,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="human_agent_message_complexity"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,20,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="human_agent_reception_count"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,21,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="human_agent_selective_attention"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,22,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="i_attack_prob"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,23,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="it_agent_initiation_count"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,24,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="it_agent_forgetting_mean"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,25,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" /><!-- for
use in binary forgetting -->
<var name="it_agent_forgetting_rate"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,26,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" /><!-- for
use in non-binary_forgetting -->
<var name="it_agent_forgetting_variance"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,27,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" /><!-- for use
in binary forgetting -->
<var name="it_agent_message_complexity"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,28,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="it_agent_reception_count"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,29,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
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<var name="knowledge_count"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,30,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" /><!-- not
intended for use within the deck, used by params_template.xls to auto-calculate plan k and
bad-plan k size -->
<var name="knowledge_general_count"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,31,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" /><!-- not
intended for use within the deck, used by params_template.xls to auto-calculate plan k and
bad-plan k size -->
<var name="knowledge_plan_bad_count"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,32,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" /><!-- not
intended for use within the deck, auto-calculated by params_template.xls -->
<var name="knowledge_plan_count"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,33,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" /><!-- not
intended for use within the deck, auto-calculated by params_template.xls -->
<var name="knowledge_plan_priority"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,34,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="knowledge_priority"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,35,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="ktm_false_neg_rate"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,36,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" /><!-replaced with agent/group flip rates for group-based TM generators -->
<var name="ktm_false_pos_rate"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,37,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" /><!-replaced with agent/group flip rates for group-based TM generators -->
<var name="meeting_interaction_multiplier"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,38,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="meeting_plan_ratio"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,39,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="num_briefings"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,40,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="ora_input_fname"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,41,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:string" />
<var name="phone_preference_mean"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,42,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="phone_preference_variance"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,43,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="plan_briefing_1_end"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,44,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="plan_briefing_1_start"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,45,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="plan_briefing_2_end"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,46,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="plan_briefing_2_start"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,47,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="plan_briefing_3_end"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,48,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />

<var name="plan_briefing_3_start"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,49,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="plan_briefing_duration"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,50,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="plan_briefing_interlude"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,51,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="plan_execution_ratio"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,52,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="plan_time_count"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,53,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="social_proximity_weight"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,54,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="time_count"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,55,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="time_failover_complete"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,56,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="ttm_false_neg_rate"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,57,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" /><!-replaced with agent/group flip rates for group-based TM generators -->
<var name="ttm_false_pos_rate"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,58,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" /><!-replaced with agent/group flip rates for group-based TM generators -->
<var name="warm_up_period"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,59,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="warm_up_period_enabled"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,60,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="web_preference_mean"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,61,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="web_preference_variance"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,62,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:float" />
<var name="facetoface"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,63,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="phone_lvl1"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,64,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="phone_lvl2"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,65,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="email_lvl1"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,66,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="email_lvl2"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,67,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="web_lvl1"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,68,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
<var name="web_lvl2"
value="readFromCSVFile[params.csv,69,construct::intvar::param_val_col]:int" />
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<!-- deck calculated value instead of always checking the numerous
vars that would indicate an attack: attack end time > 0; *_attack_*_prob > 0
used to include attack start time > 0, but there could be use cases where attacks start at
time 0 -->
<var name="attack_enabled" value="
if ((construct::floatvar::a_attack_email_prob > 0)
|| (construct::floatvar::a_attack_key_it_prob > 0)
|| (construct::floatvar::a_attack_phone_prob > 0)
|| (construct::floatvar::a_attack_web_prob > 0)
|| (construct::floatvar::c_attack_prob > 0)
|| (construct::floatvar::i_attack_prob > 0)
|| (construct::floatvar::a_attack_key_it_prob > 0)){
true
} else {
false
}
" />
<!-- ############# end copy vars from parameters file ############## -->
<var name="attack_time_list"
value="construct::intvar::attack_start_time..construct::intvar::attack_end_time" />
<var name="attack_time_list_plus_one"
value="construct::stringvar::attack_time_list,(construct::intvar::attack_end_time+1) " />
<var name="attacktime_output_list" value="
if (construct::boolvar::attack_enabled) {
(construct::intvar::attack_start_time-1)..(construct::intvar::attack_end_time+1)
} else {
0
}
" />
<var name="belief_count" value="0" />
<var name="CommunicationMedium_list"
value="construct::intvar::facetoface..construct::intvar::web_lvl2" />
<var name="dummy_nodeclass_list" value="0" /> <!-- eases use of params_template.xls->
<var name="energytask_count" value="0" />
<var name="timeperiod_list" value="0..(construct::intvar::time_count - 1 )" /><!-- out of
alpha-order, but I need it now -->
<var name="plan_meeting_ticks" value="0..(construct::intvar::plan_briefing_duration1)" />
<var name="planning_timeperiod_list" value="(construct::intvar::warm_up_period +
1)..(construct::intvar::warm_up_period + construct::intvar::plan_time_count)" />
<var name="meeting_id_list" value="if (construct::intvar::num_briefings > 0) {
0..(construct::intvar::num_briefings-1)
} else {
0
}" />

<var name="output_by_percentiles" value="
$currTime$ = 0;
$step$ = construct::intvar::time_count / 10; /* 10% step value, ASSUMES time_count
>= 10 so $step$ >= (int)1 */
$result$ = '' + $currTime$;
foreach $i$ (timeperiod_list){
if ($i$:int == ($currTime$ + $step$) ){
$result$ = $result$ + ',' + ($currTime$ + $step$);
$currTime$ = $i$:int;
} else {
$currTime$ = $currTime$; /* non-harm else statement, since 'else' is not optional in
Construct's 'if then else' statements */
}
}
/* now add the last time period to the list */
$result$ = $result$ + ',' + (construct::intvar::time_count - 1);
return $result$;"
with="$result$" />
<var name="plan_briefing_time_list" value="
$plan_briefing_1_time_list$=construct::intvar::plan_briefing_1_start..construct::intvar::pla
n_briefing_1_end;
$plan_briefing_2_time_list$=construct::intvar::plan_briefing_2_start..construct::intvar::pla
n_briefing_2_end;
$plan_briefing_3_time_list$=construct::intvar::plan_briefing_3_start..construct::intvar::pla
n_briefing_3_end;
$result$ = $plan_briefing_1_time_list$ + ',' + $plan_briefing_2_time_list$ + ',' +
$plan_briefing_3_time_list$;
return $result$;"
with="$result$" />
</construct_vars>
<!-- ******************************************************************** ->
<!-- ****************** GLOBAL SIMULATION PARAMETERS
******************** -->
<!-- ******************************************************************** ->
<construct_parameters>
<!-- set to 1 for testing to ensure consistent output
@WARNING comment the line below for runs for record -->
<!-- <param name="seed" value="1.0" />
-->
<param name="verbose_initialization" value="true" />
<param name="verbose_verification" value="true" />
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<param name="verbose_output_timing" value="false" />
<param name="verbose_interaction_weights" value="false" />
<param name="active_models" value="standard interaction model,standard task model"
with="delay_interpolation" />
<param name="active_mechanisms" value="none" />
<param name="belief_model" value="disable" />
<param name="binary_forgetting" value="true" />
<param name="communicationWeightForBelief" value="0.0" />
<param name="communicationWeightForBeliefTM" value="0.0" />
<param name="communicationWeightForFact" value="0.6" />
<param name="communicationWeightForKnowledgeTM" value="0.4" />
<param name="communicationWeightForBinaryTaskAssignment" value="0.0" />
<param name="communicationWeightForBinaryTaskAssignmentTM" value="0.1" />
<!-- <param name="operation_output_working_directory"
value="'c:/Users/Michael.Lanham/Google_Drive/dissertation/construct/strategic'"/>
-->
<param name="default_agent_type" value="human" />
<param name="dynamic_environment" value="false" />
<param name="forgetting" value="true" />
<param name="interaction_requirements" value="disable" />
<param name="thread_count" value="1" />
<param name="transactive_memory" value="enable"/> <!-- other option is enable |
disable-->
<param name="tm_model" value="multi_level"/>
<!-- multi_level | full_tm -->
<param name="activation_threshold_agent" value="-1" /> <!-- used in TM enabled in
multi_level mode, optional, default=-1 -->
<param name="activation_threshold_group" value="-2" /> <!-- used in TM enabled in
multi_level mode, optional, default=-1 -->
<param name="agent_annealing_halflife" value="6" />
<!-- used in TM enabled in
multi_level mode, optional, default=6 -->
<param name="group_annealing_halflife" value="6" />
<!-- used in TM enabled in
multi_level mode, optional, default=6 -->
<param name="use_mail" value="false" />
</construct_parameters>
<!-############################################################################
###### -->
<!-############################################################################
###### -->

<!-- ############# Start groups' names and node IDs from parameters file
############## -->
<!-- ############# copy 30+ xml nodes from params_template.xlsx Sheet 'GroupNames'
Column C ############## -->
<!-- ############# You may need to copy & paste into MS Word, then copy and paste # ->
<!-- ############# into this XML document. It depends on how your XML editor handles
## -->
<!-- ############# the Excel-oddities of embedded quotations in a cell
############### -->
<!-############################################################################
###### -->
<!-############################################################################
###### -->
<nodes>
<!-- mandatory non-empty nodeclass read from Strategic model DynetML file-->
<nodeclass type="agent" id="agent"> <!-- id serves as the prefix to the counter for node
IDs -->
<properties>
<property name="generate_nodeclass" value="true" />
<property name="generator_type" value="dynetml"/>
<property name="generator_doc_path"
value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_id" value="agent" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_type" value="agent" />
</properties>
</nodeclass>
<!-- mandatory non-empty nodeclass read from Strategic model DynetML files, uses
organization node set-->
<nodeclass type="agentgroup" id="agentgroup">
<properties>
<property name="generate_nodeclass" value="true" />
<property name="verbose" value="true" />
<property name="generator_type" value="dynetml"/>
<property name="generator_doc_path"
value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_id" value="organization" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_type" value="Organization" />
</properties>
</nodeclass>
<nodeclass type="agent_type" id="agent_type">
<node id="human" title="human">
<properties>
<property name="communicationMechanism" value="direct" />
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<property name="canSendCommunication" value="true" />
<property name="canReceiveCommunication" value="true" />
<property name="canSendKnowledge" value="true" />
<property name="canReceiveKnowledge" value="true" />
<property name="canSendKnowledgeTM" value="true" />
<property name="canReceiveKnowledgeTM" value="true" />
<property name="canSendReferral" value="true" />
<property name="canReceiveReferral" value="true" />
<property name="canSendBinaryTaskAssignmentTM" value="true"/>
<property name="canReceiveBinaryTaskAssignmentTM" value="true"/>
<property name="canSendBinaryTaskAssignment" value="false"/> <!-assignment of tasks not part of lanham's dissertation -->
<property name="canReceiveBinaryTaskAssignment" value="false"/> <!-assignment of tasks not part of lanham's dissertation -->
<property name="canSendBeliefs" value="false" /> <!-- beliefs not part of
lanham's dissertation -->
<property name="canReceiveBeliefs" value="false" /> <!-- beliefs not part of
lanham's dissertation -->
<property name="canSendBeliefsTM" value="false" />
<!-- beliefs not part of
lanham's dissertation -->
<property name="canReceiveBeliefsTM" value="false" /> <!-- beliefs not part of
lanham's dissertation -->
</properties>
</node>
<node id="it" title="it">
<properties>
<property name="communicationMechanism" value="direct" />
<property name="canSendCommunication" value="true" />
<property name="canReceiveCommunication" value="true" />
<property name="canSendKnowledge" value="true" />
<property name="canReceiveKnowledge" value="true" />
<property name="canSendBeliefs" value="false" />
<property name="canReceiveBeliefs" value="false" />
<property name="canSendBeliefsTM" value="false" />
<property name="canReceiveBeliefsTM" value="false" />
<property name="canSendBinaryTaskAssignmentTM" value="false"/>
<property name="canReceiveBinaryTaskAssignmentTM" value="false"/>
<property name="canSendBinaryTaskAssignment" value="false"/> <!-assignment of tasks not part of lanham's dissertation -->
<property name="canReceiveBinaryTaskAssignment" value="false"/> <!-assignment of tasks not part of lanham's dissertation -->
<property name="canSendKnowledgeTM" value="false" />
<property name="canReceiveKnowledgeTM" value="false" />
<property name="canSendReferral" value="true" />
<property name="canReceiveReferral" value="true" />
</properties>

</node>
</nodeclass>
<nodeclass type="CommunicationMedium" id="CommunicationMedium">
<properties>
<property name="generate_nodeclass" value="true" />
<property name="verbose" value="true" />
<property name="generator_type" value="dynetml"/>
<property name="generator_doc_path"
value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_id" value="comms_media" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_type" value="Resource" />
</properties>
</nodeclass>
<nodeclass type="knowledge" id="knowledge">
<properties>
<property name="generate_nodeclass" value="true" />
<property name="generator_type" value="dynetml"/>
<property name="generator_doc_path"
value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_id" value="knowledge" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_type" value="knowledge" />
</properties>
</nodeclass>
<nodeclass type="knowledgegroup" id="knowledgegroup">
<properties>
<property name="generate_nodeclass" value="true" />
<property name="generator_type" value="dynetml"/>
<property name="generator_doc_path"
value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_id" value="knowledgegroup" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_type" value="unknown" />
</properties>
</nodeclass>
<nodeclass type="binarytask" id="binarytask">
<properties>
<property name="generate_nodeclass" value="true" />
<property name="generator_type" value="dynetml"/>
<property name="generator_doc_path"
value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_id" value="task" />
<property name="generator_nodeclass_type" value="task" />
</properties>
</nodeclass>
<nodeclass type="timeperiod" id="timeperiod">
<properties>

Appendix 6-5

Appendix 6 Construct input deck for operational and strategic simulation
<property name="generate_nodeclass" value="true" />
<property name="generator_type" value="count" />
<property name="generator_count" value="construct::intvar::time_count" />
</properties>
</nodeclass>
<nodeclass type="dummy_nodeclass" id="dummy_nodeclass">
<node id="constant" title="constant" />
</nodeclass>
</nodes>
<networks>
<!-- need these first two grouping networks defined early, as they are used in a lot of the
generators -->
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="agentgroup" id="agent
group membership network" link_type="bool" network_type="dense">
<!-- need to assign agents to one or more groups within the simulation -->
<!-- Load from File -->
<generator type="dynetml">
<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'agent x organization'" />
<param name="transpose" value="false" /> <!-- transpose after reading? optional
param, default = false -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::agentgroup::count_minus_one" />
<param name="verbose" value="false" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="knowledge" target_nodeclass_type="knowledgegroup"
id="knowledge group membership network" link_type="bool" network_type="dense">
<generator type="dynetml">
<!-- @warning note the use of single quotes to force construct to treat
the 'value' as an entire string, else the : and \ cause the Construct lexer fits ! -->
<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'knowledge x knowledgegroup'" />
<param name="transpose" value="false" /> <!-- transpose after reading? optional
param, default = false -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledgegroup::count_minus_one" />
<param name="verbose" value="false" />
</generator>
</network>
<!-- ****************************************************************
remainder of networks are in alphabetical order by network name/id
************************************************************-->

<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="agent" id="access
network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<generator type="dynetml">
<!-- read agent x agent access network from ORA file -->
<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'agent x agent'" />
<param name="transpose" value="false" /> <!-- transpose after reading? optional
param, default = false -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
</generator>
<generator type="randombinary">
<!-- connect level 1 key IT agents to the confidentiality sink with probability
c_attack_prob -->
<rows groups="it_agent_key_level1_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols groups="confidentiality_sink_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<param name="mean" value="construct::floatvar::c_attack_prob" />
</generator>
<generator type="randombinary">
<!-- connect level 1 integrity agent to level 1 key IT Agents with probability
i_attack_prob -->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_level1_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols groups="it_agent_key_level1_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<param name="mean" value="construct::floatvar::i_attack_prob" />
</generator>
<generator type="randombinary">
<!-- connect level 2 integrity agent to level 2 Key IT Agents with probability
i_attack_prob -->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols groups="it_agent_key_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<param name="mean" value="construct::floatvar::i_attack_prob" />
<!--<param name="density" value="0.05" />--> <!-- for use with erdos_renyi -->
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod" id="agent
active timeperiod network" link_type="bool" network_type="dense"> <!--default values -->
<generator type="constant"><!-- turn all agents on at all times -->
<rows groups="all_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
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<param name="constant_value" value="1.0" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant"><!-- turn off integrity and confidentiality agents by default

0
}" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- if an availability Key IT attack is 'on', turn spare key IT on with specified delay
(time_failover_complete) as an integer multiplier of a (plan + brief) cycle,
once turned on during an attack, spare IT systems stay on until end of simulation --

-->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_group, confidentiality_sink_group"
group_membership_network="'agent group membership network'" />
<cols values="all" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant"><!-- turn off jopes as the source of plan knowledge until
the start of the planning period-->
<rows values="426,434" />
<cols values="construct::intvar::warm_up_period" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0" />
</generator>
<generator type="randombinary"><!-- turn integrity agent on at specified probability
during 'attack' times -->
<!-- during attacks, integrity agents get turned on, key agents get turned off, and spare
agents get turned on-->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="attack_time_list" />
<param name="mean" value="if (construct::boolvar::attack_enabled) {
construct::floatvar::i_attack_prob
} else {
0.0
}" />
</generator>
<generator type="randombinary"><!-- if attacks enabled, turned off 80% is the same as
turned on 20%, else on all the time-->
<rows groups="it_agent_key_level1_group,it_agent_key_level2_group"
group_membership_network="'agent group membership network'" />
<cols values="attack_time_list" />
<param name="mean" value="if (construct::boolvar::attack_enabled) {
1.0 - construct::floatvar::a_attack_key_it_prob }
else {
1.0
}" />
</generator>
<generator type="randombinary"><!-- when confidentiality attacks are enabled, turn
the sink(s) on probabilistically for the entire run -->
<rows groups="confidentiality_sink_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="0..nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="mean" value="if (construct::floatvar::c_attack_prob > 0.0) {
construct::floatvar::c_attack_prob } else {

>
<rows
groups="it_agent_key_level1_spare_group,it_agent_key_level2_spare_group"
group_membership_network="'agent group membership network'" />
<cols values="
$spares_on$ ='0';
if (construct::intvar::a_attack_key_it_prob > 0.0){
$spares_on$ = (construct::intvar::attack_start_time
+ (construct::intvar::time_failover_complete
* (construct::intvar::plan_briefing_duration +
construct::intvar::plan_briefing_interlude)))..nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one;
} else {
$spares_on$ ='0';
}
return $spares_on$;" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1.0" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod" id="agent
alive timeperiod network" link_type="bool" network_type="dense">
<generator type="constant">
<!-- mark all agents 'alive' at all times -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1.0" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- make confidentiality agents 'alive' if c_attack is enabled-->
<rows groups="confidentiality_sink_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="if (construct::floatvar::c_attack_prob > 0.0)
{
1.0
} else {
0.0
}
" />
</generator>
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<generator type="constant">
<!-- make integrity agents 'alive' if i_attack is enabled-->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="if (construct::floatvar::i_attack_prob > 0.0){
1.0
}else {
0.0
}
" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod" id="agent
initiation count network" link_type="int" network_type="dense">
<!-- Assign number of initiations per turn per agent -->
<generator type="constant">
<!--default values for all human agents -->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::intvar::human_agent_initiation_count" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!--default values for all it agents -->
<rows groups="it_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::intvar::it_agent_initiation_count"
/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- confidentiality agent is a sink, and does not initiate interactions but does receive
interactions -->
<rows groups="confidentiality_sink_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- JPG planners get to talk more throughout the planning period -->
<rows groups="jpg_joint_planning_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::stringvar::planning_timeperiod_list" />

<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::intvar::human_agent_initiation_count *
construct::intvar::meeting_interaction_multiplier" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- JPG briefing attendees get to talk more throughout the briefing periods -->
<rows groups="jpg_briefing" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::intvar::plan_briefing_time_list" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::intvar::human_agent_initiation_count *
construct::intvar::meeting_interaction_multiplier" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod" id="agent
message complexity network" link_type="int" network_type="dense">
<!-- Assign default complexity of messages per agent per time period -->
<generator type="constant">
<!-- Assign humans and integrity agents default human complexity -->
<rows groups="human_agent_group, integrity_agent_group"
group_membership_network="'agent group membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::intvar::human_agent_message_complexity" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- assign IT systems default IT Systems message complexity, which is
(presumably) more complex messages -->
<rows groups="it_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::intvar::it_agent_message_complexity" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod" id="agent
reception count network" link_type="int" network_type="dense">
<!-- Assign number of receptions per turn per agent -->
<generator type="constant">
<!--default values for all human agents -->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::intvar::human_agent_reception_count" />
</generator>
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<generator type="constant">
<!--default values for all it agents -->
<rows groups="it_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::intvar::it_agent_reception_count"
/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- JPG planners get to listen more throughout the planning period -->
<rows groups="jpg_joint_planning_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::intvar::planning_timeperiod_list" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::intvar::human_agent_initiation_count *
construct::intvar::meeting_interaction_multiplier" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- JPG briefing attendees in meetings get to listen more -->
<rows groups="jpg_briefing" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::intvar::planning_timeperiod_list" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::intvar::human_agent_reception_count *
construct::intvar::meeting_interaction_multiplier" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- integrity agents don't listen to anybody -->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="knowledge" id="agent
forgetting rate network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- set per agent per knowledge forgetting rates when non-binary forgetting is
enabled
@todo for Mike Lanham's dissertation, execute an excursion where this network is
zero'ed out
to see if construct really does only use this for non-binary forgetting -->
<generator type="constant">
<!-- set default forgetting rate for humans -->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one"/>

<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate"/>
<!-<param name="min" value="if ((construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_variance)) < 0.0) {0.0} else
{construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_variance)}"/>
<param name="max" value="if
((construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate+(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_agent_for
getting_variance)) > 1.0) {1.0} else
{construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate+(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_agent_for
getting_variance)}"/>
-->
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- set default forgetting rate for humans -->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols groups="plan_k,bad_plan_k" group_membership_network="'knowledge
group membership network'"/>
<param name="constant_value" value="2 *
construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate"/>
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- set default forgetting rate for IT systems (including confidentiality agent),
which is 0.6 of default human rate -->
<rows groups="it_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one"/>
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_variance"/>
<!-<param name="min" value="if
(((construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate*0.6)(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_variance)) < 0.0) {0.0} else
{(construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate*0.6)(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_variance)}"/>
<param name="max" value="if
(((construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate*0.6)+(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_age
nt_forgetting_variance)) > 1.0) {1.0} else
{(construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate*0.6)+(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_age
nt_forgetting_variance)}"/>
-->
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- set default forgetting rate for humans -->
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<rows groups="it_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols groups="plan_k,bad_plan_k" group_membership_network="'knowledge
group membership network'"/>
<param name="constant_value" value="2 *
construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate"/>
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
<generator type="randomuniform">
<!-- set default forgetting rate for all agents' 'bad plan' knowledge, 1.5 * regular
knowledge ,
including confidentiality agents-->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one"/>
<cols groups="bad_plan_k" group_membership_network="'knowledge group
membership network'" />
<param name="max" value="if
(((construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate*1.5)+(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_age
nt_forgetting_variance)) > 1.0) {1.0} else
{(construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate*1.5)+(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_age
nt_forgetting_variance)}"/>
<param name="min" value="
if (((construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate*1.5)(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_variance)) < 0.0) {
0.0
} else {
if (((construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate*1.5)(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_variance)) > 1.0) {
0.99
} else {
(construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_rate*1.5)(3.0*construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_variance)
}
}
"/>
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- set default integrity system forgetting rate for 'bad plan' knowledge==0 -->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols groups="bad_plan_k" group_membership_network="'knowledge group
membership network'" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0.0"/>
</generator>
</network>

<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="dummy_nodeclass"
id="agent forgetting mean network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- set per agent forgetting mean when binary forgetting is enabled, its the probability
the bit will be completely forgot-->
<generator type="randomnormal">
<!-- set the general human agent forgetting rate-->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="0"/>
<param name="mean"
value="construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_mean"/>
<param name="variance"
value="construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_variance"/>
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- set the it agent forgetting rate to 0.6 of human forgetting rate-->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="0"/>
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_mean * 0.6"/>
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- set the integrity agent forgetting rate to 0 -->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="0"/>
<param name="constant_value" value="0" />
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="dummy_nodeclass"
id="agent forgetting variance network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- set per agent forgetting variance when binary forgetting is enabled-->
<generator type="constant">
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one"/>
<cols first="0" last="0"/>
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::floatvar::human_agent_forgetting_variance"/>
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="dummy_nodeclass"
id="agent learn by doing rate network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">

Appendix 6-10

Appendix 6 Construct input deck for operational and strategic simulation
<generator type="randomuniform">
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one"/>
<cols first="0" last="0"/>
<param name="min" value="1.0construct::floatvar::human_agent_learn_by_doing"/>
<param name="max" value="construct::floatvar::human_agent_learn_by_doing"/>
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="knowledge" id="agent
learning rate network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<generator type="constant">
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one"/>
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one"/>
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::floatvar::human_agent_learn_by_doing"/>
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="dummy_nodeclass"
id="agent selective attention effect network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<generator type="constant">
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::dummy_nodeclass::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1.0" /><!-- agent considers all known bits
eligible to send -->
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="dummy_nodeclass"
id="agent type name network" link_type="string" network_type="dense">
<generator type="constant">
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::dummy_nodeclass::count-1"/>
<param name="constant_value" value="human"/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<rows groups="it_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::dummy_nodeclass::count-1"/>
<param name="constant_value" value="it"/>
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="binarytask"
id="binarytask assignment network" link_type="bool" network_type="dense">
<generator type="dynetml">

<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'agent x task'" />
<param name="transpose" value="false" /> <!-- transpose after reading? optional
param, default = false -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::binarytask::count_minus_one" />
<param name="verbose" value="false"/>
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="knowledge" target_nodeclass_type="binarytask"
id="binarytask requirement network" link_type="bool" network_type="dense">
<generator type="dynetml">
<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'knowledge x task'" />
<param name="transpose" value="false" /> <!-- transpose after reading? optional
param, default = false -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::binarytask::count_minus_one" />
<param name="verbose" value="false" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod"
id="binarytask similarity weight network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- random values for human agent in the absence of empirical data -->
<generator type="randomnormal">
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="mean" value="0.6" />
<param name="variance" value="0.06" />
</generator>
<!-- very low but non-zero random values for it agents in the absence of empirical data
-->
<generator type="randomnormal">
<rows groups="it_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="mean" value="0.01" />
<param name="variance" value="0.05" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="knowledge" target_nodeclass_type="binarytask"
id="binarytask truth network" link_type="bool" network_type="dense">
<generator type="dynetml">
<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'knowledge x task'" />
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<param name="transpose" value="false" /> <!-- transpose after reading? optional
param, default = false -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::binarytask::count_minus_one" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="CommunicationMedium"
id="communication medium access network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- Agent access to one or more communications mediums. Without access to >= 1,
the agent cannot communicate with anyone -->
<!-- Load from File -->
<generator type="dynetml">
<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'agent x comms_media'" />
<param name="transpose" value="false" />
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::CommunicationMedium::count_minus_one" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" inner_nodeclass_type="agent"
target_nodeclass_type="CommunicationMedium" id="communication medium preferences
network 3d" link_type="float" network_type="dense3d">
<!-- As a 3D network, cannot read in from ORA, so must create it within construct-->
<generator type="constant3d">
<!-- IT systems on level 1 can only use web to talk with other level 1 systems and
humans -->
<rows groups="it_agent_level1_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<inners groups="it_agent_level1_group,human_agent_group"
group_membership_network="'agent group membership network'" />
<cols values="web_lvl1" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1.0" />
<!-<param name="verbose" value="true" /> -->
</generator>
<generator type="constant3d">
<!-- web interaction is the only choice to interact with IT systems as the target/alter->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<inners groups="it_agent_level1_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="web_lvl1" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1.0" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant3d">
<!-- IT systems on level 2 can only use web to talk with other level 2 systems -->

<rows groups="it_agent_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<inners groups="it_agent_level2_group,human_agent_level2_group"
group_membership_network="'agent group membership network'" />
<cols values="web_lvl2" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1.0" />
<!-<param name="verbose" value="true" /> -->
</generator>
<generator type="constant3d">
<rows groups="human_agent_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<inners groups="it_agent_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="web_lvl2" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1.0" />
<!-<param name="verbose" value="true" /> -->
</generator>
<generator type="constant3d">
<!-- human agents prefer face-to-face with each other X% of the time -->
<!-- @TODO fix this so its collocation, non-collocation sensitive -->
<!-- @TODO add randomUniform3d as a generator type -->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<inners groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="facetoface" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::floatvar::facetoface_preference_mean" />
</generator>
<generator type="constantdiagonal3d">
<!-- human agents when talking to themselves are assured of access via facetoface->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<inners groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="facetoface" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1.0" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant3d">
<!-- human agents prefer phone & email (unfiltered & filtered) with each other Y%
of the time, respectively -->
<!-- @TODO fix this so its collocation, non-collocation sensitive -->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
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<inners groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="phone_lvl1" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::floatvar::phone_preference_mean" />
<!-<param name="verbose" value="true" /> -->
</generator>
<generator type="constant3d">
<rows groups="human_agent_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<inners groups="human_agent_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="phone_lvl2" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::floatvar::phone_preference_mean" />
<!-<param name="verbose" value="true" /> -->
</generator>
<generator type="constant3d">
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<inners groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="email_lvl1" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::floatvar::email_preference_mean" />
<!-<param name="verbose" value="true" /> -->
</generator>
<generator type="constant3d">
<rows groups="human_agent_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<inners groups="human_agent_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="email_lvl2" />
<param name="constant_value"
value="construct::floatvar::email_preference_mean" />
<!-<param name="verbose" value="true" /> -->
</generator>
<generator type="constant3d">
<!-- human agents prefer web (unfiltered & filtered) with each other Z% of the time,
respectively -->
<!-- @TODO fix this so its collocation, non-collocation sensitive -->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<inners groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="web_lvl1" />

<param name="constant_value" value="construct::floatvar::web_preference_mean"
/>
<!--

<param name="verbose" value="true" /> -->
</generator>
<generator type="constant3d">
<rows groups="human_agent_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<inners groups="human_agent_level2_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="web_lvl2" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::floatvar::web_preference_mean"
/>
<!-<param name="verbose" value="true" /> -->
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="knowledge"
id="interaction knowledge weight network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- for each agent, weight the ego places on the specific knowledge bits when picking
an interaction partner -->
<generator type="constant"><!--default values -->
<!-- start off with all agents (human and IT) weighting all knowledge equally -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::intvar::knowledge_priority" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant"><!-- plan knowledge is equally valued by all -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols groups="plan_k,bad_plan_k" group_membership_network="'knowledge
group membership network'" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::intvar::knowledge_plan_priority"
/>
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="agent" id="interaction
sphere network" link_type="bool" network_type="dense">
<!-- starting absolute agent x agent interaction network -->
<generator type="dynetml">
<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'agent x agent'" />
<param name="transpose" value="false" /> <!-- transpose after reading? optional
param, default = false -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
</generator>
</network>
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<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod"
id="knowledge expertise weight network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- weight each ego gives to knowledge bits it does not have when deciding which
alter to interact with -->
<!--default values -->
<generator type="randomuniform">
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="min" value="0.4" />
<param name="max" value="0.9" />
</generator>
<generator type="randomuniform">
<!-- during briefings, jpg briefing attendees like to get knowledge they don't have ->
<rows groups="jpg_briefing" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::stringvar::planning_timeperiod_list" />
<param name="min" value="0.8" />
<param name="max" value="0.9999" />
</generator>
<generator type="randomuniform">
<!-- during planning, jpg planners like to get knowledge they don't have -->
<rows groups="jpg_joint_planning_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::stringvar::plan_briefing_time_list" />
<param name="min" value="0.8" />
<param name="max" value="0.9999" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- integrity agents are interested in spreading bad knowledge, they weight agents
without bad plan knowledge more heavily than other agents -->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::stringvar::plan_briefing_time_list" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0.9999" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="knowledge"
id="knowledge network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- agent x knowledge assignment -->
<generator type="dynetml">
<!-- Load from File -->
<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'agent x knowledge'" />
<param name="transpose" value="false" /> <!-- transpose after reading? optional
param, default = false -->

<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one" />
</generator>
<generator type="randomnormal">
<!-- insert level 1 plan data randomly into all Key IT systems & JPG with low
density random normal -->
<rows groups="it_agent_key_group,jpg_joint_planning_group"
group_membership_network="'agent group membership network'" />
<cols groups="plan_k_level1" group_membership_network="'knowledge group
membership network'" />
<param name="mean" value="0.1"/>
<param name="variance" value="0.02"/>
</generator>
<generator type="randomnormal">
<!-- insert level 2 plan data into level 2 Key IT systems with high density erdos
renyi, as orders come through electronically -->
<!-- 28 Mar 15, erdos renyi generate was causing a seg fault when row count != col
count so moved back to random normal generator-->
<rows groups="it_agent_key_level2_group,jpg_level2"
group_membership_network="'agent group membership network'" />
<cols groups="plan_k_level2" group_membership_network="'knowledge group
membership network'" />
<param name="mean" value="0.1"/>
<param name="variance" value="0.02"/>
</generator>
<generator type="randomnormal">
<!-- insert level 1 plan data into JPG with lower density erdos renyi, as orders come
through electronically -->
<!-- 28 Mar 15, erdos renyi generate was causing a seg fault when row count != col
count so moved back to random normal generator-->
<rows groups="jpg_joint_planning_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols groups="plan_k_level2" group_membership_network="'knowledge group
membership network'" />
<param name="mean" value="0.2"/>
<param name="variance" value="0.08"/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- link integrity agent with bad plan data when i_attack_prob > 0. Keeping links
out of the ORA file reduces the chance
of knowledge leakage through TM perceptions of the integrity agent(s) -->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_level1_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols groups="bad_plan_k_level1" group_membership_network="'knowledge
group membership network'" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1" />
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</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="knowledge"
id="knowledge priority network" link_type="int" network_type="dense">
<!-- for each agent, weight the ego places on the specific knowledge bits when picking
knowledge to send to the chosen interaction partner -->
<!-- Default values-->
<generator type="constant">
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::intvar::knowledge_priority" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<rows groups="jpg_joint_planning_group,jpg_briefing"
group_membership_network="'agent group membership network'" />
<cols groups="plan_k,bad_plan_k" group_membership_network="'knowledge
group membership network'" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::intvar::knowledge_plan_priority"
/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- Zero out integrity agent priority network -->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::intvar::knowledge_plan_priority"
/>
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- now only give priority to bad knowledge for the integrity agent -->
<rows groups="integrity_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols groups="bad_plan_k" group_membership_network="'knowledge group
membership network'" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::intvar::knowledge_plan_priority"
/>
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod"
id="knowledge similarity weight network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- weight each ego gives to knowledge bits it shares with alters when deciding with
whom to interact -->
<generator type="randomnormal">
<!--default values -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />

<param name="mean" value="0.6" />
<param name="variance" value="0.06" />
</generator>
<generator type="randomnormal">
<rows groups="jpg_joint_planning_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::stringvar::planning_timeperiod_list" />
<param name="mean" value="0.7" />
<param name="variance" value="0.07" />
</generator>
<generator type="randomuniform">
<rows groups="jpg_briefing" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::stringvar::plan_briefing_time_list" />
<param name="min" value="0.2" />
<param name="max" value="0.5" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="knowledge" id="learnable
knowledge network" link_type="bool" network_type="dense">
<generator type="constant">
<!-- all knowledge is learnable -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="CommunicationMedium"
target_nodeclass_type="knowledge" id="medium knowledgegroup network"
link_type="bool" network_type="dense">
<!-- CommunicationMedium x knowledge group assignment...iow, which groups do
the mediums support? -->
<!-- @TODO Fix this so knowledge is not controlled in such an absolutist manner
<!-- it is more likely that all knowledge groups can go over all comms mediums/media
-->
<!-- In the mean time, load from File the network manually constructed in the ORA
file-->
<generator type="dynetml">
<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'knowledge x comms_media'" />
<param name="transpose" value="true" /> <!-- transpose after reading? optional
param, default = false -->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::CommunicationMedium::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledgegroup::count_minus_one" />
</generator>
</network>
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<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="agent" id="physical
proximity network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- proximity of agents to each other. Zero(0) ==> maximally distant with each other
with one(1)==>maximally close) -->
<generator type="dynetml">
<param name="filesystem_path" value="construct::stringvar::ora_input_fname" />
<param name="network_name" value="'physical proximity'" />
<param name="transpose" value="false" />
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod" id="physical
proximity weight network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!--default values -->
<generator type="randomnormal">
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="mean" value="0.6" />
<param name="variance" value="0.06" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<!-- IT agents don't care about physical proximity, including integrity agents (as IT)
-->
<rows groups="it_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="1.0" />
</generator>
<generator type="randomnormal">
<!-- during briefings, agents are nudged to talk with other close by agents -->
<rows groups="jpg_briefing" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::stringvar::plan_briefing_time_list" />
<param name="mean" value="0.9" />
<param name="variance" value="0.09" />
</generator>
<generator type="randomnormal">
<!-- during planning time, planning agents are nudged to talk with other close by
agents -->
<rows groups="jpg_joint_planning_group" group_membership_network="'agent
group membership network'" />
<cols values="construct::stringvar::planning_timeperiod_list" />
<param name="mean" value="0.9" />
<param name="variance" value="0.09" />
</generator>

</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="dummy_nodeclass"
id="public message propensity network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- Not used in this model, so all zeros -->
<generator type="constant">
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::dummy_nodeclass::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0.0" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="agent"
id="sociodemographic proximity network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- proximity of agents to each other. Zero(0) ==> maximally distant with each other
with one(1)==>maximally close) -->
<!-- random values for human agent in the absence of empirical data, it agents don't
care so they stay with default of 0 -->
<generator type="randomnormal">
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<param name="mean" value="0.2" />
<param name="variance" value="0.02" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod"
id="sociodemographic proximity weight network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<generator type="constant">
<!-- default value = 0.01 for all agents-->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0.01" />
</generator>
<generator type="randomnormal">
<!-- random values for human agent in the absence of empirical data -->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="mean" value="0.2" />
<param name="variance" value="0.02" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="agent" id="social
proximity network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- proximity of agents to each other. Zero(0) ==> maximally distant with each other
with one(1)==>maximally close) -->
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<generator type="constant">
<!-- default value = 0.01 for all agents-->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0.01" />
</generator>
<!-- random values for human agent in the absence of empirical data -->
<generator type="randomnormal">
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<param name="mean" value="0.6" />
<param name="variance" value="0.06" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="timeperiod" id="social
proximity weight network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- when picking an interaction partner, weight ego uses to develop probability of
interaction -->
<generator type="constant">
<!-- default value = 0 for all agents-->
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0.01" />
</generator>
<generator type="randomnormal">
<!-- random values for human agent in the absence of empirical data -->
<rows groups="human_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::timeperiod::count_minus_one" />
<param name="mean" value="0.4" />
<param name="variance" value="0.04" />
</generator>
</network>
<network src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="knowledge"
id="transmission knowledge weight network" link_type="float" network_type="dense">
<!-- when picking knowledge to transmit to alters, weight assigned to each knowledge
bit for inclusion in messages -->
<generator type="constant">
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />
<cols first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::intvar::knowledge_priority" />
</generator>
<generator type="constant">
<rows first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one" />

<cols groups="plan_k,bad_plan_k" group_membership_network="'knowledge
group membership network'" />
<param name="constant_value" value="construct::intvar::knowledge_plan_priority"
/>
</generator>
<!-- integrity agents like to transmit nothing but bad plan knowledge -->
<generator type="constant">
<rows groups="integrity_agent_group" group_membership_network="'agent group
membership network'" />
<cols groups="no_bad_k" group_membership_network="'knowledge group
membership network'" />
<param name="constant_value" value="0" />
</generator>
</network>
</networks>

<!-- ******************************************************************** ->
<!-- INITIAL TRANSACTIVE MEMORY VALUES -->
<!-- these are agent perceptions of others -->
<!-- ******************************************************************** ->
<transactivememory>
<network id="'knowledge transactive memory network'" ego_nodeclass_type="agent"
src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="knowledge" link_type="bool"
network_type="TMBool" associated_network="knowledge network">
<!-- default random values created from random_value < false positive and negative
rates and omniscient knowledge value -->
<!-- shifted away from perception based to group based for use with multi-level TM ->
<generator type="group_based">
<!-- ignore transactive memory about and for the integrity and confidentiality
agents-->
<ego first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one - 2"/>
<alter first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count_minus_one - 2"/>/>
<transactive first="0" last="construct::intvar::knowledge_general_count +
construct::intvar::knowledge_plan_count - 1"/>
<param name="name" value="initial_KTM_group_to_group_for_no_bad_k" />
<param name="group_flip_to_positive_rate"
value="construct::floatvar::group_flip_to_positive_rate"/>
<param name="group_flip_to_negative_rate"
value="construct::floatvar::group_flip_to_negative_rate"/>
<param name="agent_flip_to_positive_rate"
value="construct::floatvar::agent_flip_to_positive_rate"/>

Appendix 6-17

Appendix 6 Construct input deck for operational and strategic simulation
<param name="agent_flip_to_negative_rate"
value="construct::floatvar::agent_flip_to_negative_rate"/>
<param name="verbose" value="false"/>
<param name="verbosity_frequency" value="50"/> <!--** display every nth agent
** -->
</generator>
<generator type="group_based">
<!-- ignore transactive memory about and for the integrity and confidentiality
agents-->
<ego values="construct::agentgroupvar::non_integrity_agent_group"/>
<alter values="construct::agentgroupvar::integrity_agent_group"/>/>
<transactive first="construct::intvar::knowledge_general_count +
construct::intvar::knowledge_plan_count" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one"/>
<param name="name" value="initial_KTM_group_to_group_for_bad_k_only" />
<param name="group_flip_to_positive_rate" value="0.0"/>
<param name="group_flip_to_negative_rate" value="1.0"/>
<param name="agent_flip_to_positive_rate" value="0.0"/>
<param name="agent_flip_to_negative_rate" value="1.0"/>
<param name="verbose" value="true"/>
<param name="verbosity_frequency" value="1"/> <!--** display every nth agent **
-->
</generator>
</network>
<network id="'binarytask transactive memory network'" ego_nodeclass_type="agent"
src_nodeclass_type="agent" target_nodeclass_type="binarytask" link_type="bool"
network_type="TMBool" associated_network="binarytask assignment network">
<generator type="group_based">
<ego first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count - 3"/>
<alter first="0" last="nodeclass::agent::count - 3"/>
<transactive first="0" last="nodeclass::knowledge::count_minus_one"/>
<param name="name" value="initial_BinaryTaskTM_group_to_group" />
<param name="group_flip_to_positive_rate"
value="construct::floatvar::group_flip_to_positive_rate"/>
<param name="group_flip_to_negative_rate"
value="construct::floatvar::group_flip_to_negative_rate"/>
<param name="agent_flip_to_positive_rate"
value="construct::floatvar::agent_flip_to_positive_rate"/>
<param name="agent_flip_to_negative_rate"
value="construct::floatvar::agent_flip_to_negative_rate"/>
<param name="verbose" value="true"/>
</generator>
</network>
</transactivememory>
<!-- ******************************************************************** -->

<!-- OPERATIONS FOR SIMULATION OUTPUT -->
<!-- these are the values that are printed and/or saved -->
<!-- ******************************************************************** -->
<operations>
<operation name="Nodeset_dump"><!-- Dump agent nodeset for ease of agent_n to
agent_name conversions -->
<parameters>
<param name="nodeset_name" value="agent"/>
<param name="output_filename" value="agent_nodeset.csv"/>
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" /> <!-- default=false-->
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" /> <!-- default=false-->
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="0"/>
<param name="verbose" value="false"/> <!-- optional, default=false-->
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="Nodeset_dump"><!-- Dump agent nodeset for ease of agent_n to
agent_name conversions -->
<parameters>
<param name="nodeset_name" value="agentgroup"/>
<param name="output_filename" value="agentgroup_nodeset.csv"/>
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" /> <!-- default=false-->
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" /> <!-- default=false-->
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="0"/>
<param name="verbose" value="false"/> <!-- optional, default=false-->
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="AvgProbInteractOverRuns"><!-- print average of interaction
probability per agent-->
<parameters>
<param name="output_filename" value="avgProbabilityOfInteraction.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="time" value="all"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
</parameters>
</operation> <!-- these operations help test that Construct read the graphs of the dynetml
file correctly -->
<operation name="ReadGraphByName"> <!-- Printing the agent x agent access network
before and during the attack helps modeler confirm/deny the as-evolved networks == asdesigned networks -->
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<parameters>
<param name="graph_name" value="'access network'"/>
<param name="output_filename"
value="agent_access_network_attack_times.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="attacktime_output_list"/>
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_access_network" />
<param name="operation_subname" value="all_time_periods" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="no_empty_lines " value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ReadGraphByName"> <!-- Printing the agent x communication
medium access network before & during attack helps modeler confirm/deny the as-evolved
networks == as-designed networks -->
<parameters>
<param name="graph_name" value="'communication medium access network'"/>
<param name="output_filename"
value="agent_comms_media_access_network_attack_times.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="all"/>
<!-<param name="time" value="construct::stringvar::attacktime_output_list"/>
-->
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_access_network" />
<param name="operation_subname" value="all_time_periods" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="no_empty_lines " value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ReadGraphKTM"> <!-- print KTM 3D for first 11 time periods -->
<parameters>
<param name="output_filename" value="KTM_first_ten.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="0"/>
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
<param name="print_ego_numbers" value="true" /> <!-- default false-->
<param name="print_ego_names" value="true" /><!-- default false-->
<param name="print_alter_numbers" value="true" /> <!-- default false-->

<param name="print_alter_names" value="true" /><!-- default false-->
<param name="print_k_numbers" value="true" /> <!-- default false-->
<param name="print_k_names" value="true" /><!-- default false-->
<param name="no_empty_lines" value="true" /><!-- default true-->
<param name="time" value="0..10"/>
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ReadGraphByName"> <!-- Printing the agent x active timeperiod
network before and during the attack helps modeler confirm/deny the as-evolved networks ==
as-designed networks -->
<parameters>
<param name="graph_name" value="'agent active timeperiod network'"/>
<param name="output_filename"
value="agent_active_timeperiod_network_attack_times.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="attacktime_output_list"/>
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_agent_active_timeperiod_network"
/>
<param name="operation_subname" value="all_time_periods" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="no_empty_lines " value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ReadGraphByName"> <!-- Printing the agent x dummy network that
specifies the agent type at time 0 helps modeler confirm/deny the as-evolved networks == asdesigned networks -->
<parameters>
<param name="graph_name" value="'agent active timeperiod network'"/>
<param name="output_filename"
value="agent_active_timeperiod_network_0.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="0"/>
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_agent_active_timeperiod_network"
/>
<param name="operation_subname" value="time_zero" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="no_empty_lines " value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
</parameters>
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</operation>
<operation name="ReadGraphByName"> <!-- Printing the agent x knowledge network
supports exogenous to Construct analysis of knowledge based
metrics, every ten percent of the run, during attack times (+/- 1) and during brief times
-->
<parameters>
<param name="graph_name" value="'knowledge network'"/>
<param name="output_filename" value="knowledge_over_time.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<!--<param name="time"
value="output_by_percentiles,attacktime_output_list,plan_briefing_time_list"/>-->
<param name="time" value="all"/>
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_agent_knowledge_network" />
<!--<param name="operation_subname"
value="ten_percent_attacktime_output_list_plan_briefing_time_list" />-->
<param name="operation_subname" value="all_time_periods" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="no_empty_lines " value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ReadGraphByName"> <!-- Printing interaction network at all times ->
<parameters>
<param name="graph_name" value="'interaction network'"/>
<param name="output_filename" value="interaction_all.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_interaction_network_network" />
<param name="operation_subname" value="all_time_periods" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="no_empty_lines " value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ReadKnowledgeLearningHistory"> <!-- Print the knowledge
learning history for first 11 time periods -->
<parameters>
<param name="output_filename" value="knowledge_history_all.csv"/>

<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10" />
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_knowledge_history" />
<param name="operation_subname" value="first_ten_time_periods" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="no_empty_lines " value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ReadKnowledgeDiffusionByAgentGroup"> <!-diffusion_by_group_all -->
<parameters>
<param name="graph_name" value="'knowledge network'"/>
<param name="output_filename" value="diffusion_by_group_all.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="output_by_percentiles" />
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_knowledge_diffusion_network" />
<param name="operation_subname" value="every_ten_percent" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<!-<param name="verbose" value="true" />
-->
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="KnowledgeDiffusionByIndexRange"> <!-- Print the bad plan
knowledge diffusion-->
<parameters>
<param name="graph_name" value="'knowledge network'"/>
<param name="output_filename" value="bad_plan_k_all.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="output_by_percentiles" />
<param name="operation_name"
value="dump_knowledge_diffusion_bad_plan_only" />
<param name="operation_subname" value="every_ten_percent" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
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<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="verbose" value="true" />
<param name="index_list" value="construct::knowledgegroupvar::bad_plan_k" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="KnowledgeDiffusionByIndexRange"> <!-- Print the non-bad
knowledge (plan and non-plan)-->
<parameters>
<param name="graph_name" value="'knowledge network'"/>
<param name="output_filename" value="non_bad_diffusion_all.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="all" />
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_non_bad_diffusion_all" />
<param name="operation_subname" value="all_time_periods" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<!-<param name="verbose" value="true" />
-->
<param name="index_list" value="construct::knowledgegroupvar::no_bad_k" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ReadKnowledgeDiffusion"> <!-- print knowledge diffusion stats, all
times -->
<parameters>
<param name="graph_name" value="'knowledge network'"/>
<param name="output_filename" value="diffusion_all.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="all" />
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_diffusion_all" />
<param name="operation_subname" value="all_time_periods" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ReadAgentsWhoDoNotInteractWithAnyone">
<parameters>
<param name="output_filename"
value="AgentsWhoDoNotInteractWithAnyone.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<!--->

<param name="output_to_stdout" value="true"/>
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="all"/>
<param name="operation_name" value="dump_agents_who_dont_interact" />
<param name="operation_subname" value="all_time_periods" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ReadAgentCoreTies">
<parameters>
<param name="output_filename" value="agent_core_ties_first_eleven.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="time" value="0..10"/>
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_row_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_numbers" value="true" />
<param name="activation_score_as_edge_weight" value="true"/>
</parameters>
</operation>
<operation name="ActivateAltersForAgents"><!-- Used to make agents aware of a
new/old set of alters with some probability at the
specified time (post attack + 1) new awareness will stick. Use Case: A message to all
agents of who the 'chain of command' is
ActivateAltersForAgents validated output == reasonable 28 Jan 15 -->
<parameters>
<param name="output_filename" value="activateAlters_0.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="time" value="0,1"/>
<param name="activation_network_filename"
value="starting_active_Alters_edgeList.csv"/>
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
<param name="load_style" value="sparse_to_dense_convert" />
<param name="skip_first_row" value="true" />
<param name="probability_of_activation" value=".9"/>
</parameters>
</operation>
<!-- <operation name="ActivateAltersForAgents"> <!-- ActivateAltersForAgents validated
output == reasonable 28 Jan 15 -->
<!--
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<parameters>
<param name="output_filename" value="activateAlters_343.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="time" value="construct::intvar::attack_end_time+1"/>
<param name="activation_network_filename"
value="activateAlters_edgeList.csv"/>
<param name="symmetric_flag" value="false"/>
<param name="load_style" value="sparse_to_dense_convert" />
<param name="skip_first_row" value="true" />
<param name="probability_of_activation" value=".5"/>
</parameters>
</operation>
-->
<!-- Allows experimenter to force a recalculation by ego's of their transactive memory of
groups in the sim
Use Case: Can be used if some substantial change has occurred and simulator needs to tell
all agents
to reassess their understanding of the world -->
<!-- <operation name="ForceLossyIntersection">
<parameters>
<param name="time" value="all"/>
</parameters>
</operation>
-->
<!-- Prints per agent perception of groups' knowledge -->
<!-- <operation name="ReadAgentBeliefOfGroupKnowledgeMatrix"> <!-- -->
<!-<parameters>
<param name="output_filename" value="AvgAgentBeliefOfGroupKnowledge.csv"/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="time" value="all"/>
</parameters>
</operation>
<!-- <operation name="CommunicationMediumsSent"> <!-- -->
<!-<parameters>
<param name="output_filename" value="Communications_Mediums_Sent_all.csv"
/>
<param name="output_format" value="csv" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
<param name="time" value="all" />
</parameters>
</operation>
<!-- <operation name="CommunicationMediumsReceived"> <!-- -->
<!-<parameters>

<param name="output_filename"
value="Communications_Mediums_Received_all.csv" />
<param name="output_format" value="csv" />
<param name="print_row_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_col_names" value="true" />
<param name="print_run_and_timeperiod" value="true" />
<param name="time" value="all" />
</parameters>
</operation>
-->
<!-- availability attacks not specifically targeting key IT systems are targeting the
communications mechanisms -->

<operation name="ReadGeneralDecisionOutput"><!-- Use ReadGeneralDecisionOutput
to turn agent x communicationMediums on/off
as a function of being during the attack time windows, and based on a probabilistic
random draw being less than the
modeler specified threshold -->
<parameters>
<param name="verbose" value="true" />
<param name="run" value="all"/>
<param name="time" value="attack_time_list_plus_one"/>
<param name="output_filename" value="turn_comms_media_off_and_on.csv"/>'
<param name="output_format" value="csv"/>
<param name="header_row" value="true"/>
<param name="applicable_agents"
value="construct::agentgroupvar::non_integrity_agent_group"/>
<param name="decision_names"
value="a_attack_web_off,a_attack_phone_off,a_attack_email_off,turn_agents_comms_on" />
<param name="a_attack_email_off" value="1" />
<param name="a_attack_web_off" value="
if ((construct::boolvar::attack_enabled) && (timeperiod >
construct::intvar::warm_up_period)
&& (randomUniform(0.0,1.0) < construct::floatvar::a_attack_web_prob)
&& (timeperiod ≤ construct::intvar::attack_end_time))
{ /* setFooNetwork returns the value being set, multiple sets can occur by chaining
them with a boolean AND operator to cause all to execute */
setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[agent,construct::intvar::web_lvl1,0.0]
&
setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[agent,construct::intvar::web_lvl2,0.0]
} else {
1 /* non-harm else statement */
}" with="agent,verbose,timeperiod" />
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<param name="a_attack_phone_off" value="
if ((construct::boolvar::attack_enabled) && (timeperiod >
construct::intvar::warm_up_period)
&& (randomUniform(0.0,1.0) < construct::floatvar::a_attack_phone_prob)
&& (timeperiod ≤ construct::intvar::attack_end_time)){

setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al2$,construct::intvar::phone_lvl1,1.0] &
setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al2$,construct::intvar::phone_lvl2,1.0] &
setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al2$,construct::intvar::email_lvl2,1.0] &

setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[agent,construct::intvar::phone_lvl1,0.0] &
setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al2$,construct::intvar::email_lvl1,1.0]
}&
foreach $al1$ (construct::agentgroupvar::human_agent_level1_group){

setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[agent,construct::intvar::phone_lvl2,0.0]
} else {
1 /* non-harm else statement */
}" with="agent,verbose,timeperiod" />
<param name="a_attack_email_off" value="
if (construct::boolvar::attack_enabled && (timeperiod >
construct::intvar::warm_up_period)
&& (randomUniform(0.0,1.0) < construct::floatvar::a_attack_email_prob)
&& (timeperiod ≤ construct::intvar::attack_end_time)){

setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al1$,construct::intvar::web_lvl1,1.0] &
setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al1$,construct::intvar::phone_lvl1,1.0] &
setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al1$,construct::intvar::email_lvl2,1.0] &
}&
foreach $al2$ (construct::agentgroupvar::it_agent_level2_group){

setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[agent,construct::intvar::email_lvl1,0.0] &
setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[agent,construct::intvar::email_lvl2,0.0]
} else {
1 /* non-harm else statement */
}" with="agent,verbose,timeperiod" />
<!-- Use ReadGeneralDecisionOutput to turn agent x communicationMediums on after
attack as a function
of the agent being level1 or level2, or level 2, attacks were enabled, and attacks have
ended -->
<param name="turn_agents_comms_on" value="
if (construct::boolvar::attack_enabled && (timeperiod >=
(construct::intvar::attack_end_time+1)) ) {
foreach $al2$ (construct::agentgroupvar::human_agent_level2_group){
setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al2$,construct::intvar::web_lvl1,1.0] &

setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al2$,construct::intvar::web_lvl2,1.0]
}&
foreach $al1$ (construct::agentgroupvar::it_agent_level1_group){
setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al1$,construct::intvar::web_lvl1,1.0]
}
} else {
1 /* non-harm else statement */
}" with="verbose,timeperiod" />
</parameters>
</operation>
</operations>
</construct>
</construct>

setCommunicationMediumAccessNetwork[$al2$,construct::intvar::web_lvl2,1.0] &

Appendix 6-23

Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics of Operational Model, Attacks, and Mitigations
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

.00

.31

.20

1.51

4000
4000
4000
4000
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400

1.54

1.71

1.74

3.51

3.53

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

3128
351
2781

743
39
704

3871
390
3485

2669.02 14.301
306.71 1.345
2362.31 13.063

904.484
85.094
826.184

818091.880 -.172
7240.960 -1.302
682580.481 -.081

.039
.039
.039

-1.119
1.062
-1.218

.077
.077
.077

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243
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Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

3.71

400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
600
600
600
600
500
500
500
500
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
500
500
500
500
400
400
400
400

3.74

.40

.31

.33

.34

.36

.51

.53

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
289
1400

744
39
705

2427
328
2105

1785.51 17.863
247.63 3.031
1537.87 14.997

437.557
74.247
367.350

191456.523 -.321
5512.649 -1.046
134945.711 -.176

.100
.100
.100

-.937
.197
-1.075

.199
.199
.199

1722
289
1433

744
39
705

2465
328
2138

1805.97 19.959
248.40 3.312
1557.57 16.807

446.300
74.062
375.809

199183.354 -.329
5485.251 -1.054
141232.338 -.195

.109
.109
.109

-.961
.239
-1.107

.218
.218
.218

1684
289
1400

744
39
705

2427
328
2105

1785.51 17.863
247.63 3.031
1537.87 14.997

437.557
74.247
367.350

191456.523 -.321
5512.649 -1.046
134945.711 -.176

.100
.100
.100

-.937
.197
-1.075

.199
.199
.199

1684
289
1400

744
39
705

2427
328
2105

1785.51 17.863
247.63 3.031
1537.87 14.997

437.557
74.247
367.350

191456.523 -.321
5512.649 -1.046
134945.711 -.176

.100
.100
.100

-.937
.197
-1.075

.199
.199
.199

1699
291
1414

744
39
705

2443
330
2119

1767.44 19.416
252.35 3.347
1515.08 16.241

434.151
74.852
363.151

188486.825 -.282
5602.846 -1.033
131878.745 -.125

.109
.109
.109

-.948
.222
-1.084

.218
.218
.218

1699
285
1414

744
39
705

2443
324
2119

1784.82 22.248
248.70 3.643
1536.12 18.775

444.959
72.856
375.502

197988.840 -.268
5308.032 -1.074
141001.746 -.129

.122
.122
.122

-1.002
.376
-1.155

.243
.243
.243
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Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

.71

400
400
400
400
600
600
600
600
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200

.73

1.31

1.33

3.31

3.33

.60

.31

.34

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

1699
291
1414

744
39
705

2443
330
2119

1778.58 22.068
250.24 3.683
1528.34 18.570

441.358
73.659
371.396

194796.883 -.273
5425.595 -1.053
137935.085 -.126

.122
.122
.122

-.979
.304
-1.125

.243
.243
.243

1699
291
1414

744
39
705

2443
330
2119

1784.66 18.179
249.80 2.984
1534.86 15.341

445.291
73.101
375.779

198284.064 -.274
5343.730 -1.054
141209.915 -.133

.100
.100
.100

-.990
.300
-1.136

.199
.199
.199

1670
279
1391

744
39
705

2413
318
2095

1810.96 31.140
241.51 5.347
1569.45 26.003

440.381
75.617
367.732

193935.626 -.365
5717.881 -1.015
135226.642 -.231

.172
.172
.172

-.879
.021
-1.009

.342
.342
.342

1670
279
1391

744
39
705

2413
318
2095

1810.96 31.140
241.51 5.347
1569.45 26.003

440.381
75.617
367.732

193935.626 -.365
5717.881 -1.015
135226.642 -.231

.172
.172
.172

-.879
.021
-1.009

.342
.342
.342

1670
279
1391

744
39
705

2413
318
2095

1810.96 31.140
241.51 5.347
1569.45 26.003

440.381
75.617
367.732

193935.626 -.365
5717.881 -1.015
135226.642 -.231

.172
.172
.172

-.879
.021
-1.009

.342
.342
.342

1670
279
1391

744
39
705

2413
318
2095

1810.96 31.140
241.51 5.347
1569.45 26.003

440.381
75.617
367.732

193935.626 -.365
5717.881 -1.015
135226.642 -.231

.172
.172
.172

-.879
.021
-1.009

.342
.342
.342

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1818.99 31.665
243.85 5.483
1575.14 26.383

447.813
77.544
373.107

200536.341 -.347
6013.134 -.969
139209.050 -.219

.172
.172
.172

-.913
-.083
-1.031

.342
.342
.342

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1818.99 31.665
243.85 5.483
1575.14 26.383

447.813
77.544
373.107

200536.341 -.347
6013.134 -.969
139209.050 -.219

.172
.172
.172

-.913
-.083
-1.031

.342
.342
.342
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Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

.51

600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400

.71

1.31

3.31

.80

1.51

1.54

1.71

1.74

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

1699
293
1414

744
39
705

2443
331
2119

1801.64 17.627
252.19 3.010
1549.45 14.808

431.772
73.728
362.710

186426.840 -.338
5435.759 -1.110
131558.836 -.181

.100
.100
.100

-.879
.367
-1.042

.199
.199
.199

1699
293
1414

744
39
705

2443
331
2119

1801.64 17.627
252.19 3.010
1549.45 14.808

431.772
73.728
362.710

186426.840 -.338
5435.759 -1.110
131558.836 -.181

.100
.100
.100

-.879
.367
-1.042

.199
.199
.199

1699
291
1414

744
39
705

2443
330
2119

1785.21 17.904
248.36 3.058
1536.85 15.012

438.565
74.915
367.714

192339.357 -.306
5612.280 -1.023
135213.578 -.160

.100
.100
.100

-.937
.154
-1.072

.199
.199
.199

1699
291
1414

744
39
705

2443
330
2119

1785.21 17.904
248.36 3.058
1536.85 15.012

438.565
74.915
367.714

192339.357 -.306
5612.280 -1.023
135213.578 -.160

.100
.100
.100

-.937
.154
-1.072

.199
.199
.199

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243
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Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

3.51

400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200

3.53

3.71

3.74

1.00

.31

.33

.34

.36

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1684
288
1400

744
39
705

2427
327
2105

1813.79 21.472
254.69 3.751
1559.10 17.976

429.446
75.020
359.522

184423.504 -.353
5628.042 -1.143
129255.816 -.187

.122
.122
.122

-.858
.384
-1.030

.243
.243
.243

1722
289
1433

744
39
705

2465
328
2138

1782.98 12.518
247.97 2.126
1535.01 10.511

433.650
73.661
364.107

188052.207 -.324
5425.918 -1.070
132573.715 -.172

.071
.071
.071

-.902
.245
-1.038

.141
.141
.141

1722
289
1433

744
39
705

2465
328
2138

1785.61 12.537
248.92 2.127
1536.69 10.528

434.305
73.679
364.698

188620.750 -.325
5428.534 -1.072
133004.959 -.172

.071
.071
.071

-.896
.262
-1.034

.141
.141
.141

1722
289
1433

744
39
705

2465
328
2138

1782.98 12.518
247.97 2.126
1535.01 10.511

433.650
73.661
364.107

188052.207 -.324
5425.918 -1.070
132573.715 -.172

.071
.071
.071

-.902
.245
-1.038

.141
.141
.141

1722
289
1433

744
39
705

2465
328
2138

1785.61 12.537
248.92 2.127
1536.69 10.528

434.305
73.679
364.698

188620.750 -.325
5428.534 -1.072
133004.959 -.172

.071
.071
.071

-.896
.262
-1.034

.141
.141
.141
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Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

.51

1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
600
600
600
600
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
500
500
500
500

.53

.71

.73

1.31

1.33

3.31

3.33

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

1731
291
1440

744
39
705

2474
330
2145

1786.90 14.174
250.75 2.284
1536.15 12.026

448.227
72.241
380.299

200907.326 -.270
5218.819 -1.091
144627.279 -.118

.077
.077
.077

-1.000
.394
-1.147

.155
.155
.155

1731
291
1440

744
39
705

2474
330
2145

1786.90 14.174
250.75 2.284
1536.15 12.026

448.227
72.241
380.299

200907.326 -.270
5218.819 -1.091
144627.279 -.118

.077
.077
.077

-1.000
.394
-1.147

.155
.155
.155

1731
291
1440

744
39
705

2474
330
2145

1787.19 14.204
251.43 2.288
1535.76 12.054

449.156
72.363
381.188

201741.413 -.264
5236.364 -1.095
145303.980 -.110

.077
.077
.077

-1.003
.410
-1.149

.155
.155
.155

1699
285
1414

744
39
705

2443
324
2119

1785.94 14.077
248.12 2.253
1537.82 11.949

445.165
71.256
377.862

198171.623 -.291
5077.399 -1.106
142779.855 -.146

.077
.077
.077

-.991
.392
-1.144

.155
.155
.155

1670
286
1391

744
39
705

2413
325
2095

1794.42 16.919
248.99 3.038
1545.43 14.074

414.436
74.425
344.730

171757.388 -.415
5539.149 -1.110
118838.794 -.251

.100
.100
.100

-.763
.290
-.926

.199
.199
.199

1670
279
1391

744
39
705

2413
318
2095

1802.78 21.559
240.96 3.754
1561.82 17.943

431.173
75.086
358.869

185910.576 -.395
5637.851 -1.021
128787.166 -.264

.122
.122
.122

-.842
.029
-.973

.243
.243
.243

1670
279
1391

744
39
705

2413
318
2095

1802.78 21.559
240.96 3.754
1561.82 17.943

431.173
75.086
358.869

185910.576 -.395
5637.851 -1.021
128787.166 -.264

.122
.122
.122

-.842
.029
-.973

.243
.243
.243

1670
293
1391

744
39
705

2413
331
2095

1801.64 19.014
245.99 3.356
1555.65 15.838

425.171
75.034
354.150

180769.988 -.393
5630.152 -1.059
125422.552 -.246

.109
.109
.109

-.821
.164
-.973

.218
.218
.218
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Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

1.20

.31

400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
1300
1300
1300
1300
1400
1400
1400
1400
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200

.34

.51

.71

1.31

3.31

1.20

.31

.34

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1818.99 22.363
243.85 3.872
1575.14 18.632

447.251
77.447
372.639

200033.744 -.346
5998.064 -.965
138860.155 -.218

.122
.122
.122

-.916
-.097
-1.033

.243
.243
.243

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1818.99 22.363
243.85 3.872
1575.14 18.632

447.251
77.447
372.639

200033.744 -.346
5998.064 -.965
138860.155 -.218

.122
.122
.122

-.916
-.097
-1.033

.243
.243
.243

1699
293
1414

744
39
705

2443
331
2119

1789.24 11.853
250.26 2.030
1538.98 9.952

427.382
73.175
358.839

182655.695 -.348
5354.604 -1.113
128765.274 -.190

.068
.068
.068

-.876
.363
-1.037

.136
.136
.136

1699
293
1414

744
39
705

2443
331
2119

1784.15 11.487
249.83 1.971
1534.32 9.635

429.795
73.766
360.500

184723.467 -.333
5441.393 -1.082
129960.486 -.178

.065
.065
.065

-.901
.295
-1.054

.131
.131
.131

1699
291
1414

744
39
705

2443
330
2119

1782.48 12.568
248.17 2.158
1534.31 10.524

435.367
74.755
364.579

189544.505 -.317
5588.318 -1.024
132917.689 -.172

.071
.071
.071

-.926
.156
-1.064

.141
.141
.141

1699
291
1414

744
39
705

2443
330
2119

1782.48 12.568
248.17 2.158
1534.31 10.524

435.367
74.755
364.579

189544.505 -.317
5588.318 -1.024
132917.689 -.172

.071
.071
.071

-.926
.156
-1.064

.141
.141
.141

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1818.99 31.665
243.85 5.483
1575.14 26.383

447.813
77.544
373.107

200536.341 -.347
6013.134 -.969
139209.050 -.219

.172
.172
.172

-.913
-.083
-1.031

.342
.342
.342

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1818.99 31.665
243.85 5.483
1575.14 26.383

447.813
77.544
373.107

200536.341 -.347
6013.134 -.969
139209.050 -.219

.172
.172
.172

-.913
-.083
-1.031

.342
.342
.342
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Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

.51

800
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600

.71

1.31

3.31

1.60

.31

.33

.34

.36

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

1699
293
1414

744
39
705

2443
331
2119

1788.19 15.179
252.80 2.632
1535.39 12.709

429.336
74.441
359.470

184329.415 -.325
5541.457 -1.086
129218.374 -.164

.086
.086
.086

-.888
.313
-1.042

.173
.173
.173

1699
293
1414

744
39
705

2443
331
2119

1788.19 15.179
252.80 2.632
1535.39 12.709

429.336
74.441
359.470

184329.415 -.325
5541.457 -1.086
129218.374 -.164

.086
.086
.086

-.888
.313
-1.042

.173
.173
.173

1670
283
1399

744
39
705

2414
321
2104

1784.22 17.833
246.23 2.980
1537.99 15.030

436.813
73.005
368.151

190805.674 -.320
5329.709 -1.089
135535.081 -.168

.100
.100
.100

-.938
.278
-1.084

.199
.199
.199

1670
283
1399

744
39
705

2414
321
2104

1784.22 17.833
246.23 2.980
1537.99 15.030

436.813
73.005
368.151

190805.674 -.320
5329.709 -1.089
135535.081 -.168

.100
.100
.100

-.938
.278
-1.084

.199
.199
.199

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1775.86 17.476
246.13 2.977
1529.73 14.666

428.063
72.913
359.230

183238.167 -.346
5316.357 -1.092
129046.358 -.195

.100
.100
.100

-.887
.286
-1.033

.199
.199
.199

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1775.86 17.476
246.13 2.977
1529.73 14.666

428.063
72.913
359.230

183238.167 -.346
5316.357 -1.092
129046.358 -.195

.100
.100
.100

-.887
.286
-1.033

.199
.199
.199

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1775.86 17.476
246.13 2.977
1529.73 14.666

428.063
72.913
359.230

183238.167 -.346
5316.357 -1.092
129046.358 -.195

.100
.100
.100

-.887
.286
-1.033

.199
.199
.199

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1775.86 17.476
246.13 2.977
1529.73 14.666

428.063
72.913
359.230

183238.167 -.346
5316.357 -1.092
129046.358 -.195

.100
.100
.100

-.887
.286
-1.033

.199
.199
.199
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Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

.51

600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200

.53

.71

.73

1.31

1.33

3.31

3.33

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

1725
289
1436

744
39
705

2469
328
2141

1779.89 18.060
249.31 2.921
1530.58 15.319

442.366
71.550
375.226

195687.336 -.285
5119.453 -1.124
140794.727 -.128

.100
.100
.100

-.984
.445
-1.137

.199
.199
.199

1725
289
1436

744
39
705

2469
328
2141

1781.11 18.162
251.04 2.951
1530.07 15.388

444.865
72.279
376.917

197904.569 -.269
5224.239 -1.112
142066.201 -.112

.100
.100
.100

-.989
.432
-1.138

.199
.199
.199

1725
289
1436

744
39
705

2469
328
2141

1779.89 18.060
249.31 2.921
1530.58 15.319

442.366
71.550
375.226

195687.336 -.285
5119.453 -1.124
140794.727 -.128

.100
.100
.100

-.984
.445
-1.137

.199
.199
.199

1670
271
1399

744
39
705

2414
310
2104

1794.32 31.832
245.54 4.888
1548.78 27.226

450.173
69.129
385.033

202655.456 -.309
4778.887 -1.182
148250.721 -.166

.172
.172
.172

-1.010
.562
-1.176

.342
.342
.342

1610
276
1334

744
39
705

2353
315
2038

1794.60 29.890
240.41 5.285
1554.19 24.787

422.712
74.736
350.539

178685.281 -.438
5585.544 -1.036
122877.870 -.311

.172
.172
.172

-.800
.070
-.940

.342
.342
.342

1610
276
1334

744
39
705

2353
315
2038

1794.60 29.890
240.41 5.285
1554.19 24.787

422.712
74.736
350.539

178685.281 -.438
5585.544 -1.036
122877.870 -.311

.172
.172
.172

-.800
.070
-.940

.342
.342
.342

1610
276
1334

744
39
705

2353
315
2038

1794.60 29.890
240.41 5.285
1554.19 24.787

422.712
74.736
350.539

178685.281 -.438
5585.544 -1.036
122877.870 -.311

.172
.172
.172

-.800
.070
-.940

.342
.342
.342

1610
276
1334

744
39
705

2353
315
2038

1794.60 29.890
240.41 5.285
1554.19 24.787

422.712
74.736
350.539

178685.281 -.438
5585.544 -1.036
122877.870 -.311

.172
.172
.172

-.800
.070
-.940

.342
.342
.342
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Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

1.80

.31

600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
1900
1900
1900
1900
1900
1900
1900
1900
1800
1800
1800
1800
1800
1800
1800
1800
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200

.34

.51

.71

1.31

3.31

2.40

.31

.34

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1818.99 18.251
243.85 3.160
1575.14 15.207

447.065
77.415
372.484

199866.771 -.346
5993.057 -.964
138744.245 -.217

.100
.100
.100

-.917
-.102
-1.034

.199
.199
.199

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1818.99 18.251
243.85 3.160
1575.14 15.207

447.065
77.415
372.484

199866.771 -.346
5993.057 -.964
138744.245 -.217

.100
.100
.100

-.917
-.102
-1.034

.199
.199
.199

1699
293
1414

744
39
705

2443
331
2119

1784.39 9.877
248.48 1.685
1535.90 8.293

430.511
73.432
361.475

185339.982 -.338
5392.286 -1.082
130664.458 -.186

.056
.056
.056

-.905
.288
-1.058

.112
.112
.112

1699
293
1414

744
39
705

2443
331
2119

1785.78 9.849
249.41 1.678
1536.38 8.270

429.301
73.145
360.476

184299.313 -.347
5350.178 -1.100
129942.727 -.192

.056
.056
.056

-.891
.332
-1.047

.112
.112
.112

1699
291
1414

744
39
705

2443
330
2119

1780.92 10.209
246.70 1.731
1534.22 8.575

433.111
73.433
363.827

187584.725 -.331
5392.463 -1.067
132369.887 -.183

.058
.058
.058

-.924
.238
-1.070

.115
.115
.115

1699
291
1414

744
39
705

2443
330
2119

1780.92 10.209
246.70 1.731
1534.22 8.575

433.111
73.433
363.827

187584.725 -.331
5392.463 -1.067
132369.887 -.183

.058
.058
.058

-.924
.238
-1.070

.115
.115
.115

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1818.99 31.665
243.85 5.483
1575.14 26.383

447.813
77.544
373.107

200536.341 -.347
6013.134 -.969
139209.050 -.219

.172
.172
.172

-.913
-.083
-1.031

.342
.342
.342

1684
283
1400

744
39
705

2427
322
2105

1818.99 31.665
243.85 5.483
1575.14 26.383

447.813
77.544
373.107

200536.341 -.347
6013.134 -.969
139209.050 -.219

.172
.172
.172

-.913
-.083
-1.031

.342
.342
.342
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Appendix 7 Additional Model Analysis, Tables, and Figures
Descriptive Statistics

attack
severity

Mitigation
sum

N
Range
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic | Std.Error Statistic

Variance
Statistic

.51

600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
1600
1600
1600
1600

.71

1.31

3.31

4.80

3.76

Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)
Plan k (total)
Plan k level1
Plan k level2
Valid N (listwise)

Skewness
Kurtosis
Statistic | Std ErrorStatistic | Std. Error

1670
283
1399

744
39
705

2414
322
2104

1781.02 17.511
247.58 2.962
1533.44 14.717

428.926
72.559
360.479

183977.480 -.358
5264.805 -1.112
129945.430 -.205

.100
.100
.100

-.893
.347
-1.050

.199
.199
.199

1670
283
1399

744
39
705

2414
321
2104

1778.77 17.583
245.87 2.969
1532.90 14.785

430.705
72.729
362.165

185506.722 -.345
5289.486 -1.096
131163.815 -.196

.100
.100
.100

-.916
.296
-1.069

.199
.199
.199

1670
283
1399

744
39
705

2414
321
2104

1778.77 17.583
245.87 2.969
1532.90 14.785

430.705
72.729
362.165

185506.722 -.345
5289.486 -1.096
131163.815 -.196

.100
.100
.100

-.916
.296
-1.069

.199
.199
.199

1670
283
1399

744
39
705

2414
321
2104

1778.77 17.583
245.87 2.969
1532.90 14.785

430.705
72.729
362.165

185506.722 -.345
5289.486 -1.096
131163.815 -.196

.100
.100
.100

-.916
.296
-1.069

.199
.199
.199

3096
349
2750

734
39
695

3830
388
3444

3247.07 19.913
337.48 2.121
2909.59 17.841

796.527
84.841
713.620

634454.557 -1.576
7197.968 -2.069
509253.943 -1.512

.061
.061
.061

1.521
3.276
1.314

.122
.122
.122
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